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7Preface
The Cold War, the role of historians and historical debates during it and 
the political uses of Cold War history in the present, have been among 
Professor Seppo Hentilä’s main interests for a long time. This collection 
of articles is published to celebrate his 60th birthday on 10 April 2008. 
It explores Cold War history politics in different times, countries and 
contexts, and looks at the various ways in which the Cold War infl uenced 
history writing, public debates and popular representations about the 
past. Most importantly, it looks at how Cold War history still plays an 
important role in the politics of the present world.
Seppo Hentilä began his academic career as a researcher of the history 
of socialist labour movement. In his theoretically ambitious doctoral 
thesis (1979), he explored the early developments of Swedish social 
democracy. His great merits in labour history include the three-volume 
history of the Finnish labour sport movement (1982, 1984, 1987). Since 
the early 1990s, his prolifi c research activity has focused on Cold War 
history. It has resulted in several important and highly esteemed historical 
works on the divided Germany and the relationships between Finland 
and the two Germanies, including the recently published book Neutral 
zwischen den beiden deutschen Staaten. Finnland und Deutschland im 
Kalten Krieg (2006). 
In his analysis on ‘divided history in the divided Germany’ 
(Jaettu Saksa, jaettu historia, 1994), Hentilä excellently combined 
his historiographical interest and expertise with research on Cold War 
Germany. A crucial subject in his monographs and articles on German and 
German-Finnish Cold War history has been history culture and history 
politics, i.e. the cultural and political presence of the past. He has also 
infl uentially contributed to scholarly and public debates on approaches 
and concepts in this very topical fi eld of Vergangenheitsbewältigung. 
Hentilä has taught political history at the University of Helsinki since 
1971, where he has held a chair of political history since 1998. He has 
also authored several popular textbooks that are widely used at schools 
and universities, not only in Finland but also in many other countries. 
8Hentilä has been in charge of several successful research projects, 
especially on Cold War history, supervising and educating numerous 
young researchers and creating an inspiring research milieu and networks 
of lively international collaboration. 
For their part, the articles of this book, written by Hentilä’s colleagues 
and previous students, indicate his achievements in researcher training 
and international research cooperation. As editors of this book, we wish 
to thank all contributors for good cooperation in realising our aim of 
an interesting and thematically coherent scholarly anthology. We also 
wish to thank Klaus Lindgren, Ohto Rintala and Marjo Marin for their 
valuable assistance in various phases of the publication process.
On behalf of all those who have contributed to the making and 
publishing of this book, we wish to convey our warm congratulations to 
Seppo Hentilä on the occasion of his 60th birthday.
Helsinki, March 2008      
Juhana Aunesluoma               Pauli Kettunen
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the Cold War in the Present
 PAULI KETTUNEN AND
 JUHANA AUNESLUOMA
This book is on the Cold War and the politics of history. It is a 
multidimensional subject. On one hand, it concerns the different roles 
of history in the confrontations called the Cold War. The topic includes, 
on the other hand, the many-faceted presence of Cold War experiences, 
interpretations and conclusions in post-Cold-War politics. 
The very concept of the Cold War should be seen as a historical 
interpretation that has varied and changed over time. The way in which 
it has been periodized in post-1990 historical research obviously differs 
from the ways people between the late 1940s and the late 1980s conceived 
of their experiences and expectations. 
For many of them, ‘the Cold War’ was a concept referring to certain 
phases of the East-West confrontation rather than to this confrontation 
itself. The Cold War proper had started with the breakdown of the 
wartime Grand Alliance in the mid-1940s, reached its high point during 
the Korean War 1950–53, and ended in the so-called fi rst détente in the 
mid-1950s. As people saw it, the crises of 1958–62 from Berlin to Cuba 
had brought the world on the brink of an actual war. Then there were 
phases in which one spoke about a return to the Cold War, or ‘the Second 
Cold War’, as  Fred Halliday provocatively entitled his book in 1982 on 
the increased tensions in the late 1970s and early 1980s between the 
United States and the Soviet Union.1 
1 F. Halliday, The Making of the Second Cold War. London: Verso 1983.
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For many contemporaries, the East-West confrontation, as such, 
gradually came to represent a mode of existence of the present and future 
world that was, more or less, taken for granted. The term ‘war’ in ‘the 
Cold War’, with its inherent notion of temporal emergency condition, 
does not meet such an experience of normalcy in the bipolar world. On 
the other hand, the metaphorical ‘war’ in the current usage of the concept 
of ‘the Cold War’ may ignore the unique fatality that was associated with 
the next world war, nuclear war, in people’s minds and fears during the 
so-called ‘balance of terror’ and ‘mutually assured destruction’.
Further, there have appeared historical interpretations about the 
epochal change around 1990 for which the ‘the end of the Cold War’ 
is far too limited an expression. In the aftermath of the revolutionary 
upheaval in East and Central Europe in 1989 the historian  Tony Judt, 
highlighting the resurgence of populism, nationalism, anti-Semitism 
and other counter-Enlightenment movements in the post-communist 
societies, declared 1989 not only the end of the Cold War, but also as the 
end of the Enlightenment era.2
In a similar vein, the theses on ‘the end of history’ have suggested that 
the epoch then reaching its end was much longer than just the one of the 
post-Second World War international confrontation. Two main variants 
of the end of history -interpretation exist. The most famous one is the 
Hegelian thesis that  Francis Fukuyama developed with support from 
 Alexandre Kojève, claiming that through the victory of liberal capitalism 
and political democracy in the Cold War, history had reached its goal.3 
Another variant, drawing from the anti-Hegelian critique of ‘historicism’ 
by  Karl Popper, argues that as the outcome of Cold War, the ideologies 
based on the view on History with capital H, i.e. history as a supra-
personal power oriented to certain direction, suffered a decisive defeat. 
Thus, no one could any longer claim to be the true agent of a law-like 
historical process.4 In different ways, these both variants of the end of 
2 T. Judt, ’Nineteen Eighty-Nine. The End of  Which European Era?’, in V. 
Tismaneanu (ed.), The Revolutions of 1989. Rewriting Histories. London and 
New York: Routledge 1999, 165–180.
3 F. Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press 
1992. 
4 A. Touraine, Critique of Modernity. Oxford UK & Cambridge USA: Blackwell 
1995, 61–87. 
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history -thesis have linkages with post-modernist theses on the end of 
‘grand narratives’.
One does not need to delve very deeply into these discussions to fi nd 
that while all these different notions of ‘end’ are dubious, they, at the 
same time, imply the signifi cance of history as a dimension of Cold War 
confrontations. We may distinguish between three levels of confl ict. At 
each level, history played crucial although divergent roles as an aspect 
of the confl ict. 
At the fi rst level, the period defi ned from the post-1990 perspective 
as the Cold War was characterised by the political-military confrontation 
between the East and West blocs, dominated by the Soviet Union and 
the United States, respectively. At this level, some space also existed 
for neutrality recognised by both parties. One might say that, at this 
level, history as an aspect of the confl ict was actualised, in the fi rst 
place, from a realist perspective of international politics. For the actors 
of international power politics, e.g.  Henry Kissinger who is examined 
by  Jussi Hanhimäki in this book, history appeared as magistra vitae, i.e. 
as a store of lessons and the knowledge on previous similar cases to be 
utilised in decision-making. The tendency to view history, for example 
the case of democratization of West Germany, as a guide for current 
policy-making, has not disappeared, as is shown by  Heinrich August 
Winkler in the book’s fi nale. 
Other Cold War era statesmen, such as Finnish presidents  J. K. 
Paasikivi and  Urho Kekkonen, rooted their statecraft too on long historical 
continuities, external necessities and immutable geopolitical realities – 
as they perceived them – and as are analysed by  Dörte Putensen,  Raimo 
Väyrynen,  Timo Soikkanen and  Kimmo Rentola in the last section of the 
book. 
According to the school of thought represented by Kissinger and other 
realists, the Cold War was not a unique phenomenon in itself, but only 
another phase in the longue durée in the history of international politics 
and great power confl icts. If this was the case, then ancient principles in 
the uses and usefulness of diplomacy, deterrence and military force, were 
still relevant, irrespective what the geopolitical particularities of the Cold 
War international system were. For others, however, the Cold War, with 
the dual appearance of previously unseen weapons of mass destruction 
and ideologies as driving forces of foreign policy, meant that the confl ict 
was not just another cold war, but a Cold War with capital letters.
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This leads us to the second level of the Cold War, which included 
the confl ict between rivalling socio-economic systems, socialism and 
capitalism. Of course, the notion of inter-systemic confl ict, namely the 
confl ict between capitalism and socialism, was a political reality long 
before the Cold War. Moreover, it is reasonable to question whether 
the East-West confl ict ever managed to encapsulate the rivalry between 
socialism and capitalism. Nevertheless, such an effort, based on the 
authority of history, was a crucial part of the Cold War as this inter-systemic 
confl ict was in the core of the legitimation of Soviet communism. 
It may be useful to recall that in his book Capitalism, Socialism and 
Democracy from 1942,  Joseph A. Schumpeter asked whether capitalism 
can survive and answered: ‘No, I don’t think it can’. On the subsequent 
question, ‘Can socialism work?’, his answer was unambiguous: ‘Of course 
it can.’ Far from being any advocate of socialism, Schumpeter found in 
the dynamics and achievements of Western capitalism an inherent ten-
dency towards socialism that had been accelerated by the First World 
War, the Great Depression and the Second World War. According to his 
prefaces to the second edition in 1946 and the third edition in 1949, post-
war developments, notably in Britain and the United States, had provided 
further support for his argument.5
While highly original in his analysis, Schumpeter was but one of the 
intellectuals that during the wartime and the immediate post-war years 
constructed images of a future society within a framework dominated by 
the confrontation between capitalism and socialism. Most notably, his 
analysis is an example of the fact that in 1946 or even in 1949, it was far 
from self-evident to identify this confrontation with the confl ict between 
the West and the East. The socialism Schumpeter foresaw winning in 
Britain and the United States did not result from an expansion of the 
Soviet power sphere and a subsequent implementation of the Soviet 
model. Actually, the Soviet Union and communism represented for 
Schumpeter a ‘non-orthodox’ form of socialism which, though, might 
later evolve towards Western socialism, including the Western ways in 
which socialism and democracy would be combined together.     
Two infl uential interpretations of the Cold War confl ict have made 
it easy to reduce the confl ict between socialism and capitalism to the 
5 J. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. Introduction by R. 
Swedberg. London and New York: Routledge 1995 [orig. New York: Harper and 
Brothers 1942].
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East-West confl ict. First, an integral ideological ingredient of the East-
West confrontation was the Marxist-Leninist theory on two confronting 
camps that represented two historically successive social formations, 
capitalism being the lower and socialism the higher stage of world 
history. This theoretical view also preconditioned the role and orientation 
of historical research, as appears from  Manfred Menger’s account of 
the institutionalisation of academic history in the German Democratic 
Republic in this book, as well as from  Seppo Hentilä’s numerous works 
on historical research in the divided Germany.6
Second, also the neo-liberalist view on historical progress that 
became highly infl uential after the collapse of the Soviet Union tended to 
identify the confl ict between socialism and capitalism with the Cold War 
confl ict. According to the latter interpretation, the solution of the Cold 
War had universally liberated the natural and, consequently, right mode 
of economic and social dynamics and wealth creation. Reverberations of 
this vision of capitalism having passed the test of ‘war’ against its binary 
opponent have not only been felt in the United States and the Western 
democracies7, but also in the ex-socialist countries of Central and East 
Central Europe. As  Katalin Miklóssy shows in her study of the identity 
reformation of the Hungarian left after 1989, the successor party of the 
old regime had to adapt to neo-liberal ideals and individualism, and also 
6 S. Hentilä, Jaettu Saksa, jaettu historia. Kylmä historiasota 1945–1990 – Zu-
sammenfassung: Geteiltes Deutschland, geteilte Geschichte. Etappen eines kalten 
Geschichtskrieges 1945–1990. Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen Seura 1994;
S. Hentilä, ’Der Kampf um die deutsche Geschichte: vergleichende Überle-
gungen zur Geschichtsschreibung im geteilten Deutschland’, in Vom öffent-
lichen Umgang mit Geschichte. Tampere: Tampereen yliopisto 1995, 63–85;
S. Hentilä, ’Saksan historiantutkimus yhdistymiskriisin kourissa’, Historialli-
nen Aikakauskirja 93 (1995:2), 138–144; S. Hentilä, ’Über den öffentlichen 
Ge brauch der Geschichte’, Nordeuropa forum (1998: 2), 83–90; S. Hentilä, 
’His torieforskningen i DDR kontrollerades av “Sanningens ministerium”’, 
Historisk tidskrift för Finland (2005:1), 108–122; S. Hentilä, ’Löytyykö totuus 
komissioista. Historiantutkimus ja totuuskomissiot’, Tieteessä tapahtuu 8 (2005), 
5–12, also published in Suomalainen tiedeakatemia. Vuosikirja 2005, Helsinki: 
Suomalainen tiedeakatemia 2006, 87–96.
7 See for example the contributions in E. Schrecker (ed.), Cold War Triumphalism. 
The Misuse of History After the Fall of Communism. New York and London: The 
New Press 2004.
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to face the diffi culties involved in making a distinction between pre-1989 
reformist socialism and post-1989 social democracy.
On the third level, the Cold War was a confl ict of political regimes, 
including the dimensions of democracy, citizenship and human rights. 
Here, the role of history was associated with the rivalry between 
confl icting visions on human agency and the relationships between the 
individual, society and the state. 
After the end of Cold War, the so-called history-political debates 
concerning the period have very much focused on this particular level of 
the confl ict, and the other levels of confrontation – those of the political-
military confl ict and the confl ict of socio-economic systems – are 
discussed from the point of view of the third level. Thus, the history-
political controversies analysed in many chapters of this book include 
not only accounts of the repression people faced in the countries of 
communist rule, but also debates in which politics and politicians of the 
Cold War era in non-communist countries like Denmark or Finland are 
criticised for having ignored the evilness of the communist system, as 
shown by  Poul Villaume in his article on the Danish case.
This means, that the frame in which individuals and individual acts 
and decisions are often seen in the post-Cold War world, is through the 
prism of this ‘master confl ict’ between two different political regimes. 
The pertinent question of the 1940s, in time of alliance and bloc building 
about ‘whose side were you on’, became again increasingly relevant 
after 1990. Irrespective of what the individuals’ views and positions on 
the fi rst and second dimensions of the confl ict had been, their actions in 
subsequent analysis could judged using the yardstick of the fi nal outcome 
of the confl ict between the two political regimes. 
 Henry Kissinger and other realists could be criticised for having 
engaged in negotiations with a lethal enemy and President Urho Kekkonen 
– at least momentarily – for assessing socialism’ inner strengths too high 
over US-style capitalism, or promoting a positive image of  Lenin as a 
guarantee of Finland’s independence, the phenomenon investigated by 
 Joni Krekola in this book. Lesser politicians and individuals could be 
accused for having become fellow travellers, fi nlandized, soft on issues 
such as German reunifi cation and NATO-policies, or guilty of undue 
impartiality in the general portrayal of the two competing systems in 
popular histories, television programs, newspaper articles and school 
books, the latter of which are scrutinized here by  Sirkka Ahonen. As the 
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defeated side appeared as an oppressive regime, it became easy to take 
for granted that the victorious side must stand for liberty. The call from 
the US in the 1940s for Europeans ‘to stand up and be counted’ in the 
struggle against communism, echoed in the 1990s as a call for Cold War 
contemporaries to exclaim where they had exactly stood at the time. This 
call has applied as much for historians as for anyone else in a public 
position during the ‘war’, whether they at the time realised that they were 
players in it or not.
In this history political reassessment of Cold War experiences 
historians have been involved in several different ways. The currents 
of the Cold War itself infl uenced general historical interpretations of it, 
and most famously on its origins. Traditionalist, revisionist and post-
revisionist interpretations emerged as the confl ict matured.8 As Western 
authors were preoccupied in fi guring out the sequence of events that had 
dissolved the wartime alliance, in the Soviet Union and in the other socialist 
countries, correct views of history played an even more important role, as 
 Aappo Kähönen shows in his article on the linkages between legitimacy, 
reforms and Soviet history politics. In post-war Germanies, discussed by 
 Wilfried Loth and  Hannes Saarinen, history perhaps more than anywhere 
in the Cold War world concerned the future and the present, and maybe 
not so much the past at all. In countries such as Finland not only Cold 
War history, but any type of national or international history could be 
viewed through the prism of Cold War ideological rivalry, as seen in 
controversies on national history and commemoration, analysed by 
 Tauno Saarela and  Heino Nyyssönen in this book.
After the Cold War a twofold task and challenge for historians 
emerged. As the main intellectual currents among the profession led 
away from the aim of establishing fi nal truths about the past, especially 
on issues of the magnitude and complexity as the Cold War was, a public 
call was made for historians – and by some historians – now to tell what 
the Cold War really had been about. Some heeded the call, starting from 
the premise that only after events had taken their full course from 1941 
(or 1917) to 1991, could a fi nal judgement of the confl ict be given.9 In 
8 See the classic outline by John Lewis Gaddis in J. Gaddis, ‘The Emerging 
Post-Revisionist Thesis on the Origins of the Cold War’, Diplomatic History 7 
(1983), 171–190.
9 John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know. Rethinking Cold War History. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 1997.
Pauli Kettunen and Juhana Aunesluoma
16
spite the criticism levelled against this approach to what ‘the New Cold 
War history’ is and should be concerned with, this may in the end not 
have been the most problematic challenge historians faced in the post-
Cold War world.
As the opening contributions of the book show, history, and by 
implication historians, became closely involved in a public process of 
reassessing the ‘burdens of the past’, and the ways in which the public 
would become aware and eventually get rid of them. These attempts 
at ‘managing the past’ have been closely entwined with contemporary 
power struggles, as shown by  Pilvi Torsti in her chapter on the Bronze 
Soldier dispute in Estonia. In the post-communist countries physical and 
symbolic relics of the ancient regime became a fi eld of heated debate 
and political contest. However, and somewhat surprisingly, the calls for 
truth commissions, offi cial inquiries and commissioned histories of Cold 
War events and experiences, found resonance in the victorious West 
as well as in the East, where Cold War history could also be brushed 
aside altogether, as has happened in present day Russia. In this situation 
professional historians faced a diffi cult task to combine their public 
duties as important actors in Vergangenheitsbewältigung, i.e. collective 
dealing with the past, but also as individual scholars tasked to understand, 
sometimes explain, and not to judge.
Maybe Cold War history always was and still is too important a 
subject to be left for historians alone. But historians cannot leave it alone, 
for reasons we hope will become clear in the chapters that follow.
I 
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Why do History Politics Matter?
The Case of the Estonian
Bronze Soldier 
 PILVI TORSTI
In my earlier work I have developed the various concepts and phenom e na 
related to the presence of history.1 In this article I attempt to analyse the 
Estonian Bronze Soldier dispute in spring 2007 as an example of history 
politics and other phenomena related to the presence of history. Finally I 
shall close with a discussion of the signifi cance of history politics through 
analysing the consequences of history politics in Estonia and elsewhere.
THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS IN THE ESTONIAN BRONZE SOLDIER CASE
In 1947, a statue of a bronze soldier was erected in the capital of Estonia, 
three years after the arrival of Soviet troops and defeat of the Nazis. It 
was a Soviet war memorial, ‘a Monument to the Liberators of Tallinn’. 
It was located in a park in central Tallinn above a burial site of Soviet 
soldiers’ remains, which had been reburied on the site in 1945. In 1964 
an eternal fl ame was placed in front of the monument.
1 See P. Torsti, Divergent Stories, Convergent Attitudes. Study on the Presence 
of History, History Textbooks, and the Thinking of Youth in post-War Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Helsinki: Taifuuni 2003, 45–53.
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When Estonia re-established its independence in 1991, the theme of 
liberation, which formed the core of the Soviet approach to history in 
the Baltic states, was rejected. In this connection, the bronze statue was 
re-named ‘For Those Fallen in the Second World War’. The eternal fl ame 
was put out at the same time and the name of the square was changed 
from ‘Liberators’ Square’ to Tönismägi.2
Preparations for relocating the memorial started after clashes at the 
monument in 2006. In February 2007, the Law on Forbidden Structures 
(which would have banned the public display of monuments glorifying the 
So viet Union or Estonia’s fi fty years of Bolshevism, and aimed specifi cally 
at the Bronze Soldier) was vetoed by the Estonian President,  Toomas 
Hendrik Ilves, who argued that the bill did not comply with the Estonian 
constitution.3 Estonian Russians and Russia voiced their disagreement 
with the bill when it was being discussed in the Parliament.4
According to the latest census (2000) ethnic Russians form 26 per 
cent of the Estonian population. Based on a 2006 estimation, about one 
third of Estonia’s Russian speakers are Estonian citizens, another third 
have Russian citizenship, and around nine per cent are of undefi ned 
citizenship. The Estonian population, which made up 82 per cent of the 
country in 1934, had decreased to 62 per cent by 1991 as a result of mass 
deportations of ethnic Estonians during the Soviet era, together with 
migration into Estonia from other parts of the Soviet Union.5 In the 2000 
census the fi gure was 68 per cent.6 
The job of relocating the statue and the remains of the buried soldiers 
in the Defence Forces Cemetery of Tallinn fi nally started in April 2007, 
2 Helsingin Sanomat (HS), Aljosan lähtöä Tallinnasta edelsi vuoden kestänyt 
riita. 28 Apr. 2007. 
3 International Herald Tribune (IHT), Estonian president vetoes law calling for 
removal of Soviet monument. 22 Feb. 2007. <http://www.iht.com>. 28 Aug. 
2007.
4 HS, 28 Apr. 2007.
5 After the Russian population the biggest ex-Soviet single groups in 2000 were 
Ukrainians (2%) and Belorussians (1%). 
6 UN Demographic Yearbook 2002. Population by national and/or ethnic group, 
sex and urban/Rural residence: each census, 1985–2002. < http://unstats.un.org>. 
27 Nov 2007; U.S. Department of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs. 
Background Note: Estonia. <http://www.state.gov>. 27 Aug. 2007.
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just some two weeks before Victory Day on 9 May, the most important 
annual celebration of Estonian Russians. The celebration was to take 
place by the statue. Before the relocation the remains of the soldiers were 
exhumed and identifi ed, and their families were given an opportunity 
to reclaim the remains and bury them elsewhere if they so wished. In 
the absence of the law vetoed by president  Ilves, the relocation was 
based on a different law, which allowed the Estonian authorities to place 
the remains of the buried soldiers and the statue in a less controversial 
location outside the centre of Tallinn. The remains of Red Army soldier 
were an essential factor if the Estonian authorities were to have a legal 
basis for removing the statue. The precise time of the relocation of the 
statue and the graves was not announced in advance. The process started 
when the authorities covered the statue with a tent and encircled the park 
surrounding the statue with riot fences on 26 April.7 
Relocation of the statue and related activities led to controversy in 
particular between Russia and Estonia and internally between Estonian 
Russians and other Estonians. The Estonian embassy in Moscow was 
besieged for a week and violent riots continued in Tallinn for two nights, 
resulting in extensive coverage in the media and international attention.
The diplomatic relationship between Russia and Estonia has generally 
been problematic after Estonia claimed independence. Major disputes 
in recent years have included the borderline dispute between the two 
countries and the planned building of a gas pipe between Russia and 
Germany. Journalists have described Russia’s relations with Estonia and 
its neighbouring Baltic state Latvia as ‘freezing’, and characterised by 
‘diffi culties in agreeing on any minor or major issue’.8
7 K. Kunnas, Viro valmistautuu kaivauksiin sotilaspatsaan luona. Helsingin 
Sanomat (HS), 26 Apr. 2007; K. Kunnas and K. Koponen, Tallinnan sotilaspatsaan 
siirtoa vastustanut mielenosoitus kääntyi mellakaksi. Helsingin Sanomat (HS), 
27 Apr. 2007. 
8 S. Niinivaara and K. Kunnas, Venäjän ja Baltian maiden hyiset suhteet estävät 




HISTORICAL CULTURE AND HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS
IN THE SERVICE OF HISTORY POLITICS
Historical culture presents a form of relating to the past that is open to all 
the people in a society.9 Thus, in contrast to academic historical research, 
it is not a professional relation with the past, but a relation expressed 
through the daily culture of a society. History culture is considered that 
part of the culture in which people face the past and try to come to terms 
with it: the arena/forum for the use of history. It includes mechanisms and 
avenues where knowledge about the past can be produced, transmitted, 
presented, used and experienced within a society. A list of examples for 
avenues of historical culture includes books, cartoons, videos, fi lms, 
novels, museum presentations, contemporary political debates, political 
practises, historical exhibitions, television, personal histories, theatre, 
tourism, advertising, monuments, buildings and so forth.10 
Typically all the defi nitions understand historical culture as having a 
many-sided nature and appearance within the society. Crucially important 
is the understanding that historical culture exists within society in several 
forms as part of the culture, and that historical culture emerges through 
a group of channels, from state approved memorials and curricula to the 
sphere of cultural institutions, architecture and mass consumption.
Although we defi ne historical culture as ‘the forum/arena where 
history can be used’, it is important to emphasize that the idea of ‘using 
history’ here serves only as a tool for understanding, not as a condition 
9 Historical culture (Geschichtskultur) as a concept became part of the history 
discussions in Germany in the 1980s, and therefore the German interpretation of 
its content has been very infl uential.
10 S. Hentilä, ’Historiapolitiikka – Holocaust ja historian julkinen käyttö’, in J. 
Kalela and I. Lindroos, Ilari (eds.), Jokapäiväinen historia. Helsinki: Suomalaisen 
kirjallisuuden seura 2001, 26–49, 32. K. Füssman, H. T. Grütner and J. Rüsen 
(eds.), Historische Faszination. Geschichtkultur heute. Köln, Weimar and Wien: 
Böhlau 1994. P. Aronsson, ‘Historiekultur i förändring’, in P. Aronsson (ed.), 
Makten över minnet. Historiekultur I förändring. Lund: Studentliteratur 2000, 7–
33. S. Ahonen, ‘Historiakulttuuri, historiantutkimus ja nuorten historiatietoisuus’ 
(History culture, history research and the historical consciousness of youth). Oral 
presentation at the Finnish Historical Society in Helsinki 25  Mar. 2002.
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for historical culture. Historical culture appears as a collective concept 
for all kinds of products and narratives through which history exists in the 
daily culture, regardless of whether one can detect active and intentional 
attempts ‘to use history’. The product-nature of historical culture is 
essential; we are talking about usable cultural products and commonly 
held stories (e.g. myths) of the society or smaller groups, which embody 
the historical culture of a society. 
Historical culture can of course be analysed in different ways. We can 
be interested in different forms of historical culture, which seem central 
in different societies, or in changes in historical culture over time. 
Defi nitions of historical consciousness (historische Bewusstsein), 
have varied among scholars within Europe. The most commonly held 
defi nition among German and Scandinavian scholars11 has characterised 
historical consciousness as ‘a complex connection of interpretations of 
the past, perceptions of the present and expectations of the future’.12 
Following this defi nition,  Sirkka Ahonen has described historical 
consciousness as ‘the rational way in which humans are connected 
with temporality’ thus echoing the modern understanding of time.13 
Historical consciousness can help one orientate oneself in time; knowing 
and understanding the past can help one comprehend the present and 
infl uence future expectations. Thus historical consciousness is the way 
people and communities deal with the past in order to understand the 
present and future. Historical consciousness links the past and the future, 
and can construct a sense of continuity. 
Analysing historical consciousness and its dimensions can be seen as 
cognitive history research which attempts to understand the mechanics 
of history politics and the meanings people attach to various aspects of 
the past.
This leads us to the third concept, History politics (Geschichtspolitik), 
which is the key concept of this article.  Habermas introduced the concept 
11 See for example J. Rüsen, Historische Orientirung: über die Arbeit des Ge-
schichtsbewusstseins, sich in der Zeit zurechtzufi nden. Köln: Böhlau 1994; G. 
Schneider (ed.), Geschichtsbewusstsein und historisch-politisches Lernen. 
Pfaffenweiler: Centaurus 1988.
12 M. Angvik and B. von Borries (eds.), Youth and History, A Comparative 
European Survey on Historical Consciousness and Political Attitudes among 
Adolescents. Habburg: Körber Stiftung 1997, A22, A36.
13 Ahonen, ‘Historiakulttuuri, historiantutkimus ja nuorten historia tietoisuus’.
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to refer to those conservative historians who in his opinion had used their 
professional skills, knowledge and positions for political interests when 
attempting to explain Nazi Germany not as part of ‘normal’ German 
history, but as an ‘Asian act’ which followed Stalin’s persecutions.14
In my earlier works I have relied on the defi nition of history politics 
that emphasizes its active and conscious nature; the use of history for 
certain purposes is intentional, history is used for certain purposes. 
History politics is about using the results of history research, commonly 
held ideas and conceptions of history or products of historical culture to 
support and legitimise certain arguments and aims in the current situation. 
History politics is not a form of relating to the past but rather a societal 
phenomenon characterised by the interests and aims that direct the use of 
history in a society.15
In relation to historical culture and historical consciousness, history 
politics can be understood as a second level category, which makes use 
of different forms of relating to history because of political interests and 
purposes.16 This leads to the idea that in a way history politics is based on 
a conscious or unconscious understanding of historical consciousness as 
something that a) can be infl uenced (ie. through historical culture) and b) 
can be appealed to, for example, for political purposes. 
Producing historical culture is history politics in the same way as 
producing curricula is education politics. In an open society history 
politics can be practised not only by authorities in the form of school 
textbooks, museums and monuments, but also by such actors as journalists 
or non-governmental associations.
Finally, the interest in history politics is related to goals that seem 
to direct it. In his recent work  Hentilä has further developed the idea of 
the intentionality of history politics by stating that history can be used to 
support political structures even without the actors’ awareness of using 
14 J. Habermas, Eine Art Schadensabwicklung. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 
1987, 137–148.
15 Torsti, Divergent Stories, 52. Hentilä, ‘Historiapolitiikka – Holocaust, 33. See
also S. Hentilä, Harppi-Saksan haarukassa. DDR:n poliittinen vaikutus Suomes-
sa. Helsinki: SKS 2004, 307. 
16 Torsti, Divergent Stories, 53.
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history as part of their arguments. In such cases, intentionality is a hidden 
yet relevant subject for analysis.17 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BRONZE SOLDIER AS PART OF
HISTORICAL CULTURE AND HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS
The Bronze Soldier in Estonia is a classic product of the historical culture 
constructed by the previous regime. Even after the regime change it has 
continued to form an arena or forum where history is being displayed. 
The importance of the Bronze Soldier monument as a historical cultural 
product for the Russian-speaking Estonians and in particular for the 
World War II Red Army war veterans is demonstrated through its use as 
a place for celebrating historically signifi cant dates. The celebration of 
Victory Day on 9 May and Liberation of Tallinn Day on 22 September 
have gathered war veterans displaying other products of historical culture, 
namely Soviet fl ags and symbols.18 
A competing historical culture has also appeared at the monument. 
A non-violent group of Estonians with fl ags and other Estonian symbols 
approached the celebrating Red Army veterans on 9 May 2006. Police 
led the Estonian group away but the angry comments among the public 
continued, with threats to blow up the monument unless authorities 
removed it.19
Thus the statue debate in Estonia provides a good example of the 
dynamics between history politics, historical culture and historical 
consciousness. In this case the Bronze Soldier statue and the Victory Day 
celebration, both important products of historical culture, were subject 
to a political decision offi cially aimed at lessening possible tensions at 
the site of the statue. But the decision was also a clear message from the 
Estonian authorities as to who presently controls historical culture. 
Here we can note the law vetoed by President  Ilves, which would 
have allowed for the removal of all visible history culture from the 
17 Hentilä, Harppi-Saksan haarukassa, 307.
18 BBC News, Estonia split over WWII memorial. 15 Feb. 2007. <http://news.
bbc.co.uk>. 28 Aug. 2007. 
19 Several articles in the Estonian newspaper Postimees. Quoted in Wikipedia.
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Soviet era. This act of President  Ilves also demonstrates the importance 
of control in relation to historical culture. Historical culture can also be 
evaluated. For example, historical culture in Germany has been evaluated 
as open and able to handle its diffi cult and painful past. Such openness 
can be considered as one of the fundamental conditions for democratic 
development, and the greater the stability of a democracy, the more 
critical, open and permissive the historical culture. Such a historical 
culture is also able to tolerate disagreements and confl icts.20 Clearly, the 
historical culture has not been open in Estonia as regards the Bronze 
Soldier dispute.
From the point of view of historical consciousness we can look at the 
Bronze Soldier case as an example in which the parallel between past 
and present thinking can be observed among both Estonian Russians and 
ethnic Estonians. 
As noted, the Bronze Soldier has signifi cant symbolic value to 
Estonia’s community of ethnic Russians. In regard to the past, it 
symbolises the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany. The Russian-speaking 
population views Estonia’s annexation to the Soviet Union as a legitimate 
process connected to the defeat of Nazism by the Red army. This is 
based on the offi cial position of the Russian federation.21 In regard to 
the present, the statue symbolises Estonian Russians’ claim to rights in 
Estonia, in particular to language rights and their right to live in Estonia 
as descendants of those who liberated the country from fascism. Past and 
present thinking are thus interconnected.22 
On the other hand, many Estonians consider the Bronze Soldier a 
symbol of Soviet occupation and repression. In terms of the present 
20 Hentilä, ‘Historiapolitiikka – Holocaust’, 47–48.
21 Since Russian-speakers do not have their own television channels in Estonia it 
is also quite understandable that they continue to form their political views on the 
basis of offi cial Russian positions as communicated through the Russian media, 
which they continue to follow. K. Kunnas, Ei mitään voiton päiviä, Helsingin 
Sanomat (HS), 6 May 2007. 
22 L. Hietanen, Venäläiset jättivät jäähyväisiä pronssipatsaalle, Taloussanomat 
26 Apr. 2007 <http://www.taloussanomat.fi /ulkomaat>, 28 Aug. 2007, K. 
Kunnas, Kenen patsas, Helsingin Sanomat, Sunnuntai, 29 Apr. 2007. A. Daniel, 
The problem is how to live together if the two peoples have such a different 
memory, REGNUM News Agency 4 May 2007, in: <http://en.wikipedia.org/>, 
24 Aug. 2007.
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day attitudes of Estonians, many commentators saw the relocation of 
the statue as a demonstration of the unwillingness of Estonians to allow 
Russians to integrate and assimilate into Estonian society.23
In both cases we can also note Braembussche’s defi nition of historical 
consciousness, which is slightly different and more critical than the simple 
notion of historical consciousness as describing the connection between 
past, present and future. Braembussche has namely emphasised the role 
of the present in his defi nitions of historical consciousness; people are 
reminded of past experience through its presence in the current situation. 
Historical consciousness may also illustrate how an individual or a 
community attempts to deal with the past in the current situation. For 
 Braembussche, a historical experience is about attempting to reconstruct 
the past, while historical consciousness constructs the past because of 
the present. Thus historical consciousness ‘forgets’ parts of the historical 
experience. This forgetting can lead to historical traumas when people 
are faced with a diffi cult situation (e.g. the holocaust). According to 
Braembussche, historical consciousness should not ‘forget’ possible 
traumas but instead work them out. If historical traumas are not worked 
out, the memory of the traumas has a tendency to become mythical and 
an object of taboo formation.24
In the case of Estonia there seems to be the danger of such historical 
consciousness being prevalent among both major groups of the society. 
Ethnic Estonians focus on the independent Estonian state, and consider 
the past Soviet occupation as the anti-image (and Estonian Russians 
as part of it). They sometimes fail to see that Russians in Estonia were 
also victims of the system brought to Estonia as part of Soviet politics. 
On the other hand, Estonian Russians, in order to defend their right to 
exist in Estonia, focus their past-related thinking on the victory of the 
Soviets over the Nazis, a commonly acknowledged enemy, and fail to 
acknowledge the need to reconsider the Soviet version of the history of 
World War II.25 
23 Ibid.
24 A. Braembussche, ‘History and memory – Some comments on recent 
developments’, in P. Kettunen, A. Kultanen and T. Soikkanen (eds.), Jäljillä. 
Kirjoituksia historian ongelmista. Osa 1. Turku: Kirja-Aurora 2000, 76, 80, 84, 
87–88.
25 BBC News. Views diverge on Estonia’s history. 27 Apr. 2007. <http://news.
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An opinion poll gives us further information about the attitudes of 
Estonians towards the Bronze Soldier dispute and differences between 
the groups within the society. The poll conducted 5-22 April 2007 
showed that 37 per cent of the population supported the relocation of 
the monument while 49 per cent were against it and 14 per cent had not 
formed opinion on the subject. Forty-nine per cent of Estonian speakers 
and only nine per cent of Russian speakers supported the relocation.26 
INTERNAL HISTORY POLITICS:
THE RUSSIAN SS-CAMPAIGN AND ESTONIAN RESPONSE
History politics is an overall concept that can be seen to include historical 
culture and historical consciousness. History politics can attempt to 
infl uence the kind of historical culture that is created or destroyed. 
Relocation of the Bronze Soldier in itself is naturally an intentional act, 
and as such history politics whose object is the product of historical 
culture, namely the statue. In the case of historical consciousness we 
can see, for example, Russian television as making history politics and 
thereby attempting to infl uence the historical consciousness of Estonian 
Russians. 
In the following I have collected public statements and comments on 
the Estonian Bronze Statue dispute. The selection is not exhaustive. It is 
based on the collection available on Wikipedia in August 2007, as well 
as on articles I collected during the dispute. It serves to demonstrate how 
different history-political motives can be observed in the comments of 
various countries and communities.
The major history-political campaign was carried out in the Russian 
media. Allegations against Estonia of fascism, glorifi cation of the 
collaboration with Nazi Germany, glorifi cation of Nazism, resurrection 
of Nazism and pro-Nazism came from offi cial Russian spokesmen, 
religious leaders and associations.27 
bbc.co.uk >. 28 Aug. 2007. 
26 Wikipedia.
27 Voice of Russia. Estonia is Encouraging a Resurgence of Nazism in Europe. 
10 Nov. 2006. <http://www.ruvr.ru>. 29 Aug. 2007, The Daily Telegraph. Estonia 
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For example, the Federation Council of Russia approved a statement 
which urged the Russian authorities to take the ‘toughest possible 
measures’ against Estonia: The dismantling of the monument on the eve 
of Victory Day on 9 May was ‘just one aspect of the policy, disastrous for 
Estonians, being conducted by provincial zealots of Nazism,’…. ‘These 
admirers of Nazism forget that politicians come and go, while the peoples 
in neighbouring countries are neighbours for eternity. The dismantling 
of the monument and the mockery of the remains of the fallen soldiers 
is just more evidence of the vengeful policy toward Russians living in 
Estonia and toward Russia’.28 Thus we can see direct references to the 
present situation using the past as part of the argument.
History politics was also practiced on Youtube, where a number of 
video clips fi lmed with cell phone cameras appeared under the keyword 
eSStonia. The clips mainly supported the claims of police brutality 
during the riots.29 According to an Estonian newspaper most of the clips 
were mislabeled, thus serving as mere propaganda in trying to present the 
recorded incidents as evidence for anti-rioters’ brutal violence.30
The Russian Ambassador to Estonia,  Nikolay Uspensky, declined an 
invitation to attend the reburial of the exhumed remains of those soldiers 
buried at the time when the Bronze Soldier was erected, who had not 
been claimed by their families. The Ambassador claimed, again referring 
to history, that his non-attendance was an ‘expression of Russias highest-
level disapproval of the removal of the monument, the exhumation, 
and the accompanying attempts to revise history to suit the political 
conjuncture’.31 
Russia’s chief rabbi  Berl Lazar, who conducted one of the reburials 
of the soldiers buried at the site, denounced all statements describing 
blames memorial violence on Russia. 1 May 2007. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk>. 
29 Aug. 2007, Interfax, Europe must assess neo-Nazism in Estonia - Kokoshin. 
13 Nov. 2006. <http://www.interfax.ru>
28 Interfax 27 Apr. 2007. Quoted in Wikipedia.
29 Youtube. <http://www.youtube.com>. 29 Aug. 2007.
30 T. Aug. Vandaalide videod koguvad Youtube´is vaatajaid. Eesti Paevaleht. 29 
Apr. 2007. <http://epl.ee>. 29 Aug. 2007.
31 K. Kunnas, Venäjä jää pois Viron hallituksen järjestämästä muistopäivän 
juhlasta. Helsingin Sanomat (HS), 8 May 2007, Postimees, Ümbermatmisel 
osales Vene sõjaväeatašee, 3 Jul. 2007. <postimees.ee>. 30 Aug. 2007.
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the Soviet soldiers as occupants and called on the Estonian authorities 
to review their position regarding the reburial of the remains of Soviet 
soldiers in Tallinn. Making direct parallels between past and present and 
thus appealing to the historical consciousness of people, he said that ‘when 
Nazism unfortunately rears its ugly head in Europe today and as there 
have been attempts to deny the Holocaust, Estonia is acting in a manner 
that insults memory, which alarms us’, adding that ‘the Jewish people 
will always regard what the Soviet soldiers did as a heroic feat’.32
The Russian Congress of Jewish Religious Organizations and 
Associations (KEROOR) also issued a history political statement 
criticizing the Estonian government for relocating a Soviet WWII memorial 
in Tallinn and for alleged Nazi sympathies: ‘The demonstratively defi ant 
form in which the Estonian authorities have dismantled the Monument 
to the Liberator Warrior and are relocating the nearby grave of soldiers 
who gave their lives fi ghting fascism is not an accidental or spontaneous 
act,’ the KEROOR said. ‘Estonian authorities prefer to gloss over the 
fact that punitive detachments and the Estonian SS legion killed between 
120,000 and 140,000 Russians, Jews, Ukrainians, Belarussians, Gypsies, 
and people of other ethnic groups during 1941-1944.’33
The Estonian side attempted to undermine the historical arguments 
of Russia and Russians and focused its on hooliganism. President  Ilves 
stated that ‘All this had nothing to do with the inviolability of graves or 
keeping alive the memory of men fallen in the Second World War….The 
common denominator of last night’s criminals was not their nationality, 
but their desire to riot, vandalize and plunder’.34 Prime Minister  Andrus 
Ansip said in a televised address in Estonian and in Russian that the 
memory of dead soldiers was not served when ‘a picture of a drunk 
shoplifter is being shown all over the world.’35 
32 Interfax. Russia’s chief rabbi urges Estonia to reconsider Soviet soldiers’ 
reburial. 7 May 2007. < http://www.interfax-religion.com>. 29 Aug. 2007.
33 Interfax. Russian Jewish community slams Estonia over Soviet war memorial. 
4 May 2007. <http://www.interfax-religion.com>. 29 Aug. 2007.
34 J. Tanner, Estonia Removes Soviet War Memorial, Washington Post, 27 Apr. 
2007. <http://www.washingtonpost.com>. 29 Aug. 2007.
35 Reuters. Estonia calm after Red Army site riots, Russia angry. 28 Apr. 2007. 
<http://www.reuters.com>. 29 Aug. 2007.
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HISTORY POLITICS FROM OUTSIDE: VIEWS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES
Ex-Soviet countries echoed the statements of Russia and Estonia in 
their statements and comments, which all used history to support the 
arguments. The President of the Republic of Lithuania,  Valdas Adamkus, 
announced that Lithuania was concerned and following the events in 
Tallinn. The President expressed his full support for Estonia, appealing to 
history: ‘There is no doubt that respect should be shown to the memory 
of the fallen soldiers. However, the Soviet Army didn’t bring freedom to 
the Baltic states, so can we blame Estonia if the Soviet soldiers’ remains 
from a central Tallinn square are reinterred in another cemetery?’.36
On the other hand, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belarus defended 
the sentiments of Estonian Russians by referring to the historical suffering 
of Belarus in the Second World War: ‘Belarus is the country that lost 
every third of its citizens during the Second World War. Any outrage 
upon the memory of the victims of that war causes us the sentiments of 
deep indignation and regret. .... We regret that the Estonian leadership 
has failed to have enough political wisdom not to fi ght the dead.’37
The Tajik Council of War Veterans condemned the removal of the 
statue, making a history-political claim that ‘Estonian bureaucrats 
are behaving like fascists’ and the Kyrgyz Parliament condemned the 
dismantling of the monument, calling it ‘an act against history.’38
Representatives of the EU and Nordic countries provided statements 
that mainly supported Estonia. At the time of the Bronze Soldier dispute 
the EU Parliament adopted a formal resolution criticizing Russia’s human 
rights record. In the related debate, history was used to demonstrate the 
strong and united support for Estonia. ‘Today, we are all Estonians’, 
stated  Joseph Daul, the leader of the biggest European party, EPP-DE, 
echoing  John F. Kennedy’s famous phrase in 1963, when he visited 
36 President Urges to Search for New Forms of Cooperation with Russia. Press 
release. <http://www.president.lt>. 27 Aug. 2007.
37 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus. Belarusian MFA Press 
Secretary Andrei Popov Comments to BelTA Information Agency on the Events 
in Estonia. 27 Apr. 2007. <http://www.mfa.gov>. 29 Aug. 2007. 
38 Russian News and Information Agency Novosti, World Russia’s upper house 
calls for cutting ties with Estonia. 27 Apr. 2007. <http://en.rian.ru >. 29 Aug. 
2007, Itar-tas news referred in Wikipedia 24 Aug. 2007.
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West Berlin shortly after East Germany had erected the Berlin wall.39 
Interestingly, however, a different comment was given by the former 
German Chancellor  Gerhard Schröder, who stated that ‘the way Estonia 
is dealing with the memory of young Russian soldiers who lost their lives 
in the fi ght against fascism is in bad taste and irreverent.’40 
Statements by the Nordic countries echoed their historical relations 
with Estonia and Russia and their foreign policies in general.  Carl Bildt, 
minister of foreign affairs in Sweden, said that what was happening in 
Estonia was an internal matter and that the outcome formed an intricate 
part of Estonia’s independence. He said he had faith in the Estonians 
to sort it out and that he believed it to be important that they did so 
themselves, without international interference. Carl Bildt also pointed 
out that he understood why the popular reaction about the statue had 
been so ‘sharp’.41 Finnish Prime Minister  Matti Vanhanen followed suit 
but put more emphasis on the willingness of the Finnish government 
to remain neutral than on the importance of local democratic process 
in Estonia, which was the emphasis of Sweden: ‘Neither Finland nor 
other countries need to get involved. As they [events] are occurring in an 
area near Finland, then we will of course keep a very close eye on them 
[events].…It is not part of international protocol for politicians to request 
the resignation of a foreign government’s ministry, it just isn’t suitable.’42 
 Jonas Gahr Støre, Norway’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, stressed in 
his announcement the importance that both sides stop the violence and 
respect each other.43
Finally, as a curiosity I include the statement of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Serbia to demonstrate how a dispute such as the Bronze Soldier 
case in Estonia enables different actors to voice their own history political 
39 European Parliament. Wednesday in Plenary: EU’s relations with Russia 
centre stage. 10 May 2007. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu>. 29 Aug. 2007.
40 M&C News, German ex-chancellor condemns Estonia war memorial removal. 
27 Apr. 2007. <http://news.monstersandcritics.com>. 29 Aug. 2007.
41 Alla dessa dagar. Tallinn. <http://carlbildt.wordpress.com>. 29 Aug. 2007, 
C. Svahn, Bildt talade med presidenten. Dagend Nyheter 29 Apr. 2007. <http://
www.dn.se>. 29 Aug. 2007.
42 Helsingin Sanomat (HS), Vanhanen tyrmää venäläisten vaatimukset Viron 
hallituksen erosta. 1 May 2007.
43 Aftenposten 27 Apr. 2007. Referred to in Wikipedia.
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views. Here we see Serbia, in its reference to history, as displaying itself 
along with Germany as the great condemner of Nazi atrocities. The offi cial 
statement states: ‘The future of Europe is also based on full commitment 
to the shared and best pages of European history, whereas the victory 
over nazism and fascism more than half a century ago undoubtedly ranks 
among those pages deserving lasting admiration among all in Europe and 
in the world.’ Condemning the unilateral action by Estonian authorities 
on the eve of 9 May as contrary to this commitment, it continues: ‘The 
highest respect for such monuments in today’s Germany is noteworthy. 
We in Serbia shall forever place fl owers on the graves of the Red Army 
soldiers fallen in the battles for the liberation of Serbia and Belgrade 
from Nazi occupiers. We shall do so also on 9 May this year.’44
WHY DO HISTORY POLITICS MATTER?
History politics matter because we can often observe the concrete 
consequences of history being used for political purposes. In the 
exemplary case of this article, the Estonian Bronze Soldier dispute in 
May 2007, we can itemise at least fi ve types of consequences.
The fi rst, very serious consequence was the violent protests which led 
to the worst riots and looting Estonia has seen since its independence in 
1991. Hundreds of people were arrested and police had to use force to 
stop the riots that lasted for two nights. Many people were also injured 
and one person died as a result of the violent riots.45
The second consequence was the enormous material losses caused by 
the riots and looting. According to  Edgar Savisaar, the Mayor of Tallinn, 
the direct losses exceeded 40-50 million Estonian kroons (2,5-3 million 
euros).46
The third consequence was the losses suffered by Estonian businesses 
as a result of the dispute. In late April 2007, three large Russian 
supermarket networks, Seventh Continent, Kopeika and Samokhval, 
banned all Estonian commodities, and in May 2007 Moscow’s mayor, 
44 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia. Referred to in Wikipedia.
45 K. Kunnas, Viron poliisi varautui uusiin mellakoihin Tallinnan keskustassa. 
28 Apr. 2007. http://www.hs.fi /arkisto. 30 Aug. 2007.
46 Delfi . Referred to in Wikipedia.
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 Yury Luzhkov, proposed to boycott everything related to Estonia for 
‘actions taken against the Bronze Soldier Monument and graves of our 
soldiers’. He said that Russian companies should cut off their relations 
with partners in Estonia. ‘One should tell our business: stop contacts with 
Estonia. The country showed its negative, and I would say fascist face,’ 
the mayor said, adding: ‘No one will be able to re-write history.’47 
The fourth consequence was related to the EU and foreign policies. 
The EU-Russia Summit took place some three weeks after the relocation 
of the Bronze Soldier and related events. The hoped-for cooperation 
agreement between the EU and Russia was not reached, one of the 
reasons being the Bronze Soldier dispute in Tallinn, and the willingness 
of the European Union to show support for its member state Estonia.48 
The fi fth and perhaps most important consequence of this history 
political dispute was that it revealed underlying social problems. The 
International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights stated that ‘the 
riots in Tallinn and other Estonian cities served to highlight remaining 
problems relating to the integration of the country’s Russian-speaking 
minority, which constitutes about one third of the 1.4 million residents. 
Despite a number of important legislative reforms since the fi rst years 
of independence, this minority is still not offi cially recognized as a 
linguistic minority and continues to face discrimination and exclusion 
in everyday life, thus fostering frustration and resentment among 
its members. Many Russian-speakers still lack Estonian citizenship, 
Russian-language education has gradually been reduced and stringent 
language requirements restrict access to the labor market for Russian-
speakers.’49
This illustrates the idea about the necessary role of the present situation 
in regard to interest in the past. In the Estonian case the Russian minority 
hangs on the historical monument of the Bronze Soldier and its location 
at least partly because of their present unresolved social problems in the 
47 Interfax. Luzhkov proposes boycotting Estonia. 1 May 2007. <http://www.
interfax.ru>. 30 Aug. 2007. Lenta.ru internet source 28 Apr. 2007 referred to in 
Wikipedia: <http://lenta.ru/news>. 30 Aug. 2007.
48 Helsingin Sanomat (HS), Venäjän asenne yhdistää EU:ta. 22 May 2007.
49 International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights. Estonian Authorities 
Must Investigate Allegations of Police Brutality during War Memorial Riots. 30 
Apr. 2007. <http://www.ihf-hr.org>. 30 Aug. 2007.
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Estonian society. The important notion here is the idea of the politics of 
tomorrow: the major dimension of the infl uence of history is the future 
and politics and decisions related to it.50 Taking a somewhat idealistic 
stance, one had hoped that the events in May 2007 would have led to 
concrete actions, ‘politics of tomorrow’, concerning the social problems 
of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia.
More generally we can note the practical consequences of history 
politics in different parts of the world. History textbook battles in China, 
Japan and India have led to riots in Gujarat and to attacks on Japanese 
companies and products in China.51 The most extreme form of violence, 
war, can be largely motivated by utilising history politics as part of 
propaganda. The former Yugoslavia provides sad examples of this. In 
Poland, but also in other post-socialist countries, history politics has 
recently led to legislation enabling political purges of those involved in 
the communist system.52
I would conclude by stating that because history politics matters in a 
very concrete sense in societies, the analysis of history political interests 
should be seen as one important dimension of historical research. The 
objects of history political research are the different ideas of history held 
by individuals and communities and the motives behind those ideas. 
I would very much agree with the thesis that historical research has a 
two-level mission: the production of new historical knowledge and the 
analysis of the history political interests related to that knowledge.53 
Therefore an understanding of the notion of history politics in relation 
to history research is vital for historians as well as for active citizens of 
societies.
50 Hentilä, Harppi-Saksan haarukassa, 308–309.
51 History teaching shapes identity. Oxford Analytica – International. 9 Aug. 
2005.
52 Boston Globe, Eastern Europe confronts its communist past. Russia warns of 
souring relations if statues removed. 24 Apr. 2007. <http://www.boston.com>. 
30 Aug. 2007.




Danish Post-Cold War Foreign Policy
and the Use of Cold War History
 POUL VILLAUME
During and immediately after the Cold War, the main thrust of Danish 
Cold War foreign policy was generally seen by scholars, politicians, and 
the public alike in Denmark as having been basically loyal to the NATO 
Alliance. This was the case although, as historical research of the late 
1980s and the 1990s demonstrated1, the Danish policy profi le in NATO 
during the Cold War was characterized by more, and partly more far-
reaching, reservations towards certain aspects of US and alliance policies 
than most other member nations including the smaller ones, perhaps with 
the exception of like-minded Norway.
However, this image of the Danish Cold War foreign policy 
profi le has gradually been contested by some political and scholarly 
quarters, especially during the late 1990s and in the beginning of the 
new millennium. The present article attempts to outline the extent to 
1 See, e.g., P. Villaume, ‘Neither Appeasement nor Servility: Denmark and the 
Atlantic Alliance, 1949–1955’, Scandinavian Journal of History 14 (1989), 155–
179, and P. Villaume, Allieret med forbehold: Danmark, NATO og den kolde 
krig. En studie i dansk sikkerhedspolitik 1949–1961. København: Eirene 1995. 
A bibliographical essay is in P. Villaume, ‘Denmark during the Cold War, 1945–
1989. A  Stocktaking of Post-Cold War Research Literature’ in T. Borring Olesen 
(ed.), The Cold War - and the Nordic Countries: Historiography at a Crossroads. 
Odense: Odense University Press 2004, 17–41.
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which this process of reinterpreting and rewriting recent Danish Cold 
War history has been motivated by, and/or has served to underpin, the 
gradual reorientation of Denmark’s foreign policies towards militant so-
called ‘activism’ after the end of the Cold War, and especially after the 
9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States. Most recently, Denmark has 
consistently been one of the staunchest supporters in NATO of the US led 
military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq since 2001 and 2003.
Thus, the article should throw some empirically based new light 
on the old question of the mutual relationship between (foreign) policy 
change and the role of historical (re)interpretations in this process.
EARLY COLD WAR FOREIGN POLICY PROFILE
First, we must capture some basic features of Danish foreign policy 
after 1945. It is important to bear in mind that Denmark came out of 
the Second World War with the rather traumatic experience that its 
traditional neutralist security policy and low-key military posture ever 
since the disastrous defeat in 1864 to Prussia had indeed failed to save 
the country from a Nazi-German occupation. However, due to the Danish 
Government’s so-called policy of negotiations and cooperation with the 
German occupation power during the war, Denmark did not suffer the 
same harsh consequences of Nazi rule that most of occupied Europe 
did. The inherent delicate political compromises and moral dilemmas 
which this policy entailed, however, did create some degree of domestic 
political bitterness and strife, although there was widespread political 
consensus in 1945 in Denmark to ‘look forward’. 
The post-War consensus included the slogan ‘Never again an April 
9’, alluding to the date in 1940 when Denmark was invaded by Nazi 
Germany, hardly without any shots being fi red. In other words, not only 
the Conservative Party (Det Konservative Folkeparti) and the Liberal 
Party (Venstre), but even the Social Democratic Party (Socialdemokratiet) 
and the Social Liberal Party (Det Radikale Venstre) now agreed that the 
foreign policy of isolated neutrality was no longer feasible. Instead, all 
political parties paid tribute to the principle of collective security, i.e. 
Danish membership of the United Nations. There was also a consensus 
that Denmark should be prepared to contribute with military forces to 
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permanently prepared armed forces under UN Security Council auspices 
and control, to be deployed anywhere against possible aggressors and 
violators of the UN charter.
However, as the Cold War systemic and ideological contest between 
the former wartime allies in East and West intensifi ed from 1947–48, 
and as Soviet power expanded and was consolidated in Eastern Europe, 
it soon became the conviction of most Danish politicians that the UN 
security system would not be suffi cient to protect small states such as 
Denmark against the threat of aggression and another occupation. 
Still, Denmark’s road to joining the Atlantic Treaty in 1949 was not 
an easy one. To the social democrats in particular, but also to the social 
liberals as well as to certain conservatives and liberals, the abortive 
Scandinavian Defence Union (SDU) was the preferred solution to 
Denmark’s security problem under the new great power constellation of 
the Cold War. The SDU failed to materialize in early 1949, in essence, 
according to the perception of key Danish social democrats, because of 
Norwegian refusal to accept Swedish insistence on a non-aligned SDU. 
Many top social democrats in Denmark, including party leader  Hans 
Hedtoft, regarded Danish membership of the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) 
alliance only as the lesser of ‘two evils’ – the major evil being renewed 
isolated Danish neutrality. Indeed, leading social democrats feared that 
the neighbouring Soviet Union would regard Denmark’s joining the NAT 
as so provocative that Moscow might use it as an immediate excuse to 
occupy at least parts of Danish territory.2
When Danish top decision makers’ suspicion was confi rmed in 
1950 that NATO’s secret defence plans did not at all cover Denmark 
(nor Norway) in case of Soviet military aggression in the short term (i.e. 
prior to the mid-1950s), offi cial Danish attitudes towards NATO hardly 
became more confi dent. On the other hand, decision makers did not have 
much choice other than hoping for the best, contributing to the common 
military build-up and deterrence posture of NATO, and with the US 
nuclear umbrella as the ultimate – and awesome – security guarantee. 
2 H. Branner, ‘Vi vil fred her til lands… En udenrigspolitisk linie 1949-1949-
1989’, in Vandkunsten 3 (1990), 47–90; Villaume, Allieret med forbehold, 100–
120; T. Borring Olesen (ed.), Interdependence versus Integration: Denmark, 
Scandinavia, and Western Europe, 1945–1960. Odense: Odense University 
Press 1995; T. Borring Olesen & P. Villaume, I blokopdelingens tegn. Dansk 
Udenrigspolitiks Historie 1945–1972. København: Gyldendal 2005, 105–125.
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Although Danish defence budgets were criticized by the major allies as 
too low and insuffi cient throughout most of the Cold War, no one ever 
raised doubts about the value of Denmark as a staunchly anti-communist 
and utterly democratic ally with a highly developed social liberal welfare 
state system. Thus, in this respect Denmark as a NATO member served 
both as a role model and as a show-window to the peoples of communist-
ruled Eastern Europe. In addition, Danish authorities closed their eyes 
to very important top secret US military activities – including storage of 
nuclear weapons – at Thule and other US bases in Greenland.3 
At the same time, Denmark insisted upon several more or less 
substantial open and confi dential reservations in NATO, political and 
military; at times, some of these reservations were indeed regarded as 
annoying by the major allied powers. The most well-known cases in 
the early 1950s were Denmark’s no to foreign troops (US air wings) on 
Danish soil in peacetime, and in the late 1950s the corresponding no 
to nuclearization of the Danish defence forces, a reservation that was 
consolidated in the early 1960s – although highly secret – to include even 
wartime.4
The basic concern behind these reservations, at times explicitly 
formulated at closed NATO meetings, was the risk that Denmark would 
be drawn into a major nuclear war between the big powers, and that such 
a war would result in nothing less than the physical annihilation of the 
small and densely populated country. Therefore, while integrating into 
North Atlantic alliance structures, Denmark should take no military steps 
which could be construed or presented, with or without justifi cation, as 
unnecessarily provocative as seen from the Soviet side. In more general 
terms, this is what is generally described as the ‘alliance dilemma’ of 
small states in a great power alliance, which often also involves the so-
called ‘security dilemma’.5
3 N. Petersen, ’The H.C. Hansen Paper and Nuclear Weapons in Greenland’, in 
Scandinavian Journal of History 23 (1998), 21–44.
4 Borring Olesen & Villaume, I blokopdelingens navn, 153–236 and 288–347.
5 Glenn H. Snyder, ’The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics’, in World Politics 
36 (1984), 461–495; Villaume, Allieret med forbehold , 22–32; cf. also C. Due-
Nielsen and N. Petersen (ed.), Adaptation and Activism: The Foreign Policy of 
Denmark 1967–1993. Copenhagen: DJØF Publishing 1995, 11–43.
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Although the bans on foreign troops and nuclear weapons in 
peacetime were probably the most substantial and spectacular of the 
specifi c Danish reservations, they were far from the only ones. The 
slogan ‘For the Atlantic Treaty – No to Yes-men’ was coined in 1952 by 
the social democratic leadership, but in practice the Conservative Party 
and the Liberal Party were also inclined to adapt to its political content, if 
nothing else because at no time they could form a parliamentary foreign 
and security policy majority without the support of the social democrats. 
Thus, the slogan encapsulates a dominant tenet of Danish alliance 
policies up until at least the early 1960s: Basically, Denmark was a loyal 
ally in NATO, yet Danish decision makers did not uncritically embrace 
or automatically support any political guidelines or strategic directives 
which the major NATO allies, including the United States, came up with. 
What guided Danish reservations in NATO more than anything else was, 
to put it simply, a concern that the alliance would focus too much upon 
military and strategic deterrence at the cost of political and diplomatic 
negotiation and dialogue with the communist adversary.
Characteristically, key Danish decision makers argued confi dentially 
in NATO that in its threat analyses, the alliance should not focus 
exclusively upon Soviet military capacities, but also on probable Soviet 
intentions and concerns. According to the Danes, the frequent more or 
less propagandistic Soviet disarmament proposals should be tested by 
NATO in practice, and countered by concrete NATO initiatives for a 
reduction of tensions and for disarmament, so that the Soviets did not gain 
a ‘monopoly’ in this respect. In the same vein, Western cooperation in the 
so-called COCOM, which involved tight strategic trade embargo against 
the Eastern bloc countries, met with more behind-the-scenes criticism and 
resistance from Denmark than from virtually any other NATO country; 
the Danes insisted in the early 1950s that the US defi nitions of ‘strategic 
goods’ were so broad that the embargo rather resembled ‘economic 
warfare’, thus contributing to the risk of ‘hot’ war. On the ideological 
front, the Danes were sceptical towards any form of coordinated US 
or NATO propaganda, which they feared to be counterproductive. The 
Danes preferred a low-key and matter-of-fact information effort.
Back on the military side, the Danes retarded and postponed for 
years NATO’s demand to establish a joint Danish-West German Baltic 
NATO Command (COMBALTAP). It took the acute Berlin crisis and 
the personal initiative of NATO’s Supreme Commander in the summer 
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of 1961 to persuade the Danes to accept a somewhat ‘softer’ version in 
the form of a multinational NATO solution instead of the initial bilateral 
Danish-German one.6 
FROM DIPLOMATIC DÉTENTE ACTIVISM TO ‘FOOTNOTE POLICIES’
Still, the COMBALTAP constituted a major Danish integration step into 
NATO’s military structures in the sensitive northern region bordering 
Soviet bloc waters. In an apparent attempt to compensate for this step, 
Danish governments initiated, in the early 1960s, what should be termed 
an activist diplomatic offensive in Eastern Europe. Offi cially, the aim 
was to build diplomatic (and economic) bridges across the Iron Curtain 
in order to enhance a relaxation of East-West tensions, and between 
the smaller countries of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in particular. 
Confi dentially, the early Danish ‘Ostpolitik’ also and explicitly aimed at 
contributing to loosen the Kremlin’s political and military grip on its East 
European satellites.7
The Danish initiative at the NATO Council Meeting in June 1966 to 
propose the calling for an all-European security conference should be 
seen in this light. Although the Danish proposal was rejected by the NATO 
allies as premature at best, the Danes stuck to their proposal. However, not 
until December 1969 did the NATO Council eventually agree to engage 
in preparatory talks with the Warsaw Pact countries on détente in Europe. 
At this point, West German Foreign Minister and (from 1969) Chancellor 
Willy Brandt had initiated his version of détente policies towards Eastern 
Europe (‘Wandel durch Annäherung’). Danish governments of different 
political colours – social democratic, conservative, and liberal alike – 
6 Villaume, Allieret med forbehold, chapters 3, 4, and 9; K. C. Lammers, 
‘Denmark’s Relations with Germany Since 1945’, in H. Branner & M. Kelstrup 
(eds.), Denmark’s Policy Towards Europe After 1945: History, Theory, and 
Options. Odense: Odense University Press 2000, 260–281; P.Villaume, ’Leaning 
on England: Danish Cold War Alliance Policies in the 1950’s between Great 
Britain and the United States’, in J. Sevaldsen et al. (ed.), Britain and Denmark: 
Political, Economic, and Cultural Relations in the 19th and 20th Centuries. 
Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press 2003, 575–593; Borring Olesen and 
Villaume, I blokopdelingens tegn, 288–354. 
7 Borring Olesen and Villaume, I blokopdelingens tegn, 575–587.
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strongly supported this policy and took several independent initiatives 
during the preparatory talks in Helsinki and Geneva from 1972 to 1975 
on a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Danish 
diplomats were particularly active in the preparation of ‘basket III’ of the 
Final Act of the Helsinki summit in 1975, dealing with human contacts 
and human rights (‘détente from below’).8
At the same time Denmark, often together with Norway, contradicted 
policies of the US and major European NATO powers by being the most 
outspoken NATO member country in criticizing the military junta in 
Greece (1967–1974), the Portuguese colonial wars in Africa, and the 
white apartheid regime in Southern Africa. From 1972 Denmark even 
provided humanitarian aid to liberation movements in Southern Africa.9
The renewed tensions of the ‘Second Cold War’ in the 1980s lead to 
the most controversial period of Danish Cold War security policies, the 
so-called ‘footnote policy’. In the late 1970s, social democratic leader 
and Prime Minister  Anker Jørgensen, always a strong supporter of Danish 
membership of both NATO and the European Community, developed an 
increasingly sceptical attitude towards the escalating nuclear arms race 
between East and West. Under his auspices, social democratic members 
of parliament, party activists and trade union leaders gradually joined 
many of the activities and slogans of the emerging independent anti-
nuclear peace and grass-root movements.
When a conservative-liberal minority coalition government took 
over in 1982,  Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, the new foreign minister, seemed 
determined to turn Denmark, for the fi rst time, towards the role as a 
‘core country’ of NATO. The social democratic opposition, supported 
by the socialist left wing parties and the Social Liberal Party, opposed 
this new effort, and the oppositional so-called ‘alternative majority’ 
gradually radicalized its critique of aspects of US and NATO security and 
armaments policies, thus forcing the conservative-liberal government 
to pursue their own line in NATO – typically by passing parliamentary 
8 Borring Olesen and Villaume, I blokopdelingens tegn, 648–665; cf. D. C. 
Thomas: The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the 
Demise of Communism. Princeton: Princeton University Press 2001, 52 ff.
9 Borring Olesen and Villaume, I blokopdelingens tegn, 678–681; C. 
Morgenstierne, Denmark and National Liberation in Southern Africa. Uppsala: 
The Nordic Africa Institute 2003, 41–97.
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majority resolutions to be implemented as Danish reservations in the 
form of ‘footnotes’ to joint NATO Council documents.
For several years, the Danish government acquiesced to this 
unprecedented way of operating, primarily because the Social Liberal 
Party consistently voted with the government on all major economic 
and social issues, which the government considered decisive. Examples 
of the security policy ‘footnotes’ were the offi cial Danish support of a 
postponement of the deployment of NATO’s tactical nuclear missiles in 
Western Europe, a nuclear ‘freeze’ in the West and the East, a Nordic 
nuclear-free zone, an international ban on nuclear tests etc.10
The ‘footnote period’ ended abruptly after the 1988 Parliamentary 
elections when the Social Liberal Party left the security policy opposition 
role and fully joined the conservative-liberal government. At the same 
time, of course, the international Cold War confrontation and the arms 
race between the two superpowers already seemed to be heading towards 
a peaceful settlement.
The domestic political polarization over Denmark’s security and 
defence policies during the ‘footnote period’ lasted less than a decade 
of the Cold War. Yet the effects were almost traumatic, and were to have 
long-term political and personal consequences to involved politicians and 
other actors on both sides of the main political divide, and on different 
levels. As we shall see, even post-Cold War Danish historical research on 
the Cold War has been infl uenced by this period.
LEGACIES OF DANISH COLD WAR POLICIES
During the fi rst period after the end of the Cold War, consequences 
of the ‘footnote period’ appeared to be few, however. True to offi cial 
Danish ideals of establishing a strong international legal order, Denmark 
was always, during the Cold War, a relatively substantial contributor 
of military forces to peacekeeping operations under the clear auspices 
and command of the United Nations (especially in Suez, Congo, and 
10 N. Petersen, Europæisk og globalt engagement: Dansk Udenrigspolitiks 
Historie 1973–2006. København: Gyldendal 2006, 241–311; P. Villaume, 
Lavvækst og frontdannelser, 1970–1985. Politiken/Gyldendals Danmarkshistorie 
15. København: Politiken/Gyldendal 2005, 329–351.
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Cyprus). In 1990, the fi rst slight change in this policy occurred with 
the deployment of a corvette of the Danish Navy to the Persian Gulf 
to participate in the enforcement of UN sanctions against Iraq after its 
invasion of Kuwait. Although the operation was based on a UN mandate 
and on a broad political consensus in Denmark, the military operations 
which the Danish corvette was part of were de facto dominated and 
commanded by the United States, not by the United Nations.11 
On the other hand, the substantial number of Danish military units in 
peacekeeping operations in the Balkans from 1992 onwards was under 
formal UN command. Even so, the Danish military hardware, including 
heavy tanks, which were deployed in the Balkans in the early and mid-
1990s even in operations with elements of peace-enforcement, suggested 
a certain novel degree of military ‘activism’ and ‘militarization’ of Danish 
security policies that had been unseen during the Cold War.
Still, a continuation of the traditionally strong Danish support 
for the diplomatic CSCE process was refl ected during the peaceful 
transformation of the European security landscape of the early 1990s, 
after the disappearance of the Soviet bloc. For instance, in a mid-1993 
comprehensive Foreign Ministry report on principles and perspectives 
of Danish foreign policy towards the year 2000 it was proclaimed that 
it was the new social democratic government’s objective to “make the 
CSCE a central organization for peace and security in Europe’.12
However, there was little evidence that the United States, nor major 
European NATO powers, took much interest in strengthening the role and 
infl uence of the CSCE (in 1995 formalized as OSCE, Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe), and defi nitely not at the potential 
cost of NATO. On the contrary, it became the explicitly – although 
confi dentially – formulated policy of the Bush Administration in 1992 
to ‘prevent the emergence of security arrangements exclusively for 
Europeans, which would undermine NATO’. Therefore, ‘a substantial 
11 This was a situation similar to that of the Korean War in 1950–53, but at that 
time the questions of command probably contributed to Denmark’s refusal to 
provide military units for the Korean operations, despite the fact that formally 
they were conducted under a ‘UN hat’ (P. Villaume, Allieret med forbehold, 
645–652).
12 Udenrigsministeriet, Principper og perspektiver i dansk udenrigspolitik på vej 
mod år 2000. København: Udenrigsministeriet 1993, 50.
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US presence and continued cohesion of the Western Alliance’ remained 
‘vital’.13
The Danish government’s foreign policy report of 1993 did indeed 
conclude that despite the fact that there was no threat of any military 
aggression against Denmark in the foreseeable future, NATO would 
remain ‘the central defence organisation in Europe’, and that even in 
the future NATO would be ‘the irreplaceable guarantor of Denmark’s 
territorial integrity’. The stated reasons were, fi rst, that NATO’s 
integrated military cooperation prevented a re-nationalization of defence 
policies and defence forces of the member countries, and, second, that the 
alliance remained the principal instrument for securing the engagement 
of the United States in the security of Europe, which in itself had been a 
long-standing foreign policy interest especially for small states such as 
Denmark. Third, NATO was expected to have an expanding role as an 
‘entrepreneur’ for universalist security organizations such as the UN and 
the CSCE/OSCE.14
Signifi cantly, the question of NATO’s geographical enlargement 
towards the east was not mentioned at all in the 1993 report. Indeed, 
this was not yet an issue for NATO as an alliance, probably because the 
Russian government had voiced clear opposition to such an undertaking 
since 1992. Not until a resolution passed by the NATO Summit in January 
1994, reinforced in a subsequent statement by President  Bill Clinton in 
Prague, the issue of NATO membership expansion quite abruptly became 
a question of high priority for the alliance – indeed, it seems, the new 
issue on which NATO was to concentrate its attention and resources; 
‘expand – or die’ was the unoffi cial slogan to be heard in the corridors 
of NATO quarters at this time. At the same NATO summit, a US 
proposal was adopted to initiate the ‘Partnership for Peace’ (PfP) offer 
to selected former Warsaw Pact countries in Central and East Europe; 
PfP was conceived as a fl exible platform which could lead to full NATO 
membership at a later stage.
From 1994 on, the Danish social democratic-social liberal coalition 
government, supported by the conservative-liberal opposition, 
unequivocally embraced not only the PfP concept but in particular the 
13 Pentagon-National Security Council Overall Planning Directive, leaked to 
International Herald Tribune, 12 March 1992. 
14 Udenrigsministeriet, Principper og perspektiver, XII, 53 f., 62–67, 200.
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idea to expand NATO towards East and Central Europe, even despite 
vocal Russian protestations. Admonitions from some security experts 
that early NATO membership for some of the East and Central European 
countries might provoke or fuel Russian anti-Western nationalism and 
dangerously contribute to isolation of Russia, carried little weight in 
offi cial Danish security policy elite circles. In 1994, Denmark signed 
comprehensive framework agreements on defence cooperation with 
Poland and the Baltic countries, including the build-up of the Baltic 
Battalion, and in 1996 Denmark, as the only NATO country, even 
began to openly advocate full membership of NATO for the three Baltic 
countries. In 1998, Denmark also initiated participation in a PfP progam 
on military advising in the Caucasian region.15
Denmark also actively supported NATO’s new mobile ‘Rapid 
Reaction Forces’, RFF (from 1992). In 1993 the Danish Parliament 
decided to establish a 4,500 men ‘Danish International Reaction Brigade’ 
(DIB), which would be available to the RFF (as well as to the UN and the 
CSCE/OSCE). The DIB has contributed, for instance, to the NATO-led 
UN Stabilisation Force (SFOR/IFOR) in Bosnia. Another post-Cold War 
military creation of NATO, the ‘Combined Joint Task Forces’, CJTF, also 
received active Danish support from its initiation in 1996. The main idea 
behind the CJTF was to create a more fl exible and mobile instrument for 
use of the alliance’s military resources, in particular in peace-supporting 
or peace-enforcing out-of-area operations, also known as non-Article 5 
operations.
‘HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISM’ AND MILITARY INTERVENTIONS
As can be seen from the above, Denmark fully supported and followed 
the military and political transformations of NATO throughout the 1990s, 
including any preparations for NATO membership expansion among 
former Warsaw Pact member countries. Early on, this development 
was characterized by a senior Danish security researcher as a distinct 
‘militarization’ of Danish foreign policy as compared to the Danish 
15 P. Villaume, ‘Denmark and NATO through 50 Years’, in B. Heurlin and H. 
Mouritzen (eds.), Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 1999. Copenhagen: Danish 
Institute of International Affairs 1999, 50 f.
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profi le during the Cold War (and even before the Second World War), in 
the sense that Danish armed forces were now being used as an active and 
integral part of the country’s foreign policy.16 
Indeed, since the late 1990s the militarization of Danish foreign 
policy has escalated signifi cantly in connection with Danish active 
– or ‘activist’, to use the offi cial phrase – participation in more or less 
unilateral Western/NATO out-of-area military operations against Serbia 
(Kosovo), Afghanistan, and Iraq. 
In an unprecedented move, the Danish social democratic-social 
liberal government in February 1998 placed, with the support of the 
conservative-liberal opposition, Danish military assets at the disposal 
of the US-led command poised for attack against a sovereign country 
without the explicit consent of the United Nations Security Council, 
namely against  Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Quite similar operations were 
approved by the Danish parliament twice again in 1998, fi rst in October 
against President  Slobodan Milosevic’s ex-Yugoslavia and then, in 
December, against Hussein’s Iraq. In all three cases independent Danish 
and international experts questioned whether or not there was suffi cient 
international legal basis behind these military actions.
This was also the case in March 1999 when Denmark contributed 
eight F-16 fi ghter-bombers to the massive US led NATO air offensive 
for 78 days against Ex-Yugoslavia. The immediate purpose of the 
NATO campaign was to force President Milosevic to accept the Western 
ultimatum at the Rambouillet talks to admit NATO forces on Yugoslav 
and Kosovo soil to ensure political autonomy for Kosovo. The NATO 
operation was unilateral in sense that it was not authorized by the UN 
Security Council; it was also the fi rst offensive NATO military operation 
ever ‘out-of-(NATO)-area’, and it was even, according to many observers, 
‘out-of-charter’, since Yugoslavia could not in any meaningful way be said 
to threaten the security of any NATO country. The Danish government 
conceded that the operation might not be ‘legal’ in the traditional sense, 
but like the US government and the NATO alliance as such it insisted 
that the operation was fully ‘legitimate’ since the lives of thousands of 
16 B. Heurlin, ‘Danish Security Policy over the last 50 Years – Long-Term 
Essential Security Priorities’, in B. Heurlin and H. Mouritzen (eds.), Danish 
Foreign Policy Yearbook 2001. Copenhagen: Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Institut 
2001, 29–50.
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Albanian Kosovars were at stake faced with impending atrocities – or 
even genocide – from the Serbian forces in Kosovo.17
Thus, the novel concept of ‘humanitarian intervention’ was used to 
legitimize NATO’s air war against ex-Yugoslavia. As in Western public 
discourse in general, it was surprisingly soon forgotten or repressed in 
Danish public debate and among decision makers that the Serb atrocities, 
killings, and ‘ethnic cleansing’ against the Albanian Kosovars on a mass 
scale occurred after and in part as a direct consequence of the initiation 
of the United States and NATO air offence, not the other way round. 
In justifi cation of the air war, chronology was reversed. In the same 
vein, it was ignored or forgotten that NATO’s Supreme Commander, US 
General  Wesley Clark, explicitly told US Secretary of State  Madeleine 
Albright shortly before the air war started that the reason for the war 
was that ‘NATO’s credibility [had been put] on the line’, and that similar 
statements were made publicly at the time by President  Bill Clinton and 
by British Prime Minister  Tony Blair.18
Notwithstanding, so-called human rights activism, in combination 
with a certain kind of moral absolutism, gained further ground in offi cial 
Danish security policy vocabulary after the Kosovo experience.19
Immediately after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington 
on September 11, 2001, the shocked Danish social democratic Prime 
Minister Poul  Nyrup Rasmussen publicly assured that Denmark would 
‘stand shoulder to shoulder’ with the United States and would be ‘behind 
the US all the way’ in what U.S. President  George W. Bush had already 
termed ‘the war against terror’. War was to be launched, in other words. 
As Washington started its air war against Afghanistan in October, 2001, 
the Danish government accordingly sent special forces as well as air 
17 T. Brems Knudsen, ‘Humanitær intervention i Kosovo: Konsekvenser for FN 
og det internationale samfund’, in Militært Tidsskrift 128 (1999). 
18 For documentation on these points, see, e.g., A. J. Bacevich, American 
Empire: The Realities & Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press 2003, 181–197; and N. Chomsky, Failed States: The Abuses 
of Power and the Assault on Democracy. New York: Metropolitan Books 2006, 
94–101.
19 For an introductory argument, see Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Institut [DUPI], FN, 
verden og Danmark. Copenhagen: Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Institut 1999, 211–
250; DUPI, Humanitær intervention. Retlige og politiske aspekter. København: 
Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Institut 1999.
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support for the US ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ aimed at toppling the 
Taliban regime and installing a pro-Western regime in Kabul.
Since 2002 Denmark, from now on under the liberal-conservative 
government of Prime Minister  Anders Fogh Rasmussen, has contributed 
to the NATO-led international stabilization force in Afghanistan (ISAF) 
with a relatively high-profi le force of several hundred troops, especially 
in the southern Helmand province, a traditional stronghold for the 
Talibans. In 2007 the number of Danish troops in Afghanistan was even 
substantially increased, and with the support of the social democratic 
opposition.
In late 2002 and early 2003, the Danish liberal-conservative gov-
ernment signalled its preparedness to participate in a US led war on 
Iraq, with or without prior authorization from the UN Security Council. 
Remarkably, the government insisted that Denmark had reasons of her 
own to go to war against Iraq, reasons which had not to do with any 
existence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Rather, the 
ostensible defi ance of  Saddam Hussein’s regime of several UN Security 
Council resolutions on Iraqi WMD was the sole reason for Denmark’s 
active participation in the invasion of Iraq. Despite the insistence of the 
government to present its decision as concern for the reputation of the 
United Nations, many observers pointed to the fact that Iraqi WMD were 
actually mentioned about a dozen times in the very parliamentary bill of 
March 2003 which the government presented as the basis for Denmark’s 
participation in the US-led attack against Iraq. The bill was passed with 
the votes only of the government and its populist-right wing supporting 
party, the Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti).
The most recent major step in consolidating the new direction of 
Danish security and defence policies was taken with the 2004 defence 
agreement in parliament, covering the period 2005–2009. The agreement 
was supported by a broad parliamentary majority, which included the 
conservative-liberal and the social democratic opposition party. According 
to this agreement, Danish defence forces are no longer designed for 
the territorial defence of Denmark, but exclusively for international 
operations, especially combat operations, and in conjunction with US 
and other Western forces.20 
20 B. Heurlin (red.), Nationen eller verden? De nordiske landes forsvar i dag. 
DJØF-forlagene: København 2007, chapter 3; for the text of the 2004 parliamentary 
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CONFRONTING ‘THE SMALL STATE SYNDROME’
In sum, then, it appears obvious that since the end of the Cold War, Danish 
governments, social democratic and conservative-liberal alike, have 
pursued a novel course in the country’s foreign and security policies, 
marked by (1) clearly more focus on the use of Danish military forces as 
an integral part of policies, and (2) an intimate security policy in tandem 
with the administrations in Washington, regardless of political colour 
( Bush Sr.,  Clinton,  Bush Jr.).
How to account for this change of policies, i.e. from being a loyal, yet 
independent ally with reservations during the Cold War to being a super 
loyal – uncritical, some would say – ally of the United States after the 
end of the Cold War? Several explanations have been suggested. 
First, the new policies have been explained in terms of geopolitical 
theories, implying that after the Cold War, Denmark as a small state 
has a foreign policy interest in forging even closer ties with the distant 
transatlantic superpower as a counterweight to the reunifi ed German 
neighbour as part of the emerging European Union.21 
Second, it has been pointed out that increasingly strong Danish 
commercial and technological interests link Denmark to US strategic 
initiatives and defence policies. For instance, since the Gulf War in 1990, 
key Danish shipping company A.P. Møller-Maersk has become the third 
most important contractor in the world of transportation services for 
the US government, primarily the Pentagon. At the same time, certain 
Danish high-tech companies have gained important contracts from the 
Pentagon.22 
Third, Denmark’s possession of Greenland in the strategically 
important and potentially resource-rich arctic area has been regarded as 
an additional reason for close ties between Denmark and the American 
superpower in the prospective international scramble for oil and sea-
defence agreement, see http://forsvaret.dk/NR/rdonlyres/BD0DB719-4F0F-41A4
-AEDB-4F28C602FCE0/0/20050318Implementeringsnotatet6.pdf
21 O. Wæver, ’Fra halvneutral til hyperallieret – men hvor længe?’, in 
Atlantsammenslutningen, På sporet af europæisk sikkerhed? København: 
Atlantsammenslutningen 2000, 57–72; see also H. Mouritzen & A. Wivel (eds.), 
The Geopolitics of Euro-Atlantic Integration, London: Routledge 2005.
22 For details, see Børsens Nyhedsmagasin (Copenhagen), 15 June 2007.
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routes, and in connection with the establishment of the US Missile 
Defence System.23
Fourth, unusually close personal ties and individual inclinations 
among key decision makers in Denmark and in the United States since 
the early 1990s have consolidated the intimate offi cial relations between 
Copenhagen and Washington.24 
Fifth, the new policies may be seen as a kind of compensation or ‘doing 
penance’ for the controversial – traumatic, to some – ‘footnote period’ of 
the late Cold War period which, according to Danish conservative and 
liberal forces in particular (although also, more indirectly, according to 
certain leading social democrats), seriously threatened the credibility of 
Denmark as a loyal NATO ally in the eyes of Washington and major 
European NATO countries.25
Sixth, and closely related to the previous point, even after the end of 
the Cold War the national security of Denmark is regarded as basically 
depending on the power – and ultimately the nuclear power – of the 
United States. Also in the age of terror and Islamic fundamentalism, it is 
in the fundamental short and long-term interest of Denmark to forge as 
close political, commercial, and military relations with the United States 
as possible.
The crucial point in this connection is that in the public and offi cial 
justifi cation of the post-Cold War Danish ‘militarized’ security policy 
in close conjunction with Washington, the Danish liberal-conservative 
government, and Prime Minister  Fogh Rasmussen in particular, has put 
overriding focus upon the fi fth and sixth of the reasons listed above. This 
may be seen as part of the government’s proclaimed ‘contest of values’ 
23 This point is stressed in B. Lidegaard and T. Højrup, ‘Suverænitetsarbejde og 
velfærdsudvikling i Danmark’, in T. Højrup & K. Bolving (red.), Velfærdssamfund 
– velfærdsstaters forsvarsform? København: Museum Tusculanums Forlag 2007, 
209–246.
24 Individuals to be mentioned in this connection include, in particular, Hans 
Hækkerup, former social democratic Minister of Defense, who developed 
close ties to offi cials in the Pentagon and the RAND Corporation, Poul Nyrup 
Rasmussen, former social democratic Prime Minister, and Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen, liberal Prime Minister since 2001, who developed personal ties to 
Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, respectively.
25 Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, Fodfejl. Da Danmark svigtede under den kolde krig  
København: Gyldendal 2004.
Confronting the ‘Small State Syndrome’
53
(Kulturkampf), which includes a confrontation with the so-called Danish 
‘small state syndrome’. 
A striking example of this point was given by  Anders Fogh Rasmussen 
in a major magazine interview on September 11, 2006, where he levelled 
an unprecedented general criticism of Danish foreign policy “during the 
past century’. According to the Prime Minister, the country’s ‘foreign 
policy was fi lled with double standards and hypocrisy’ because the epoch 
was
dominated by a typical small state thinking of living quiet and 
unnoticed, pretending to be neutral and offending no one. This 
kind of thinking has to be changed. […] In the 1930s, during the 
[Nazi German] occupation and to a large degree during the Cold 
War, the basic attitude was that we should enjoy liberty and peace 
while others were fi ghting for it. This is not an acceptable way 
of thinking in the world we live in today. We must also make our 
contribution, even though we are a small country.26
This was indeed a revisionist reinterpretation of Danish foreign policy 
history of the 20th Century. It not only criticized the small state policy of 
quiescence, acquiescence and cooperation vis-à-vis Nazi Germany during 
the 1930s and during the Second World War. It also defamed the entire 
Cold War foreign policy of not only the social democrats and the Social 
Liberal Party, but also that of the Prime Minister’s own Liberal Party 
and, by implication, that of the Conservative Party as well. According 
to the Prime Minister, these parties had in essence been pusillanimous, 
coward and defeatist confronted with the Soviet neighbouring power and 
military threat. How may this fundamental historical reinterpretation of 
recent Danish Cold War history be explained? 
‘WHICH SIDE WERE THEY ON?’
First of all, it must be noted that statements such as the above had been long 
in the making. During the so-called ‘footnote period’ of the 1980s, voices 
were admittedly heard to the effect that the policies of the parliamentary 
‘footnote majority’ were less than loyal to the United States and the 
26 Mandag Morgen 30, 11 September 2006.
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NATO alliance as such. It was no coincidence when conservative Prime 
Minister  Poul Schlüter asserted in Parliament in1988 that ultimately these 
policies would ‘jeopardize Denmark’s full membership of NATO’.27 
However, the conservative-liberal government at the time consequently 
refused to step down as a result of being ‘voted down’ in parliament on 
security policy issues, since it regarded its ‘restoring economic policies’ 
as in effect more important; a parliamentary majority was behind these 
policies since they were supported by the Social Liberal Party which 
otherwise was one of the ‘footnote parties’.
Therefore, hardly anybody else at the time than probably extreme right 
wing fringes would openly accuse the ‘footnote parties’ as such of being 
outright and consciously disloyal and treacherous to the country and to 
the alliance. But this situation changed decisively during the following 
decade and afterwards. It developed slowly, but accelerated as the 1990s 
progressed. In 1994, the conservative intellectual weekly newspaper 
‘Weekendavisen’ opened a major critical debate on the political excesses 
of the Danish extreme left wing of the 1970s and 1980s, in particular its 
alleged fascination of the totalitarianism of communist-led states.28
The public newspaper debate escalated during the late 1990s, and 
was accompanied by the additional publication of a number of books 
originating from both sides of the divide. In contrast to the early and 
mid-1990s, when the debate unfolded between intellectual former (or 
current) members of radical leftist organisations and outspoken liberal-
conservative individual debaters, the two sides now encompassed 
27 In 1987 Danish history professor Bent Jensen published a monograph, based 
on open sources only, on Danish-Soviet Cold War relations (Tryk og tilpasning: 
Sovjetunionen og Danmark siden 2. verdenskrig. København: Gyldendal 1987). 
Jensen suggested that Danish foreign and security policies since 1945 had 
been formed, to a large degree, by Soviet pressures and Danish adaptation to 
Soviet policies. Generally, Bent Jensen’s book received rather cool and sceptical 
reviews.
28 Ten years earlier, Bent Jensen had published a monograph of a somewhat 
similar character, namely on Danish intellectuals, Communists and ‘fellow 
travellers’ who had expressed various degrees of sympathy with Stalinist Soviet 
Union during the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s (Stalinismens fascination og danske 
venstreintellektuelle, København: Gyldenda1 1984). The book aroused some 
debate, but primarily in quite narrow circles due to the historical nature of book; 
most of the individuals who came under fi re in the book were no longer alive.
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representatives of the broad liberal-conservative spectrum on the one 
hand, and on the other hand representatives of the whole range of socialist 
and social democratic oriented groupings and parties, and included even 
the Social Liberal Party, i.e. the so-called center-left ‘cultural radical 
tradition’ in Denmark.
The new tenet of conservative-liberal criticism in the late 1990s 
contained more or less open intimations that the Social Democratic Party 
and the Social Liberal Party had, in effect, joined the communist and 
socialist left wing in crossing the line of demarcation between freedom 
and totalitarianism. The title of a book on the responsibility of the social 
democratic opposition during the ‘footnote period’, written by  Nils Jæger, 
a retired top offi cial of the Danish Foreign Ministry and published in 
1999, was indicative in this respect. The title, ‘The Historical Desertion’ 
(Det historiske svigt), pointed to the author’s outright accusation against 
the parliamentary majority of ‘siding with the enemy in the great world 
confl ict’.29 That same year, history professor  Bent Jensen published a 
lengthy monograph on Danish-Soviet relations from 1945 to 1965, 
primarily based upon declassifi ed Soviet source material. Although 
his analysis and conclusions were in fact somewhat ambiguous (or 
contradictory) as to the degree of actual Soviet infl uence upon Danish 
security policies during the early years of the Cold War, his book was 
uncritically interpreted by most media as supporting a thesis of general 
Danish acquiescence or even appeasement towards Soviet demands.30
A third book published in 1999 went much further, namely ‘Which side 
were they on?’, edited by  Bertel Haarder, former Minister of Education 
and long-time leading member of the Liberal Party (Venstre). The main 
thrust of the book was contained in its remarkable introduction, written 
by  Anders Fogh Rasmussen, then leader of the opposition in parliament 
and leader of the Liberal Party. Fogh Rasmussen announced that
29 N. Jæger, Det historiske svigt: Socialdemokratiet og venstrefl øjen i den kolde 
krig. København: Gyldendal 1999, 29.
30 B. Jensen, Bjørnen og haren: Sovjetunionen og Danmark 1945–1965. Odense: 
Odense Universitetsforlag 1999. For nuanced reviews, see T. Borring Olesen & N. 
S. Sørensen, ’Spiser bjørne harer?’, Historie 2 (2000), 358–366, and P. Villaume, 




 a showdown is badly needed […] with the forces who, during 
the Cold War, played into the hands of the Soviet Union and the 
Warsaw Pact, [with] those people who were not able to grasp that 
there is, after all, a difference between friend and foe. The simple 
– yet depressing – fact is that here we have to do with people who 
have in fact committed great intellectual and moral betrayal, yet 
has entirely escaped any charge.
Against this background,  Fogh Rasmussen proposed the appointment 
of an independent commission to look into the history of Denmark 
during the Cold War. The liberal leader did stress that the purpose of the 
commission should ‘not be to punish’; the reason was not, apparently, 
that there was no reason to punish, but rather that it was ‘diffi cult to see 
any purpose in placing a legal responsibility for something that happened 
decades ago’. Thus, the real purpose was not revenge, but ‘to come to 
grips with our past’.31
 Nils Jæger’s and especially Fogh Rasmussen’s nearby-accusations 
against the ‘footnote majority’, including the social democrats and the 
Social Liberal Party, of outright treason was soon followed by other 
similar voices in the ongoing newspaper debate.32 From this point of time 
on, the extraordinarily strong connotations of words and expressions such 
as ‘betrayal’, ‘close to treason’, ‘useful idiots’, ‘desertion’, and ‘siding 
with the enemy’ became part of a broadly accepted public discourse on 
Denmark during the Cold War. The notion ‘betrayal’ seemed to have 
become, to use the habermasian expression, a ‘communicative act’, in 
the sense that it has been incorporated in the consensus that constitutes a 
signifi cant part of the Danish debate over Cold War history.33 
31 A. Fogh Rasmussen, ‘Introduktion’, in B. Haarder (red.), Hvem holdt de med? 
København: Peter la Cours Forlag 1999, 8 f.
32 See especially contributions by Kjeld Olesen and by Peter la Cour, in B. 
Blüdnikow (red.), Opgøret om den kolde krig. København: Peter la Cours Forlag 
2003, 340 and 359, respectively.
33 It should be noted that in former Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen’s 
book Fodfejl on Denmark during the Cold War, the notion ‘betrayal’ is not used. 
‘Desertion’, on the other hand, is indeed used in the subtitle of the book (‘When 
Denmark Deserted During the Cold War’). For a similar approach, see the book 
by Danish Lieutenant General K. Hillingsø, Trusselsbilledet – en koldkriger taler 
ud. København: Gyldendal 2004.
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COMMISSIONED COLD WAR HISTORY
The following year, in June 2000, the social democratic  Nyrup Rasmussen 
government actually assigned a research commission under the auspices 
of the independent but government-sponsored Danish Foreign Policy 
Institute, DUPI (from 2003: Danish Institute for International Studies, 
DIIS), to look into the external Cold War threat to Danish security 
originating from the Warsaw Pact. Initially, the liberal-conservative 
opposition agreed that this investigation should be a supplement to 
the so-called PET Commission already assigned in 1999 by the social 
democratic government. On the basis of the archives of the Intelligence 
Service of the Police (PET), the latter commission was to look into the 
internal security threat from leftist and rightist parties and groupings 
during the Cold War.
However, general elections in late 2001 led to a change of 
government, and in 2002 the new liberal-conservative government 
under Prime Minister  Anders Fogh Rasmussen insisted, prompted by 
the government’s parliamentary basis, the populist-right wing Danish 
People’s Party, that the mandate of the DUPI Cold War Commission be 
expanded to include an investigation of offi cial Danish security policy 
and the security policy debate, with special emphasis on the late period 
of the Cold War, i.e. the ‘footnote period’. In particular, attempts by 
the Warsaw Pact countries to exert direct or indirect infl uence, through 
Danish parties and organizations, on Danish debates and foreign and 
security policy formulation was to be examined.34
An intermezzo followed in 2003 when the Danish People’s Party 
insisted that this was not enough. MPs from the DFP explicitly stated 
that additional funding should be given to a research project on the 
Soviet Gulag system, headed by history professor  Bent Jensen from the 
University of Southern Denmark (SDU). As a result of the intervention 
of the Danish People’s Party (DPP), four million Danish kroner (0.6 
million euros) were actually earmarked on the budget for such a project 
and allocated to the SDU, although the DPP readily managed to change 
34 See Dansk Institut for Internationale Studier [DIIS], Danmark under den kolde 
krig. Den sikkerhedspolitiske situation 1945–1991. København:  DIIS 2005, vol. 
1, 15. See also T. Borring Olesen, ‘Truth on Demand: Denmark and the Cold 
War’, in N. Hvidt and H. Mouritzen (eds.), Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 
2006. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies 2006, 82–87.
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the project in the direction preferred by  Bent Jensen, namely ‘Domestic 
confl icts during the Cold War’. As the SDU leadership considered this 
to be a somewhat too direct political involvement in the research of the 
university, the SDU launched an open Cold War research competition 
which resulted in the allocation of only 42 per cent of the total funding 
for Bent Jensen.
Upon this only partial success, the DPP managed during the budget 
negotiations in 2004 to insert a clause by which the government and the 
DPP (i.e. the parliamentary majority) would assess whether the upcoming 
DUPI/DIIS Commission Report on Denmark during the Cold War was 
satisfactory, or whether there was any need for further studies.
Thus, the stage was set for the next act when the DIIS Commission 
Report, ‘Denmark during the Cold War’, was published in the summer 
2005. Its 2,350 pages in four volumes was the result of fi ve years of 
collective research team work under the guidance of three experienced 
senior scholars, and based on a wealth of Danish and international 
archival sources and research literature. However, much of the report 
was immediately assailed by leading representatives of the DPP and of 
the government, including Prime Minister  Fogh Rasmussen, strongly 
supported by professor Bent Jensen and a few other researchers as well as 
by numerous editorials and articles in the conservative and liberal press 
(Jyllands-Posten, Berlingske Tidende, Weekendavisen). A main target of 
attack was one of the cautiously formulated conclusions of the report 
to the effect that the ‘footnote policy’ and the temporary breakdown of 
domestic security policy consensus in the 1980s had only ‘to some degree’ 
negatively affected Denmark’s position and infl uence within NATO.35 
The DPP and other critics of the DIIS Report claimed that their 
scepticism towards ‘closed and offi cial commission writing’ of Cold 
War history was fully vindicated, and during budget negotiations in late 
2005 the DPP managed, once again and with even greater luck, to secure 
additional funding for research of Danish Cold War history. This time, 
no less than 10 million Danish kroner (almost 1.6 million euros) were 
earmarked for ‘free and independent’ Cold War research, by which the 
DPP explicitly meant research done outside of the universities. In the 
end, the funds were allocated to a new, temporary Cold War Research 
35 A comprehensive outline of the DIIS report and of the critical public debate on 
the report is in Borring Olesen, ‘Truth on Demand’, 89–107.
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Centre physically located at the Danish Defence Academy, and the 
government and the DPP even formulated, in early 2006, an unusually 
detailed objects clause for the new Centre, pinning out several specifi c 
themes of research to be pursued.36 The government also handpicked the 
board of the new Cold War Research Centre.
The position of research director of the Centre was, of course, out 
in open competition. Yet it hardly came as a surprise in early 2007 that 
the chosen scholar for the job was indeed professor  Bent Jensen, who, 
on his part, insisted that the research to be conducted at the Centre will 
be absolutely free of any outside political interference, and will be 
independent and, not least, unpredictable.
It should be pointed out, though, that unpredictability, at least, does 
not appear to be the expectation of key politicians who helped the Centre 
into existence. As Prime Minister  Anders Fogh Rasmussen stated in 
parliament in May 2007, writing the history of the Cold War is important, 
in his opinion,
so that we can learn from it, so that hopefully future generations 
will never again repeat the despicable policies and the security 
policy fallacies which the left wing was behind, not least during 
the “footnote period” of the Cold War, which put Denmark in a 
pitiful position in the eyes of the international community. It is 
in order to avoid that the left wing repeats such fallacies, among 
others, that I believe it is interesting to have research in the Cold 
War.37
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Danish foreign and security policy, then, underwent a gradual process 
of transformation during the fi rst 17 odd years after the end of the Cold 
War, a process that appears to be still in progress and consolidation under 
the liberal-conservative government of Anders Fogh Rasmussen since 
2001. The trail was blazed, however, by Prime Minister  Poul Schlüter’s 
36 See Borring Olesen, ’Truth on Demand’, 109.
37 Folketingets forhandlinger [Parliamentary Records], København: Folketinget 
2007, May 9, 2007.
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conservative-liberal coalition government in the late 1980s and the early 
1990s, and in particular by Prime Minister  Poul Nyrup Rasmussen’s 
social democratic-social liberal coalition government (1993–2001).
Recent collective memory (and amnesia) of the domestic political 
controversies of the ‘footnote period’ of the 1980s were used effectively 
by liberal and conservative opinion leaders and politicians during the 
1990s to silence centre-left forces of the political spectrum or to put them 
on the defensive, thereby blocking effective opposition to the radicalized 
version of the ‘militarized’ Danish security policies under the  Bush 
administration from 2001, and in particular Denmark’s active military 
role in the Iraq war since 2003.
A powerful instrument here was here rhetorical simplicity of 
concepts and expressions such as ‘betrayal’ and ‘siding with the 
enemy’, with implicit connotations of ‘treason’. The moral and even 
socio-psychological dimensions of these concepts were diffi cult for 
the centre-left political forces to cope with and to counter. Firstly, and 
paradoxically, because the social democrats and the social liberals 
themselves had been so instrumental in bringing about the preconditions 
for the policy change. And secondly because at the same time, the liberal-
conservative government and its right-wing supporting party engaged in 
a Kulturkampf which involved attempts to change gradually traditional 
aspects of Danish political and foreign policy culture and ultimately, 
by implication, Danish national identity as a small state with security 
concerns and norms which do not necessarily or always coincide with 
those of Denmark’s major Western allies.
In this act of exercising ‘communicative power’, efforts to transform 
the collective memory of the recent past, including the Cold War period 
and the international role of Denmark in the East-West confl ict, seems to 
have played an important part. In more general terms, then, this seems to 
be yet another example, and some would say a rather coarse one, of how 
history needs to be rewritten in order to fi t the (recent) past with present 
requirements and policies.
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Shadows of the Communist Past:
The Consolidation Project of
the Hungarian Left
– Transitional Identity and the
Demarcation of History
 KATALIN MIKLÓSSY
IDENTITY-BUILDING IN TRANSITION  
Creating time-boundaries as political agenda is never as apparent as 
during great social transitions such as was the case after the collapse of 
the communist system in Central and Eastern Europe. Any transitional 
phase presupposes the temporary survival of old elements along with 
the new. Nevertheless, the governing political rhetoric can accentuate 
exclusively the divergences from the previous era. Quick and thorough 
change with a categorical denial of the past can create a need for re-
identifi cation with new ideals; hence it might accelerate the establishment 
of the new system.1 
In this comprehensive process of reformulating the social Self, 
identity-building of ex-communist parties represented an extraordinary 
1 Evans, J. Richard, ‘Introduction. Redesigning the Past: History in Political 
Transitions’, Journal of Contemporary History. Special Issue: redesigning the 
Past 38 (2003:1), 5.  
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example in which coming to terms with the Past became decisively 
important. Defi ning the basic values and goals of democratic statehood 
after an authoritarian system infl icted peculiar diffi culties for the successor 
parties. First, they had to rule out old habits and behavioural patterns in 
policy-making and introduce new standards not only for the party elite 
but also for the loyal membership and sympathisers the parties inherited 
from the previous system. They had to convince the general public that 
the ex-communists had left behind old practices and were now fully 
committed to democracy. In other words, the past was present, on the one 
hand, in the political culture and, on the other, in the immanent political 
discourse. In addition, there occurred another challenge: the successor 
parties constituted the backbone of the new left-wing now called either 
social democratic or socialist parties. Thus, besides their facing the huge 
task of democratising the party organisation and its operational methods, 
they had to modernise the leftist ideology as well. It was not only a 
question of how to distinguish the new platform from the communist 
mind-set but also what the new leftist idea should incorporate in the post-
modern period societies had now entered. 
This article investigates this post-communist identity re-construction 
under the pressures of political discourse over the signifi cance of past 
events for contemporary changes. We chose the Hungarian Socialist 
Party (HSP, in Hungarian Magyar Szocialista Párt) as a case-study, in 
which we focus on the diffi cult process of abandoning the label of being 
a successor party and becoming a convincing social democratic force. 
The party of the communist period, the Hungarian Socialist Worker Party 
(Hung. Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt), simply changed its name in 
1989 to the contemporary one, leaving only the ‘worker’ attribute out. 
This rather smooth modifi cation accentuated the problem of continuity, 
particularly because it was not the fi rst time in the party’s history. After 
the defeat of the Hungarian revolution in 1956 the Hungarian Workers’ 
Party (Hung. Magyar Dolgozók Pártja) took the above mentioned name, 
Hungarian Socialist Worker Party, in order to mark the Soviet-dominated 
change in leadership from the independence seeker  Imre Nagy’s circle.2 
Since the revolution holds a special place in the Hungarian national 
2 See the document about changing names ‘A Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt 
Ideiglenes Központi Bizottságának 1956 november 6-I felhívása a 
kommunistákhoz’ in S. Rákosi (ed.), 1956 júliustól 1957 júniusig. Dokumentumok 
1956–1957 történtéhez. Budapest: Kossuth 1981, 101–104.
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consciousness, the method of changing names is still well-remembered.  
From the point of view of our analysis there is a further peculiarity 
in the Hungarian situation: the political map has been divided into 
conservative-nationalist and liberal-leftist groupings since the early 
1990s, but after 2000 the political arena has been dominated by only 
two parties: the right-wing FIDESZ (Alliance of the Young Demo-
crats) and the Hungarian Socialist Party (accompanied by small client 
parties) constituting basically a bipolar system. Since the FIDESZ, a 
characteristically new-born party (formed in 1988), is in a favourable 
position concerning the discourse over the past, this situation provides 
grounds for extremely pointed debates. 
The fi rst important question to be answered here is how the past 
emerged in the self-perception of and accusations against the HSP under 
the above-mentioned circumstances. Secondly, we examine how the 
major split of the Hungarian political fi eld between nationalist and liberal 
forces affected the consolidation of the socialists as social democrats.   
Our hypothesis is that a liberal, non-nationalist political group was 
better equipped ideologically to adjust to a globalizing post-modern era 
than those parties that were anchored to a dated, typically modernist 
idea like nationalism. Consequently, according to our presupposition the 
main collision in the domestic political arena has its origin in the clash 
of different time-related ideas and their representatives. Since all these 
issues fi tted the discourse over the past extremely well they emerged 
most often as history-debates. In conclusion, we also argue that for no 
other political actor did the Past play such a consequential role during the 
transition as for the emerging new left.   
SEARCH FOR A NEW IMAGE  
The collapse of an entire social-political construction launched an 
extraordinary crisis situation in the whole region where entire societies 
were desperately trying to cope with the demanding and harsh 
circumstances of rebuilding a new basis for social existence. With the 
collapse of the communist system the artifi cially prolonged image of the 
industrial society was also jeopardised. The industrial workers, who were 
considered as the leading class and backbone of state-socialism, suffered, 
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if probably not the most, at least a great deal in the transformation 
process. They mutated from a privileged class into an ordinary employee 
category, and became part of a heterogeneous mass without a point of 
reference.3 Insecurity, fear of marginalisation and unemployment, loss 
of societal position, and confusion about the fast changing political and 
economic situation established a need for strong left wing representation, 
especially in those who were ill-prepared to face transition. The question 
in the Hungarian case was: could the HSP meet the people’s expectations? 
It seemed that as a successor party the socialists were well endowed to 
face the challenges. In the case of a political party, there appears most 
likely a double identifi cation process where, on the one hand, the party 
defi nes itself and on the other, aspires to identify with supporters. In other 
words, it is a question of the identity of the party and its image.4
Transition can be perceived from one angle as the complete reform 
of the state structures and their relation to other spheres of the economy 
and society. As the legacy of the previous system, the ex-communists had 
the advantage of long work experience in running the state, in contrast to 
the beginners of the early 1990s. People became disappointed with the 
hardships the major transformation caused in their lives and blamed the 
political newcomers for their problems. Due partly to their reputation as 
professional politicians the successor parties were elected back to power 
almost everywhere in Eastern Europe in the second round of free elections 
in the mid-1990s. Similarly, the HSP won in 1994 with an outstanding 
result of 54 per cent of all votes,5 which would have legally authorized 
the socialists to form a government all by themselves. Nevertheless, they 
did not dare to do so because they feared that it would have sent a false 
message about the comeback of the communist regime. 
In the process of reformulating identity there occurred a peculiar 
problem for the HSP, namely, how to reach a proper balance between 
3 A. Ágh, ‘The ECE Social Democracy in Social and Political Trap: Social 
Democrats between Europeanization and Post-Accession Crisis’ Conference 
Paper at the Conference Shaping and Reshaping Social Democracy in Central 
and Eastern Europe, Brussels, 28.–29.9.2007, organised by CEVIPOL of ULB.  
4 S. Rokkan, Citizens, elections, parties: Approaches to the Comparative Study 
of the Processes of Development. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget 1970, 154. C. Tilly, 
Stories, Identities and Political Change. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefi eld Pub. 
2002, 45–56. 
5 http://www.vokscentrum.hu/vtort94.htm (downloaded 28.12.2007) 
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continuity and change, between old elements that could be adjusted 
to the changed circumstances and those that had to be reinvented. The 
predecessor communist leadership had a unique but not widely known 
tradition of pragmatist tendency. The realm of ideology was already 
questioned during the mid-phase of socialism, starting gradually from 
the late 1960s. The eventual identifi cation with market economic values 
was coupled with a liberal attitude toward society. In consequence, this 
atmosphere affected the way of thinking of the communists, causing 
severe damages in the ideological foundation. The offi cial attitude 
change towards the ideological establishment became apparent fi nally in 
1976–77 when the Stalinist old-liners were excluded from the party. This 
represented an unveiled rise of economic thought and technocratism, 
which heavily coloured pragmatic policy-making.6 By the early 1980s 
the mid-level party elite were rejuvenated and young professionals 
strengthened the reformist spirit.7 Political decision-making became 
entirely restricted to economy-based considerations. What the successor 
party inherited from the previous system was an utter disinterest in 
ideological matters. 
The consequence of this heritage, however, was dubious in many 
respects. The question was how to distinguish the old platform from 
the new: what was the difference between reformist socialism and the 
rather unfamiliar social democracy? During the whole 1990s the social 
democratic platform appeared only on a declarative level without 
refl ections on any deeper ideological content. This was due to the fact 
that there was no mutual understanding in the party leadership about the 
adequate proportion of necessary changes and acceptable continuities. 
Besides the party elite, also the membership was a mixed group of 
more conservative ex-communists and modern social democrats.8 
Thus, the party failed to provide a synthesizing melting pot where a 
6 M. Kalmár, ‘Az optimalizálás kísérlete. Reformmodell a kultúrában 1965–
1973’ in M.J .Rainer (ed.) ‘Hatvanas évek’ Magyarországon. Tanulmányok. 
Budapest: 1956-os Intézet 2004, 161–197. See also K. Miklóssy, ‘Khrushchev 
after Khrushchevism. The Rise of National Interest in the Eastern Bloc’ in J. 
Smith – M. Ilic (eds.) Khrushchev in the Kremlin: State and Society in the Soviet 
Union, 1953–1964. London – New York: Routledge (forthcoming 2009).    
7 Interview with László Kovács, 4 May 2007. The recorded discussion is in the 




consensus of different ideas could be reached. Instead it was more like 
a loose forum of coexisting divergent opinions. Consequently, the party 
had no common, ideologically identifi able, consistent political line 
as a backbone for decision-making. Due to the lack of a recognisable 
ideological background, decisions were made on a day-to-day basis, 
motivated completely by pragmatic incentives. 
There occurred a consistent tendency to sidestep this problem. 
In the midst of the 1989 changes, there was an attempt to acquire the 
name of ‘Social Democratic Party’, and thus a new profi le with it. As 
 Pekka Korhonen pointed out, a name in its shortness is appropriate for 
repetition; it serves as a reminder of a basic argument and emphasizes 
it.9 The argument hidden in this name brings back the memory of the 
historical social democratic party, which existed before the communist 
take-over. It symbolises the most respected democratic traditions of 
the Hungarian working class movement.10 By choosing this name the 
socialists tried to create an image of their theoretical continuity with 
social democratic ideas instead of communist ones. However, the name 
had already been taken by the reorganized Hungarian Social Democratic 
Party (SDP) which had been eliminated in 1948 by the communist party. 
So, the only thing left for the socialists to do was to stick to their old 
name and reshape the political content. 
The diffi culty in crystallising a sound, new ideological basis was 
partly due to the extraordinary situation of the underlying societal 
transformation. With the decline of social classes the traditional working 
class rhetoric was seemingly hard to replace convincingly. The left wing 
had to address a now fairly unknown and thus unpredictable complex 
multitude of employees, which every other party was also trying to 
infl uence. 
A consistent ideological foundation can clarify the set of values, ideals 
and long term objectives that are the essence of party-identity. However, 
it seemed in the 1990s in the transition countries that the parties had 
diffi culties to come up with a compact ideological base that affected the 
9 P. Korhonen, ‘Naming Europe with the East’, Manuscript of the forthcoming 
article (2008).
10 The Hungarian Social Democratic Party was established in 1890. See also 
I. Simon, A „peyerizmus” mint történeti kategória értékelése és elhelyezése 
a „Peyer-kérdés” problematikájában. Ph.D Thesis Manuscript, Debreceni 
Egyetem, Történeti Intézet, Doktori Iskola 2006.
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electoral behaviour generally. Since people did not have an ideological 
basis to identify with they supported certain policies for awhile without 
party loyalty.  Berglund (et al) argued that the transition societies inherited 
a basically atomized, fragmented structure that infl uenced people’s 
relations with the sphere of politics and their trust in politicians.11  Ralph 
Dahrendorf pointed out that people became increasingly impatient with 
the transition process, requiring instant benefi ts without being interested 
in their costs.12 In this situation lurks considerable danger, especially in 
the case of the post-communist left wing. If the people have no clear 
idea of what a non-communist leftist ideology is, they might identify 
social or economic policy with leftist values. In the transition period 
when the new democracies are called on to make painful decisions13 this 
inappropriate identifi cation pattern can cause alienation and loss of the 
electoral base. This happened in the late 1990s in most of the East Central 
European countries where disillusionment of the left-wing governments’ 
performance emerged. Moreover, this situation can also further populism 
in the political arena since populists operate on the short-term, pragmatic 
decision-making level, promising/demanding economically questionable 
social improvements, and fast answers to diffi cult problems. They can 
appeal to voters that are traditionally leftist sympathisers. It is not by 
chance, for example, that the major political opposition of the Hungarian 
socialists is the FIDESZ, a characteristically populist party. 
In addition, people in Hungary found it diffi cult to identify pragmatic 
social policy decisions with the declared leftist values because left-wing 
administrations (1994–1998, 2002– ) conducted neoliberal, strictly 
monetarist economic policies with major cut-backs on social welfare.14 
11 S. Berglund – F. H. Aarebrot – H. Vogt – G. Karasimeonov, Challenges to 
Democracy. Eastern Europe Ten Years after the Collapse of Communism. 
Cheltenham, UK – Northampton, USA: Edward Elgar 2001, 45–79. 
12 R. Dahrendorf, ‘The politics of frustration’ in  http://www.thedailyjournalonline.
com/article.asp?ArticleId=200655&CategoryId=13303 (downloaded 15.9.2007)
13 T. I. Berend, ‘Changes in Central and Eastern Europe in the Last Quarter of the 
20th Century’ Paper for the Session on Historical Views on the Recent Changes 
in the World Economy, 1980–2000, XIII.International Congress of Economic 
History, Buenos Aires, in http://eh.net/XIIICongress/cd/papers/7Berend63.pdf 
(downloaded 15.9.2007)
14 Ferge, Zsuzsa, ‘Egy mítosz társadalmi ára’ in Társadalmi Szemle 8–9/1998. 
T. Tiusanen – S. Vinni, Hungary in the 1990s. Business Opportunities in 
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Furthermore, the leading politicians sent confusing messages about 
their understanding of aspired goals of social development. As the 
Prime Ministers  Gyula Horn in 1995 and, later,  Péter Medgyessy in 
2003 declared, they wanted welfare but not a welfare state, which they 
considered an outdated illusion.15 The HSP tried to clarify its ideological 
stand as late as 2004, 15 years after its reorganisation. The newly 
elected party leader,  István Hiller announced the programme of ‘New 
Hungarian Social Democracy’ which can be perceived as a systematic 
and articulated identifi cation with social democratic values.16 However, 
it is one thing to make statements about social democratic ideals but 
another thing to provide a plausible representation of it. Since 2004 the 
unfl attering nickname for the leftist administrations has been ‘banker 
governments’, which indicates that people are unable to perceive the 
socialists as representatives of the poor.   
It can be argued that for the HSP creating a new ideological structure 
and its realisation in policy-making suffered from the survival of old 
ideas. It recalled the elementary gap between political language and 
the actual decision-making of state socialism. For a successor party 
it was seemingly diffi cult to abandon communist practices in which 
communication with the people was irrelevant for maintaining power. 
The problem here, however, was that if rhetoric diverged a great deal 
from political ‘reality’ how could the people be convinced of the identity-
change the party had gone through. 
REINTERPRETING HISTORY: DEFINING ‘GUILT’  
The image the HSP desperately sought for was an ultra-modern party that 
was totally capable of handling challenges in a fast changing world. This 
dynamic image was to prove the radical departure from being a successor 
party troubled by the burden of its past. However, in the Hungarian case 
a Successful Transitional Economy. Studies in Industrial Engineering and 
Management. Lappeenranta: LUT 1999. 
15 Medgyessy announced the dead-end of the welfare state in public on 19.8.2003. 
See, for example, the evening news of MTV1 and MTV2. See also Mozgó Világ 
2004/3.  
16 http://www.szocialdemokracia.hu/index_2.php
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the problem was that – as it became evident – the party went through a 
more rapid change than the surrounding society and political discourse.  
The discourse on such interlinked notions as ‘guilt’, ‘crime’ and 
‘victim’ had decisive power over the perceptions of the past and hence 
infl uenced directly the re-identifi cation process of the post-communist 
communities in Eastern Europe. The diffi culty of applying these concepts 
in the Hungarian context is that, considering the extraordinary liberal 
recent decades of the socialist period, their content is blur and ambiguous. 
Since the communist past was not easy to judge by simple terms in 
Hungary, a plausible example was needed to demonstrate the essence of 
the ‘past crimes’ and, as it turned out, the Hungarian commemoration of 
the 1956 revolution was just what the guilt-discourse required. October 
the 23rd represents not only a historical trauma that became canonised 
as a common tragic experience of the nation, but it also symbolises the 
collapse of the communist system since Hungary became a republic on 
that date in 1989. Thus, this day encapsulates the memory of a shared 
sacrifi ce, but also the message that it was worth it. 
The main political discourse ever since 1989 has been centred on the 
ultimate question: who has the right to remember on that day? According 
to the right-wing, the revolution was a manifestation of the Hungarian 
people’s struggle against communism. The violent suppression by the 
Red Army constituted a legitimacy crisis for the Kádárist regime, which 
stepped in. In this light, the contemporary Socialist Party is pictured as 
the successors of the Hungarian Socialist Worker Party, who applied a 
harsh vengeance policy after 1956 and came to power against the will 
of the people. 
From a political party’s point of view, it is vital for its existence to 
create an acceptable public image of its past, and consequently have the 
chance to infl uence the historical consciousness of the people. We could 
argue, relying on  Jürgen Habermas17, that the representation of one’s 
past should be consistent on a minimum level with the prevailing history 
culture of the society in general, but at the same time it should also be 
defendable in the arena of political debates over history. It has been 
diffi cult for the Hungarian socialists to respond properly to the accusations 
because too many public fi gures in their rank and fi le who were directly 




involved in the suppression of the revolution. Subsequently, indications 
that many communists took sides with the people and fought against the 
invading Red Army, or that the very symbol of 1956,  Imre Nagy, was a 
devoted communist, bear no weight in this debate. Prime Minister  Péter 
Medgyessy asked for forgiveness for the Kádárist harsh reprisals against 
the revolutionaries after the suppression.18 Unfortunately, pleading for 
forgiveness is not a satisfactory substitute for the demanding process 
of coming to terms with a moment in the past that symbolises a key 
memory. 
Political rituals are unilateral exercises of power by the political elites, 
which may not only divide people but conceal the lack of consensus in 
society.19 Concerning the commemoration of 1956, it is rather obvious 
that this day in particular does not constitute national unity – it is not 
even supposed to aspire to it. Through this grave juxtaposition of the 
political elite, the people are also compelled to assume bipolarity during 
the celebrations, since instead of one, two opposing political images are 
offered to the people to identify with. 
In times of great changes, when whole societies re-identify 
themselves, one’s past can became a traumatic burden – and as a result, 
coming to terms with one’s past can turn out to be a traumatic experience 
that one tries to avoid by all costs. This stalemate situation concerning 
the governing interpretation of a central memory piece induced the 
Hungarian Socialist Party to initiate major changes in order to overstep 
this divisional line. With the change of leadership in September 2005, a 
more active struggle for reinterpreting 1956 started. The new generation 
of leaders were in their early 40s, and hence literally free of accusations. 
Consequently, they could claim to share the national remembrance. In 
2005, for the fi rst time, the new leadership celebrated the national day 
openly and in a more relaxed way than ever.20 As a result, in 2006 the main 
discourse on 1956 had changed. Now, the direct accusations of past guilt 
were dropped and turned into a covert anticommunist discourse where 
18 He made a speech in the Parliament on June 16, 2004, which was released in 
the evening news and published in Magyar Nemzet the next day (17 June). 
19 N. Couldry, Media rituals: a critical approach. London: Routledge 2003, 
63–67. 
20 The Evening News of the National Broadcast, Channels 1 and 2 23 October 
2005; dailies Népszabadság and Magyar Nemzet 24 October 2005.  
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any contemporary criticism of the socialist-run government strengthened 
the same old argument. In 2006, the subject of the fraudulence of the 
socialist regime was raised because of the release of the PM  Ferenc 
Gyurcsány’s speech in a closed party meeting where he referred to the 
party’s policy of withholding the truth about the economic situation from 
the people.21 The revolution was remembered as the right to fi ght against 
the usurpation of power by dishonest means.22 So, it seems that waiting 
until the last 1956-communist dies is not a good strategy for coming 
to terms with the past because the anti-communist discourse reproduces 
itself in different situations.    
The guilt discourse is also a remarkable opportunity for a new elite to 
take shape and elaborate the boundaries toward the unpleasant legacies, 
as a new force of change. To expose traces of the wrong kind of legacy 
of a political opponent can undermine his/her political credibility while 
strengthening one’s own in contrast. In the Hungarian political debates the 
communist era has been repeatedly referred to by the right wing rhetoric 
as a time outside history. A rather widespread view concerning socialism 
throughout East Central Europe states that communist rule actually sent 
this region off its natural rails and bound it to an alien civilisation. The 
mutual understanding about what the ‘right’ course of history should 
have been is based on the old idea, dating back to the Enlightenment, 
of two different Europes, East and West, where the opposing sides only 
slightly infl uenced each other’s cultures.23 A mediating view of the same 
division was presented by  Jenô Szûcs, who argued that the line between 
East and West is not a strict line but an area where the cultural infl uences 
from both poles meet and create a unique heterogeneous area as an 
outcome. The ‘Europe Between’ is, however, not a crystallised entity, 
but its regions are exposed very differently to the magnetism of East and 
West due to historical reasons. Those that belonged to the hemisphere 
of the Carolinian Empire in the Middle Ages are susceptible to Western 
21 Gyurcsány Ferenc: Speech at Balatonöszöd, 26 May 2006. (Teljes balatonőszödi 
beszédének írott változata) Published in 17 September 2006. Downloaded from 
the website: http://hu.wikiquote.org/wiki/Gyurcs%C3%A1ny_Ferenc 
22 MTV 1 Evening News, 23 October 2006, Magyar Nemzet 24 October 2006.   
23 W. Larry, Inventing Eastern Europe. The Map of Civilisation on the Mind 
of the Enlightenment. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994; F. Braudel, A 
History of Civilisations. New York: Allen Lane, 1993; S. P. Huntington, Clash of 
Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. London: Free Press 2002.  
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infl uences while those that were connected to Bysantium are more likely 
to respond to Eastern affects.24
This argument attempts to modify the public’s history-consciousness 
about the idea of selection; in other words, it clarifi es what moments of 
the common past can or cannot be considered as part of national history. 
Subsequently, those who can be identifi ed with the unwanted period(s) are 
excluded from the defi nition of the nation through the new codifi cation of 
history. A vivid example is the public attempt to discredit a central political 
fi gure by denying state honours. The man in question,  Gyula Horn, was 
a very successful transition politician of the 1990s (prime minister in the 
period 1994–1998) who led Hungary into EU-negotiations and launched 
an unquestionable economic revival after a grave depression. On Horn’s 
75th birthday the socialist PM,  Ferenc Gyurcsány wanted to remember 
his transition achievements by proposing an award but the right-wing 
President refused to accept this. President  László Sólyom replied that 
Horn had an ill-famed reputation of being involved in the suppression of 
workers’ strikes in the aftermath of the 1956 revolution.25 In this case it is 
not only a question of the hierarchy of past events but also of an ongoing 
struggle to establish a competitive evaluation of the present.          
Identity can be understood as a continuous process organised across 
difference. As  Stuart Hall pointed out, it is a positioning of a subject 
that accentuates its position in relation to the Other that is situated at 
the opposite pole.26 In our case, the accepted image of history becomes 
the basis of positioning.  Ernesto Laclau describes this as the relation 
of ‘marked’ and ‘unmarked’ poles of constructing otherness where the 
unmarked stands for normality, referring to the basic governing rule, and 
signifying in this sense the majority.27 The concept of national history 
24 J. Szûcs, ’Vázlat Európa három történeti régiójáról’ in Történelmi Szemle 
1981/3, 313–359.
25 About the polemic see Magyar Nemzet 4 July 2007, Magyar Hírlap 4 July 
2007, Népszava 6 July 2007, Népszabadság 7 July 2007.  
26 Stuart Hall defi ned this two-sided process of identity formation: ‘The notion 
that an effective suturing of the subject-position requires, not only that the subject 
is “hailed”, but that the subject invests in the position, means that suturing has 
to be thought of as an articulation, rather than a one-sided process.’ S. Hall, 
‘Introduction: Who needs identity?’, in S. Hall and P. du Gay (eds.) Questions of 
Cultural Identity. London: Sage 1996, 6.    
27 According to Laclau: ‘Derrida has shown how an identity’s constitution is 
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includes the unmarked position where there is no need to specify the 
content of the notion, while marking the Other with the label of being 
a part of the time outside history puts the counterpart into a defensive 
position automatically. Unmarking creates a presupposed knowledge, a 
common understanding, but it is also a cunning rhetorical strategy, a means 
of relegating a topic outside the discursive sphere. Thus, certain issues 
became non-negotiable in the community; in this case, the hierarchy of 
past events and their signifi cance for the present value-system.         
In consequence, the dominant right-wing rhetoric accuses the HSP 
of not being a national political force but alien by nature to the genuine 
Hungarian political traditions. If we remember that the HSP is the biggest 
left-wing party in the contemporary bipolar political arena the above-
mentioned argument is a signifi cant discursive strategy to disqualify the 
opponent in the struggle for power.  
THE ACHILLES-HEEL OF IDENTITY: THE NATION-DISCOURSE 
Plain labelling, like alien-national differentiation, has a grave side effect: 
people understand the left wing values as being non-national. This 
widely spread conception especially favoured by right-wing rhetoric 
was rooted in a simplifi ed image of state socialism. Accordingly, the 
communist system relied on the principle of internationalism, an idea 
that the regime itself strongly identifi ed with and propagated extensively. 
Internationalism was on the one hand a basic theoretical demand of 
proletarian solidarity without acknowledging the importance of national 
borders. On the other hand, it was also a political action plan that 
worked as a compulsory guideline for the intra-relations of the Eastern 
bloc countries. Although this concept had changed from time to time 
the redefi nitions always came from the Kremlin; thus, it became an 
always based on excluding something and establishing a violent hierarchy 
between the two resultant poles – form/matter, essence/accident, black/white, 
man/woman, etc. In linguistics a distinction is made between “marked” and 
“unmarked” terms. The latter convey the principal meaning of a term, while 
marked terms add a supplement or mark to it. … What is peculiar to the second 
term is thus reduced to the function of an accident, as opposed to the essentiality 
of the fi rst.’ E. Laclau, New Refl ections on the Revolution of Our Time. London: 
Verso 1990, 32. 
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instrument of command in this centre-periphery structure.28 The practical 
aspect of this guideline in the Cold War situation was that the outward 
appearance of brotherhood and unity of the Bloc had to be maintained by 
downplaying national controversies. Although propaganda and political 
practices diverged a great deal especially in the post-Stalinist period29 this 
offi cially cherished attitude caused a great deal of harm for the overall 
image of the socialist era. Since the general public had no insight into 
the secret decision making that ran counter to the propagated line, after 
the collapse, the offi cial historians’ black and white images furthered 
a simplistic understanding which actually refl ected the propaganda 
machine’s message of the previous period.30 Consequently, this false 
knowledge has resulted in two major integral misperceptions in the right 
wing accusations: (1) the communist elite were loyal fi rst and foremost to 
an outside great power; (2) they denied national sentiment par excellence 
on a theoretical basis. From this point of view, a successor party simply 
had no choice but to try to change this non-national, non-patriotic image. 
Transition was a process of reconstructing the states, and moreover it was 
a huge endeavour to redefi ne ‘nation’ for the new era.
We argue that those successor parties with an accentuated 
internationalist image during the socialist era faced comparably graver 
diffi culties in reconstructing their relation to the national discourse than 
those that openly displayed the national character. So, in this respect the 
Romanian Social Democratic Party, for example, is in a much better 
position due to the previous  Ceauşescu regime’s overtly emphasised 
national policy. During the 1990s the party became one of the major EU-
critical forces, declaring the importance of maintaining a non-servile, 
independent line towards outside powers.31 The Romanian party was 
28 F. Barnard Pluralism, Socialism and Political Legitimacy. Refl ections on 
Opening up Communism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1991, 66–81. 
K. Miklóssy, Manoeuvres of National Interest. Helsinki: Kikimora Publications 
2003, 51–61. 
29 Miklóssy 2003. 
30 As Károly Szerencsés put it: ‘Kádár was a nation-denier (‘nemzettagadó’)’ 
See the documentary of K. Szerencsés – I. Szöllős, ‘Az elátkozott XX. század. 
Part 9. A végzetes konszolidáció.”  Presented on MTV2 26 January 2002. 
31 I. Iliescu, Communism, Post-Communism and Democracy. The Great Shock 
at the End of a Short Century. New York: Boulder 2006, 327–356. See also F. 
Abraham, ‘The Social Democratisation of the Romanian Left’ Conference Paper 
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never accused in the public discourse of being a non-national force like 
its Hungarian or Polish counterpart. Similarly, the Bulgarian successor 
party uses openly nationalist, populist rhetoric in relation to the country’s 
Turkish minority much the same way as in the communist system.32 The 
continuity of nationalist discourses helps these parties by consolidating 
them as the national left.           
To establish credibility in front of the public, it is imperative for 
any party to connect to nationally important discourses in order to get a 
foothold in society. In this respect the party formulates its own attitude 
to the central notions of national self-perception and hence defi nes its 
stand as well as itself as a party. In other words, it puts itself on the 
national palette and declares its true colours. By doing this, the party 
participates in the modifi cation or even reformulation of the national idea 
on a general level. 
In times of comprehensive modernisation processes, as in our case 
during the democratic transition where the whole social being comes 
under reconsideration, taking an active part is vital for the political 
parties. By having a say in the reconstruction they also fi rmly establish 
themselves in the new system being formulated and, by the same token, 
by avoiding involvement in certain areas they effectively exclude 
themselves from these spheres. Consequently, there are central issues in 
major processes that the parties can not afford to be unconcerned about. 
In the post-communist transition, the state and the nation were closely 
interlinked mega-spheres to be transformed structurally. Their intimate 
connection meant that they were inter-dependent concerning the huge 
reformation and therefore both had to be reconsidered simultaneously. 
Political actors had to come forward with constructive ideas for the 
modernisation of both areas.  
If we compare these two aspects of this overwhelmingly massive 
task of post-communist transition we can fi nd an interesting imbalance 
between the two. The reconstruction of statehood relies to a greater extent 
on institutional restructuring of the political, legal, economic and social 
at the Conference: Shaping and Reshaping Social Democracy in Central and 
Eastern Europe. Brussels, 28.–29.9.2007, organised by CEVIPOL of ULB.   
32 N. Stoyanova, ‘Desecuritising Identity in Souteastern Europe: the Bulgarian 
Turks from the ‘Revival Process’ to Euro-Atlantic Integratio’, Conference Paper 




spheres. It means a huge number of clear-cut changes, the introduction of 
totally new elements – in other words, a transparent distinction from the 
past. The reappraisal of the nation-concept is deeply bound up with the 
emphasis of continuity axiomatically. In the construction of a national 
identity the concept of the past plays a central role33: basic common 
denominators are necessarily time-related elements like language, 
myths, common fate, territory and historical consciousness.34 We argue 
that the nationhood discourse is accentuated especially in times when the 
political elite feel themselves threatened or insecure in relation to power. 
And the period of transition was nothing else but a time of uncertainties 
and instabilities owing to the radical changes in every sector of social 
being. 
In the Hungarian historical consciousness besides the idea of political 
nation there is a wider connotation of an ethnic nation. Political nation 
refers to the concept of citizenship and thus to that of the state. The term 
ethnic nation is, ironically, connected also to the notion of the state but 
on a more ancient level, as an indirect reference to the fi rst kingdom that 
established statehood for the Hungarians. The memory of this ideal state 
lives on in the culturally based defi nition of outlander Hungarians35, 
a population that is scattered around the borders of modern Hungary. 
Whereas political nation is remembered in the trauma of 1956, the idea of 
the ethnic nation, on the other hand, is crystallised in the Trianon trauma, 
which refers to the sorrow caused by the loss of territories and population 
after the disaster of the First World War. 
In the case of socialist identity formation, neither of these key 
points of reference can be absorbed easily. In addition to the earlier 
mentioned problems of connection with the memory of 1956, the idea of 
the ethnic nation turned out to be an insurmountable notion to relate to. 
The party tried to avoid discourse on it throughout the 1990s and as an 
33 Benedict Anderson referred to the artifi ciality of the idea of the nation which 
has been created to be politically aware and is presented with a ready-made 
concept of identity. B. Anderson, Imagined Communities. Refl ections on the 
Origins and Spread of Nationalism. London – New York: Verso 1996, 37–45.  
34 A. D. Smith, National Identity. London: Penguin Books 1991, 10–14.
35 Hungarian ethnic groups living as minorities in the neighbouring countries. 
The term ‘Hungarians living outside the borders of Hungary’ (in Hungarian: 
‘határokon túli magyarság’) has settled in the political language and also in 
scientifi c literature during the 1990s.
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auxiliary strategy it started to stress the importance of EU-membership. 
The emphatically right-wing agenda of advocating the improvement 
of minority rights for the Hungarian minorities in the neighbouring 
countries was not acknowledged in the socialist foreign policy goals. 
In contrast, for the left the EU served as a means of salvation for all 
problems, including minority rights. However, this tactic meant that 
the socialists simply withdrew from the ‘nation’ idea which helped to 
strengthen their internationalist image but linked them to a ‘wrong’ past. 
By ignoring the whole subject, the HSP has overlooked the signifi cance 
of the urgent present need for modernisation of the nationhood idea. This 
unwillingness is rooted obviously in the past attitude the party has been 
accustomed to. To a great extent it is a failure in communication since 
the party relates to subjects it feels comfortable discussing and not to 
subjects that need to be discussed. 
Looking at it from another angle, it is fair to say that the HSP as 
a successor party has long been socialised to neo-liberal ideals and 
individualism, fi rst by the reform in communist thinking in the late 
socialist period, and then by the pragmatic attitude towards policy making 
in the 1990s. On the one hand, this might partly add to the extraordinary 
success of the HSP, which is unmatched among the left-wing parties in 
the whole region (being elected to power in 1994, 2002 and 2006). On 
the other hand, this ideological affi nity makes it diffi cult for the party 
to absorb and adjust to the nation concept, which is characteristically 
based on the idea of communality. Consequently, it partly explains the 
reinterpretation of the applied left wing ideology itself, which can be 
categorised as a typical ‘third way’ platform in spite of the solemn party 
declarations.             
CONCLUSION: LEFTIST IDENTITY IN TRANSITION  
In great systemic transformations identity, based on historical self-
perception, is considered with impatience, as if it were not an integral 
part of the overall transitional phenomenon in which the old structures 
gradually fade away. In constructing a new system after the collapse of 
communism it was necessary to create a watershed in order to visibly 
mark a change from the previous era. Transition is a coup d’état of minds 
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where identifi cation with the basic values of the new era is expected to 
happen overnight. The underlying reason can be found in the complexity 
of the situation. On the one hand, a sudden identity change is supposed to 
ensure the irreversibility of the change in the system by denoting a wide 
consensus of new values. This mutual understanding is also needed for 
the huge project of restructuring the whole system. On the other hand, 
this requirement of quick identity change helps the new elite to come to 
the fore and seize power. For this reason, it is also in the interest of this 
elite to demand a division between old and new identities.  
 Identity is a social construction that manifests a deeply political 
relation between the past and present, in which the contact of different time-
dimensions always involves interpretation, argumentation, manipulation 
and rhetoric.36 The transitional period was a time to rebuild party identity 
and its image for the outside world. Reformulating party identity relied 
on the success of reinventing a non-communist leftist ideology and of 
refl ecting it in political practice. The problem, as it appeared, was that 
like any other successor party the HSP carried the weight of old practices 
and had long diverged from value-based policy making; in addition it had 
no genuine social democratic experience of its own.  
The direct and indirect discourses on the past also caused serious 
diffi culties because they set any successor party into a defensive position 
automatically. From a defensive position it is not easy to take part in 
the reinterpretation process of the past that the transitional societies had 
to conduct for their future’s sake. The demarcation of an acceptable 
past from the unacceptable also accentuated the new boundaries for 
the identity of the community. The struggle to be incorporated into the 
national history actually meant a deserved place in society.      
Nonetheless, the transition periods can produce extraordinary 
situations where identity has not yet been crystallised, therefore weak, 
and hence the image becomes a substitute for it. Image in itself is a 
strong discursive power that can shape unsettled identity on its own, 
which is why politicians’ contradictory representations can be harmful 
for identity building. It can not only prolong the accomplishment of this 
re-identifi cation process, but controversial statements can undermine the 
36 P. Anttonen, ’Menneisyyden politiikka’, in P. Kettunen – A. Kultanen – T. 
Soikkanen (eds.), Jäljillä. Kirjoituksia historian ongelmista. osa 2, Turku: Kirja-
Aurora 2000, 11–12. 
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reliability of a compact image. Still, the greater problem in the case of 
formulating the new left is the loss of points of reference for what the 
essence of leftist values is. Thus, problems in the identifi cation process 
can launch a complex crisis also in the society, where people are confused 
about which leftist values can be accepted without the shadow of the 
communist past.
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Symbolic Places in Berlin
before and after the Fall of the Wall
 HANNES SAARINEN
In 1945 Berlin was taken by Soviet forces. Shortly afterwards the former 
capital of the German Reich was occupied by the four wartime Allies and 
eventually divided into a ‘western’ and an ‘eastern’ half. In the course of 
the Cold War Berlin was not only a focal point of international political 
power demonstrations and crises, it also assumed quite different symbolic 
functions.  
On the one hand there were signals tinged with propaganda. They 
were associated with the name of the city and indirectly connected with 
the city’s former, current and future role as capital. On the other hand 
Berlin, which in 1991 was again elected capital of Germany, became 
a place of historical signifi cance conveying Germany’s recent past, a 
place of meaningful remembrance culture with visual symbols, such as 
memorials, historical buildings and memorial sites, and ‘atmospheric 
symbols’, such as streets and urban spaces. In this context the term 
symbolic places signifi es both concrete objects and a mostly politically 
intended desire or attitude to remember certain events of the recent 
past.1 In post-war Germany, and today perhaps even more than ever, 
memoralisation has become a part of ‘national education’.2
1 The German publication, Deutsche Erinnerungsorte [Places of Memory] vol. 
I-III, (edited by Etienne Francois, Hagen Schulze). München: C. H. Beck 2001, 
contains articles about several such places in Berlin with signifi cance for the 
nation’s  memory, as the Reichstag, the Wall, the Brandenburg Gate, the Freedom 
Bell, the Palast der Repulik and the Museumsinsel. See also A. Kaminski (ed.), 
Orte des Erinnerns. Gedenkzeichen, Gedenkstätten und Museen zur Diktatur in 
SBZ und DDR. Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag  2007, 45–154. 
2 See E. Wolfrum, Geschichtspolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Der 
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The most well-known edifi ce of the Cold War is doubtless the Berlin 
Wall and ‘The fall of the Berlin Wall is one of the defi ning images of the 
late twentieth century.’3 It did not prove itself a successful and permanent 
solution for the preservation of the German Democratic Republic 
(GDR), as desired by the Communist party dictatorship. Instead it was, 
and always remained, a negative symbol for a state which had never been 
democratically legitimated and depended on this construction for its very 
existence.
For years, even after the GDR’s international recognition in 1972 
with East Berlin as its capital, slogans such as ‘peaceful coexistence’ 
and ‘normalisation’ concealed the fact that Berlin as a whole was still 
a symbol of division, and visible proof that the ‘German question’ was 
still unsolved. After the fall of the Wall in 1989 the city became a symbol 
of unity, a seismograph and laboratory for monitoring the unifi cation 
process. The information and media society, and the constant fl ow of 
images, also act as driving forces in the formation of historical myths 
surrounding the city of Berlin.
The subject I am dealing with here is both extensive and complex 
from a scholarly point of view, so I shall focus on six topics, mainly in 
chronological order: beginning with the name of the city, how it was 
used during the Cold War, and then the way in which the ‘negative’ past 
of the city was cleaned up. This concerns, for example, street names 
and public monuments. Berlin’s 750th anniversary celebrations in 1987 
marked a turning point, when both halves of the city tried to demonstrate 
their links with the older historical heritage in a positive manner. Only 
two years later the Wall came down. This leads us to the question of 
the symbolic character of the old and new capital Berlin. The last two 
chapters are located in the present. Firstly how does the city remember the 
bygone GDR and the presence of the four Allies, and secondly what are 
the symbols of the German capital of today. This contribution concludes 
with some remarks on two of Berlin´s most outstanding and timeless 
Weg zur bundesrepublikanischen Erinnerung 1948–1990. Darmstadt: Wiss. 
Buchges. 1999; K. von Schilling, Scheitern an der Vergangenheit. Das deutsche 
Selbstverständnis zwischen Re-Education und Berliner Republik. Berlin: Philo 
Verlagsgesellschaft 2002.  
3 C.A. Constabile-Heming et al. (eds.) Berlin – The Symphony Continues: 
Orchestrating Architectural, Social and Artistic Change in Germany´s New 
Capital. Berlin: de Gruyter 2004, 3.
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architectural symbols, the Reichstag Building and the Brandenburg Gate, 
both of which are defi ning monuments which survived all the regimes of 
the fi rst German nation state.4 
 
CLAIMING THE NAME OF BERLIN
In the years of division the two city sides claimed they represented the 
real, original Berlin. The name had a signal effect. Well into the eighties 
‘Berlin’ was used without qualifi cation in western terminology to denote 
the western part of the city, but in the broader sense it always referred to 
the whole of the divided city. In eastern offi cialese terminology Berlin 
tended to refer mainly to the eastern part of the city. The ‘western sectors’ 
were presented, for instance in illustrated books, as a vivid example of 
capitalist exploitation. This suddenly changed after 1961: in maps printed 
in the GDR, ‘WB’ or ‘Westberlin’ was a blank white area, a nonentity, 
an alien place. 
The only solution was for each side to fi nd a more straightforward 
term or description for its own part of the city. The simplest and clearest 
form of distinction was East and West Berlin. This was the convention 
in the west. As is well-known, in those days the terms East and West had 
different connotations. They still live on. In the fi fties ‘the golden West’ 
was in widespread use among GDR inhabitants, much to the annoyance 
of the SED, the ruling Communist party. On the other hand the party 
probably never tried, and certainly never succeeded in, reversing the 
negative connotations associated with ‘the East’. The eastern attribute 
which was often used pejoratively in western Germany (eastern zone, 
eastern sector, East Berlin) simply became a non-word in the SED 
vocabulary. The term ‘Soviet’ was also unpopular, which probably 
explains why the ‘Soviet sector’ dubbed itself the ‘democratic sector’, 
and why in the fi fties GDR publications referred to ‘democratic Berlin’ 
as opposed to East Berlin.  
In the process numerous positive self-descriptive terms were 
generated by east and west and often ironically rebuffed by the opposite 
4 For the history of Berlin since 1945 and further literature used here, see W. 




side. Here, from the western standpoint: a ‘showcase of the free West’ 
with a ‘bargaining chip of Communist tyranny’ over there. Or, from the 
eastern standpoint: a ‘hotbed of subversive imperialist warmongers’ 
over there, here the national home of ‘democratic progress’. In the west: 
capitalism, a free market economy, but in the same city, in the east: a 
planned economy, socialism and the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’. 
When the west spoke of an ‘island of freedom’, the east pointed an 
accusing fi nger at unemployment in the west of the city which was still 
very high in the fi fties. Later, when the east spoke of a ‘city of peace’, 
the west merely had to mention the victims of the Wall. The western 
side saw itself protected by the USA (and the British and French) while 
the east was occupied by the Soviets, and vice versa from the opposite 
perspective.
At that time some of the most effective propagandistic descriptions 
for Berlin came from Bonn, the provisional federal capital. Addressing 
the Bundestag in October 1949,  Adenauer called (West) Berlin the ‘strong-
hold of democratic western Europe’, prompting jeers of ‘American 
imperialism’ from the KPD which was still represented in parliament.5 
Adenauer liked to belittle the GDR government, which had claimed 
Berlin as its capital in 1949, by constantly calling it the ‘Pankow regime’. 
During the fi fties West Berlin was also dubbed the West’s ‘cheapest atom 
bomb‘, the ‘thorn in the fl esh of the East’ and the ‘front-line city’. In the 
eighties Honecker once again cited these western epithets as imperialist 
positions which history had disproved.6 In retrospect the thorn in the fl esh 
of the GDR seems quite an apt image, since the western radio and TV 
transmitters in West Berlin could broadcast almost throughout the GDR. 
Today only one of Berlin’s many attributes has retained any appeal. 
The current Berlin Senate seems to wish to cultivate Berlin’s international 
image with the slogan ‘the city of freedom’,7 but the concept of freedom 
used here is much broader than the classic political liberties of the 
citizens. East Berlin and West Berlin are still commonly used terms. And 
today in some areas, such as in youth culture, and only in Berlin, the old 
negative-positive contrast has actually been reversed: the east is trendy, 
while the west is slow and rather uninteresting. 
5 F. Matthey (ed.),  Entwicklung der Berlin-Frage. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 
1972, 52.
6 E. Honecker, Aus meinem Leben. Berlin: Dietz Verlag 1981, 202.
7 Berliner Morgenpost 16.8.2007.
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The SED, which spent decades after 1949 doggedly pursuing the 
‘universal recognition’ of the GDR, defi nitely had no interest in registering 
its capital under the ‘East Berlin’ trademark. After all, the city’s historical 
centre belonged to them. The resulting, rather cumbersome offi cial term 
was ‘Berlin capital of the GDR’. No real capital in the world had a name 
like that. So the city’s addendum was soon increasingly omitted, which 
meant that atlases printed in the GDR then looked like this: there was a 
city with the name of Berlin in bold print, this was the socialist capital. 
Depicted next to it was a second city, ‘the separate political entity’ 
called ‘Westberlin’, an isolated enclave within the confi nes of the GDR 
state border.8 A comparison of two German encyclopaedias provides a 
similar picture. The western introduction stated: ‘Berlin, former capital 
of the German Reich, divided as a result of World War II...’, while the 
eastern version simply said: ‘Berlin, capital and political, economic and 
scientifi c-cultural centre of the GDR...’. If readers wanted to know about 
the western part, they had to look under the headword ‘Westberlin’.9 
But what about the Berliners themselves? In this respect President 
 John F. Kennedy defi nitely won the contest of symbolic meanings. 
Speaking in a symbolic place, at Schöneberg Town Hall beneath the 
freedom bell donated by America, he fi nished as follows: ‘All free men, 
wherever they may live, are citizens of Berlin, and, therefore, as a free 
man, I take pride in the words “Ich bin ein Berliner”.’ This fi nal key 
sentence in German circled the globe. But today his words have little 
meaning without knowledge of the original context. At the time they 
confi rmed how astonishingly quickly, especially since the beginning of 
the Cold War, the name Berlin had developed a positive note in American 
ears. After all, the Americans had also once seen the capital of the Third 
Reich as the bulwark of evil. A decisive event fi fteen years before 
Kennedy’s speech contributed to this major image change amongst the 
Western Allies: the cutting-off of West Berlin and Stalin’s attempt in 
1948 to bring the whole city under Soviet control. The ensuing, often 
dramatic airlift was successfully carried out by the Western Allies. In 
the west it came to symbolise the upheld freedom of two million (West) 
8 Haack Weltatlas, 7. Aufl age, Gotha: VEB Hermann Haack Geographisch-
Kartographische Anstalt 1987, 28.
9 Meyers Enzyklopädisches Lexikon in 25 Bänden, vol. 3, Mannheim: 
Bibliographisches Institut 1971, 840;  Meyers Universallexikon, vol. I, Leipzig: 
VEB Bibliographisches Institut 1978, 260–61. 
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Berliners. In 1951 Berlin’s fi rst western political memorial was erected, 
the Airlift Memorial, dedicated to the airlift and the airmen and Berliners 
who lost their lives. 
     
CLEANING UP THE PAST
According to eastern propaganda only the East Berliners lived ‘in free-
dom’, in contrast to the West Berliners, in other words the East Berliners 
had been liberated from fascism and exploitation. The date of reference 
was the unconditional capitulation of the German Reich on 8/9 May 1945 
in Berlin-Karlshorst. This is where we fi nd the fi rst symbolically loaded 
edifi ce of the post-war years. The scene of capitulation was turned into a 
memorial site for the ‘victory of the Soviet Union and its allies over fascist 
German imperialism’. It was the place to illustrate how the Soviet Union, 
which had been attacked by  Hitler’s Germany, had defeated fascism and 
liberated Berlin. This indicated that the subsequent ´anti-fascist´ GDR 
was on the right side, the side of the victorious nation. There is no need to 
stress that the topic of rape by members of the Red Army was absolutely 
taboo at that time, and that nowadays the bigger picture of Germany’s 
defeat, occupation and liberation is far more differentiated. 
However, the four wartime Allies did agree in principle on one point 
concerning the former capital of the German Reich: all surviving visible 
references to and political symbols of the Third Reich should disappear. 
The prime candidate in terms of buildings was Hitler’s new Reich 
Chancellery in the Soviet sector. The partially war-damaged building 
was demolished. 
In general the top priority was a new beginning rather than 
reconstruction. In contrast to Warsaw, where the national architectural 
heritage was completely and systematically destroyed by Nazi Germany, 
and then buildings, including the palace, were recreated from nothing, 
the aim in the whole of Berlin was to make a break with the past. The 
most radical act in this respect was carried out by the leading communist 
functionary  Walter Ulbricht fi ve years after the end of the war, with the 
explicit political aim of destroying a political symbol. In a spectacular 
demolition event he ordered the detonation of the burnt out shell of 
the Royal City Palace, a baroque masterpiece by  Schlüter which had 
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marked the city centre for 250 years. Reconstruction would certainly 
have been possible. Although the palace had symbolised the power of 
the Hohenzollerns in earlier times, after 1918 it had only been used as a 
museum and, as  Bertolt Brecht once noted, great buildings were made by 
workers, not by rulers. Premier  Otto Grotewohl is said to have cynically 
remarked at the time: ‘Nobody will care two hoots once the palace 
has gone’. He was wrong. The Bundestag has now voted in favour of 
reconstruction in the original dimensions and using parts of the original 
facade to create the ‘Humboldt Centre’ which will act as a new cultural 
complex. Seeing this as a tribute to the rulers of Prussia is a popular 
misconception. It is simply a reconciling gesture in honour of Berlin’s 
best architect for this urban space, even though he died almost 300 years 
ago.  
The competition between the two political systems during Berlin’s 
post-war reconstruction is symbolised by two rival model quarters: fi rst, 
Stalinallee (now Karl-Marx-Allee) in the east, a neo-classical palatial 
boulevard, and in response, the Hansaviertel with its slogan ‘the city 
of tomorrow’10 in the west, a relaxed residential complex designed 
by international architects. Meanwhile, the classicism of the former 
Stalinallee has been ennobled. Like the Hansaviertel, it has now been 
added to Berlin’s catalogue of protected buildings. This could be a sign 
of reconciliation, but the visible contrast remains. They were singular 
products of the Cold War, both without any normative infl uence for later 
urban planning. 
Berlin was spared a cultural palace similar to Stalin’s dominating gift 
to Warsaw. Such ideas for a ‘central building’, a key landmark in the 
old city centre, were restricted to the drawing board.11 In contrast, the 
American’s made their mark on the city architecture of the fi fties with 
their democratic and cultural sense of mission. These buildings included 
the daringly designed Congress Hall on John Foster Dulles Allee, an 
America Memorial Library and the Henry Ford Building of the new Free 
University in the west. In 1989 the Congress Hall was transformed into 
a multicultural ‘House of World Cultures’ possibly signalling a change 
in attitude towards America. Around 1968 the American cultural centre 
10 Interbau Berlin 1957. Amtlicher Katalog, Berlin 1957,  55.
11 See P. Müller, Symbolsuche. Die Ost-Berliner Zentrumsplanung zwischen 
Repräsentation und Agitation. Berlin: Gebr. Mann Verlag 2005, 106–154.
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‘Amerika-Haus’ defi nitely became an early example of how a young 
generation questioned belief in America’s freedom mission and vented 
their anger by attacking the building.
It was only in the sixties and seventies, after the construction 
of the Wall, that the GDR capital created a modern, ‘socialist’ centre 
between the old Royal City Palace site (meantime Marx Engels Platz) 
and Alexanderplatz. The areas’ unique barrenness is still a conspicuous 
oversized relic of planned economy. The city landmark was a 
technological, future-oriented edifi ce, an over 300-metre-tall television 
tower which has dominated Berlin’s skyline ever since. During the Wall 
era the viewing area offered spectators an excellent view of the city, 
including West Berlin. It created an unavoidable, not exactly explicit, 
but nevertheless political power symbol in the heart of the old city.12 And 
it became the prime symbol of the GDR capital. The tower was popular 
with the public, and some probably still see it as a nostalgic monument 
of the vanished GDR. 
The population assessed the two competing economic and social 
systems mainly on the basis of the available levels of prosperity and 
living standards. And corresponding symbols emerged, such as specifi c 
central boulevards with an accompanying atmosphere. Berlin’s major 
pre-war boulevard, Unter den Linden, had been destroyed. It now lay 
in the east. As an alternative in West Berlin the Kurfürstendamm was 
successfully revamped to become a glittering ‘showcase of the west’.
It was enticing bait. It had everything: expensive shops, cinemas, thea-
tres, cafés, nightlife and big-city traffi c. At one end stood the im pressive 
ruin of the Kaiser Wilhelm Memorial Church (Gedächtniskirche), 
consecrated in 1897. This became West Berlin’s visual symbol, but 
not in honour of Kaiser  Wilhelm I, the founder of the Reich. Quite the 
opposite: his name was usually omitted. The ‘memorial’ was now seen as 
an earnest reminder of the Reich’s demise and of  the wartime suffering. 
Not far away was probably the west’s most enticing and opulent 
consumer paradise, the ‘Kaufhaus des Westens’ or KaDeWe. A tradition 
was cultivated: the store’s name dates back to 1907, but even then it was 
seen as evidence that the so-called New West was something grander in 
the expanding city.
12 P. Müller, Symbolsuche, 248–280.
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The east had nothing comparable, because the corresponding consumer 
world could not be created, nor was it offi cially desired. Despite the 
reconstruction of a few 18th century public buildings, the once legendary 
Unter den Linden never regained its once lively atmosphere during the 
GDR era. A further attempt was made with the modern design of the 
traffi c hub at Alexanderplatz, where East Berlin’s fi rst large department 
store was built. As demand was still unrequited, the refurbishing of 
Friedrichstraße was started during the years of  Erich Honecker, but the 
project was interrupted by the fall of the Wall. Meanwhile the mythical 
splendour of the Kurfürstendamm has also faded: it is now a victim of 
capitalist profi t maximisation.
Nowadays the new capital’s symbolic urban space is Potsdamer 
Platz: in pre-war Berlin the city’s Piccadilly Circus, during the Cold 
War the meeting point of three sectors, the British, American and the 
Soviet. When the Wall was built it was simply one of the wastelands, 
where the effects of division could be viewed – only from the west, of 
course. Today it is a lively mixed quarter: three miniature commercial 
skyscrapers, a theatre, a shopping mall, the international fi lm festival 
centre, hotels, apartments. Some strategically placed remnants of the 
Wall for the tourists and markings on the ground tracing the Wall are the 
only reminders of the past division.
But the symbolic nature of names is not limited to some famous 
streets and squares. After 1945 the naming and renaming of streets 
often acquired politically charged signifi cance, especially in Berlin. 
National Socialist names were of course erased, but the Soviet sector 
went beyond this. Names from the Wilhelminian era, even from the 18th 
century, vanished. Wilhelmstraße was redubbed because it was once a 
German Reich power centre. Representative streets were then named 
after leaders and heroes of the workers’ movement and GDR politicians. 
To give a few examples: Wilhelmstraße  was renamed after the fi rst East 
German premier and became Otto-Grotewohl-Straße, Danziger Straße 
was renamed after  Georgi Dimitrov, the Bulgarian communist who 
played a famous role in the Reichstag Fire Trial,  Kaiser Wilhelm Straße 
became Karl-Liebknecht-Straße, and Horst-Wessel-Platz (before 1933 
Bülowplatz)  became Rosa-Luxemburg-Platz. Of course the names of 
 Marx,  Engels,  Bebel,  Lenin and  Stalin were also commemorated.
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Berlin’s east administration also applied another cleansing method 
to its historical urban space. All public monuments to Prussian rulers 
were removed from the streets, a ‘revolutionary act’, a punishment and 
revenge well-known in history. This included the national monuments 
to the unifi cation emperor  Wilhelm I, and King  Friedrich II (the Great), 
who was an undesired fi gure on the offi cial parade and demonstration 
arena of Unter den Linden. The large monuments to nineteenth-century 
German unifi cation and the wars of 1864 to 1871, the Victory Column, 
 Moltke,  Roon and  Bismarck have survived to the present – they stood in 
the British (not the French) sector. 
In 1980  Erich Honecker justifi ed the return of the Friedrich monument. 
Like other reinstated Prussian statues, he said it had been created ‘by 
famous sculptors’ and was thus ‘part of the people’s culture’. This was 
a somewhat feeble attempt to protect himself from the (interviewer’s) 
suspicion that it could be risky for the ‘GDR and the FRG to celebrate some 
of the same past national heroes.’13 It was indeed risky. East Berlin did, of 
course, erect new ‘socialist’ monuments. The rather insignifi cant  Stalin 
statue existed for just ten years. The SED’s most ambitious enterprise 
was to create a suitable monument for the ‘fathers’ of Marxism, ‘for the 
greatest sons of the German people’,  Karl Marx and  Friedrich Engels. 
But the result in 1986 was a fairly modest, very conventional sculpture. 
It was left standing after 1990, whereas the colossal  Lenin monument, 
erected shortly before his 100th birthday, was demolished after 1990. 
However, a larger-than-life statue dating from 1986 and depicting the 
communist leader in the Weimar years,  Ernst Thälmann, still acts as a 
reminder of the communist movement. It stands in a residential area on 
the outskirts of the city.
 Renaming in the west rarely discriminated against fi gures of Prussian 
or Wilhelminian history: Bismarck,  Hindenburg, Kaiser Wilhelm (I) 
survived in West Berlin. The Straße des 17. Juni was the only street 
renamed after a contemporary political event, the East Berlin uprising of 
1953. The symbolism and tribute to the victims was all too clear, since 
the road ran east, straight to the Brandenburg Gate, and the eastern sector 
border. 
After 1990 local CDU and SPD politicians successfully reinstated 
almost all of the traditional street names – except for the one com-
13 Honecker, Aus meinem Leben,  437. (Interview on 4.7. 1980)
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memorating Kaiser  Wilhelm I – in the city centre (in the east). The 
artifi cially created Marx-Engels Platz was dispensable, since  Karl 
Marx was still honoured with streets in west and east. As ‘victims of 
the revolution’  Rosa Luxemburg and  Karl Liebknecht were sacrosanct. 
The Greens disliked the return of Wilhelmstraße, but their alternative 
‘Toleranzstraße’ failed. All the names of SED and Eastern Bloc celebrities 
disappeared, and Leninplatz became the Platz der Vereinten Nationen. 
THE RIGHT AND THE POWER TO INTERPRET THE CITY’S HISTORY:
THE 750TH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS
Just three years before the unexpected end of the GDR in 1990 both 
halves of Berlin elaborately celebrated the city’s 750th anniversary. 
Looking back, the self-assurance of the GDR state celebrations in their 
semi-capital is quite striking. While West Berlin wanted to illustrate 
the historically evolved and, despite the Wall, still existent common 
denominators, the east was interested in stressing only the dividing 
aspects. They even claimed to be the sole legitimate bearer of the name 
Berlin. Some western commentators saw this, quite correctly, as the GDR 
capital’s claim to an ‘exclusive right of representation’,14 even though 
East Berlin was smaller in terms of population and area than its western 
counterpart. It was irrelevant that the Federal Republic of Germany with 
its much larger population had long since abandoned the exclusive right 
of representation for the whole of Germany, as was the practise in the 
fi fties and sixties. Although the SED leadership had constantly attacked 
this position, in the context of the situation and from a democratic 
majority perpective, it seems to me, it was more plausible. 
Marxist historians pointed out that the GDR was founded in Berlin, 
whereas the western ‘imperialist dividers’ of the German people had 
‘retreated to Bonn on the left bank of the Rhine’.15 The implication was 
clear: the GDR supposedly possessed greater legitimacy than the Federal 
Republic of Germany, because it was founded in Berlin. Thus the better 
German state, the ‘socialist German fatherland’, was unquestionably the 
14 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 29.9.1986.
15 750 Jahre Berlin: Thesen. Dresden: Verlag Zeit im Bild 1987, 53
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GDR. The idea was probably to discredit the prevailing political and 
historical ‘west orientation’, the ‘road to the west’ which west German 
historians, such as  Hans-Ulrich Wehler and  Heinrich August Winkler,16 
had recognised since the seventies as a lucky coincidence and the only 
right decision.
In 1987 recollections of the older native historical heritage were, and 
still are, clearly manifested in East Berlin in a particular place, the so-
called Nikolaiviertel. A small section of the old city, a characteristic of 
all old central European cities, was simply recreated with prefabricated 
concrete panels. Since cultural and building policies lacked orientation 
and modern design lacked appeal, a hold was sought in the past, in 
reconstructed ‘islands of tradition’. The trend was by no means confi ned 
to the GDR. Things were similar, and increased, in western Germany. 
The recently decided reconstruction of the Royal City Palace in Berlin 
also belongs in this context. 
Representation through a combination of older history and modern 
design, of culture and politics – this was illustrated by the venues 
the GDR leadership chose for the two highlights in its 1987 Berlin 
celebrations: the opening in the reconstructed Schauspielhaus, and the 
‘state ceremony’ in the ‘Palast der Republik’. This building, completed 
in 1976 in a record ‘thousand days’, contained the People’s Parliament 
and public restaurants. It was supposed to express the modernity of 
socialism, but strangely needed the feudal-sounding word ‘Palast’. Its 
architecture, the marble facade, its use of form, was neither socialist nor 
GDR specifi c. In private it was compared with a western department store. 
Its design was unspectacular. But according to contemporary witnesses, 
this palace for workers and farmers, built on the old Royal City Palace 
site, was very popular – and the slow demolition process starting in 1997, 
due to asbestos content, and intensifi ed since 2006, caused protests. 
Opinions differ. What did the palace stand for? For a dictatorship, or 
for petty bourgeois everyday geniality? Should not a western democracy 
have preserved it as testimony to a historical phase? Again there is an 
interpretation confl ict between purpose, content and form – and a distinct 
fear of the symbol.
16 See H. A. Winkler, Germany: The Long Road West, Volume Two, 1933–1990. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007.
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The GDR capital always wanted to mirror its ‘international standing’. 
The Schauspielhaus, a historicising new creation, a concert hall in the 
old shell of 1821, linked up with the Old Prussian bourgeois-monarchic 
culture of representation. And there was an element of competition 
with West Berlin too. Berlin’s international fame as a city of music was 
inspired by the philharmonic orchestra. But it resided in the western city, 
and thanks to the prestige of its conductor  Herbert von Karajan, also had 
a stunningly modern, internationally renowned home, the Philharmonie. 
On her visit to West Berlin in 1987  Queen Elizabeth II pointed out that 
the city symbolised ‘the German nation in the sphere of culture and the 
sciences’,17 a distinction to which West Berlin aspired. It is worth noting 
that a ‘state ceremony’ with Federal President  von Weizsäcker marking 
Germany’s unifi cation took place in the Philharmonie on 3 October 1990, 
not in one of the halls in East Berlin.
THE FALL OF THE WALL AND THE DEBATE SURROUNDING THE CAPITAL
During the years of so-called peaceful coexistence of the Soviet Union 
and its allies towards the capitalist world in the late sixties and in the 
seventies, the western side tried to come to terms with East Berlin being 
the GDR capital, while struggling to secure West Berlin’s existence as far 
as possible. One result in connection with  Willy Brandt´s Ostpolitik was 
the Quadripartite Agreement which was reached by the four former al lies 
on the Berlin area and came into effect in June 1972. This agreement 
signifi cantly eased the situation of West Berliners on their ‘island’. 
Today it is tempting to see West Berlin’s continuing existence differently, 
but not only Der Spiegel once saw it as a city in demise.18 The question, 
whether the collapse of the GDR and reunifi cation was foreseeable in 
the eighties, was universally denied around 1990. But shortly before, 
a number of western politicians had again emphasised Berlin’s special 
role as proof of the ongoing German question.  Heinrich Albertz, former 
governing mayor of West Berlin, said in 1983: ‘Berlin is the only bit of 
Germany that has still not fi nally been settled…’, and Federal President 
17 Der Tagesspiegel 27.5.1987. At the same time M. Gorbachev was on visit in 
East Berlin. 
18 ‚Berlin- Stadt in Bedrängnis‘, Der Spiegel No. 42, 9.10.1967
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 Richard von Weizsäcker cited the city’s most famous architectural symbol 
in 1987 with striking intuition: ‘The German question will remain open 
as long as the Brandenburg Gate remains closed’.19
In 1990 Richard von Weizsäcker stressed in a highly regarded speech, 
that Berlin was the only place where Germans came from both east and 
west, but were nevertheless united. Even the PDS, the successor to the the 
former Communist party in the GDR, saw things similarly: Berlin was 
‘the only east-west city’ in Germany, 20 and should thus be Germany’s 
capital again.
The event that had accelerated Berlin’s division in 1948, the 
introduction of two currencies, was reversed on 2 July 1990, when the 
DM replaced the GDR Mark in the east. The DM was a highly sought-
after symbol of the west, and many an East Berliner had associated it 
with West Berlin. Finally it had arrived – but not as a blessing for the 
budget of the soon unifi ed city, quite the opposite. The unifi cation of 
Berlin resulted in a defi cit. Without going into details, it was due to 
the loss of the federal subsidies, almost total de-industrialisation, and 
above all the lacking economic attraction of the nominal capital. The 
federal capital’s failing self-suffi ciency has since created a debt problem, 
harming its image compared with the rich federal states. Who pays for a 
historical symbol? It no longer has a Prussian state to support it. 
The capital city function opens up special perceptions and expectations 
of a city. Is it, should it become, or can it feasibly be the cultural, political 
and economic centre, and thus a dominant emblem of a state? Did the 
Federal Republic, a federal state with strongly established centres, need 
a prime city again, a metropolis that dominates all areas of politics, 
economics and culture? Did it need a city which ‘functions as a national 
symbol’, as Berlin’s Senator for Construction and Housing,  Wolfgang 
Nagel rapturously declared, just because reunifi cation had surprisingly 
expressed an existing German national sentiment?21  Johannes Rau, 
prime minister of North Rhine-Westphalia, prudently warned that opting 
19 H. Albertz et al., Lokal 2000: Berlin als Testfall. Reinbek: Rowohlt 1983, 
258  
20 Gregor Gysi in H. Herles (ed.), Die Hauptstadtdebatte. Bonn: Bouvier 1991, 
25
21 Kongreßbericht. Erste Stadtkonferenz Berlin. Planen, Bauen, Wohnen (edited 
by Senatsverwaltung für Bau- und Wohnungswesen). Berlin 1990, 12. 
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for Berlin as a ‘symbolic decision’ harboured certain dangers.22 Many 
agreed with him that the ‘modest’ city of Bonn would guarantee the 
continuity of a decidedly western democracy, a democracy based on 
non-national constitutional patriotism and championed by people such 
as the political scientist  Dolf Sternberger and especially the philosopher 
 Jürgen Habermas with his theory of the ‘post-national constitutional 
state’. Did Berlin hold the lure of power, or was it more like a healthy 
warning? The question came to a head in fi erce discussions about the 
concept of the ‘Berlin Republic’ which then faded into oblivion.23 Today, 
one thing is certain: if the ‘Berlin Republic’ really is different from the 
pre-1990 Federal Republic, the change cannot be ascribed to the place 
called Berlin. 
The former GDR population was never particularly enamoured 
with its privileged Berlin. But they would have been very irritated if 
everything had been decided in the west after their accession to the 
Federal Republic of Germany. In the summer of 1991 the Bundestag 
vote for Berlin as seat of government was carried by a narrow majority. 
Minister  Wolfgang Schäuble’s speech helped tip the scales. He said that 
Berlin had always been the ‘symbol of unity and freedom, of democracy 
and the constitutional state, for the whole of Germany’, but he made 
his appeal mainly with the future in mind.  Willy Brandt again reminded 
everyone of promises from the  Adenauer era and of ‘West Berlin’s free 
self-assertion’, but also of the fact that Berlin was ‘a symbolic form of 
solidarity with the East’.24 
Although historical arguments, including Adenauer’s capital city 
promise of 1949, were presented in favour of Berlin, they were not 
particularly convincing. Champions of the cause preferred to stress 
Berlin’s East-West mediator role and its central position in the new 
Europe. CDU Chancellor  Helmut Kohl felt a permanent need to couch 
national sentiment in the European context. Pure German nationalism 
was much scorned in the ‘old’ federal republic and despite everything 
still aroused suspicions abroad of revived German aspirations to power.
22 Die Hauptstadtdebatte,  84.
23 H. A. Winkler, ’Die “Berliner Republik“ in der Kontinuität der deutschen 
Geschichte’ in Werner Süß/ Ralf Rytlewski (eds) Berlin. Die Hauptstadt. Bonn: 
Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 1999, 235–244.
24 Die Hauptstadtdebatte, 29–30, 38.
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Berlin’s history was here to stay, but what was the main focus now? 
During these months a new theme crystallised in both west and east to 
form an almost set phrase: ‘Berlin – it’s the city that mirrors German 
history like no other.’ East Berlin’s last mayor,  Tino Schwierzina, put 
it this way: ‘We forget and repress nothing. Here was the centre of the 
Third Reich, here was the headquarters of Nazi terror. The Holocaust 
was decided here.’ He did not mention that it was also the centre of the 
second German dictatorship, but his audience either knew that anyway, 
or were afraid of the details. The idea now was to link up with ‘the city’s 
democratic and republican traditions’, with ‘liberal’ Prussia, the ‘struggle 
for liberty’ of 17 June 1953 and the ‘democratic movement of 1989’.25 
Antifascism and resistance, Weimar and the Empire were still clearly 
absent. 
Around 1990 there was a widespread tendency to blame Berlin for 
Germany’s recent history. It was even called the ‘symbol of German 
guilt’.26 A much older Berlin tradition was associated with Prussia, with 
magnifi cent 18th century buildings and intellectual principles, such as 
tolerance and enlightenment. But in other parts of Germany, especially in 
the west, Prussia seemed to be eternally associated with negative values, 
such as subservience, discipline and militarism. In the capital-city debate 
some advocates saw Berlin’s supposed lack of tradition as an advantage: 
Berlin had always been a future-oriented city of the modern age. 
Berlin’s reunifi cation and the prospect of becoming the German 
capital came as a blessing to urban designers who outbid each other with 
their visions of a new metropolis. Historical symbolism also played a 
big role. ‘Critical reconstruction’ became the key theme. The aim was 
to rescue the ‘remains of the middle-class world’ of old Wilhelminian 
Berlin which post-war generations in ‘east and west’ had eradicated 
with ‘unparalleled fury’ driven by a hatred of the past and a belief in 
progress.27  But above all, the Wall had left a deep gash in the body of the 
25 Ganz Berlin im Aufbruch: Richtlinien der Magistratspolitik. Edited by 
Magistrat von Berlin 1990, 14
26 Konrad Weiß (Bündnis 90) in Die Hauptstadtdebatte, 99. 
27 Hans Stimmann, ’Berlin nach der Wende: Experimente mit der Tradition des 
europäischen Städtebaus’, in Berlin. Die Hauptstadt. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für 
politische Bildung 1999, 543, 550.
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city, a wound that needed healing open-heart surgery. Others saw signs of 
a ‘dawning neo-Teutonism’ in the architectural debates of 1994.28 
It is amazing how vehemently the Third Reich guilt syndrome was 
projected onto the urban environment after 1990. Berlin’s Senator for 
Construction and Housing,  Wolfgang Nagel, reckoned the ‘age of fascism’ 
urgently needed ‘reappraisal’, and it was thus essential to ‘fi nally make 
the Holocaust visible’ too.29
This happened in 2005 with the dedication of the ‘Memorial to the 
Murdered Jews of Europe’ in a very central location, a few paces away 
from the Brandenburg Gate. There has seldom been such a heated and 
controversial debate, about collective guilt, responsibility of the nation 
and the purpose of remembrance set in stone.30 The remarkable museum of 
German-Jewish history had opened a few years earlier in Kreuzberg, and 
planning began on extensions to the museum ‘Topography of (SS) Terror’. 
The Holocaust memorial, with some 2,700 granite stones in an area of 
20,000 square metres, stands in the former so-called ministerial garden 
at Wilhelmstraße. A place steeped in history. Although unintentional, the 
 Goethe memorial of 1880 stands opposite on the western side like an 
earnest reminder of German humanism. Between the two runs a further 
symbolic reminder of German history: a trail of cobble stones marks the 
route of the fallen Wall. 
It was only a matter of time before other victims spoke out, including 
Sinti and Roma and homosexuals, claiming a memorial of their own in 
the government quarter. One Berlin newspaper referred to a veritable 
‘memorial quarter’ in the centre of Berlin.31 Silence surrounded the long-
standing central memorial of the Federal Republic of Germany dedicated 
to ‘the Victims of War and Tyranny’ on Unter den Linden in the former 
‘New Guardhouse’ designed by  Schinkel. In the GDR a daily military 
ceremony took place at this ‘Memorial to the Victims of Fascism and 
Militarism’ as it was then called. Federal Chancellor  Kohl ensured its 
28 K. Hartung, ‘Doppelgesicht: über die Paradoxien Berlins‘, in  Kursbuch 137. 
Berlin: Rowohlt 1999, 9.
29 Kongreßbericht. Erste Stadtkonferenz Berlin, 11. 
30 On the signifi cance of this question for German identity, see M. Fulbrook, 




rededication and extended the circle of victims by explicitly including 
the second German dictatorship. But critics complained that the naming 
of victims was too vague, and that the perpetrators were included. 
During the Cold War both sides had already erected remembrance sites 
for the victims of the years before 1945. By chance, Berlin’s division saw 
the memorial site of Count  Claus Schenk von Stauffenberg’s execution 
in West Berlin, while Lichtenberg Cemetery was in East Berlin. This was 
where the bodies of  Rosa Luxemburg and  Karl Liebknecht were interred 
in 1919. After the war all GDR dignitaries were buried at this ‘Socialists’ 
Memorial Site’ which is still a rallying point for the ‘left’. 
In the past 100 years one development is clear: the growth of ‘warning’ 
memorials and ‘memorial sites’ as opposed to simple ‘monuments’. 
Whereas individuals were once remembered for their commitment to 
something, people are now remembered as the victims of something. One 
aim of these remembrance sites is doubtless the awakening of a sense of 
responsibility and the development of civil consciousness. This requires 
a certain level of refl ection and knowledge on the part of the observer. 
Can this form the basis of a positive attitude to the nation state, or is the 
objective prevention?
REMEMBERING THE GDR AND THE FOUR ALLIES
 
The war ended over sixty years ago, the Cold War is over and Germany 
is unifi ed, but political experts still treat recent German history with an 
element of trauma or mourning.  Educational goals such as ‘warnings’, 
‘overcoming the past’ and ‘coming to terms with the past’ illustrate this. 
As the former capital of three fallen German states and today’s seat 
of government, Berlin is – as stated at the outset – predestined to be a 
living museum and a place of symbolic remembrance culture. But, as 
yet, there are few reminders of Germany’s division, which is still part 
of many people’s living memories. The 17 June, commemorating the 
1953 people’s uprising in the GDR, was a national holiday in the Federal 
Republic of Germany up to reunifi cation. A few years ago, at the place 
where East Berliners once demonstrated against their government in front 
of the GDR House of Ministries, today’s Ministry of Finance, a modest 
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work of art was installed in the pavement as a reminder of the uprising. 
In contrast the building’s surviving large external mural ‘In Praise of 
Socialism’ of 1951 is far more overriding.
As yet Berlin has no explicit monument to German unifi cation, but a 
debate seems to be under way. Only  Eduardo Chillida’s Berlin sculpture in 
front of the Federal Chancellery suggests the ongoing process of growing 
together. Whether it is too soon, whether a democracy has no need for 
triumphal stone monuments, whether it is care to avoid new nationalism, 
or simply the fact that things happened so peacefully without victims to 
be remembered – who can tell?  We should also bear in mind that the 
euphoria of 1990 was short-lived. 
The ways of ‘remembering’ the GDR are contradictory and still in 
fl ux. All former sites of the Ministry of State Security, offi ces and prisons 
are open to the public. Yet complaints can be heard that, despite debates 
about the secret police and shoot-to-kill orders, the history of the ‘second 
German dictatorship’ is still being neglected, or even played down. The 
Museum of German History is ‘critically assessing’ the GDR dictatorship 
as part of over 1,000 years of German history. Old everyday culture is 
of great interest, as the current wave of so-called ‘Ostalgia’ shows – and 
there is a small GDR museum with a fully equipped living room of the 
times. For the time being at least, the history of the GDR seems to be 
mutating into a nostalgically idealised memory of everyday life. 
 The Berlin Wall was the overriding negative symbol of the Cold 
War and division, and a key symbol standing for the ‘inhumanity of 
Communism’. In reality the 164 kilometres of boarder installations 
and blocking systems were only visible from West Berlin. In the East 
access to the ‘border area’ was impossible. Today the Wall with all its 
intricacies can no longer be viewed for what it was and what it stood 
for: a ‘barbaric construction that separated our city and the Berliners for 
over 28 years’.32 After reunifi cation, in the euphoria of those months it 
was quite easy to understand that the Berlin Senate wanted to get rid 
of the Wall as soon as possible: It concretely separated the people, it 
was an obstacle to traffi c, it was ugly, but not simply that, it was the 
symbol of fi nally overcome oppression and inhumanity. Only a few 
relics remain. There is a remembrance site in Bernauer Straße which is 
currently being extended. And a border-crossing building, the so-called 
32 T. Schwierzina in Ganz Berlin im Aufbruch, 3.
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‘palace of tears’ at Friedrichstraße Station, has symbolic character. But 
here in particular, the problems surrounding authentic building shells 
become clear. The content has vanished in every respect and is hardly 
understandable now. Only those with real memories have associations 
with the building. Nothing is authentic at the famous border crossing for 
foreigners: Checkpoint Charlie. But the place has gained a mythical aura 
through literature and is a major tourist attraction. The imagination and 
scant knowledge is fi red by a museum full of related fi lms, photos and 
objects. But there is no explicit memorial, here or elsewhere in Berlin, to 
over one hundred people killed at the Wall (and over 1,000 killed on the 
inner-German border). 
In one place monumental symbolism from the Cold War years has 
been preserved. The colossal Treptow ‘Monument to the fallen Soviet 
Heroes’ is the city’s largest post-war memorial. Of the four Allies only the 
Soviet Union had such large-scale cult monuments erected on conquered 
enemy territory. They were far more than resting places for the thousands 
of fallen soldiers. They were victory monuments. This is borne out by 
the pathos of the reliefs, and especially by the newly gilded Stalin quotes 
carved in stone. When the last Russian troops left Germany, the Federal 
Republic of Germany signed a contract with Russia promising to maintain 
this and similar Soviet sites on former GDR territory. 
Probably a more signifi cant memento for the Germans in their capital, 
a reminder that the Soviet Union had conquered  Hitler’ s Germany and 
that Moscow held the key to solving the German question, is a similar but 
much smaller monument with a martial bronze statue of a soldier located 
right in the city centre. It is strategically placed just a short way from the 
Reichstag Building and the Brandenburg Gate. The Soviet powers had it 
erected straight after the war, but it lay in the British sector, in subsequent 
West Berlin. It stands within visible distance of the already mentioned 
Victory Column which commemorated the Prussian victories in what are 
known as the German wars of unifi cation. The rise and fall of the nation 
state from 1871-1945 are symbolically documented in a very confi ned 
urban space. 
After 1990 the western Allies were content to make contributions to 
a museum that remembers their role as ‘protecting powers’ in Berlin. It 
is located in a one-time US army cinema on Clayallee, itself dedicated 
to the man who engineered the airlift. The museum in Karlshorst, with 
the unchanged hall where Germany capitulated, has now altered its name 
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and purpose to accommodate German-Russian ‘understanding between 
nations’. Barracks once used by allied forces, especially the huge Soviet 
army complexes, for instance near Nauen and in Wünsdorf, often stand 
empty and decaying. But the latter are vivid reminders of the explosive 
Cold War military confrontations, and of how heavily West Berlin was 
surrounded by military presence.
Did the four Allies have nothing in common that is manifested 
today? The buildings where the Allied Control Council and the Allied 
Kommandatura met for a few years, both in West Berlin, are acknowledged 
as such with plaques, but they are not memorial sites. One of the last 
jointly run institutions was Spandau Prison in the British sector. It was 
completely demolished after the suicide of its last prisoner  Rudolf Hess, 
to prevent it ever becoming a ‘martyr’s shrine’ for neo-Nazis.
NEW AND OLD CAPITAL CITY SYMBOLS
Once Berlin had been chosen as capital in 1991, decisions had to be 
made about the federal institutions. The Federal Republic also expected 
to represent itself with symbolic buildings in its new seat of government. 
Again the same question arose: Was historical continuity desirable or even 
possible? Should the now unifi ed Germany start from a new beginning? 
As so often the result was a more or less pragmatic compromise, the 
old Reichstag Building was accepted as the seat of parliament – as will 
be shown later, but reanimating Wilhelmstraße was out of the question. 
With just one exception, the ministries that moved to Berlin received 
offi ces in existing buildings in the district of Mitte, in former East Berlin. 
The Bundesrat moved into the former Prussian upper house. The federal 
president took up residence in the west, or rather, he stayed there, since 
Bellevue Palace had been his ‘second offi cial residence’ since 1959. 
The real nerve centre with parliamentary offi ces and chancellery 
was sited near the Reichstag Building. The architects  Axel Schultes and 
 Charlotte Frank designed a chain of buildings, a symbolic ‘federal ribbon’ 
that joins west and east, beginning with the rather large chancellery 
in the west close to the old sector border and ending in the east with 
the Bundestag library. At this point the Spree was once separated by 
the border. Now, with its new embankment promenades, it makes you 
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particularly aware of something long ignored: a river fl ows through the 
heart of Berlin. But the River Spree, Berlin’s quietly fl owing, oldest 
natural city link, does not possess the same symbolism that the mythical 
Rhine gave to Bonn.
This leaves us with the two timeless architectural symbols of the 
capital which survived all the regimes of the fi rst German nation state 
and following times: the Brandenburg Gate and the Reichstag Building. 
An arc can be drawn, from Prussia through  Bismarck’s empire to the 
present day. When the Bundestag in Bonn decided to move the seat of 
government and parliament to Berlin, a building also had to be chosen. 
The Palast der Republik with the People’s Parliament chamber was clearly 
out of the question, although it fulfi lled all the technical requirements and 
was easy to reach in the city centre. It was simply the wrong symbol. But 
in the west, immediately next to the Wall, was the Reichstag Building. 
As a symbol it was predestined to house the German parliament again, 
despite its worst defeat there in 1933. The building was completely gutted 
and remodelled ready for the move. The members wanted a glass dome, 
which the architect  Sir Norman Foster duly provided. It became a new 
symbol of the ‘Berlin Republic’. In the language of architecture glass 
symbolised transparency, and transparency symbolised democracy.
A great deal of historical signifi cance is concentrated in and around 
this building: outside, inconspicuous white crosses for some who died at 
the Wall, inside the restored graffi ti left by the Red Army in 1945. Most 
of the external allegorical decorations from the Wilhelminian era, such 
as a Germania statue, have vanished. There was even a debate about 
renaming the ‘Reichstag’. The Bundestag deserved a building with a new, 
modern name. Apart from this the word ‘Reich’ itself was negatively 
charged. The name remained – the building is still generally called the 
Reichstag.
When Berlin was divided by the Wall, the Reichstag bore the 
German fl ag of black-red-gold which had been reintroduced in the 
whole of Germany after 1945. The same fl ag fl ew on the neighbouring 
Brandenburg Gate, but this one bore the GDR insignia created in 1956. 
The Brandenburg Gate had always been Berlin’s most famous city 
symbol since it was built with its grand, ancient Greek-style pillars in 
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1788. It was originally a city entrance gate presenting an impressive view 
of the main thoroughfare Unter den Linden. As Berlin grew, the gate no 
longer stood on the edge but in the centre of the city. 
Who owned the gate after 1945? The district border between Mitte 
(Soviet sector) and Tiergarten (British sector) ran a few metres west of 
the gate, which was thus in East Berlin’s custody. It was now the entrance 
to the ‘democratic sector’, a kind of initial visiting card. East Berlin’s 
city council renovated the war-torn gate in 1957. The crowning quadriga 
was recast in West Berlin. The Prussian insignia were removed in the 
East, but without any addition of socialist symbols.
This gate, shut and impassable since 1961 at the heart of a city of 
millions, epitomised the division of the one-time imperial capital, and of 
Germany itself. Seen historically it would be easy to wag a moralising 
fi nger: wasn’t this gate too often used as the setting for demonstrations of 
military and political victories and power? But again this depends on the 
standpoint. Alongside the picture taken by  Jevgeni Chaldei on the roof 
of the Reichstag, the photo with the Red Flag implanted on the shattered 
Brandenburg Gate with its bullet-ridden Victoria, is the most famous 
visual document of victory over the National Socialist dictatorship, but 
also of Germany’s total defeat.
After 1961, from the eastern perspective, the massive Wall lay behind 
the gate and was hardly visible, but from the western side it was blindingly 
obvious. It became the ritual site for western politicians to decry the 
GDR regime and communism in front of running cameras, right through 
to President  Reagan who demanded in summer 1987: ‘Mr Gorbachev, 
open this gate! Mr  Gorbachev tear down this wall!’33 At the time many, 
including westerners, regarded this as a hopeless, futile provocation. 
The east referred back to the original gate of peace in an effort to 
cleanse it of ‘militaristic and imperialistic’ connotations.  But it was 
risky trying to turn the Brandenburg Gate into the symbol of a promising 
socialist city. Even so, it still appeared on stamps and in every illustrated 
(East) Berlin book. Ignoring the Wall in the latter would have been 
counter-productive, so standard phrases emerged ranging from ‘anti-
fascist protective wall’ to ‘GDR state border’. The new East Berlin 
landmark, the Television Tower, was much easier to handle, but lacked 




west and east, was solved as follows: a western encyclopaedia printed 
an aerial view of the Brandenburg Gate, including the Wall and thus the 
city’s division; an eastern encyclopaedia showed the neo-classical section 
of Karl Marx Allee (previously Stalinallee) with the Television Tower.34 
After the fall of the Wall the gate became the symbol of German 
unity and the peaceful overthrow of the GDR. Could this be the missing 
monument to German unifi cation? In metaphorical terms it certainly 
became a vehicle of national meaning. Everywhere, at home and abroad 
and in all visual media, this was the favourite image for references to 
recent German history and the present. The gate was restored at great 
expense as the most valuable authentic gem in the city’s heritage. The 
Prussian insignia of victory, the eagle and iron cross of 1814 were 
reinstated on Victoria’s sceptre. The Brandenburg Gate: as history’s 
plaything of interpretation, the four horses could even – anachronistically 
– be seen to symbolise the four Allies whose embassies now stand in the 
gate’s immediate vicinity, as they last did in 1939. 
OUTLOOK
Nearly every capital in Europe has a symbolic function for its country 
and special symbolic places to illustrate this. Having been the capital of 
three vanished states, Prussia, the German Reich of 1871 and the German 
Democratic Republic, having endured division during the Cold War, 
Berlin re-emerged in the nineties as capital of the whole of Germany, but 
mainly as the seat of government, lacking the traditional concentration 
of fi nancial and economic power. However, over the centuries Berlin has 
accumulated a unique collection of memorial sites and other architectural 
relics. In addition to this the four powers, the United States, Great Britain 
and France on the one hand, and the Soviet Union on the other, left their 
marks whilst piloting and accompanying the process of re-education in 
post-war Germany. In 1945 at the end of a disastrous dictatorship each 
side propagated its own idea of democracy, a new trust in freedom and 
peace at one of the most sensitive points in divided Europe. This in turn 
34 Meyers Enzyklopädisches Lexikon in 25 Bänden, vol. 3, 842;  Meyers Uni-
versal lexikon, vol. I, 260–61. 
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evolved into an ongoing struggle over the right to interpret history and its 
visual symbols. The confrontation in Berlin resulted in a special symbol 
of the Cold War period, the Wall. 
More than anywhere else in Germany Berlin has become a sphere 
of politically intended remembrance, a place of national education and 
image-making. Two years ago, when Der Spiegel announced in its title 
story the ‘Comeback einer Weltstadt’, the cover featured several of the 
architectural symbols already mentioned here with a design echoing 
the famous New Yorker style: the Brandenburg Gate acted as the as the 
central eye-catcher, leading to the Prussian Victory Column and fl anked 
by a variety of edifi ces, such as the Reichstag, the Gedächtniskirche and 
the Bode Museum, all erected in the time of the Prussian and German 
monarchies. Relegated to the sideline in the background we can make 
out a slender Television Tower, a single reminder of the GDR, while 
the Federal Chancellery and Potsdamer Platz act as representatives of 
the new ‘Berlin Republic’.35 Remarkably, the picture shows no trace, 
not even the slightest hint, of the Wall. It has vanished. Although the 
concrete Wall was rapidly demolished after reunifi cation, it is well worth 
considering, whether it nevertheless continues to exist ‘in the minds’ of 
the people, as the saying goes, and pondering how long this will last.
The question remains how all these symbolic places will be perceived 
by the now growing young generation in Berlin, Germany and abroad. 
For the future of these young people a recent artistic symbol in Berlin 
could be of greater relevance. At the heart of the Parliament’s Reichstag 
Building, in contrast to the old 1916 inscription on the façade ‘To the 
German people’, the artist  Hans Haacke created a new hotly debated 
dedication ‘To the Population’. With this he embraced the growing 
proportion of migrants in German society. Will they be integrated into 
a German nation – and its complexly symbolic history, or will such 
questions be of less signifi cance to a population more deeply involved in 
the great cultural diversity which exists in society today?
Translation from German by  Ann Robertson, Berlin 
35 Der Spiegel No. 12, 19.3.2007.
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 Lenin Lives in Finland
 JONI KREKOLA
During the Cold War era, Finland’s foreign policy was based on friendly 
neighbour relations with the Soviet Union. Offi cially, the state relations 
were defi ned in the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual 
Assistance (the YYA Treaty, 1948). Culturally, the Finns had to create and 
maintain a more positive image of their former enemy. The politicians 
and historians had to, among others things, reconsider their relation to 
Vladimir Lenin, who had became the canonized symbol of the Soviet 
system.    
The legacy of Lenin in Finland, especially since the late Cold War 
era of the 1960s, is the subject of this article. Lenin’s grip on Finland 
is explained by his personal contribution to the history of Finland, an 
issue that has been debated since the gaining of independence in 1917. 
After the fi rst demonizing decades and the Second World War, Lenin’s 
public representations became more positive in Finland. A museum was 
dedicated to him in 1946, and later Lenin started to appear in names and 
statues that still exist in Finland. In this respect, but to a far lesser extent, 
Finland resembles the Eastern European countries that became People’s 
Democracies:
In Eastern Europe not Leninism, not Lenin but the external 
trappings of the Lenin cult – the monuments, the posters, the 
renamed streets, squares, and cities – composes what today might 
be called the “material culture” of the Soviet empire abroad.1
In the Eastern European countries, the end of the Cold War era resulted 
in attacks on the statues and street names that were connected to the 
1 N. Tumarkina, Lenin Lives! The Lenin Cult in Soviet Russia. Enlarged edition. 
Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press 1997, 270. 
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former Soviet occupier.2 Nowadays museums displaying the horrors of 
Soviet crimes, terror, GULAG and deportations have been opened. The 
material culture of the Soviet era is collected in statue parks that could 
be called, ironically, concentrations camps for the historical symbols of 
Soviet oppression.3 
During the 1990s, Russians themselves gradually purged the most 
striking Soviet monuments from their towns. However, the Lenin 
mausoleum still dominates the most central place in Moscow’s Red 
Square, and thousands of monuments to the great leader remain in the 
countryside, obviously because no one has bothered to remove them. 
The Lenin cult has ceased to exist; instead there are signs of nostalgia 
for the good old Soviet times, and on the other hand, the commercial 
trivialization of the former sacred fi gure.4 
Public artefacts, like statues that are connected to the political past, 
are always signs of conscious history politics, which attempts to infl uence 
people’s consciousness of history. The founding of a monument activates 
certain images of the past. The destruction of statues of fallen heroes 
means an active aspiration to forget.5 The Finns have remained relatively 
indifferent to their own surroundings. The few monuments and places 
that were dedicated to Lenin have mostly been allowed to rest in peace.
Are the Finns not sensitive to the sufferings of their neighbours, 
who became victims of the Second World War? If anything, should we 
analysed why Lenin still has a foothold in Finland? 
2 Tumarkina, Lenin Lives!, 278–279. 
3 H. Kuusi, ‘Prison Experiences and Socialist Sculptures – Tourism and the Soviet 
Past in the Baltic States, in A. Kostiainen and T. Syrjämaa (eds), The Uses of 
History in Tourist Development. Finnish University Network of Tourist Studies, 
forthcoming 2008. A description of mixed feelings of a Finnish visitor (’spoiled 
by democracy’) of Gruto Parkas in Lithuania, see C. Nynäs, ‘Statyparken – Lenin 
ner på jorden’, Finsk Tidskrift (2003: 8–9), 643–645.  
4 T. J. Smith, ’The Collapse of the Lenin Personality Cult in Soviet Russia, 1985–
1995’, Historian 60 (1998: 2), 325–343; T. Vihavainen, ’Vladimir Iljitšin toinen 
elämä eli de-leninisoinnin kysymyksiä’, Kanava (2001: 6), 347–353.  
5 H. Salmi, ’Menneisyyskokemuksesta hyödykkeisiin – historiakulttuu rin muo-
dot’, in J. Kalela and I. Lindroos (eds), Jokapäiväinen historia. Helsinki: SKS 
2001, 146.  
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SILENCED TRAUMA OF 1918
It is a historical fact that Lenin spent one and a half years of his life, 
in short periods, in Finland that was a suitable hiding place for the 
Bolshevik leaders of the early 20th century. Finland was near enough to 
St. Petersburg, and revolutionaries were not under as close surveillance 
as in Russia. Lenin paid his fi rst visit to Tampere Workers’ Hall in 1905, 
which was later honoured by a bronze relief (1965).6 The longest period 
that Lenin hid in the Grand Duchy was between 1906 and 1907, but the 
most famous of these sojourns, surely, was on the eve of the October 
Revolution of 1917 when he wrote his State and Revolution in Helsinki. 
Before 1917, Lenin was a relatively unknown fi gure in Finland. After 
seizing power, however, Lenin and his Bolshevik government signed 
Finland’s declaration of independence on the last day of 1917. The 
recognition of the other states soon followed. 
Lenin’s stays in Finland and his personal contribution to the recognition 
of Finland’s independence are the basis of the positive Lenin image. 
His true motive behind this recognition has been debated ever since. 
During the fi rst decades of Finnish independence, Lenin symbolized the 
Bolshevik power that was the main enemy for the majority of Finns.7 
The Finnish revolutionaries, the ‘Reds’, had been beaten in the Civil War 
of spring 1918. The Finnish publicity was fi lled with the ‘White truth’, 
which regarded Lenin’s support of Finnish independence as tactical. The 
voice of the beaten working class could not be heard for a more balanced 
picture. Professional history writers did not touch the delicate subject.
After the Second World War the legacy of Lenin became the 
cornerstone of the friendly neighbour relations between Finland and the 
Soviet Union. The members of the Finnish government set an example 
for the citizens by joining the Finnish–Soviet Friendship Society, and 
the fi rst Lenin museum outside the USSR was founded in Tampere 
in 1946. However, the image of Lenin was overshadowed by Stalin, 
6 The text on the relief: ‘V.I. Lenin has expressed his sympathy towards our 
people’s independent will in the historical meetings of 1905 and 1906 held in 
this building.’
7 K. Immonen, Ryssästä saa puhua… Neuvostoliitto suomalaisessa julkisuudessa 
ja kirjat julkisuuden muotona 1918–1939. Helsinki: Otava 1987, 151–155.
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who proclaimed himself as the continuator of Lenin’s legacy. In any 
case Lenin’s and Stalin’s Finnish supporters now had the legal right to 
participate in Finnish politics for the fi rst time. The Finnish People’s 
Democratic League (SKDL), including communist party members, 
had a post-war electoral support of 20 per cent. There was little further 
analysis of the controversial question of Lenin and independence; the fi rst 
scientifi c historical study on Finnish independence by  Juhani Paasivirta 
(Suomen itsenäisyyskysymys 1917 vol. I–II, 1947–1949) recognised that 
Lenin’s role had been neglected earlier.8
In processing their historical traumas, the Finns had to start from 
the year 1918, which had divided the newborn nation. The memory of 
the hard experiences suffered by the Reds had been maintained quietly 
as oral tradition and communal folklore. The history debate among the 
public was not initiated by the conservative historians, but by novelists 
like  Väinö Linna (Täällä Pohjantähden alla I–III, 1959–1962), who 
challenged the ‘White truth’, as well as the academic historians who had, 
except for one relatively unbiased study, conformed to it. The viewpoint 
of the Reds was acknowledged by historians some years later. It would 
have been done without Linna, but his criticism undoubtedly forced the 
historians to react faster.9 The political integration of the Finnish labour 
movement led to the left-agrarian coalition in 1966. In the fi eld of history 
writing, the government further supported the healing of the wounds of 
1918 by appointing a state fi nanced history committee to investigate the 
Red Guards.10
The general reassessment of the history of 1918 in the 1960s was 
perhaps a prerequisite for reawakening the discussion of Lenin’s role 
in Finnish history. In addition to the novelists, history writing was now 
challenged by the highest quarter, President  Urho Kekkonen.
8 T. Vihavainen, ‘Suomalaisten arvioita Leninistä’, in Lenin ja Suomi. Vol. III. 
Helsinki: Opetusministeriö 1990, 46–48.
9 Suomi vuonna 1918 by Juhani Paasivirta (1957) had taken the Reds seriously. 
P. Haapala, ’Väinö Linnan historiasota’, Historiallinen Aikakauskirja (2001: 1), 
25–34.
10 P. Kettunen ’Politiikan menneisyys ja poliittinen historia’, in P. Ahtiainen et 
al. (eds) Historia nyt. Helsinki: WSOY 1990, 185–186, 191. In the 1980s, the 
committee published four massive studies, which resulted in three dissertations, 
under the common title History of Red Finland 1918. O. Jussila, Suomen historian 
suuret myytit. Helsinki: WSOY 2007, 285–288.
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LENIN,  KEKKONEN AND HISTORY
It is really startling that the bourgeois politicians of the 1970s and 
the 1980s refer to Lenin with the same ease that was characteristic 
of their predecessors, before 1944, who considered the Bolsheviks’ 
Russia as the one and only, but even more dangerous enemy of 
Finland’s independence. When seen from the ‘Western’ viewpoint, 
the current Finnish attitude to Lenin raises the question whether 
this kind of approach would be ‘Finlandization’ which means that 
the Finns have resorted to distorting the historical reality in order 
to preserve good relations with their Eastern neighbour.11
The most favourable era for public Lenin memorials in Finland began at 
the end of the 1950s.  Nikita Khrushchev had denounced the  Stalin cult, 
stressed the original founder of Soviet socialism, and created instead his 
own personal cult. For the Finns, it was Stalin who had persecuted ethnic 
Finns in Red Karelia, started the Winter War, and claimed the harsh 
war indemnities after the Second World War. During a short wave of 
openness in 1956–1958, the Finns published shocking memoirs of Soviet 
experiences during the Stalin era.12 Their main enemy was no longer 
Lenin, whose relations with Finland were favourably documented by 
 Sylvi-Kyllikki Kilpi (Lenin ja suomalaiset, 1957).
However, enough time had passed since the war for the Finns to get 
used to Soviet infl uence on Finnish politics. Urho Kekkonen, who had 
become a master at fostering friendly Finnish–Soviet relations since the 
war, was elected president in 1956 after having been prime minister for 
fi ve years almost uninterruptedly. Kekkonen used his prerogatives to the 
extreme in negotiating personally with the Soviet leaders. Despite some 
setbacks, he was able to increase Finland’s room for manoeuvre with 
the Soviets and strengthen the Western integration of his country. One 
of his trumps in this game was Lenin himself. After the resolution of 
the famous ‘Night Frost Crisis’ in January 1959, Kekkonen for the fi rst 
time connected Finnish independence with the strongest Soviet author ity, 
11 J. Kalela and J. Turtola, Lenin ja Suomen työväenliike. Unpublished manu-
script, 1980, 3. 
12 For an overview of the Finnish gulag memoirs, see E. Vettenniemi, Surviving 
the Soviet Meat Grinder: The Politics of Finnish Gulag Memoirs. Helsinki: 
Kikimora Series A6, 2001.
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Lenin. As a present from the grateful Finnish people, Kekkonen donated 
a commemorative plate to Lenin’s workroom in Leningrad. From then 
on, Lenin was institutionalized and publicly honored in Finland.13
In the 1960s, memorial plates of Lenin started to appear in the various 
places of Finland where he had visited. They grew to statues in two 
towns, Turku and Kotka, in the late 1970s.14 The unveiling ceremonies of 
the memorials were honoured by local and national leaders, and liturgical 
speeches to the Soviet guests: ‘This plate will remain a visible reminder 
of the bonds to Finland and to its capital of the great leader of the Soviet 
Union, its founder and friend of Finland, Lenin. It symbolizes the 
fortunate, close and confi dential relations of friendship and neighbourly 
spirit between Finland and the Soviet Union.’15
President Kekkonen fostered an image of Lenin as the decisive force 
in the recognition of Finnish independence and the friendly relations 
between the neighbouring countries. Kekkonen did not hesitate to use a 
freer interpretation of history for increasing Soviets’ confi dence. He even 
challenged the professional history writing that had eventually produced 
a solid version of Lenin’s role in Finnish independence. Lenin’s value for 
the Finns increased especially after 1968 when the Soviets had questioned 
the earlier formulations of Finnish neutrality. The calculations based on 
the current political realism, however, led to unnecessary concessions; 
Kekkonen stated, for instance, that it would have been better for the 
Finns if Lenin had lived longer. Kekkonen’s history interpretations 
appealed to Moscow so much that he was twice awarded the Lenin prize 
(1964, 1980).16
13 O. Apunen, Tilinteko Kekkosen aikaan: Ulkopoliittinen valta ja vallankäyt tö 
Suomessa. Helsinki, Kirjayhtymä 1984, 141. O. Jussila, Suomen historian suuret 
myytit, 205.
14 Sites of the Lenin plates in Finland and their unveiling year: Kotka 1957, Lahti 
1962, Turku 1964, Tampere 1965, Helsinki 1965; 1970, Tornio 1967, Parainen 
1970. Lenin statues: Turku 1977, Kotka 1979. People’s Archives, Helsinki, 
Vladimir Iljitsh Lenin, Lenin-muiston vaaliminen.
15 The chair of the city council Teuvo Aura at the unveiling ceremony of the 
Lenin plate in Helsinki, 1965. L. Kolbe, Unelmien Helsinki. Kadut ja korttelit 
kertovat. Helsinki, Jyväskylä: Minerva 2007, 148–149.
16 V. Pernaa, ’Lenin, Kekkonen ja Suomen itsenäisyys – malli 1970’, in V. Vares 
(ed.), Vuorovaikutuksia: Timo Soikkasen juhlakirja. Turku: Turun historiallinen 
yhdistys 2007, 241–242; K. Rentola, Vallankumouksen aave. Vasemmisto, 
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Tuomo Polvinen’s Venäjän vallankumous ja Suomi, 1917–1920 
(vol. I 1967) was the fi rst academic study that placed the question of 
Finnish independence into a wider historical and international context. 
Polvinen presented the Bolsheviks as the one and only Russian party 
that accepted the secession of the Finns. They acted according to Lenin’s 
national politics, but simultaneously believed in the world revolution 
that would have solved the Finnish problem too. Behind the myth of 
a benevolent Lenin was a realistic statesman that had chosen the most 
advantageous alternative at a certain historical moment. He never hoped 
for a bourgeois national state Finland to emerge. Despite ‘painful cuts’ 
into the mythical Lenin image, Polvinen represented history writing that 
supported friendly neighbour relations built on the ‘common interests’ 
between the countries.17
President  Kekkonen gave a speech on the 100th anniversary of the
birth of Lenin in 1970. Despite Polvinen’s explanatory study on Lenin’s
role, Kekkonen preferred his political version in which Lenin had 
defended Finnish autonomy and crowned this intention by recognizing 
its independence. According to Kekkonen, as a realist Lenin accepted 
the result of the turbulent phase of 1918. ‘White’ Finland was good 
enough for the formation of decent state relationships. Kekkonen wanted 
to equate Lenin’s policy with  Khrushchev’s peaceful coexistence, a 
favourable slogan for the Finns since 1956.18
The national climax of the Lenin celebrations was surely Lenin Park 
(Lenin-puisto), which appeared on the map of Helsinki in 1970 and was 
located behind the headquarters of the Communist Party of Finland. 
There were over one thousand different Lenin festivities in the whole 
country. They included symposiums, exhibitions, Lenin quizzes for the 
schoolchildren, a Lenin stamp, and various Lenin publications. The main 
event for the international audience was the symposium ‘Lenin and the 
development of science, culture and education’, which was organised 
in Helsinki with the support of UNESCO.  Polvinen, the original chair 
of the symposium, was replaced by Professor  Lauri Posti, who echoed 
Beljakov ja Kekkonen 1970. Helsinki: Otava 2005, 164.
17 P. Kettunen ’Politiikan menneisyys ja poliittinen historia’, 189–191.
18 T. Vihavainen, ’Suomalaisten arvioita Leninistä’, 57–60. O. Jussila, Suomen 
historian suuret myytit, 205–206.
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 Kekkonen’s interpretations of Lenin’s role.19 Actually, events similar 
to the Lenin year had already been arranged in 1967 when the 50th 
anniversary of Finnish independence was connected with the festivities 
of the October Revolution.
Did Finnish politicians have to go this far in fl attering the Soviets? 
The political motif of highlighting Lenin on the state level, especially 
in 1970, was the guaranteeing of Finnish independence in the future by 
invoking the Soviets’ most sacred leader. What Lenin had given could 
not be denied by Brezhnev. The balance of the Soviet block had been 
shaken by 1968 and the occupation of Prague in particularly. Moscow 
was worried about anti-Soviet opinions in Finland as well. Offi cial 
Finland used the legacy of Lenin in its foreign policy to strengthen 
Finnish neutrality. It satisfi ed the Soviet leaders although they must have 
been aware of the tactical motives behind the liturgical surface.
The praises for Lenin may have been a low price for Finland’s 
neutrality in the 1970s, but there surely were excesses that are irritating 
to recall afterwards. The political left was genuinely in favour of the 
ce lebrations, as were the radicalized youth and student movement. The 
Finnish student protest of the 1960s had evolved from value radicalism 
through the New Left ideas towards the bureaucratic party politics of 
the 1970s. Part of the protest had been the younger generation’s uprising 
that challenged their parents’ War Generations. The fathers had defended 
Finland against the Soviet aggressor and offered their lives for the nation. 
What could be more insulting, then, than youth proclaiming to follow 
the path paved by Lenin? The relatively strong Moscow orientation of 
the Finnish student movement of the 1970s differs from most of the 
European and Scandinavian countries where the Maoists and Trotskyites 
were more popular.20
The Lenin hype infl uenced the adversaries. It was almost impossible to 
criticize Lenin or the Soviet system without being labelled an anti-Soviet. 
Tendencies of self-censorship in the press and in some publishing houses 
prevented the publications of some Soviet-critical books. Consequently, 
the average person could not necessarily distinguish between tactical 
Lenin rhetoric and the true expressions of a friendly neighbour. I myself, 
for example, grew up in this context of doublespeak. 
19 Rentola, Vallankumouksen aave, 142–173; Pernaa, ’Lenin, Kekkonen ja 
Suomen itsenäisyys – malli 1970’, 242–245.  
20 Rentola, Vallankumouksen aave, 163–164. 
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HISTORY PROJECTS: LENIN AND FINLAND      
The Finnish communists were usually defenders of Lenin’s glory 
in Finland. The Communist Party of Finland had good reasons for 
celebrating Lenin in 1970. One of the preparatory projects that its 
educational section started in late 1968 was dedicated to Lenin and his 
sojourns in Finland. The historians of the party were gathered into a 
committee that was ordered to study Lenin’s visits in Finland and his 
connections to the early Finnish labour movement.21 A research plan that 
included four chapters was established: 
1. Lenin’s sojourns in Finland
2. Lenin and the Finns
3. Cooperation between the Finnish and Russian revo lutionary 
movement
4. Detailed questions22
A complete bibliography of Lenin’s texts in Finnish
The controversial question of Lenin’s contribution to Finnish independence 
was hardly mentioned. Had this plan been carried out, the result would 
have been a reconstruction of Lenin’s routes and his contacts in Finland. 
The sacred fi gure was not planned to mess with politics. As a modest 
result, a collection of Lenin memoirs, edited by a committee member, 
was published. In addition, a symposium organized by the Soviet Peace 
Committee and Suomen Rauhanpuolustajat was held in Leningrad.23
The professional historians could not keep silent about Lenin and 
Finland either. It was the main theme of the 2nd joint seminar of Finnish-
Soviet historians held in Moscow in May 1969. According to the Finnish 
21 People’s Archives, Vladimir Iljitsh Lenin, vuosijuhlat, 100-vuotis syn ty-
mäpäivään liittyviä tutkimusaineistoja 1969, Aarne Vuori to Veikko Sippola, 7 
Nov. 1968.   
22 Clarifi cation was needed, for example, to the burning question of whether the 
persons that made up Lenin as a barber were really members of the drama club 
of the Helsinki Workers Theatre. People’s Archives, Helsinki, Vladimir Iljitsh 
Lenin, vuosijuhlat, Leninin syntymän 100-vuotispäivän johdosta suoritettavat 
tutkimukset. 
23 T. Lehén, Lenin suomalaisten muistelmissa. Helsinki: Kansankulttuuri 1969. 
‘Lenin ja Suomi. Symposium Leningradissa 1.11.1969’, Ihminen ja yhteiskunta, 
APN:n kirjasarja 1969: 16. Suomen Rauhanpuolustajat was a member 
organisation of the Soviet-dominated World Peace Council. 
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report, the seminar included lively debates that were more than just polite. 
The interpretations of Lenin’s role naturally differed between the Finns 
and the Soviets, but bringing together the most prominent researchers 
was valuable as such.24
The great Lenin year 1970 produced an idea of a state fi nanced 
history project, Lenin and Finland. It was inaugurated by the Ministry 
of Education in 1977. The initiative was taken by the Finnish–Soviet 
Friendship Society, obviously again in order to celebrate the 60th 
anniversary of Finnish independence / the October Revolution.25 The goal 
was similar to the project of the communist party ten years earlier, but the 
historians chosen for the project were young professionals with academic 
degrees. It was obvious that the subject chosen would not harm friendly 
relations with the USSR. In the forefront of the experienced historians 
was Professor Tuomo Polvinen, whose highly respected research could 
not be passed by. In order to balance the interpretations, two Finnish 
writers who had done their doctoral degrees in Moscow were hired.26 The 
Soviets themselves were not cooperative; the visiting Finnish scholar 
was very restricted in the use of the archives in Moscow and Leningrad.27 
A state fi nanced history project indicates that at least Lenin’s role in the 
history of Finland was worth a detailed examination.
The working group of Lenin and Finland was led by Permanent 
Under-Secretary of State Jaakko Numminen. Its members represented 
different political opinions. The guidelines for the research were planned 
by Professor Osmo Apunen.28 Preliminary studies were made by Antti 
Kujala, whose contribution to the fi nal book was the biggest; roughly 
a fi fth of the 1,045 pages. The other contributors were hired as writers 
24 O. Jussila, ’Seminaari Moskovassa’, Historiallinen Aikakauskirja (1969: 4), 
302–308. See also the seminar papers: ibid, appendixes, 3–71. 
25 Archive of the Ministry of Education (AME), Helsinki, 1977–1991 Lenin ja 
Suomi -teoksen valmistelutyöryhmä, kansio 1, ryhmä 1. Suomi–Neuvostoliitto-
seuran johtokunta opetusministeriölle 3 Mar. 1977.  
26 Timo Karvonen who has worked in the Finnish–Soviet Friendship Society 
since the 1970s withdrew from the project in 1982. Aimo Minkkinen has worked 
at the Lenin Museum in Tampere since 1982.  
27 Interview with Antti Kujala, 15 Jun. 2007.  
28 The working group: Numminen, Apunen, Professor Sune Jungar, Professor 
Toivo J. Paloposki, Sectary General Christina von Gerich-Porkkala. 
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that got paid for the manuscripts.29 The drafts were evaluated by senior 
researchers who were the most prominent historians of the time.30 
Their comments forced a couple of contributors to rewrite their drafts. 
Some writers had diffi culties with qualifying a scientifi c historical text 
for a wider audience, some with the style of their text.31 After the fi nal 
corrections, only one of the manuscripts was dropped by the working 
group.32
What was the outcome of the project? The fi rst volume of Lenin and 
Finland came out opportunely to highlight the important anniversaries 
of 1987. In the foreword, Jaakko Numminen justifi ed the project, which 
the press had been sceptical about, by presenting historical facts about 
Lenin and his contribution to the friendly relations that developed later. 
However, mutual gratitude had to be expressed: the Finns were grateful 
for Lenin’s view on Finnish independence and the Soviets, for their part, 
acknowledged the Finns that had helped Lenin in preparations for the 
Russian Revolution.33 Lenin’s footprints in Finland were painstakingly 
documented in the fi rst two volumes covering the period from the turn of 
the century to the death of the protagonist. Fortunately, the third volume 
was published in 1990 before the fi nal collapse of the Soviet block.
Professor Osmo Jussila titled his sarcastic but appreciative review 
of the project: ‘A gift to Uncle Lenin’. Jussila suggested that the three 
29 The fi nal contributors: Jyrki Iivonen, Eino Ketola, Aimo Klemettilä, Antti 
Kujala, Aimo Minkkinen, Juhani Piilonen, Tuomo Polvinen, Osmo Rinta-Tassi, 
Timo Vihavainen.  
30 Professors Jaakko Paavolainen, Hannu Soikkanen, Osmo Jussila, Osmo 
Apunen, Toivo J. Paloposki, Ohto Manninen, Pekka Suvanto.
31 ‘In too detailed presentations there might be a danger of a slight comical side-
effect or even a shade of personal cult that would have been sharply disapproved by 
Lenin himself.’ AME, 1977–1991 Lenin ja Suomi -teoksen valmistelutyöryhmä, 
kansio 1, ryhmä 1, Osmo Jussila’s expert opinion on Eino Ketola’s manuscript, 
23 Aug. 1982.
32 The reason was not the scientifi c quality of the chapter, but it was considered 
too theoretical and diffi cult for a wider audience. It was not in line with the other 
manuscripts. AME, 1977–1991 Lenin ja Suomi -teoksen valmistelutyöryhmä, 
kansio 1, ryhmä 2. Lenin ja Suomi valmistelutyöryhmän pöytäkirja 2 Jun. 1986. 
Resolution of publishing the manuscript by Jorma Kalela and Jussi Turtola.
33 J. Numminen, ’Lenin ja Suomi’ (foreword), in Lenin ja Suomi. Vol. I. Helsinki: 
Opetusministeriö 1987, 10–11. 
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volumes should be translated into Russia and published in the Soviet 
Union (still roughly half a year of lifetime left) – as an example of critical 
historical study. He admitted that a full picture of Lenin’s cruelty could 
not be drawn. There was no chapter on Lenin and terror, and even some 
descriptions of him by certain Finnish politicians were not put as bluntly 
as the originals were: cynical, fanatical. However, Jussila concluded 
that Lenin and Finland made one thing clear: ‘… the original intention 
was that Finland, too, should eventually join the great Soviet family.’34 
According to Jussila’s latest view, the Lenin myth in Finland was fi nally 
dissolved with Lenin and Finland.
The third volume of Lenin and Finland was perhaps the most 
interesting since it included three unrelated articles from different 
viewpoints. Professor Polvinen expanded on his previous studies in 
Lenin and the national question. About Lenin’s views on foreign policy 
by Aimo Minkkinen presented a theoretical analysis solely based on 
the hero’s own texts. The third main article, The Finns’ evaluations of 
Lenin by Timo Vihavainen, deserves closer attention. It described the 
image of Lenin in Finnish newspapers, school books, and other public 
representations as of 1917. The ultimate self-refl ective comments were 
from the late 1980s when the fi rst volume of Lenin and Finland had 
already been put out: ‘The fi rst volume, published in late 1987, was 
considered successful practically everywhere.’35
Vihavainen described the most embarrassing Lenin-happenings of the 
Kekkonen era, as well as the famous Finno-Soviet cooperation fi lm The 
Confi dence (1976).36 The subject was challenging since Vihavainen had 
to fi nd a balance between criticism and the traditional friendship liturgy 
during an era of accelerating change in the socialist block. The solution 
in approach was political objectivity; the author gave room for different 
Lenin images without commenting on them too harshly. The evaluators 
of the original manuscript had considered the Lenin representations in 
34 O. Jussila, ’Suomen lahja Leninille’. Helsingin Sanomat (HS) 6 Apr. 1991. 
English translation: ‘A gift to Uncle Lenin’. Books of Finland (1991: 4), 228–
230.  
35 T. Vihavainen, ‘Suomalaisten arvioita Leninistä’, 69.
36 It reconstructed the historical events of late 1917 and managed to end the fi lm 
with a scene of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which 
took place in Helsinki in 1975.
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the era of ‘White Finland’ too crude and they had suggested a more 
‘discreet’ style.37 The colourful early Lenin descriptions have been left 
in the published version. However, as later comments reveal, the Lenin 
image of the Kekkonen era was characterized too uncritically, without 
Vihavainen’s typical sarcastic comments.38
Vihavainen’s most famous book, however, is Kansakunta rähmällään 
(Nation on its knees. The short history of Finlandization, 1991), a critical 
release of the repressed shame felt in regard to Finnish–Soviet relations. 
The style of the text and timing of the publication was perfect. There was 
only one obvious weakness; the author did not comment on the project 
Lenin and Finland and his recent participation in it. Nor did he refl ect 
on it later in his confessional article When I was Finlandicized. In the 
same collection of popular essays (2001) Professor Seppo Hentilä asked 
whether Finnish history writing was Finlandicized. When hypothetically 
accused, Finnish historians would, according to him, muddle through. The 
historians used to explain that there was no reason for studying Russian 
or Soviet history as long as the Moscow archives remained closed. Since 
most of them belonged to the quiet ones that kept silent in order to avoid 
problems, the ‘crimes’ of Finlandization were at most minor. On the other 
hand, Hentilä admits that the theme remains unstudied.39
Finnish professional historians shared the burden of maintaining 
friend ly relations with the Soviets during the later Cold War era. This was 
in line with the earlier favours that the historians had done for the Finnish 
state. What strikes the eye, however, is what was not explored. In Finland, 
neither Russia nor the Soviet Union had been studied academically after 
Finnish independence. There was not a single professorship in Russian 
/ Soviet history. In the mid-1960s, a small research group started to 
concentrate on Soviet studies at the Finnish Institute of Foreign Affairs. 
37 AME, 1977–1991 Lenin ja Suomi -teoksen valmistelutyöryhmä, kansio 1, 
ryhmä 1, Osmo Apunen’s expert opinion on Timo Vihavainen’s manuscript 12 
Dec. 1983.
38 O. Jussila, ’Timo Vihavainen – vaitelias fi losofi ’, in K. Kalleinen (ed.), Venäjä 
ja Suomi: Juhlakirja professori Timo Vihavaiselle 9.5.2007. Helsinki: Aleksanteri 
Series 1:2007, 15. 
39 S. Hentilä, ’Kun historiankirjoitus kohtaa suomettumisen’ and T. Vihavainen, 
’Silloin kun minä suometuin’, in J. Bäckman (ed.), Entäs kun tulee se yhdes-
toista? Suomettumisen uusi historia. Helsinki: WSOY 2001, 57–70, 649–659.
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Despite the academic aspirations of the group, its work was politicized 
and labelled anti-Soviet, especially after 1968. Very few individual 
researchers dared take the risk of engaging Soviet studies in the 1970s. 
Little by little, this low point was passed in the 1980s with increasing 
Scandinavian research contacts.40 The Finns might have known something 
about their Eastern neighbour and the Soviet mentality because of their 
practical cooperation with the Russians in trade relations and tourism. 
During the Cold War era, however, Finnish knowledge on history of the 
Soviet Union was not based on scientifi c research.  
THE LENIN MUSEUM AND STATUES
The egocentric Finnish culture doesn’t include empathy for other 
nationalities by turning over the statues. Why to bother, if the 
statue is expensive and it remains in good condition.41
The Lenin museum in Tampere, the fi rst of the Lenin museums established 
outside the USSR, was opened in January 1946. Originally, it collected and 
preserved Finnish Leniniana, memories and items that were connected to 
Lenin. The museum was maintained by the Finnish–Soviet Friendship 
Society with a representative from the city of Tampere. Despite ‘modest’ 
fi nancial support and exhibition materials from the Soviet Union, the fi rst 
ten years of the museum were burdened with fi nancial problems. For the 
majority of the Finns, Lenin’s legacy raised suspicions, and the Lenin 
museum was considered a propaganda institution.42 Until 1956, Lenin’s 
legacy in the museum was accompanied by his successor, Stalin, even 
so much that a joint statue of the heroes was planned. Despite the failure 
of the daring enterprise, the Central Lenin museum in Moscow tried for 
40 V. Pernaa, Tehtävänä Neuvostoliitto: Opetusministeriön Neuvostoliittoinsti-
tuutin roolit suomalaisessa politiikassa. Helsinki: Venäjän ja Itä-Euroopan ins-
tituutti 2002, 150–152, 304–326.
41 E. Heino, ’Eurooppalaisia Lenin-museoita’, Suomi (1991: 4–5), 23.
42 For the general history of the museum, see http://www.lenin.fi /uusi/uk/index.
htm
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years to donate a huge Lenin statue to be located in front of the Tampere 
museum. It never happened.43
The fi rst Soviet tourists reached the offi cial place of pilgrimage in 
1955. Until the 1960s, however, the Lenin museum kept a low profi le. 
The Soviet visitors were from the top: Brezhnev, Podgorny, Kosygin 
(with Kekkonen) and cosmonaut Gagarin. During and after the Great 
Lenin Year of 1970, the museum became more popular among the leftist 
youth. Simultaneously, fi nancial support from Moscow diminished and 
the exhibitions could be organized more independently. The Finnish 
Ministry of Education started to fi nance the museum, whose prosperity 
reached its peak during the 1980s. The state’s fi nancial support indicated 
that Lenin’s ambiguous legacy was offi cially accepted in Finland during 
the 1970s. Protests against the Lenin museum were few. In 1977 there 
was a failed attempt by an extreme right wing organisation to blow up the 
Tampere museum building.
The tourist attractions for the Soviets were complemented by the 
Lenin museum room in Helsinki (1976–1995). In the autumn of 1917, 
Lenin had hid in a fl at that belonged to Helsinki’s chief of police, Kustaa 
Rovio. Near the museum room was the headquarters of the Finnish–
Soviet Friendship Society, which used to open the doors of the museum 
room for high-ranking Soviet guests. Everything changed in the early 
1990s; the Russian guests of the Finnish-Russian Friendship Society, 
whose headquarters was moved further away, could not have cared less 
of the room. The prevailing pressure against Finland’s Lenin museums 
was relieved by closing down the museum room in 1995. According to 
the head of the Tampere museum it was the price to be paid for preserving 
the main museum.44
The decline of the Tampere Lenin museum was caused by the 
collapse of the Soviet block and the subsequent deep economic recession 
in Finland. The Russian tourists that had formed the majority of annual 
visitors disappeared. When the network of Lenin museums in Russia and 
abroad quickly diminished, a public debate started on whether it was 
acceptable to maintain the Finnish Lenin museum. On the eve of the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Lenin museum of Tampere 
43 K. Kinnunen, Suomi–Neuvostoliitto-Seuran historia 1944–1974. Helsinki: 
Suomi–Venäjä-seura 1998, 279–281.
44 Interview with the head of the museum Aimo Minkkinen 9 July 2007.
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received international publicity because of rumours that Lenin’s 
embalmed body was planned to be transferred to Tampere.45 The news 
was too good to be true.
However, the Lenin museum in Tampere survived and remained the 
only one kept open regularly through the transition years. A change in 
the museum’s strategy was a necessity for its survival. The exhibitions 
could now treat subjects that had been taboo during the Soviet years. A 
museum shop that commercialized the formerly sacred Lenin tradition 
was opened in 1993, a crisis year for the museum. The updating of the 
museum’s image was skilfully done in cooperation with artists and 
journalists that understood its uniqueness. The political antagonists of 
the museum, both local and national, were too few to seriously threaten 
its future.46
What actually happened on a more general level? The Finnish Lenin 
museum did not deny its history as the leading advocate of a positive 
Lenin image in Finland. Instead it started to produce exhibitions that 
could be critical towards the consequences of Lenin’s achievements in 
the USSR. Moreover, a mixture of irony and nostalgia in approach kept 
the most tragic years of Soviet history at arm’s length. The museum 
invested in digitalisation and history products such as the CD-rom Soviet 
Dada – the Rise and fall of the Lenin Cult (1999). It was marketed as 
edutainment that was supposed to enlighten the younger generations 
about the absurd Soviet years. In the Lenin museum shop, visitors could 
buy reprints of the socialist cult fi gures and Soviet posters. The museum 
has become trendy for the leftist youth, who process history as retro by 
recycling the revolutionary symbols.47
The survival strategy of the Finnish Lenin museum has been 
successful. Today demands for closing it are not often heard (except in 
45 In total, the number of all professionally managed Lenin museums had been 
about 50. In 1991 the Lenin museums of Prague, Leipzig, Warsaw, Krakow, and 
Riga had been closed down. Of the former ten European museums, only one Lenin-
room in Paris was then partly open for special guests. Heino, ’Eurooppalaisia 
Lenin-museoita’, 22–26. 
46 There was an anti-museum demonstration that did not interest people. The 
Lenin relief was stolen and maltreated. Interview with the head of the museum 
Aimo Minkkinen 9 Jul. 2007.
47 O. Pajamäki, ’Vasemmistoretro on vapauttavaa’, HS 28 Feb. 2007.
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some internet discussions). The resources for maintaining the museum 
are scarce, but it can manage. The cultural and historical value of its 
collections grows the more the items of the former Soviet culture abroad 
are rejected and destroyed. Its current role was rather accurately foreseen 
in 1991 by a journalist who suggested consulting tasks for the museum 
in the future when mourning for communism would have proceeded 
towards a more ruminative phase.48
The same can be said of the Finnish statues and memorials that are 
connected to the Soviet period. The most impressive of the statues of 
socialist realism, World Peace in Helsinki, was a present from the city 
of Moscow. When it was unveiled in January 1990, the lord mayor of 
Helsinki still described it with liturgical expressions. Later he has claimed 
that actually getting of World Peace was a relief, since the Soviets had 
fi rst offered a Lenin statue. Except for one single incident, the monument 
has rested in peace since then. A group of students covered the grotesque 
statue with tar and feathers in October 1991.49 
In 1992 there were attempts to change the names of Lenin Park in 
Helsinki (to apolitical Vesilinnanpuisto) and Leningradinkatu in Turku 
(to Pietarinkatu, St. Petersburg Street), and to move the Lenin statue 
in Turku into the art museum. The local city governments decided to 
resist these suggestions. The conservative decisions had a predecessor; 
after the fi rst decade of Finnish independence, there was a gradual reform 
of Helsinki’s street names that indicated the Russian past, and over 100 
years as a Grand Duchy. Despite obvious national romanticism in the new 
street names of the era, many old street names with a Russian fl avour, 
like Aleksanterinkatu, were preserved.50
48 Heino, ’Eurooppalaisia Lenin-museoita’, 23.
49 H. Kaarto, Helsingissäkin ollut patsaskiistoja. HS 20 May 2007. As an ironic 
initiation to the subject, the new students of political history wash World Peace 
once a year at the beginning of the fi rst term. 
50 A committee of Helsinki city had already decided, with a one-vote majority, to 
remove Lenin from the city map. In 1928, streets for Nikolai, Andreas, Wladimir, 
Galitz and Kulneff were dedicated to nation builders like J. V. Snellman and 
E. Lönnrot, to the national epic Kalevala, writer J. Aho and J. Z. Duncker, a 
character of the national poet J.L. Runeberg. K. Palonen, ‘Reading street names 
politically’, in K. Palonen and T. Parvikko (eds), Reading the Political. Exploring 




Lenin Park in Helsinki became international news in the turn of 
1999–2000 when a local city activist suggested that the park without a 
memorial should be honoured with a Lenin statue. Although the city of 
Tartu in Estonia kindly offered four Lenin statues for free, the initiative 
failed. Debate over this project, both serious and malicious in nature, has 
continued ever since, but without results.51 In late 2007 the suggestion 
was renewed by a group of leftist artists, trade union leaders and a couple 
of university professors. The timing of the initiative coincides with the 
90th birthday of Finland. Laura Kolbe, a professor of European history, 
explained that with her support she wanted to activate a dialog between 
different stratifi cations of the past in Helsinki. The arguments of the 
scholars that acknowledge the diversity of historical experiences were 
ridiculed by the press to whom Lenin simply symbolizes the dark history 
of communism. It was claimed that the raising of a new Lenin statue 
would insult the casualties of the communist system, for example in the 
Baltic States.52 A liberal newspaper, published only on the internet, was 
even ready to censure its own columnist for his pro-statue opinions.53
Generally, dispute over statues in Finland is still concentrated on the 
historical monuments that symbolize the trauma of the 1918 Civil War. 
There are no memorials in Finland such as the Estonian Bronze Soldier, 
which arouse strong and polarising national sentiments.54 Compared with 
these controversies, few Finns feel strongly about the statues of socialist 
realism and other symbols of the Soviet empire abroad. They can rest in 
peace as relics and curiosities that symbolize, more than Soviet power, the 
years of friendship liturgy and the Finlandization of Finnish politicians.
  It is very doubtful that the plan for a Lenin monument will ever be 
carried out in the future. The history conscious arguments of the statue 
activists may be accepted when the existing Lenin trappings in Finland 
51 Kolbe, Unelmien Helsinki, 148–149. HS 20 May 2007.
52 Ilta-Sanomat 28 and 30 Nov. 2007; L. Kolbe, ‘Lenin ansaitsee patsaansa’, 
Iltalehti 1 Dec. 2007; S. Snellman, ’Opi perusasiat’, HS 4 Dec. 2007.  
53 ’Uusisuomi.fi  sensuroi Venäjä-kirjoittajansa’, Kansan Uutiset Viikkolehti 5 
Dec. 2007. Pentti Stranius’ column ’Lenin-patsas paikallaan’ was published in 
Tiedonantaja 26 Nov. 2007.
54 M. Lappalainen, ’Maailmanrauha ja valkoinen kenraali’, HS 26 Jun. 2007. 
U. Peltonen, Muistin paikat. Vuoden 1918 sisällissodan muistamisesta ja 
unohtamisesta. Helsinki: SKS 2003, 187–243. 
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are defended. Much stronger statements, however, are needed in order to 
convince people of the necessity for the raising of a new Lenin.55 Finns 
can afford to preserve the historical stratifi cation of the street names 
and the statues, as well as of the Russian tsars56 and the products of 
socialist realism. Statues are not overturned nor names changed although 
interpretations of their meanings alter both temporally and locally. It may 
be a sense of history, an understanding of the value of different historical 
epochs, but the prerequisite for tolerance has been Finland’s good fortune 
in the cruel game of the history of the 20th century.
55 S. Snellman, ’Opi perusasiat’, HS 4 Dec. 2007.
56 In the middle of the Senate Square, the most central place in Helsinki, stands 







Legitimacy, History Politics and
Ideological reforms in
the Soviet Union 
 AAPPO KÄHÖNEN
As research of any historical topic, research on the Soviet society and, 
even more so, the political system, is unavoidably infl uenced by the 
present day in many ways. The ending of Cold War Era with the defeat 
of the Soviet Union has unavoidably changed the perspective on that 
period. All the decisions made by, or on behalf of, the Soviet side are 
easily seen as falling in the category of ‘loser’s history’, to be explained 
away or condemned. On the other hand, as all historical research is 
based on hindsight, recognising the result of a historical process does not 
automatically commit one to the ‘winner’s history’, which justifi es the 
actual outcome of the process, and only that. 
On a most general level the theme of this article is based on the relation 
between policy making and ideology. On a second, more practical level, 
this article examines the role of ideology and history in legitimating the 
political system of the Soviet Union, which was characterised by one-
party rule, and the open role of ideology. Here it becomes essential to 
keep in mind the old dual meaning of ‘history’ both as the events and 
the processes of the past, and as a discipline offering representations of 
those past events.   
In trying to understand the interdependence between political system, 
ideology and history in the Soviet Union the following questions serve 
as a starting point: Which new conditions did de-Stalinisation set for 
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legitimating the Soviet political system and Soviet history? Which 
historical and ideological arguments were used for legitimating the 
radical social and political reform programme, the perestroika? Did the 
practises used during these reform periods differ from the earlier use of 
ideology and history as a means of legitimating the existing order?      
Soviet domestic and foreign policy from the 1930s to the 1980s offers 
cases through which to clarify the connection of historical interpretations 
and ideology with policy formation and the legitimating of the political 
system. First, it is informative to observe how history had been used to 
justify the emergence and stabilization of the new political system.
STABILIZATION OF THE REGIME: THE SHORT COURSE TO POWER
For the ‘Bible’ of the Soviet history, The History of the CPSU (b): 
Short Study Course (1949, orig. 1938), some of the central tools of 
argumentation were, perhaps surprisingly, omission and labelling. The 
direct personality cult of  Stalin was somewhat less obvious, unless the 
words ‘party’, ‘central committee’ and ‘party organs’, especially after the 
death of  Lenin, are understood to equate with ‘Stalin’.1 These collective 
institutions of power seemed to refl ect his views remarkably well in the 
textbook, specifi cally when it came to intra-party opposition. This is no 
wonder, since in practise Stalin was the real editor and partly even writer 
of the book, despite the pseudonym ‘the editorial board set by the CPSU’, 
mentioned in the front leaf.2 
1 See, for example, descriptions related to the preparation and implementation of 
collectivization in agriculture during 1928–1930, Neuvostoliiton kommunistisen 
puolueen (bolshevikkien) historia: Lyhyt oppikurssi, toim. Neuvostoliiton 
kommunistisen puolueen keskuskomitean asettama toimituskunta. [History of 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks): Short Study Course, 
editorial board set by the Central Committee of CPSU, no individual names 
given]. Petroskoi: Karjalais-suomalaisen SNT:n valtion kustannusliike 1949, 
326–334, 339–349. However, ‘comrade Stalin ‘could be mentioned four times 
on a page, when his role needed to be underlined, for example, in relation to 
industrialization policy, 322. 
2 R. Tucker on the creation and context of the ‘Short Study Course’ in Stalin 




Though omission and outright slander is used repeatedly in relation to 
the political opponents, the most important case of omission is connected 
to the Bolshevik party’s rise to power in 1917. When the emperor had 
been forced to abdicate as a consequence of the February Revolution 
and the provisional government had assumed power, the political climate 
became remarkably more liberal, despite the continuing First World War. 
The Bolshevik party, together with many other revolutionary groups, was 
allowed to emerge from underground and to organise openly. However, 
initially the Bolshevik party had no clear policy to follow under the new 
circumstances. The party was divided over the question of the revolution’s 
prospects: should Russia fi rst develop into a bourgeois democracy under 
the new provisional government, or should it proceed immediately 
towards a socialist revolution. According to the Short Study Course:
 Kamenev, and some other members of [the party’s] Moscow 
organisation, i. e.  Rykov,  Bubnov and  Nogin, had a semi-
menshevist stance, supporting conditionally the provisional 
government and policy of ‘defending fatherland’. [However], 
‘… Stalin,  Molotov and others together with the majority of 
the party defended policy of distrust towards the provisional 
government… 
This division existed, but actually Stalin’s views published in Pravda 
and Izvestya in the spring of 1917 were clearly moderate and supported 
a defensive war against Germany, whereas young Molotov supported a 
more radical line. Here the exclusion of Stalin from the fi rst group, and 
inclusion in the second means that as a tool omission is combined with 
outright misrepresentation of the facts.3  
The arrival of the party’s leader, Lenin, in Russia solved that confl ict, 
as he favoured the fast approach. This is the information the Short Study 
Course offers to the student:
The absence of the party’s leader – Lenin – was felt. On April 3 
(16) 1917, after a long lasting exile, Lenin returned to Russia. 
3 Lyhyt oppikurssi [Short Study Course], 204–205. Compare to T. Polvinen, 
Venäjän Vallankumous ja Suomi, vol. 1. Porvoo: WSOY 1967 40–41, on the 
basis of Pravda 5/18 Mar. 1917, 14/27.1917, 21 Mar. /4. Apr.1917. The double 
dates show the difference (13 days) between the Julian calendar, used in pre-
revolutionary Russia, and the more generally used Gregorian calendar.  
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Lenin’s return had immense signifi cance for the party and the 
revolution. In Switzerland, immediately after receiving the fi rst 
information on the revolution, Lenin wrote to the party and the 
Russian working class in ‘Letters from afar’: …Lenin arrived to 
Petrograd on the night of 3 April.4   
This is all that is ever told about  Lenin’s return to Russia from Switzerland. 
On the basis of geographical conditions alone some questions arise. 
What route did Lenin take in returning to Russia? Why is this deemed 
completely irrelevant, as though he would have been ‘beamed up’ 
directly from the Swiss Alps to the Petrograd railway station? However, 
the omission of even a brief description is far from accidental, and has 
remarkable signifi cance from the viewpoint of legitimacy for the regime, 
which was established later in early November 1917.
The answer to this problem is not self-evident, as neutral Switzerland 
was surrounded by the countries taking part in the First World War, some 
of which were fi ghting on the same side as Russia, while others were 
fi ghting against it. The shortest and most rational route to Russia went 
through Germany, against which Russia was at war. Even if crossing the 
front line was out of the question, the crossing of German territory was 
required to reach neutral Sweden, from where it would be possible to cross 
the Russian border. Lenin’s supporters were able to arrange such a route, 
with the acceptance of German offi cials, in a sealed train compartment, 
and he made the trip with other emigrant Russian revolutionaries, mainly 
Mensheviks. This much Lenin himself had been ready to publish at the 
time, simultaneously in Pravda and Izvestya on 18 April 1917, though 
he readily gave credit for the idea to the Mensheviks. Even this version, 
public at the time, is completely omitted from the Short study course.5
This becomes more understandable when it is taken into account that 
the Bolshevik connection to Germany was not merely geographical, but 
also fi scal, though in an indirect way, and some doubts connected to this 
sur faced before the Bolshevik rise to power. The point is not so much 
how truthful or accurate the doubts were, but how the Bolsheviks reacted 
to them, fi rst immediately, and later through historical presentations, and 
why. 
4 Lyhyt oppikurssi [Short Study Course], 204–205.
5 D. Volkogonov, Lenin: Life and legacy. Glasgow: HarperCollins 1995, 120. 
Compare to the Short Study Course, 204–205.
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The case of the ‘German connection’ regarding the Bolshevik party 
can be briefl y explored through two individuals,  A. L. Helphand, also 
known as  Parvus, and Y. A. Fürstenberg, also known as  Ganetsky. 
Both these men, but especially Parvus, were important middlemen in 
the indirect relation between the Bolsheviks and imperial German 
offi cials, specifi cally after 1915. Parvus had met  Lenin and a number of 
other revolutionary emigrants, as well as German socialists, including 
 Plekhanov,  Axelrod, and  Kautsky in Western Europe before the 1905 
Russian revolution. He, like  Trotsky, also had signifi cant role in the 
fi eld, organising the revolutionary action of 1905, which after Russian 
defeats in the war against Japan shook the foundations of the autocratic 
monarchy. However, after 1905 Parvus became more prominent in 
writing successful theatre plays and in business enterprises. In January 
1915 he had established contacts with German offi cials through the 
German embassy in Constantinople, Turkey, and during the same year the 
German Foreign Ministry prepared to increase considerably, by several 
million marks, the fi nancing of revolutionary propaganda in Russia. 
Since the beginning of hostilities between Russia and Germany in 1914, 
German war aims had included the weakening of Russia by supporting 
national separatism in the multinational empire, as well as by supporting 
a revolution in Russia, and thus ruining its fi ghting capabilities. On the 
basis of his Constantinople contact, Parvus was able to sell the Germans 
the idea of helping the return of Russian revolutionaries to Russia after 
the 1917 February revolution. The idea was also introduced to, and 
accepted by, the German High Command and the emperor.      
The second interesting step in this indirect relation is that after the 
February revolution in 1917 the Bolshevik publications had been greatly 
increased, so that in July 1917 the Bolsheviks ran 41 newspapers. The 
seven biggest had a total circulation of 320 000, of which Pravda alone 
included 90 000 daily copies. The party could also afford to buy printing 
machines and pay, though not on a continuous basis, salaries to its 
permanent functionaries. It would be surprising if membership fees, even 
in a growing party, would have been enough for all that.6
The third step is formed by the investigations of the Bolsheviks’ 
opponents, the provisional government, after July 1917, when the party 
had been momentarily defeated in street demonstrations in the capitol, 
6 Volkogonov, Lenin: Life and legacy , 110–113, 118, 123.
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St. Petersburg. The provisional government, and later  Kerensky as its 
former head, can be regarded partly as witnesses in their own case, when 
they charged the Bolsheviks of treason on basis of wartime co-operation 
with the Germans. However, the legal investigation, which was never 
fi nished, brought up interesting reactions to these charges, as well as some 
facts. The investigation, on the one hand, had been able to prove that 
 Parvus’ and  Ganetsky’s business enterprises were a front, through which 
money had been directed from German banks to Bolshevik supporters in 
St. Petersburg who, however, were not members of the party. As early 
as the spring and summer 1917 the money transferred was believed to 
amount to 2 million German marks.
 Lenin, though hiding from the provisional government, reacted 
through the Bolshevik papers with a vehement and uncompromising 
denial of the charges presented. As the money transfers apparently could 
not be denied, he claimed that Parvus and Ganetsky were not Bolsheviks 
at all, and that he had no contact with them whatsoever. Regarding 
Parvus, this was formally true, as he was member of the nationalist-
minded Polish socialist party, but Ganetsky had been a party member 
almost from the beginning, as it later came out, when he was interrogated 
and executed during  Stalin’s purges 20 years later. At present, as Lenin’s 
correspondence after collapse of the Soviet Union has become available 
for researchers, a link between him and Parvus can be easily established. 
Their correspondence did deal with fi nancial themes, though it did not 
directly mention German money. In spring 1917, the volume of this 
correspondence surpassed that of Lenin and  Inessa Armand, Lenin’s 
mistress, so Parvus was not a complete stranger to Lenin. As a last step 
in the case of ‘the German connection’, promptly organised Bolshevik 
secret police VtchK (‘tcheka’) destroyed the material produced by the 
provisional government’s investigation on 16 November 1917, very soon 
after the Bolshevik rise to power.7
This description needs to be located in the context formed by the 
Short Study Course. The point here is not, as provisional government 
would have wanted, to prove that Lenin and the Bolsheviks were agents 
bought by German money, but instead the denial of the whole ‘German 
connection’, fi rst actively by Lenin, and then passively, through omission, 
by Stalin in the canonised history interpretation. The Bolsheviks were 
7 Volkogonov, Lenin: Life and legacy, 116–122.
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genuinely a very internationalist, or world revolutionary party. On this 
basis they could argue, coherently, that their only common interest with 
Imperial Germany was in the collapse of the Russian Empire, and in 
such a case, there was no reason not to accept German support, even 
fi scal, towards that end in 1915–1917. However, here the ideological and 
legitimating aspects of historical interpretations come into play.  Lenin’s 
responses show, that the Bolshevik party felt vulnerable to accusations 
based on deceiving the nation. When the new regime had consolidated its 
foundations and was canonising its past in the mid 1930s, it could admit 
even less the acceptance of fi nances from the enemy of the ‘Motherland’ 
(Rus. Rodina). This clearly points to the growing signifi cance of 
nationalist legitimacy, despite the offi cially claimed internationalism in 
Marxist-Leninist ideology.  
REFORMING IDEOLOGY AND WEAKENING LEGITIMACY:
DIVISIONS IN THE PARTY AND ITS ELITE 
The political system of the Soviet Union changed after the death of  Stalin 
in 1953 roughly from a totalitarian to a more pluralistic model, run by 
different bureaucratic interest groups within the party-state. Different 
levels of party bureaucracy, various branches of state administration, the 
army and the security apparatus have all been identifi ed as examples of 
such interest groups. Despite the changes that took place it was crucial 
that the basis of the one-party system was never questioned.8 When 
discussing policy-making in this article the Marxist-Leninist ideology is 
mostly understood as a structure of political communication offering a 
common vocabulary, arguments, and shared values. Even though political 
decisions were formulated and justifi ed by the ideology, the political 
elite was not free to speak or act in whatever way it liked. Regardless of 
whether the only offi cial ideology was believed in or not, its canonised 
8 V. P. Naumov, ‘Vvedenie’ [Introduction], in N. V. Kovaleva, A. V. Korotkov, 
S. A. Meltshin, Ju. V. Sigathev, A. S. Stepanov  (eds), Molotov, Malenkov, 




language limited the observation of problems and the solutions to them,9 
thus setting ‘the limits of the possible.’ 
The single most important process that affected the legitimacy of the 
Soviet system was de-Stalinisation, announced by the general secretary 
of the CPSU,  Nikita Khrushchev, at the XX Party Congress in February 
1956. The actual speech held in the congress by Khrushchev remained 
secret in the USSR, but was soon leaked abroad. De-Stalinisation can 
best be understood as an attempt to deal with  Stalin’s legacy, mostly in 
relation to the party, as well as a weapon in the internal power struggle 
between his successors. However, in a one-party state it proved diffi cult 
to limit criticism to the ‘cult of personality,’ to the former leader, without 
at least implicitly questioning the legitimacy of the political system 
which had allowed him to rise to and consolidate his power.10 This 
fundamental ideological shift had profound consequences not only for 
the Soviet society, but also for international relations. With the loss of 
the aura of ideological infallibility, the USSR’s leadership in the socialist 
world could be questioned in a totally different manner than before. This 
questioning came from both within and beyond the bloc of socialist 
countries.       
THE SOVIET OPINION
The Soviet political elite, including the top as well as the local party 
leadership, soon noticed the dangerous and unexpected consequences of 
the XX Party Congress. The intelligentsia increasingly went beyond the 
criticism of Stalin, interpreting de-Stalinisation as a call for creative liberty. 
In addition to non-party members of the intelligentsia, even members of 
the party demanded, at the local party meetings in March 1956,that those 
responsible for mass terror should be punished. Only about a month later, 
in early April, the CPSU Central Committee sent a letter to members of 
the party warning about ‘unhealthy criticism.’ The letter, published in 
9 C. Pursiainen, Beyond Sovietology: International Relations Theory and the 
Study of Soviet/Russian Foreign and Security Policy. Helsinki: The Finnish 
Institute for International Affairs 1998, 80–83 on the basis of Joseph Schull and 
Robert G. Herman.
10 Naumov, ‘Vvedenie’ [Introduction], 9–11
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Pravda, called for a ‘struggle against demagogues and rotten elements, 
who try to use the cover of criticizing the personality cult to criticize the 
Party line.’ These kinds of seeds of a civil society seemed to continue 
troubling the leadership during the summer, as a similar letter had to be 
sent in July. Limited action was also taken against the troublemakers.
The real turning point, however, in the position of the Central 
Committee emerged in November-December, in the form of ‘the 
Hungarian Syndrome’. The crisis in Hungary brought the Party’s fear of 
losing power into the open, which, it was thought, might happen if the 
Party’s total control over the political sphere was even slightly eased. 
The letter sent to local party organizations by the Central Committee now 
spoke about the dictatorship of the proletariat, which ‘in relation to anti-
Soviet elements should be used without pity.’ The letter was followed 
by a wave of arrests and very severe court sentences. As early as the 
fi rst months of 1957 a couple hundred persons, both party members and 
non-party, were sentenced because of ‘lies concerning Soviet reality’ and 
‘revisionism.’11 
A few examples of the letters from the ‘rank and fi le’ of the Central 
Committee and the Politburo members illustrate the changing mood. 
Reactions towards de-Stalinization, and the denunciation of the cult of 
personality are divided, but a majority of the writers seem to think that 
the adversary, the West, had gained new weapons. 
 Petrosgin, an engineer, in his letter of 25 January 1957 still criticized 
 Khrushchev for making too weak a commitment concerning de-
Stalinization. Specifi cally he was troubled by inconsistencies in the 
statements made by the First Secretary when he visited the Chinese 
embassy in Moscow. He began to think, ‘that there are two N. S. 
Khrushchevs, the fi rst fi ghting with all the Leninist commitment and 
directness against  Stalin’s cult of personality,’ the other in the embassy 
‘defending those criminal actions committed by Stalin, made against the 
people during his 20-year personal dictatorship.’ In conclusion Petrosgin 
observes that the presentations of Khrushchev have created ‘misgivings 
and doubts about the fact that Stalin’s cult of personality will be eliminated 
from our country.’12  
11 Naumov, ‘Vvedenie’ [Introduction], 11–12
12 Rossiskii gosudarstvennyi arhiv noveishei istorii (RGANI), Petrosgin’s letter 
to the Central Committee of the CPSU, 25 Jan. 1957, 5/30/19.
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The letters arriving in mid April have another, altogether different 
tone.  Antonina Mikhailova Peterson, a member of the party since 1914, 
proposed the rehabilitation of Stalin for the fortieth anniversary of the 
party. Peterson also thought it necessary to refer to the Chinese views, 
‘What did the Chinese comrades say to us after the XX Party Congress: 
One must not allow the services of Stalin to be forgotten. ‘ As an example 
of party discipline,  Peterson does not oppose the criticism of  Stalin as 
such, ‘But the disaster is that such forms used at the XX Party Congress 
and later were chosen. With this kind of criticism we handed weapons into 
the hands of our enemies around the world, we gave them an opportunity 
to mock our country, our party, [and] Stalin (as the Yugoslavian renegades 
did).’13 The opinions expressed in the letter of three offi cers criticizing a 
lecture held in Leningrad are even harsher. The mocking of Stalin’s name 
was seen to have refl ected badly on the position of the whole party and 
to have served only the objectives of the imperialists. ‘And it must be 
said that the imperialist troubadours have managed to gain some success 
in this dirty business, to get themselves some moral capital, and to cause 
defeats to our general cause, the cause of communism.’14
One factor to these letters of the enlightened ‘rank and fi le’ have in 
common is that the international context is included in their evaluations of 
de-Stalinization. From the point of view of the legitimacy of the political 
system, it is interesting that the fi rst letter criticizes Stalin’s personal 
dictatorship, not the dictatorship of the proletariat. On the other hand, it 
criticizes Stalin’s crimes against the people, not just against the party.
THE GERMAN QUESTIONS
The conservatives in the CPSU leadership had been quite justifi ed in their 
concern during the spring of 1956 that the criticism of ‘the personality 
cult’ could extend outside the boundaries of the existing political system. 
Though related only to a minor Western communist party, the report to 
13 RGANI, Antonina Peterson’s letter to member of the Central Committee 
Shepilov, 11 Apr. 1957, 5/30/191.
14 RGANI, letter of Slomanskii, Makarov and Fazimiamekhtov to member of 
the Central Commitee of the CPSU Mikhail Suslov, 1 Apr .1957, 5/30/191.
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Shepilov, member of the CPSU Central Committee, from Pravda’s Bonn 
correspondent should offer some clues to these concerns.15 
To begin with, the West German Communist Party (GCP) was reported 
to have had problems since 1954. The authorities of the Federal Republic 
of Germany had banned the party, and its leadership had fl ed to East 
Berlin, losing touch with the party organisation. It was underlined that 
‘This kind of atmosphere of dissatisfaction prevailed towards the party 
leadership and towards communism before the reactions to the events 
of the 20th Party Congress.’ The GCP newspapers had avoided dealing 
with the diffi cult themes of de-Stalinization, ‘especially questions on 
the personality cult’, whereas the bourgeois German papers had taken 
advantage of the situation. 
This was, however only an introduction to the main substance of the 
report.  A sharp discussion had begun in the GCP after GDR leader  Walter 
Ulbricht’s article, which announced that  Stalin should not be regarded 
as one of the classics of Marxism-Leninism. The presentation of GCP 
chairman,  Max Reiman, did not help the situation either, as it had led 
to a ‘hostile and stormy reaction among the party masses.’ According to 
Neues Deutschland’s Bonn correspondence,  Dengler, the party activists 
were astonished at the fact ‘that Ulbricht and Reiman spoke of Stalin’s 
mistakes in such a manner as if though they themselves had not taken 
part in the personality cult.’ The person reading the report, apparently 
 Shepilov, had deemed this sentence worth underlining. Both Ulbricht and 
Reiman were, according to the report, still seen to ‘act like gods’, which 
the GCP offi cials could not accept ‘after what had been said about the 
personality cult in the 20th party congress of CPSU.’ However, Dengler 
claimed that according to his impression ‘CPSU’s and USSR’s authority 
had not been shaken’ among the West German communists. 
The last part of the report is based on an inside view of GCP by 
 Emil Karlbach from the international department of the GCP organ, 
Freies Volk. His following characterisation of the atmosphere in the GCP 
underlines again the signifi cance of de-Stalinization:   
15 The following presentation on German Communist Party is based on a report: 
RGANI,  P. Naumov to Dmitri Shepilov, memeber of the Central Commitee and 




Nowadays the personality cult and its consequences are at 
the centre of party life. The party leadership has attempted to 
direct the party organisation’s attention to other, more important 
questions, which were dealt with at the CPSU XX party congress, 
but in so far it has not succeeded [underlined up to this]. While 
exchanging opinions and during discussions, communists usually 
think like this: all that has been said at the CPSU party congress 
on the present international situation is good and right; many 
things had been clear to us earlier; but regarding the question 
of the personality cult there yet remains much [that is] unclear 
to us.
 Karlbach also repeated the distrust of the party ‘masses’ towards the 
leadership. According to the ‘masses’ the GCP party leadership should 
have been able to show through deeds, not through directives, their ability 
to lead. Since the ‘masses’ had also expressed interest in participating 
in the making and shaping of decisions. Together with these structural 
problems, the GCP chairman  Reiman had also committed a grave tactical 
mistake. He had admitted that the toppling of ‘the  Adenauer regime’ 
through revolutionary methods would be unlikely in the near future. 
This is commented on the following way: ‘With one sentence Reiman 
destroyed all that the party had been trained for many years, and he does 
not consider it necessary to clarify how to mend this dramatic mistake 
and its consequences.’ 
The prevailing mood in the GCP is summed up in very clear 
terms. Despite the claim that the prestige of the USSR is seen to have 
strengthened, as a consequence of 20th party congress:
West German communists want answers to two questions:
1) Why did the leaders of the CPSU not react against  Stalin’s 
personality cult at the time, and thus prevent many mistakes?
2) Where are the guarantees that the Soviet comrades will not err 
again, and bring their new mistakes to the fraternal parties?
From the viewpoint of the party-state’s legitimacy, these questions would 




FROM REFORM TO DEFENCE OF LEGITIMACY
The Perestroika policy offers an intriguing example of an attempt to 
revitalise a regime, while simultaneously deconstructing and rebuilding 
it. It is already well known how this attempt ended. However, it may 
be interesting to review some of the arguments that were supposed to 
support this endeavour in the beginning.
Generally,  Mikhail Gorbatchov’s reform policy can be divided into 
two phases. First, during 1985–1987 he aimed at reform within the limits 
of the existing political system, mainly by improving its effi ciency. 
This could be based on the example of the previous general secretary, 
 Juri Andropov. As this proved increasingly insuffi cient, after 1988 the 
perestroika policy came to mean defending the legitimacy of the Soviet 
regime, while restructuring it at the same time.16
The more open attitude to media and historical research, glasnost, 
had become also part of the reform policy; this led to the resurfacing of 
Stalinist ‘excesses in building socialism’. This meant that  Stalin and his 
methods could no longer be thought of as the only possible ones leading to 
the present modern stage of the Soviet society. During 1986  Gorbatchov 
had still accepted Stalinist means to justify the achieved results. However, 
after Stalinist methods begun to be seen as intolerable, the Soviet political 
system could be defended only by excluding Stalin from the regime. This 
meant that the perestroika policy needed to be founded on  Lenin, the 
creator of the revolution and the regime following it. In this situation 
Lenin’s New Economic Policy (NEP), a mixed economy, which followed 
the revolution and civil war in 1921, became the centre of attention in the 
late 1987. It presented an example of a former reform period aimed at 
correcting economic and systemic failures in the regime.17
The NEP of 1920s was the example for reform in the Soviet Union 
for another reason as well. Even though Gorbatchov was aware of, 
and appreciated, more recent Eastern European reform attempts from 
the1950s and 1960s, it would not have been possible to publicly borrow 
from their experience. Firstly, this was because from the ideological point 
16 O. J. Bandelin, Return to the NEP: The False Promise of Leninism and the 
Failure of Perestroika. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers 2002, 63–64.
17 Bandelin, Return to the NEP, 101.
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of view their socialism was established later than the Soviet one and 
thus less mature. Secondly, and even more importantly, their attempts 
to reform socialism had been crushed by the military force of Soviet 
Union in 1956 and 1968, because these reforms had been seen as threats 
to the Soviet sphere of infl uence in Eastern Europe. Thus NEP became 
a promising example for perestroika, especially in economic terms. 
Politically, however, it included considerable risks, as it was connected 
to  Lenin’s late, but growing concerns over the failures of the political 
system he had created.18   
To better understand the potential and the pitfalls NEP presented 
as an argument for perestroika in the 1980s, it is useful to see how the 
offi cial interpretation of Soviet history had characterised it. According 
to the Short Study Course, NEP and the mixed economy it created 
was a necessary and successful solution initiated by Lenin to address 
the problems created by the civil war. Although it ideologically meant 
a temporary setback since private enterprise and land ownership were 
allowed on a limited basis, it would eventually pave the way to socialism 
by creating the wealth needed for the transformation of society. Within 
the party opposition to this policy was claimed to rise from its left and 
right wings. The left wing (‘trotskyites’) opposed the policy in the 
beginning, arguing that it was a retreat from socialism. The right wing 
(‘bukharinities’), on the other hand, opposed the end of the policy, siding 
with the peasants, especially when collectivisation of agriculture was put 
into effect in the late 1920s. 19  
As one of the most condemning accusations the Short Study Course 
claimed that the opposition, including in this case both the left and the 
right wing ‘did not believe in the possibility of socialist development 
in our country.’20 Also, in relation to the industrialisation programme it 
was observed that ‘ Zinovjev and  Kamenev already once dared declare 
that the victory of socialism in the Soviet Union is impossible because 
18 Bandelin, Return to the NEP, 82, 92.
19 Lyhyt oppikurssi [Short Study Course], 287–289. The Short Study Course is 
not completely logical in the division between the ‘left-wing’ and ‘right-wing’ 
opposition in the Party regarding the NEP. On page 287 ‘Trotskyites’ are included 
in the left-wing, but on the page 289 Trotsky is connected to the right-wing. 
Apparently Trotsky and his supporters could be conveniently included in every 
possible deviation from the Party main line. 
20 Lyhyt oppikurssi [Short Study Course], 289.
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of the country’s economic backwardness, ...’ The arguments of  the 
‘zinovjevite’ opposition, fi rstly that Soviet state-owned industry was not 
socialist industry, and secondly, that the so-called mid peasant could not 
be an ally of the working class in building socialism, were specifi cally 
labelled as ‘anti-leninist’.21 This characterisation was meant to defi ne the 
arguments as absurdities, and not deserving an answer. However, when 
compared to what  Lenin actually wrote during his last active period after 
the beginning of the NEP at the turn of 1922–1923, it is obvious that this 
is not the case at all.
ANTI-LENINIST VIEWS OF LENIN
Several serious doubts concerning the Soviet political system had arisen 
in Lenin’s mind after initiating the NEP, and before he was completely 
incapacitated by strokes in the spring of 1923. The basis for these 
concerns had then been carefully hidden in the USSR. Lenin’s doubts, 
which he had earlier (c. 1905–1920) actively denied but then begun to 
reconsider, were connected to critical views of  Karl Marx and  Georgi 
Plekhanov, the founder of Marxism in Russia and former mentor of 
Lenin. At the heart of the matter was the question of the prerequisites 
for a socialist revolution in Russia, and about specifi c features which 
possibly differentiated Russia from Western Europe. 
When writing about the prospects of Russia, Marx had referred to 
a term called ‘Asiatic mode of production’, in which the term ‘Asian’ 
does not refer to race, but more generally to the geographic location. The 
term, already in use, was meant to describe mostly agrarian societies, 
where economic and political power depended on one key feature, for 
instance, a raw material or resource such as an irrigation network22. 
Because of this, later the concept has also been known later as ‘hydraulic 
despotism’. These conditions would demand a strongly centralised 
21 Lyhyt oppikurssi [Short Study Course], 308–310.
22 On the historical background of the concept from Enlightenment to Marx 
and Engels, see Anne M. Bailey and Joseph R. Llobera, ‘The AMP: Sources and 
Formation of the Concept’, in Anne M. Bailey and Joseph R. Llobera (eds ), The 
Asiatic Mode of Production: Science and Politcs. London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul 1981, 18–36. 
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bureaucracy, and would give the ruler a disproportionally strong, despotic 
position. Examples mentioned are the ancient civilizations of the Nile 
and Mesopotamia; later, China and India are seen to mainly fall into this 
category. To Marx the Russian autocracy had some common traits with 
these societies. The main problem from the viewpoint of revolution was 
that according to  Marx these societies were extremely diffi cult to change 
or reform, except through external defeat. This is because they had a 
large, passive peasantry, a small and weak middle class and scarcely any 
proletariat as counter weights to the autocracy.23
Russian Marxists, including the Mensheviks and Socialist 
revolutionaries (SR), generally thought that before a socialist revolution, 
Russia needed to go through not only a bourgeois revolution but also 
the development of a bourgeois society.  Plekhanov warned in 1906 
and again in the autumn of 1917 that a premature attempt to carry out a 
revolution and construction of socialism in Russia would lead to ‘Asiatic 
restoration’, a resurfacing of the old, autocratic power structures under 
new names.  Lenin and the Bolsheviks denied this possibility passionately 
claiming that the phase of bourgeois society was possible to bypass in 
Russia and move directly to the construction of socialism. Regardless of 
the accuracy of the concept of ‘Asiatic mode of production’ / ‘hydraulic 
despotism’, or its applicability specifi cally in the case of Russia, the 
signifi cant thing is, that criticism based on it was taken seriously among 
the Russian revolutionaries, and eventually by Lenin as well.24
After having begun the NEP Lenin begun to seriously question 
whether a socialist economy and society had emerged in Russia, as had 
been claimed after the revolution. He now, in March 1923, observed that 
it would be a lengthy process, and ‘It would be most harmful to trust 
that we already know something, or that we even in some respect have 
enough material to create a really new machinery, which would really 
deserve to be called socialist, Soviet etc.’25 In any case, he considered it 
23 Bandelin, Return to the NEP, 36–37, on the basis of K. Wittfogels, Oriental 
Despotism, 1957. On similar emphases in Russian pre-revolutionary society, 
based on the concept of ‘Patrimonialism’, see R. Pipes, Russia Under the Old 
Regime. Norwich: Harmondsworth 1979, 249.
24 Bandelin, Return to the NEP, 37 – 38, see also Bailey and Llobera, ‘Editors 
Introduction’ in part 2, The Asiatic Mode of Production: Science and Politcs, 
49–51.
25 V. I. Lenin, Teokset, osa 31. [Complete Works of Lenin, vol. 31]. ‘Mielummin 
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necessary to allow the return of limited private enterprise to revitalise the 
economy. He also took great pains to argue, on what bases the alliance 
between the industrial proletariat and the mid peasants could be made to 
work. Regarding the general aspects of everyday life,  Lenin stated ‘We 
have destroyed capitalist industry, we have tried [emphasis added] to 
destroy medieval institutions of manorialism down to its foundations….’ 
As a consequence of this, a small and split landowning peasantry had 
emerged, which it was claimed, followed the proletariat on the basis 
of the trust it felt towards the results of the revolution. This vital trust, 
however, could not be easily maintained.26
Together with the improvement of economic effi ciency, the NEP was 
meant to improve the quality of administration. State administration, by 
and large, was characterised as having ‘some new colour on the surface, 
but otherwise it was a most typical reminder of our old state machinery.’27 
The criticism of ‘bureaucratism’ regarding the party was brought up, 
meaning the strongly developed position of the party organisation. 
Lenin’s chief concern was now that especially the party administration 
was distancing itself from its members, and as such, its uncontrolled, 
autocratic, power could potentially be turned against even the ‘good 
communists’. However, Lenin’s solution to ‘bureucratism’ was to create 
new administrative organs, such as the Central Control Committee and 
Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection Committee. They were allowed special 
prerogatives. Careful selection of the personnel to these new organs was 
to guarantee their functioning.28
In regard to pre-revolutionary Marxist criticism concerning a prema-
ture revolution and its consequences in Russia, Lenin comes perhaps 
closest to admitting its relevancy when he characterises relations between 
workers and peasants, and evaluates, once again, the state administration. 
vähemmän mutta parempaa’ [’Rather less, but better’]. Moskova: Vieraskielisen 
kirjallisuuden kustannusliike 1962, 478.
26 Lenin, ‘Mielummin vähemmän mutta parempaa’[’Rather less, but better’], 
488.
27 Lenin, ‘Miten meidän olisi uudelleen järjestettävä työläis- ja talonpoi-
kaisinspektio’ [How we should rearrange worker and peasant inspection] in 
Teokset, osa 31, [Complete Works of Lenin, vol. 31], 471.
28 Lenin, ‘Miten meidän olisi uudelleen järjestettävä työläis- ja talonpoi-




While the workers need to maintain their leading position, and the trust 
of the peasants, they, ‘following the greatest of thrift, have to expel from 
their social relations all the traits of excesses.’ The theme of ‘economising’ 
in social relations continued, with the admonition that:
We have to reach the greatest of thrift in our state machinery. We 
need to expel from it all the traits of excesses, of which so many 
have remained from Tsarist Russia, its bureaucratic and capitalist 
machinery.29  
As the two articles cited were among the last  Lenin wrote and published 
in the early spring of 1923, it becomes clear that NEP had not solved 
the post-revolutionary problems regarding the economy and the party-
state, political system of the Soviet Union. According to Lenin’s fi nal 
evaluation, it was a compromise, unfi nished at its best. It would seem, at 
the very least, that in Lenin’s mind something akin to ‘Asiatic restoration’ 
needed to be fought against in Soviet Russia, even if he avoided using 
the term.
EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMENTS
As these views became better known in the Soviet Union as a consequence 
of glansnost, the  NEP as an argument for  Gorbatchov’s perestroika 
policy, and indeed as defence for the legitimacy of the Soviet regime, 
would become increasingly questionable. The East European criticism 
of the Soviet system had a similar infl uence. 
During the 1960s the Czechoslovakian reform movement, culminating 
in the Prague spring, had underlined the importance of the rule of law and 
civil rights if a truly democratic and functional socialist society was to be 
achieved. The very foundation of the party-state, the arbitrary position of 
the Communist party based on its claimed representation of the working 
class, was strongly criticised. These views were presented in  Zdnek 
Mlynar’s book State and Man, as early as 1964. This in fact questioned 
the dictatorship of the proletariat, though in Mlynar’s mind, the party’s 
duty would be to uphold the rule of law and genuine constitutionalism. 




Generally, Czechoslovak intellectuals characterised the Soviet-type 
command economy as ‘Asian’, and a ‘return to Europe’ was seen as 
necessary if socialism was to prove viable in Czechoslovakia. 
In Poland, the ‘bureaucratic’ nature of Soviet socialism was openly 
criticised by  Jacek Kuron and  Karol Modzelewski in 1965 in their ‘Open 
Letter to the Party Members’. They named the Poznan worker uprising 
of 1956 as the ‘fi rst anti-bureaucratic revolution’ in Poland. Though the 
USSR would be an opponent in this struggle, the Russian and Ukrainian 
working classes were recognised as allies. After 1956 the stifl ing effects 
of Soviet socialism were seen to have increased, and a continuous 
struggle against it was called for.30  Polish intellectual criticism of the 
socialist system increased in March 1968, but it lacked worker support. 
In December 1970, on the other hand, the workers went on strike in 
Poland as response to rising prices, but did not receive support from the 
intellectuals. The two groups fi nally cooperated in March 1976, and the 
KOR (Committee for the  Defence of Workers) was formed. The KOR 
was the basis from which a better known independent and non-communist 
labour union, Solidarity, would rise in 1980,31 and shake Poland and the 
whole Socialist camp by actually challenging the ruling position of the 
Communist party in the society. 
This kind of development eventually could not be allowed to go on 
in the Soviet Union, even in the framework of perestroika and glasnost. 
Despite  Gorbatchov’s sincere interest in reforms and democratisation 
of Soviet society, he aimed to revitalise socialism, and this included 
the political monopoly of the Communist party. Thus, history political 
decision to use the NEP as an argument to support perestroika changed 
from potential to risk from the viewpoint of the legitimacy of the party-
state.  Lenin’s concerns related to it became well known, to the public, 
and the growing East European protest movements had adopted these 
same doubts as the foundation for their struggle. 
30 Bandelin, Return to the NEP, 88–89.
31 Bandelin, Return to the NEP, 87–88.
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IN THE DEFENCE OF SOVIET LEGITIMACY
The interdependence between political system, ideology and historical 
research in the Soviet Union is not extraordinary as such. The one-party 
system merely gave these relationships their unique features. However, it 
might also be interesting examine the relationship of historical research 
and politics in present day Russia. The resurgence of the country seems 
to be based on an energy related raw material cycle resembling some 
aspects of hydraulic despotism, and the re-emergence of state sponsored 
youth organisations, carrying president  Putin’s face on their shirts.  
An examination of the three history political cases: Bolshevik rise to 
power, the comments of Communist party members on de-Stalinisation, 
and the NEP-policy as a precedent for Perestroika, makes it possible to 
outline some practical aspects in this relationship. These cases, especially 
the fi rst and the third, allow for the observation of Marxist-Leninism’s 
consistency, or lack of it, as an ideology aiming to achieve power and 
maintain it, on the basis of its own values. The Bolshevik reactions to 
the ‘German connection’ proved their vulnerability to accusations of 
betraying the nation, both when aiming at power in 1917 and when 
consolidating their position in the late 1930s. This would mean that even 
an internationalist party could not risk being regarded as openly acting 
against the nation, however defi ned, in whose name it claimed to assume 
state power and establish a new society.  On this basis nationalism was a 
much stronger, though latent, component of Bolshevik and, later, Soviet 
legitimacy than would seem on the basis of Marxist-Leninist ideology. 
When evaluating the signifi cance of NEP policy in the 1920s as a 
precedent or an argument for Perestroika,  Lenin’s late doubts over the 
political system he had created can also be examined from the viewpoint 
of the values of Marxist-Leninist ideology. Lenin’s concern at the turn 
of 1922–1923 about the emergence of new powerful party bureaucracy 
and old, imperial administrative methods fi ts the context of Marxist 
discussion on ‘Asiatic mode of production’, which in Russia specifi cally 
was connected to the prerequisites of socialist revolution. Within this 
discussion ‘Asiatic restoration’ was the term which described the 
resurfacing of old power structures. This could take place if a socialist 




Lenin’s implicit agreement that something like ‘Asiatic restoration’ 
needed to be resisted in Soviet Russia opened two themes for 
reconsideration: Firstly, should a revolution aiming at socialism in Russia 
have been realized the way it was, and secondly, once done, could the 
revolutionary regime succeed in creating a socialist society.  
These themes could be quite unsettling from the viewpoint of the new 
regime, and the Soviet mainstream history did not favour interpretations 
based on an Asiatic mode of production even during 1920s32. These 
mainstream interpretations were but one example in, which  Lenin also 
was canonized for the needs of Soviet legitimacy. However, from the 
viewpoint of present day historiography, the questions also offer a way 
to avoid teleology based on the collapse of the Soviet Union and to see 
alternative paths of historical change. If the regime created in Russia 
after the 1917 revolution was not socialist by Marxist defi nition, then 
it is possible to think that a socialist society would have been different 
from the Soviet party-state experience. Also, consequently, collapse of 
the Soviet Union in 1991 can be differentiated from collapse or survival 
of socialism as an ideology. 
In terms of the questions presented at the beginning concerning history 
political relations, it is clear that a major shift had occurred between the 
presentation of the Bolshevik rise to power in the Short Study Course, 
originally in 1938, and the fi rst effects of de-Stalinization. Such canonised 
interpretations as presented in the Stalinist Short Study Course, would 
simply not be credible after  Khruschchev’s ‘secret speech’ in early 1956. 
The admission of and aim to correct one’s own mistakes was thought 
as a resource for increasing the legitimacy of the Soviet regime both 
among its own citizens and abroad.  However, as a consequence, the 
CPSU had irreversibly lost the status of infallibility, which meant that the 
party’s leading position both in the Soviet society and in the international 
communist movement could be challenged from now on.
Mihail  Gorbachov’s reform policy from the mid 1980s onwards 
meant the next qualitative change had taken place. After expansion of the 
reform programme from economic effi ciency to thorough reform of the 
political system, exclusion of  Stalin from the regime was required, as was 
focusing on Lenin and his policies, especially the NEP, as the foundation 




of the regime. In fact, the fi rst step on the road to this direction was 
taken when Stalin’s crimes were exposed in 1956 by Khrushchev. Now 
it became clear that Lenin had decisively infl uenced the formation of 
coercive policies and organisations of the party. When he fi nally doubted 
their expediency, but did not fi nd any practical solutions, this meant the 
beginning of the end from the viewpoint of legitimacy. Though Stalin 
had come to the leadership of the party after Lenin, his policies could not 
be excluded from  Lenin’s principles. When this kind of interpretation of 
history began to spread and became popular in the Soviet Union, there 
was little left on which to build the legitimacy of the Soviet regime. For 
without Lenin, there would probably not have been an October-type 
revolution in Russia, and without it, no Soviet Union to defend.   
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The legalisation of the Communist Party of Finland (SKP) and the 
foundation of the People’s Democratic League (SKDL), a wider 
organisation of socialists and communists, in autumn 1944 gave the 
communist movement better opportunities to become part of Finnish 
political life. A good 20 percent support and a position in the government 
in 1945–48, 1966–1971 and 1975–82 was far different from living under 
various restrictions or underground they did during the inter-war years. 
It was now easier for the communist movement to make known its own 
interpretation of its history and to challenge the identifi cation of Finnish 
communism with the Soviet Union. For this purpose various articles and 
books on the activities of the movement in the 1920s and 1930s were 
published1, important leaders were presented and  Otto Ville Kuusinen 
commemorated. 
Kuusinen, who had lived in the Soviet Union since the Finnish Civil 
War in 1918, served as a secretary of the Communist International in 
1921–1939 and belonged to the leadership of the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union (CPSU) from the 1940s, was a controversial fi gure in 
Finland after the Second World War. For the bourgeoisie he symbolised 
the Soviet origin and interests of the Finnish communist movement, as 
indicated by the establishment of the Terijoki government during the 
Winter War in November 1939 and participation in the war propaganda 
against Finland during the Continuation War. Among the communists, 
on the other hand, he was regarded as a great man with a remarkable 
international career. 




This article studies how Kuusinen’s past was used as a means in the 
history struggle on Finnish communism. It also examines other purposes 
connected with the eulogies of Kuusinen delivered during his anniversary 
celebrations from the late 1940s to the early 1980s.
ANNIVERSARIES
It had not been customary in the Finnish communist movement to pay 
a great deal of attention to the anniversaries of its living leaders; the 
newspapers generally wrote briefl y about the career of the person and 
published his/her photograph. In this respect the 65th birthday of Otto Ville 
Kuusinen in October 1946 indicated a change as Työkansan Sanomat, the 
organ of the SKP, published several articles on him.2 A bigger change 
took place in 1951 when the SKP made Kuusinen’s birthday an important 
part of its political activities and harnessed its whole organisation to 
celebrate him.
In doing so the SKP followed the example of the Soviet Union and 
the international communist movement, which had made the  Lenin 
anniversaries important political occasions and created a cult for Lenin 
and  Stalin.3 The celebration had assumed vast proportions especially 
in 1949, when the whole Soviet Union and the entire international 
communist movement celebrated Stalin’s 70th birthday.4 The leader cult 
was also adopted in the people’s democracies and western communist 
parties.5 Thus the SKP wanted to teach its members to pay proper respect 
2 ’O.V. Kuusinen 65-vuotias’; M. Ryömä, ’Puolueemme ansioitunut johtaja’; 
’Tervehdyksemme’; ’Ystävät kertovat Kuusisesta’; ’Selvä järki ja tasainen 
luonne ominaista O.V. Kuusiselle’, Työkansan Sanomat (TS) 4 Oct. 1946.
3 N. Tumarkin, Lenin lives! The Lenin Cult in Soviet Russia. Enlarged edition. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, London: Harvard University Press 1997.
4 E.g. J. Brooks, Thank You, Comrade Stalin! Soviet Public Culture from 
Revolution to Cold War. Princeton: Princeton University Press 2000, 66, 219–
223.
5 The leader cult in communist dictatorships. Stalin and the Eastern Bloc. Edited 
by Balázs Apor, Jan C. Behrends, Polly Jones and E. A. Rees. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan 2004; Claude Pennetier et Bernard Pudal, ’Stalinisme, culte ouvrier et 
culte des dirigeants’, in Le siècle des communismes. Sous la direction de Michel 
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to the communist leaders. But the celebration could also be regarded as an 
attempt to prove that the Finnish working class had leaders comparable 
to such bourgeois great men as  Mannerheim, whose 70th birthday in 
1937 and funeral in 1951 had reached national dimensions. Kuusinen’s 
anniversaries were, however, different from those – the absence of the 
birthday hero contributed to the general character of the occasions.
Various festive meetings assumed an important role in the birthday 
campaign of 1951, and the SKP went as far as to give up the yearly 
anniversaries of the party in order to organise the Kuusinen celebration 
well.6 In Helsinki the birthday festivities took place in Messuhalli (Fair 
exhibition hall) where the wall behind the stage was decorated with 
 Lenin’s and  Stalin’s reliefs, and connected by a red line to Kuusinen’s 
large photograph. Under these was the text Long live Kuusinen – the 
student of  Marx,  Engels, Lenin and Stalin – the greatest Finnish fl ag-
bearer of communism! On the stage  Aimo Aaltonen, chairman of the 
SKP, gave a speech, and various greetings and a festive poem Pohjolan 
punainen honka (The red old pine of the North) were read.7 The festive 
meetings in other towns were not as bombastic, and epithets attached to 
Kuusinen not as conspicuous.8
The celebration was not limited to festive meetings. On the fourth 
of October Kuusinen’s large photograph and the salutation of the party 
committee covered the whole front page of Työkansan Sanomat. Almost 
the whole paper was devoted to Kuusinen.9 The other papers did not 
give as much room; Keski-Suomen Työ in Jyväskylä, Kuusinen’s school 
town, and Kansan Tahto in Oulu used almost half of their pages for 
Kuusinen, and Vapaa Sana, the organ of the SKDL, three pages out of 
Dreyfus, Bruno Groppo, Claudio Ingerfl om, Roland Lew, Claude Pennetier, 
Bernard Pudal, Serge Wolikow. Éditions de l’Atlelier/Éditions Ouvrières 2004 
(2000).
6 People’s archive (KA), the archive of the SKP, instruction letters 1951, the 
plan for the 70th anniversary of O. V. Kuusinen; Educational department (Saara 
Kontulainen) to educational secretaries of the districts, 15 Sept. 1951.
7 ’Työväenliikkeen kunniakkaat perinteet’, TS 5 Oct. 1951.
8 E.g. ’Suurenmoinen taistelujuhla’, Kansan Tahto (KT) 3 Oct. 1951; ’O.W. 
Kuusisen 70-vuotis- ja SKP:n 33 vuotisjuhla, KT 5 Oct. 1951; ’”O.W. Kuusinen 
on tuonut marxismi-leninismin aatteet Suomeen”’, Keski-Suomen Työ (KST) 11 
Oct. 1951. 
9 TS 4 Oct. 1951.
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eight.10 Kuusinen’s own speeches and articles from 1918 to 1949 were 
published in a book Kansainvälisiä kysymyksiä (International issues), 
which was regarded as an important means to convey Kuusinen’s lessons 
to Finland.11
Besides the festive meetings and literary assessments, a special re-
ception was organised so the organisations and members of the movement 
could deliver their gifts and congratulations to Kuusinen.12 As Kuusinen 
was not present, the leaders of the SKP received the gifts. They included 
fl ags, handicrafts and articles such as a metallic globe and peace dove, 
a kantele, the traditional Finnish music instrument, and a rug picturing 
Kullervo, a character in the Kalevala.13 In Jyväskylä the communists 
wanted to give another kind of present, and sent the city council an 
initiative according to which the name of Puistokatu, leading from the 
centre towards Laukaa, Kuusinen’s home village, should be changed to 
Otto Ville Kuusinen’s street.14
Five years later, in October 1956, Kuusinen’s 75th birthday was no 
longer as important for the Finnish communist movement; the SKP sent 
its congratulations but there were no festive meetings and the pages of 
the newspapers were not covered with Kuusinen’s photographs or articles 
about his feats. The change refl ected how the Finnish communists had 
adapted to  Khrushchev’s disclosures about  Stalin and his personal cult at 
the 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 
February 1956.
Those disclosures, or Kuusinen’s vast celebration in 1951 were not 
mentioned, however, when  Mauri Ryömä, the chief editor of Työkansan 
Sanomat, explained the change. According to him, it was not in line 
with the principles of the labour movement to worship its distinguished 
leaders, to overestimate their contribution or to underestimate or despise 
ordinary people. Ryömä ascribed that kind of attitude to the bourgeoisie 
10 KST 4 Oct. 1951; KT 4 Oct. 1951; Vapaa Sana (VS) 4 Oct. 1951.
11 A. Äikiä, ’Lukijalle’, in O. W. Kuusinen, Kansainvälisiä kysymyksiä. Lahti: 
Kansankulttuuri 1951, 5.
12 KA, the archive of the SKP, instruction letters 1951, Educational department 
to educational secretaries of the districts 15 Sept. 1951.
13 ’Lahjojen ja tervehdysten tulva jatkuu’, TS 2 Oct. 1951; ’SKP:n lähetystö 
matkusti tervehtimään O. W. Kuusista’, TS 3 Oct. 1951.
14 ’O. W. Kuusisen katu Jyväskylään!’, KST 4 Oct. 1951.
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but admitted that even the labour movement could occasionally be guilty 
of worshipping some great man. The principles of the labour movement 
did not, however, deny the importance of prominent individuals, and 
it was willing to honour those who expressed the will of the people, 
served its cause loyally and paved the way towards victory. According to 
 Ryömä, Otto Ville Kuusinen was obviously such a person – he continued 
his article by describing Kuusinen’s career.15
In 1961 the SKP had obviously found a balance; the party and 
parliamentary group of the SKDL organised modest festive meetings, 
the newspapers published some articles on Kuusinen and the SKP 
published a book, Suuri vuosisata, containing Kuusinen’s memoirs on 
his underground activities in Finland in 1919–20 and his speech on  Lenin 
in 1960.16 After his death in May 1964, the SKP arranged memorial 
occasions in Helsinki and printed articles about Kuusinen’s career.17 The 
papers also covered his funerals in the Hall of Columns at the House of 
Trade Unions and in Red Square in Moscow and published the speech by 
 Nikolai Podgornyi, the president of the Soviet Union, at the funerals, but 
did not give Kuusinen the whole front page as did the Soviet papers.18
Death did not separate Kuusinen from the SKP, and in June the party 
proposed the CPSU publication of Kuusinen’s articles and speeches, 
and dreamed of a special marxist-leninist research institute dedicated 
to Kuusinen. Such an institute, however, was not founded but similar 
activities were planned under the auspices of the Otto Ville Kuusinen 
Foundation, established in December 1964.19
The SKP also continued to organise festive meetings on Kuusinen’s 
important birthdays, and in co-operation with the Otto Ville Kuusinen 
Foundation, they held various seminars where the leading Finnish 
15 M. R(yömä), ’O. W. Kuusinen 75 vuotta’, TS 4 Oct. 1956.
16 ’Suomen työväenliike onnittelee 80 vuotta täyttävää O. W. Kuusista’; ’O. 
W. Kuusinen 80 vuotta’; ’SKPn tervehdys O.W. Kuusiselle’, Kansan Uutiset
(KU) 4 Oct. 1961; ”Hän oli poliitikko”’, KU 5 Oct. 1961.
17 ’O.W. Kuusinen kuollut’; ’Hänen työnsä jälki pysyy’, KU 19 May 1964.
18 ’Surunvalitteluja virtaa Moskovaan’, KU 19 May 1964; ’O.W. Kuusinen sai 
viimeisen leposijansa Kremlin muurissa’, KU 20 May 1964; ’O.W. Kuusisen 
elämä ja työ’, KU 22 May 1964.




communists and Kuusinen’s Soviet co-workers  Georgi Arbatov and 
 Fjodor Burlatsky presented their views on Kuusinen.20 In January 1975 
the Socialist Student Union (SOL) launched the slogan ‘Forward along 
the road paved by Otto Ville Kuusinen!’ in order to prove that students 
and intellectuals had been allies of the working class in the fi ght for 
the socialist society.21 Kuusinen’s celebrations were also carried on 
with the publication of books. In 1971 the book Otto Wille Kuusinen – 
suomalainen internationalisti was published, in which foreign and Finnish 
communists remembered Kuusinen, and in 1981 Asian periaatteellinen 
puoli consisted of Kuusinen’s articles in 1903–1918. A book, however, 
was not considered enough for the 100th anniversary celebration, and 
hand-made glass plates with Kuusinen’s face and signature were ordered 
for the foreign guests of the SKP congress in 1981. The plates, though, 
were subsequently viewed as representing the cult of personality and 
destroyed before the congress.22
‘THE EMINENT THEORETICIAN’
The celebrations as such were important as an attempt to make Kuusinen 
known and accepted in Finland, but the characterizations of him at 
meetings and in articles revealed more about his role and signifi cance in 
Finnish history.
In the offi cial vocabulary of the SKP in 1951 Kuusinen was 
characterised as ‘the student of  Marx,  Engels,  Lenin and  Stalin’, ‘the 
greatest Finnish champion for the ideas of Marx, Engels, Lenin and 
Stalin’ or ‘the greatest Finnish fl ag-bearer for the victorious ideas of 
20 ’Skp:n keskuskomitean avoin juhlaistunto’, KU 3 Oct. 1971; ’Otto Wille 
Kuusinen marxilais-leniniläisenä tutkijana, teoreetikkona ja soveltajana’, KU 18 
Nov. 1978; ’Seminaari pohti O.W. Kuusista tiedemiehenä ja poliitikkona’, KU 4 
Oct. 1981; ‘O.W. Kuusinen – työväenliikkeen johtaja ja luova ihminen’, KU 5 
Oct. 1981. 
21 Reijo Kalmakurki, ’70 vuotta sosialistista opiskelijaliikettä Suomen työ-
väenluokan rinnalla – Eteenpäin O.W. Kuusisen viitoittamaa tietä’, Soihtu 1 
(1975), 4–20.
22 KA, Typy Tapiovaara’s archive, objects.
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Lenin and Stalin’.23 The articles about him showed little variation; he was 
‘the distinguished propagandist of the doctrines of Lenin and Stalin’, ‘the 
man who knows the doctrines of  Lenin and  Stalin thoroughly’, ‘a faithful 
student of these great revolutionaries’ or ‘one of the most prominent 
theoreticians in the international communist movement’.24
In the following years the names were replaced by a more general 
reference to the communist doctrine. Accordingly, in 1961 Kuusinen 
was hailed as ‘the most prominent Finnish representative of the great 
marxist-leninist ideas’ or was more modestly placed ‘in the vanguard of 
the Marxist theoreticians produced by the Finnish labour movement’.25 
The change refl ected the impact of revelations about the Stalin cult by 
 Khrushchev, but also the fact that Kuusinen had established a name 
for himself in the fi eld of theory after The Fundamentals of Marxism-
Leninism, written under his leadership, had come out in 1959.26
The year 1956 witnessed another change anticipated by  Ville Pessi, 
the general secretary of the SKP. In 1951 he wrote about Kuusinen’s 
creative application of the doctrines of Lenin and Stalin.27 After 1956 
it was typical to emphasize how creative Kuusinen had been. After his 
death he was characterised as ‘the pre-eminent creative marxist-leninist 
theoretician in the Finnish labour movement’, and it was argued that 
he had ‘a bold creative attitude in theoretical studies and conclusions 
regarding the political struggle’.28
23 ’Toveri Otto Wille Kuusinen’; Suuren isänmaanystävän ja rauhantaisteli jan 
merkkipäivä’, TS 4 Oct. 1951; ’Marxin-Engelsin-Leninin ja Stalinin aatteiden 
suurin suomalainen lipunkantaja’, TS 5 Oct. 1951.
24 V. Pessi, ’Otto Wille Kuusinen 70-vuotias’, in Demokraattisen kansan ka-
lenteri 1951. Helsinki: SKDL 1950, 68; I. Lehtinen, ’Työväenluokan voiton 
johtaja’, in SKP Taistelujen tiellä 1952. Vuosikirja VIII. Helsinki: SKP 1952, 
84–85; A. Äikiä, ’Lukijalle’, in Kuusinen, Kansainvälisiä, 12
25 ’SKPn tervehdys O.W. Kuusiselle’; ’Suomen työväenliike onnittelee 80 vuot-
ta täyttävää O.W. Kuusista’, KU 4 Oct. 1961.
26 J. Renkama, Ideology and Challenges of Political Liberalisation in the USSR, 
1957–1961. Otto Kuusinen’s ”Reform Platform”, the State Concept, and the 
Path to the 3rd CPSU Programme. Helsinki. SKS 2006, 145–154.
27 Pessi, ’Otto Wille Kuusinen’, 68.




The image of Kuusinen as a theoretician was so strong that attempts to 
argue that he was also a politician and a prominent man of action re-
mained in its shadow. Besides the respect for the priority of theory in the 
communist movement, this was also due to writers’ diffi culties to express 
how his prominence had manifested itself. So it was common to write 
about Kuusinen’s deeds in general terms or to emphasize certain events. 
It was also in accordance with the idea that the history of the party was 
the same as that of the party leader.29
Kuusinen’s merits in politics were often found in the fi ght against war 
and fascism and in the defence of democracy.30 It was, however, more 
usual to present examples in relation to the history of the Finnish labour 
movement, to emphasize his role in the People’s Deputation in 1918, 
even to regard him as its leading character.31 It was even more common 
to say that Kuusinen was one of the founders of the SKP32 or, stressing 
Kuusinen’s role, to say that the SKP, ‘the party of a new type’, was 
founded ‘on the initiative of Kuusinen’.33 Regarding their later relation 
it was common to argue that the party had worked under his guidance in 
the 1920s and 1930s34 or to say more modestly that Kuusinen helped the 
party on various occasions.35
Kuusinen’s guidance was often seen in questions regarding the attitude 
of communists to other political forces, especially social democrats. In 
1951 it was stressed how Kuusinen had taught that the working class 
29 Pennetier et Pudal, ‘Stalinisme’, 559–562.
30 TS 5 Oct. 1951; ’O.W. Kuusinen kuollut’; A. Äikiä, ’Sosialistisen työväenliik-
keemme suuri kunniaveteraani Otto Wille Kuusinen’, in SKP Taistelujen tiellä 
1948. Vuosikirja IV. Helsinki: SKP 1948, 122
31 ’Toveri Otto Wille Kuusinen 70-vuotias’, 468; Pessi 1951, 62; ’Hänen työn sä 
jälki pysyy’.
32 ’Marxin-Engelsin-Leninin ja Stalinin’, TS 5 Oct. 1951; ’Suomen työväenliike 
onnittelee’, KU 4 Oct. 1961; ’O.W. Kuusinen kuollut’, KU 19 May 1964.
33 Äikiä, ‘Sosialistisen työväenliikkeemme’, 120; Pessi, ’Otto Wille Kuusinen 
70-vuotias’, 62–63.
34 Lehtinen, ’Työväenluokan voiton johtaja’, 86; ’Toveri Otto Wille Kuusinen 
70-vuotias’, 471; ’Hänen työnsä jälki pysyy’.
35 S. Suvanto, ’O.V. Kuusisen kirjallisen tuotannon esittelyä’, Kommunisti 9 
(1956), 456–466.
Otto Ville Kuusinen commemorated
159
could fulfi l its historical task only by expelling the betrayers of the class 
struggle. Thus he had been active in the fi ght against the right-wing 
social democrats.36 In Kommunisti, the theoretical organ of the SKP, the 
fi ght for the leninist line against various opportunist deviations was also 
considered an important part of Kuusinen’s political legacy.37 In 1956 
 Jarno Pennanen, the chief editor of Vapaa Sana, regarded Kuusinen as 
‘one of the most patient and far-sighted builders of the re-emerging 
working class unity’.38 And in 1961  Ville Pessi, the general secretary of 
the SKP, emphasized that Kuusinen’s infl uence on the decisions of the 
SKP had been most evident in the moments the party had re-oriented its 
activities toward the masses.39
Otherwise Kuusinen’s actual deeds were not discussed in detail, but 
there was a tendency to study even his pre-communist activities through 
communist glasses; his work in the parliament was seen in the context of 
the importance of mass activities and the draft of the constitution written 
by him in 1918 was equated with the dictatorship of the proletariat.40
Short biographical articles written about him increased the impression 
that Kuusinen was the only leader of the SKP, but this idea was also 
strength ened by the fact that nobody wanted to remember  Kullervo 
Man ner, who had been the leader of the People’s Deputation in 1918 
and the chairman of the SKP in 1920–1934, but who had been labeled 
as a deviationist and dismissed. This impression was also furthered by 
the use of the words ‘fi rst’, ‘active’, ‘most skilful’ and ‘credited’ – and 
soon Kuusinen was ‘the iron helmsman of the SKP’. In October 1951 
Kommunisti gave the impression that Kuusinen had been the fi rst in every 
action and everything was done under his leadership or his initiative.
36 ’Toveri Otto Ville Kuusinen’, TS 4 Oct. 1951; ’Marxin-Engelsin-Leninin ja 
Stalinin aatteiden suurin suomalainen lipunkantaja’, TS 5 Oct. 1951; T. Le hen, 
’Otto Wille Kuusisen taistelu oikeistososialidemokratiaa vastaan’, Kommu nisti 9 
(1951), 483–489.
37 ’Toveri Otto Wille Kuusinen 70-vuotias’, Kommunisti 9 (1951), 465–474;
 E. Parkkari, ’Otto Wille Kuusinen – SKP:n rautainen perämies’, in SKP Tais-
telujen tiellä 1945. Vuosikirja I. Oulu: SKP 1945, 28–33; Suvanto, ’O.V. Kuusisen 
kirjallisen’, 462.
38 Pennanen, ’O.V. Kuusinen’.
39 ’Suomen työväenliike onnittelee’
40 ’Hänen työnsä jälki pysyy’.
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The offi cial line of the SKP was mainly written by persons who had 
come to know Kuusinen as a Communist International functionary and 
one of the leaders of the SKP, and who had worked with him in the SKP. 
Thus it was natural for them to emphasize Kuusinen’s role in regard to 
the SKP. But their characterizations were also strongly infl uenced by 
their living in the Soviet Union and their adaptation to the celebration of 
communist leaders and to communist history writing initiated by  Stalin 
in the early 1930s. That commitment led them to picture Kuusinen as a 
theoretical and political star of the communist movement.41 
The characterizations of Kuusinen’s theoretical and political eminence 
were mainly directed to the members of the SKP for whom they were to 
teach respect and obedience towards the leaders of the communist party 
and the importance of a united and determined communist party. But they 
were also meant to demonstrate the signifi cance of marxism-leninism as 
a scientifi c world view. Though some of the authors emphasised that by 
means of Kuusinen’s example the members could learn how to apply 
marxism-leninism, the articles did not describe how Kuusinen had 
applied the theory.
Among Finnish socialists and communists there were still persons 
who remembered Kuusinen as a schoolmate or a social democratic party 
comrade. These persons, whose recollections of Kuusinen were written 
in Työkansan Sanomat in 1946 and in Vapaa Sana in 1951, saw him 
in the context of the Finnish labour movement. They were content to 
admit Kuusinen’s capabilities and regard him as one of the leaders of the 
movement.  Raoul Palmgren, the chief editor of Vapaa Sana, also brought 
up Kuusinen’s merits as a cultural person who was interested in music, 
literature and poetry.42 He did not, however, include Kuusinen as the 
main representatives of the labour movement in the fi ght for universal 
suffrage.43
41 Saarela, Suomalaisen, 9–10.
42 ’Ystävät kertovat Kuusisesta’; ’Selvä järki ja tasainen luonne ominaista 
O.V. Kuusiselle’, TS 4 Oct. 1946; ‘”Rajaton huumorintaju ja niin teoreetti-
nen mielenlaatu…”’; ’”Alusta alkaen valtiomiehen puheita”’; ’Kuusinen 
perusteellinen niin lehti- kuin eduskuntatyössäkin’; ’”Siinä poistui pakkovallan 
uhrina Suomen mies…”’; ’”Niitä musiikki- ja kirjallisuushetkiä en koskaan 
unohda”’; Raoul Palmgren, ’O.V.K’, VS 4 Oct. 1951.
43 R. Palmgren, Suuri linja. Arwidssonista vallankumouksellisiin sosialistei hin. 
Kansallisia tutkimuksia. Helsinki: Kansankultuuri 1976 (1948), 184–204.
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‘PATRIOT AND INTERNATIONALIST’
Though there were different emphases within the SKDL regarding Kuu-
si nen’s assessment in the fi elds of theory and politics of the labour 
movement, everyone agreed on his merits as the builder of peace between 
Finland and the Soviet Union. This characterization also implied criti cism 
towards the nationalist perspective of bourgeois Finland, and communists 
recommended a new kind of perspective based on internationalism 
and on the marxist-leninist principles – taught to them, of course, by 
Kuusinen.44
From this perspective Kuusinen was portrayed as a great patriot 
and fi ghter for the brotherhood of nations.45 Thus he had fought for the 
independence of Finland from the beginning of the 20th century but at 
the same time realised the importance of safeguarding the friendship 
between the peoples of Finland and the Soviet Union. He was the pioneer 
and had done more than any other Finn in this fi eld.46
The Finnish communists did not fi nd it diffi cult to connect these
two aims. Accordingly, the party committee considered in 1951 that the 
war between Finland and the Soviet Union would not have broken out in 
1939 and all the controversial issues would have been solved peacefully, 
if Kuusinen’s advice had been followed.47 Even  Raoul Palmgren, who 
had felt confused in late 1939, but gone to the front to defend Finland, 
regarded Kuusinen’s participation in the government as an attempt to 
prevent the war from becoming a national disaster.48 The assessment was 
44 ’Toveri Otto Wille Kuusinen’, TS 4 Oct. 1951.
45 E.g. ’Suuren isänmaanystävän ja rauhantaistelijan merkkipäivä’; O.W. 
Kuusinen – suuri isänmaanystävä ja kansojen veljeyden esitaistelija’, TS 4 Oct. 
1951.
46 T. Lehen, ’O.W. Kuusisen ajatuksia’, in SKP Taistelujen tiellä 1951. Vuosi-
kirja VII. Helsinki: SKP 1951, 22, 30; Äikiä, ’Lukijalle’, 12; M. Ryömä, ’Otto 
Wille Kuusinen Suomen ja Neuvostoliiton kansojen ystävyyden esitaistelijana’, 
Kommunisti 9 (1951), 475–482.
47 ’Toveri Otto Wille Kuusinen’, TS 4 Oct. 1951; see also Äikiä, ‘Sosialistisen 
työväenliikkeemme’, 131–132; Ryömä, ’Otto Wille Kuusinen Suomen’, 478.
48 R. P(almgren), ‘O.W. Kuusinen 65 vuotta’, VS 4 Oct. 1946; ‘R. Palmgren, 
O.V.K.’, VS 4 Oct. 1951; on Palmgren in 1939, e.g. K. Kalemaa, Raoul Palm gren 
– suomalainen toisinajattelija. Helsinki: Tammi 1984, 112–115. 
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repeated on some later occasions49 but there was a growing tendency 
not to mention the Terijoki government as one of Kuusinen’s great 
achievements.
The depiction of Kuusinen’s eminence in the fi elds of theory and 
politics and his connections to the leaders of the international labour 
movement was an attempt to say that Kuusinen was an important Finnish 
person. What was demanded was a new concept of great men and of 
history.  Mauri Ryömä had tried as early as 1946 to teach the ideas of 
marxist history and explain that the great men were those who were able 
to perceive the historical and social forces of development and interpret 
the needs of the masses. Kuusinen fi lled these requirements since he had 
taken into account the needs of the Finnish people but had also been an 
example for other peoples.50
Ryömä, therefore, wanted to position Kuusinen alongside other 
national great men such as  J. V. Snellman and  Yrjö Sirola. In 1951, 
however, Kuusinen’s merits were compared more often with those of 
the contemporary bourgeois leaders; Kuusinen was considered more 
patriotic than  Mannerheim, who had been glorifi ed by the bourgeoisie,51 
but Mannerheim was not mentioned when the communists emphasized 
that no other Finn had had a comparable international infl uence or career 
and therefore wanted to include Kuusinen among the national great 
men.52 The international signifi cance of Kuusinen was also referred to 
in the connection with the messages of congratulations received from 
the world in 195153 and by the awards granted to Kuusinen in the Soviet 
49 E.g. J. Pennanen, ’O.V. Kuusinen 75 vuotta’, VS 4 Oct. 1956; ’Hänen työnsä 
jälki pysyy’, KU 19 May 1964.
50 ’Tervehdyksemme’; M. Ryömä, ’Puolueemme ansioitunut johtaja’, TS 4 Oct. 
1946.
51 Liukas Luikku (A. Äikiä), ’Tervetuloa isänmaalliseen rintamaan’, TS 4 Oct. 
1951; Kärkevä (M. Nikkilä), ’Herjat hurjistuvat’, KT 7 Oct. 1951.
52 E.g. ’O.W. Kuusinen luettava suurmiesten joukkoon’, VS 11 Oct. 1951; 
Pennanen, ’O.V. Kuusinen 75 vuotta’; ’Suomen työväenliike onnittelee 80 vuotta 
täyttävää O.W. Kuusista’; ’O.W. Kuusinen kuollut’.
53 ’Miljoonat ihmiset maailmassa tuntevat O.W. Kuusisen’, TS 30 Sept. 1951; 
’Tervehdyksiä yli maapallon’, TS 4 Oct. 1951.
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Union – in 1951 he was awarded the Order of  Lenin, in 1961 the title of 
Hero of Socialist Labour.54
Though the communists campaigned rather extensively for 
Kuusinen, they were not able to have a great impact on the dominant 
ideas concerning him. Thus Kuusinen’s street did not fi nd its place in 
Jyväskylä because the other political groups were against naming a street 
after a living person.55 In Kotka the response to the attempts to declare 
Kuusinen the greatest Finnish patriot and to see the Terijoki government 
in this light was much sharper; the strips of window paper attached to 
the posters advertising Kuusinen’s birthday in 1951 read ‘the destroyer 
of Tiutinen’.56 The negative attitude to Kuusinen was also evident 
during the 40th anniversary of the SKP in 1958; he was not considered 
welcome, and because of ‘his personal past’ and its negative infl uence on 
the atmosphere of friendship and good will, he was not given a visa to 
Finland as the head of the CPSU delegation.57 
‘FINNISH LITTLE  KAUTSKY’
The articles written on Kuusinen by the Finnish communists in the 
late 1960s indicated a strengthening of the Finnish point of view. This 
refl ected the general orientation of the movement, whose acceptance 
as part of the Finnish society grew at the same time as the ‘white’ 
interpretation of events in 1918 (i.e. as solely the outcome of Russian 
propaganda) started to lose credibility. From the mid-1960s there was 
also a certain attempt by the SKP and SKDL to adapt the movement to 
Finnish conditions. This was also evident in history writing within the 
SKDL; it tried to take advantage of studies written outside the movement 
54 ’Leninin kunniamerkki O.W. Kuusiselle’, TS 5 Oct. 1951; ’O.W. Kuusiselle 
NL:n korkein ansiomerkki, KU 4 Oct. 1961.
55 Jyvä, ’Omituinen ehto Kuusisen-katuasiassa’, KST 11 Oct. 1951.
56 K. Rentola, Niin kylmää että polttaa. Kommunistit, Kekkonen ja Kreml 1947–
1958. Keuruu: Otava 1997, 273. Tiutinen is a district in Kotka which was bombed 
heavily during the Winter War.
57 J. Suomi, Kriisien aika. Urho Kekkonen 1956–1962. Keuruu: Otava 1992, 
154–155; J. Nevakivi, Miten Kekkonen pääsi valtaan ja Suomi suomettui. Keu-
ruu: Otava 1996, 141–145.
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and to see its own history in the context of the events and other political 
forces in Finland.58
The new historical orientation was most manifest in the works of 
 Erkki Salomaa, trade union man and teacher, and the vice chairman of 
the SKP in 1966–71.59 His biography of  Yrjö Sirola helped him to realise 
that the work in the Finnish labour movement created the basis for the 
activities in the communist movement.60 The article on Kuusinen was 
mildly critical of the tendency to see his whole career as determined by 
his position in the international communist movement. By reminding 
his readers that Kuusinen was named ‘little  Kautsky’ in the Finnish 
labour movement, Salomaa pointed out that there were other sources for 
Kuusinen’s thinking besides the Russian version of marxism.61 
Salomaa was also willing to take advantage of the studies carried out 
on Kuusinen in the late 1960s and early 1970s62 and to give a sense of 
proportion to Kuusinen’s role in the People’s Deputation in 1918.63 The 
draft of the constitution written by Kuusinen, devoid of any means of 
coercion and full of radical democracy, was newly emphasised as being 
in harmony with the democratic demands of the movement in the late 
1960s. Salomaa did not hesitate to deal with the diffi cult questions of 
personality cult, purges in the Soviet Union and Kuusinen’s survival, 
though he did not have any new information on Kuusinen’s attitudes 
58 Saarela, Suomalaisen, 10.
59 E. Salomaa, Suuri Raha & Isänmaa Co. Kuopio: Kansankulttuuri 1961; E. 
Salomaa, Tavoitteena kansanvalta. Suomen työväenliikkeen vaiheita vuosina 
1944–1960. Kuopio: Kansankulttuuri 1964.
60 E. Salomaa, Yrjö Sirola – sosialistinen humanisti. Kuopio: Kansankulttuuri 
1966.
61 E. Salomaa, ‘Usko Sotamies – O.W. Kuusinen’, in Tiennäyttäjät 3. Suomen 
työväenliikkeen merkkimiehiä Ursinista Tanneriin. Edited by H. Soikkanen. 
Rauma: Tammi 1968, 358–359; see also T. Lehén, Marxilaisuuden alkukylvöä 
Suomessa. O.W. Kuusinen ja Sosialistinen Aikakauslehti 1906–1908. Pori: 
Kansankulttuuri 1971.
62 Nuori Otto Ville Kuusinen 1881–1920. Edited by V. Salminen. Jyväskylä: 
K.J. Gummerus Oy 1970; T. Henrikson, Romantik och marxism. Estetik och 
politik hos Otto Ville Kuusinen och Diktonius till och med 1921. Helsingfors: 
Söderström & C:o 1971.
63 E. Salomaa, ’Vallankumoushallituksen jäsen’, in Otto Wille Kuusinen – 
suomalainen internationalisti, 94–105.
Otto Ville Kuusinen commemorated
165
and behaviour. He admitted that during the formation of the Terijoki 
government, the opinions of its members were not consulted. Although 
 Salomaa used epithets of Kuusinen, he used them in less infl ated terms; 
he described him, for example, as ‘a scholar who used scientifi c methods 
with a fi rm grip’.64
KUUSINEN AND MARXISM-LENINISM
The attempt to study Kuusinen in his actual contexts was, however, short-
lived. In the 1970s it again became more common to see Kuusinen in the 
context of the international communist movement. That was evident in 
Otto Wille Kuusinen – suomalainen internationalisti; the book mainly 
consisted of articles by representatives of various communist parties 
who, in the genuine style of the 1950s, extolled Kuusinen’s merits.65
There were practical reasons for the change; after Erkki Salomaa’s 
death in 1971 there was no one in the SKP to continue his approach. Some 
of the party functionaries, however, took advantage of the accessibility of 
the SKP archives in Moscow when writing on the SKP during the inter-
war years and also produced some new information on Kuusinen in the 
Communist International.66 The visits of Kuusinen’s co-workers directed 
the interest towards Kuusinen’s later career in the CPSU.
In a way the change refl ected the general orientation of the SKP 
which, despite its strong commitment to Finnish daily politics in the 
government, had a tendency to follow Soviet interpretations of marxism-
leninism in theoretical questions. This orientation was consolidated by 
inner disputes in the SKP (which, despite the formal unity, was in fact 
divided into two parties as from 1969), and by the eager, occasionally 
64 E. Salomaa, ‘Usko Sotamies – O.W. Kuusinen’, in Tiennäyttäjät 3, 376, 378–
379.
65 The writers included German Walter Ulbricht, French Jacques Duclot, 
Swede Hilding Hagberg, British Rajani Palme Dutt, Austrian Friedl Fürnberg, 
Norwegian Emil Lövlien and Hungarian Dezsö Nemes.
66 A. Hyvönen, Suomen Kommunistinen Puolue 1918–1924. Tampere: 
Kansankulttuuri 1968; A. Hyvönen, SKP:n maanalaisuuden vuodet. Suomen 
työväenliikkeen historiaa 1920–1930-luvuilla. Kuopio: Kansankulttuuri 1971; L. 
Linsiö, Komintern ja Kuusinen. Helsinki: Kirjapaino Kursiivi Oy, 1978.
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even fi ery, commitment of the minority of the party, especially its youth, 
to marxism-leninism.
This indicated a return to the model in which Kuusinen was mainly 
seen in the context of marxism-leninism, not in the context of actual 
events and other political forces in the Finnish or Soviet societies. 
Studies on Finnish communism from outside the movement,67 which had 
contributed to more information on actual events, were also forgotten. In 
a sense, Kuusinen’s life history was harnessed to demonstrate the power 
of marxist-leninist theory.
 Lenin’s 100th anniversary stimulated interest in Kuusinen’s 
orientation along Lenin’s thoughts; Kuusinen became ‘a prominent 
agitator and teacher of leninist thoughts’, even during the phase when he 
hardly knew much about them.68 Some communists were more modest 
and saw Kuusinen’s meeting with Lenin in Helsinki in August 1917 of 
crucial signifi cance for Kuusinen’s move to leninism69 – thus forgetting 
Kuusinen’s own writings stating that one did not become a leninist 
immediately. Everyone, however, remembered Lenin’s words about 
Kuusinen in 1921: ‘he knows and thinks’.
It was common to reiterate how great Kuusinen’s infl uence on the 
development of party work had been, that he had acted as an intermediary 
informing the SKP of the experiences of the international communist 
movement and guided it to becoming a marxist-leninist party. Besides 
guiding the SKP, he had fought against the white terror and fascism in 
Finland.70 Regarding Kuusinen’s career in the Communist International it 
became customary to concentrate on his contribution to the organizational 
thesis in 1921 and the creation of the people’s front policy in the mid-
1930s, sometimes even his strong position in the International in the late 
1920s. In this connection it was common to mention Kuusinen as Lenin’s 
67 J. Hodgson, Communism in Finland. A History and Interpretation. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press 1967; I. Hakalehto, Suomen kommunistinen puolue ja 
sen vaikutus poliittiseen ja ammatilliseen työväenliikkeeseen 1918–1928. Por voo: 
WSOY 1968; A. Upton, Kommunismi Suomessa. Rauma: Kirjayhtymä 1970. 
68 ’Otto Wille Kuusinen’, Kommunisti 9 (1971), 417.
69 S. Toiviainen – J. Krasin, ’Kansainvälisen työväenliikkeen merkkihenkilö’, 
Kommunisti 10 (1981), 737.
70 V. Pessi, ’O.W. Kuusinen ja Suomen kommunistinen puolue’; Kommunisti 9 
(1971), 418; S. Toiviainen, ’O.W. Kuusisen merkitys SKP:n synnylle, kehitykselle 
ja toiminnalle’, Kommunisti 1 (1979), 4–7.
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student and associate. Sometimes Kuusinen’s contribution to the fi ght 
against ‘deviations’ represented by  Lev Trotsky,  Grigori Zinovjev and 
 Nikolai Bukharin was mentioned, but no-one remembered  Stalin.71
The internal disputes of the SKP had some infl uence on the Kuusinen 
commemorations. In the 1971 festive meeting the legacy of Kuusinen 
was connected to the problems concerning the unity of the communist 
party. Although  Aarne Saarinen, the chairman of the SKP since 1966, 
emphasized Kuusinen’s criticism of ‘rigid, narrow, one-sided and 
unrealistic attitudes’ in the inner disputes of the SKP and his speeches 
of ‘sectarianism’, it was not an attempt to fi nd examples of Kuusinen’s 
activities in various situations and to use them against the minority of 
the party. It was rather the general idea of ‘a tight and united communist 
party’ that was regarded as Kuusinen’s heritage.72
Since the policy of friendship between Finland and the Soviet 
Union was becoming offi cial in Finland, it was not necessary to refer 
to Kuusinen’s pioneering role in this fi eld. The attitude to the Terijoki 
government varied; in the SKP festive meetings and in the book Otto Wille 
Kuusinen – suomalainen internationalisti the issue was not mentioned,73 
but in the festive meeting of SOL in September 1971,  Urho Jokinen, 
the chief editor of Tiedonantaja, the organ of the SKP minority, made 
the government his main topic and regarded its foundation as a duty 
imposed by proletarian internationalism. Thus he left out the patriotism 
that communists had connected with internationalism in the 1950s and 
considered, in a more straightforward way, the Soviet interests primary 
for Finnish communists, too.74 In 1981  Seppo Toiviainen and  Juri Krasin 
revived the old connection between patriotism and internationalism but 
did not try to ponder the question from various points of view. They 
claimed that the foundation of the Terijoki government had manifested 
71 Linsiö, ‘O.W. Kuusinen Kominternin työssä’; Toiviainen–Krasin, ’Kan-
sainvälisen’, 734; Toiviainen, ‘O.W. Kuusisen merkitys’, 5–6.
72 ’Kuusisen perintö velvoittaa luomaan puolueyhtenäisyyden’, KU 4 Oct. 1971.
73 ’Kuusisen perintö velvoittaa’, KU 4 Oct. 1971; ’Otto Wille Kuusinen’, 
Kommunisti 9 (1971), 417–418; T. Karvonen, ’Suomen ja Neuvostoliiton 
ystävyyden esitaistelija’, in M.-L. Mikkola (ed.), Otto Wille Kuusinen – 
suomalainen internationalisti. Helsinki: Kansankulttuuri 1971, 132–139.
74 ’O.W.K 90 vuotta’, TA 30 Sept. 1971.
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the real patriotism of the Finnish people.75 The representatives of the 
majority, in contrast, regarded the Terijoki government as a result of 
growing diffi culties in Finland and ‘the phenomena connected with the 
period of the cult of personality.’76
Kuusinen’s co-workers,  Georgi Arbatov and  Fjodor Burlatsky, 
emphasized Kuusinen’s interest in questions concerning state monopolist 
capitalism, the democratic front against monopolies and the peaceful 
transition to socialism. They did not, however, relate Kuusinen with other 
persons in the CPSU or the theoretical heritage of  Stalin.77 Some Finns 
adressed the same questions in order to legitimise the SKP’s prevailing 
line.78
***
In Finland the communist leader cult could not legitimise the power of 
a small ruling group, to manage potential confl icts between the ruling 
group and the wider society as in those countries where communists 
were in power.79 In Finland, the Kuusinen cult consolidated obedience to 
the Soviet interpretations of marxist-leninist theory within the SKP and 
SKDL, though there were also attempts to give the Kuusinen celebrations 
a signifi cance more in accordance with the traditions of the Finnish labour 
movement. The attempt to use Kuusinen to challenge the dominant view 
of history in Finland was doomed to failure from the very beginning.
75 Toiviainen–Krasin, ’Kansainvälisen’, 735–737.
76 E. Kauppila, ’SKPn historian suuruus ja sen tutkimisen ongelmat’, KU 29 
Aug. 1978.
77 G. Arbatov, ’Etevä tiedemies ja marxismin teoreetikko’, in Mikkola (ed.), 
Otto Wille, 12–23; F. Burlatski, ’Otto Wille Kuusinen – marxilais-leniniläinen 
tutkija, teoreetikko ja poliitikko’, Kommunisti 12 (1978), 967–976.
78 E. Rautee, ’O.W. Kuusinen ja kapitalismin kriisin uusi vaihe’, Kommunisti 12 
(1978), 976–979; ’Otto Wille Kuusinen’, Kommunisti 10 (1981), 730; E. Rautee, 
’O.W. Kuusinen ja kommunistien strategia tänään’, Kommunisti 10 (1981), 746–
749.
79 E. A. Rees, ‘Leader Cults: Varieties, Preconditions and Functions’, in The 
Leader Cult, 21–22.
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German Historians and the German
Question in the Cold War
 WILFRIED LOTH
How did historians participate in the debate over the German question? 
How relevant their contributions were? Did they offer explanations or 
provide orientation or did they give impetus to false interpretations? 
These questions are addressed predominantly to German historians since 
it was they who, for obvious reasons, primarily concerned themselves 
with the developments and the policy options on Germany during the 
Cold War and thus had the opportunity to contribute to the national 
discourse on identity and political orientation. They will continue to do 
so as well. That is why a dispassionate analysis of their achievements 
and biases regarding historical fi ndings in the era of the Cold War (and 
beyond) can be benefi cial.
ANXIETIES AND SWEEPING JUDGMENTS
My review begins with the observation – or lament – that in dealing 
with the German question, historians have allowed themselves to be 
infl uenced all too much by emotions, anxieties, and fears linked to the 
Cold War. That is basically no surprise given that they themselves were 
contemporaries of the Cold War and that it was to a great extent perceived 
as an existential confl ict. Yet it does remain surprising how long many 
authors clung to their obsessions even after the most intense phases of 
the Cold War had long since passed and, furthermore, after a signifi cant 




From the beginning, there has been no lack of such differentiated 
accounts.  Hans-Peter Schwarz, for example, surprised his colleagues 
in the fi eld as early as 1966 with his habilitation Vom Reich zur 
Bundesrepublik, in which he asserted that Soviet policy on Germany in 
the immediate postwar period had not necessarily been oriented toward 
the Sovietization of all of Germany within a Soviet Europe. Instead, there 
were contradictions to be found in Soviet policy; along with the view in 
favor of Sovietization, three other possible concepts and goals could be 
distinguished:  the alternative of a “Carthaginian” peace in alliance with 
the Western powers completely subjugating the Germans, the possibility 
of an understanding with Germany, and, lastly, the option for a division 
of Germany with the Sovietization of the USSR’s own occupation zone 
as a consequence.1 
Yet even for such an astute analyst as Schwarz, whose observations 
were to a great extent precise, the Sovietization of all Germany essentially 
remained a possibility in Soviet policy and at a certain juncture, namely 
that of the Berlin Blockade, was even the most likely policy.2 He did not, 
however, pose the question as to the discrepancy between what may have 
been desired and what could actually have been accomplished given the 
presence of Western troops on German soil. Moreover, Schwarz praised 
 Konrad Adenauer’s analysis of the division in the autumn of 1945 as 
exceptionally insightful. Conversely, he dismissively treated such 
politicians as  Jakob Kaiser und  Martin Niemöller who in opposition to 
Adenauer focused on variants two and three in Schwarz’s typology; he 
regarded such fi gures as having suffered from illusions.3 All this meant 
that his overall picture of developments implicitly privileged variant one, 
the Sovietization of all Germany.
In the eyes of the bulk of Western and West German authors 
who expressed views on the goals of Soviet policy on Germany, the 
expansionistic quality of this policy remained an unquestioned and 
unshakable certainty. At the beginning of the 1980s, one could still read 
1 Hans-Peter Schwarz, Vom Reich zur Bundesrepublik. Deutschland im Widerstreit 
der außenpolitischen Konzeptionen in den Jahren der Besatzungsherrschaft 
1945–1949. Neuwied and Berlin: Luchterhand 1966, second edition Suttgart: 
Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt 1980, 201–269.
2 Ibid., 251, 254.
3 Ibid., 343, 425 ff., 478 ff., 643, 695.
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in the works of such authors as  Vojtech Mastny and  Walrab von Buttlar 
that the goal had indeed been the Sovietization of all Germany.  Evidence 
regarded as suffi cient for this thesis was reference to Stalin’s turn away 
from dismemberment plans in the spring of 1945, the possibility of an 
American troop withdrawal from Europe, the strength of the communist 
parties in Western Europe, and also of course Soviet propaganda, 
according to which everything the USSR did was in the service of 
“socialism.” In other words: The anxieties which initially plagued a 
few individual contemporaries such as  Winston Churchill and  Konrad 
Adenauer became seemingly objective certainties about the intentions 
of Soviet policy thanks to these authors. Little attention was paid to the 
actual power differential between the US and the Soviet Union or to the 
many statements by Stalin as to his respect for the global economic might 
of the US with its monopoly on nuclear weapons; Soviet protestations 
that the transition to socialism was not on the agenda were dismissed 
as “salami tactics,” that is, a divide-and-conquer strategy. Nor was any 
impression made by the demonstrable fact that neither the French nor the 
Italian Communist Party was pursuing a revolutionary course but, quite 
the contrary, had adopted policies aimed at system stabilization.4 Just 
the opposite: Authors who called attention to the discrepancy between 
Western expectations and Soviet praxis sometimes had to hear themselves 
be accused of “ambitious falsifi cation” with “totalitarian intentions,” as 
 Kurt Marko said in a review of my book Teilung der Welt.5
The fl awed nature of the source base upon which the Sovietization 
thesis rested can be seen, for example, in  Karel Kaplan’s study of the 
communist takeover of Czechoslovakia, Der kurze Marsch, which 
appeared in 1981.6  Alexander Fischer, who shortly before this had taken 
4 Cf. W. Loth, ‘Frankreichs Kommunisten und der Beginn des Kalten Krieges’ 
in Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 26 (1978), 7–65; on the context, W. Loth, 
Die Teilung der Welt. Geschichte des Kalten Krieges 1941–1955. München: 
Deutscher Taschenbuch-Verlag 1980, enlarged edition 2000.
5 K. Marko, ’Die Teilung der Welt – mit schiefem Blick,’ Österreichische Osthefte 
24 (1982), 92–103; K. Marko, ’Die Teilung der Welt – ein kurzer Lehrgang in 
Demagogie’ in Zeitschrift für Politik  29 (1982), 429–435. On this, cf. my reply: 
W. Loth, ‘Kalter Krieg gegen die historische Forschung?’ in Zeitschrift für Politik  
30 (1983), 193–201.
6 K. Kaplan, Der kurze Marsch. Kommunistische Machtübernahme in der 
Tschechoslowakei 1945–1948. München and Wien: Oldenbourg 1981.
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as his starting point the position “that Soviet policy on Germany at the 
end of the war was directed neither toward a division of Germany nor 
toward subjugation and Sovietization,” and who had identifi ed only 
cautious “steps” meant to “infl uence developments in Germany in a way 
benefi cial to themselves,”7 reported at the 1982 Historikertag in Münster 
that  Kaplan’s study, based on internal sources from the Czechoslovakian 
Communist Party, had now “established” that by war’s end,  Stalin was 
hoping to be able to expand Soviet infl uence across the entire European 
continent step by step.8 That was actually to be found in Kaplan:9  Upon 
closer investigation, the numerous sources supposedly proving this thesis 
boiled down to one – and that single source actually proved something 
completely different:  In August of 1946, Stalin told a delegation of the 
British Labour Party, British socialists, and Soviet communists that they 
could “work together and contribute to the realization of socialism in all 
of Europe”; he acknowledged, however, that in contrast to the process in 
the Soviet Union, it was possible “to achieve Socialism with democratic-
socialist methods.”10 This allegedly so revelatory source was thus nothing 
more than a goodwill declaration to the governing party of the leading 
Western European power, a source which moreover made it clear that 
Stalin was quite fl exible as to his defi nition of “socialism!”11
7 Thesis presentation at the Colloquium of the Institut für Zeitgeschichte, 23 
November 1979: Der Weg nach Pankow. Zur Gründungsgeschichte der DDR. 
München and Wien: Oldenbourg 1980, 15.
8 A. Fischer, ‘Handlungsspielräume der UdSSR in der Entstehung des Ost-West-
Gegensatzes 1945 bis 1950’ in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B 25/83, 25 June 
1983, 13–18, here 16; cf. also A. Fischer, ’Die Sowjetunion und die “deutsche 
Frage“ 1945–1949’ in Die Deutschlandfrage und die Anfänge des Ost-West-
Konfl ikts 1945–1949. Berlin: Dunckler & Humblodt 1984, 41–57, here 44 ff.
9Kaplan, Der kurze Marsch, 90 ff.
10 Harold Laski’s report from the stenographic copy in the personal papers of 
Klement Gottwald in German translation quoted in Kaplan, ibid.
11 In the British version (which Kaplan does not know), the inoffensive character 
of the source is even clearer: ‘Mr. Stalin said that he was gratifi ed to know that 
two great countries were traveling in the Socialist direction. In Russia they 
were travelling to Socialism in the Russian way, whereas Britain was going in 
a roundabout British way’, Report of the 46th annual Conference of the Labour 
Party (1947), 218.
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The development of a realistic picture of Soviet policy on Germany 
has not only been hindered by the persistence of subliminal anxieties 
over Soviet expansion and Bolshevik revolution, however. The anti-
American emphasis of the “New Left,” conditioned above all by the 
traumatic experience of the Vietnam War, also contributed – if only 
inadvertently – to a situation in which unrealistic conceptions of decision-
making processes on German policy could predominate for so long. The 
“revisionists” combined their criticism of exaggerated conceptions of a 
Soviet threat with severe attacks against alleged American imperialism, 
which they exclusively blamed for the division of Germany and of Europe, 
and then also systematically played down the repressive aspects of Soviet 
policy. All this made it easy for the colleagues they were attacking as 
“traditionalists” to reject their viewpoint lock, stock, and barrel without 
having to deal substantively with the criticism of the Sovietization thesis 
by these “revisionists.”12
Historical writing in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) func-
tioned in a similarly counterproductive manner right up to the end:  On 
the one hand, it claimed that only the Soviet Union had remained steadfast 
in adhering to the Potsdam Agreement for the joint democratization of 
Germany by the victorious powers. On the other hand, East German 
historians insisted that “true securing of peace” was possible “only in 
class struggle and with the hegemony of the working class,” naturally 
embodied in the Communist Party or the Socialist Unity Party (SED).13 
The latent contradiction between these two assertions could only be 
resolved if one presupposed that the transformation realized on the soil 
of the Soviet Occupation Zone was initially intended for all of Germany. 
This did fi t with the democratic-antifascist claims of the GDR but also 
amounted to a shining justifi cation for the policy of founding the Federal 
Republic as well as its integration into the West.  
Thus, the attacks of the “revisionists” developed into a situation 
in which the two sides were talking past one another and in which 
ideological and political factors pushed their way into the foreground 
12 Cf. the now classic presentation, which has many follow-ups but has not been 
further expanded, J. and G. Kolko, The Limits of Power. The World and United 
States Policy 1945–1954. New York: Harper and Row 1972.
13 Most recently R. Badstübner, Friedenssicherung und deutsche Frage. Vom 
Untergang des “Reiches“ bis zur deutschen Zweistaatlichkeit (1943 bis 1949). 
Berlin: Dietz 1990, 111. 
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even as historical argumentation fell by the wayside. Given that such a 
dialog leads only to frustration, it was soon broken off; the antagonists 
retreated into the assertion of their respective positions. In the vacuum 
they left behind, a superfi cially intermediary view quickly gained 
popularity: the thesis of the irreconcilability of the two systems which 
met at the River Elbe. “Each side introduces its own system as far as its 
army can advance.” This quote from  Stalin, reported by  Milovan Djilas,14 
became the starting point for a whole series of works in which the 
development of two German states and their integration into antagonistic 
bloc systems seemed a necessary consequence of the arrangement 
between two powers as dissimilar as the US and the USSR to fi ght on 
until the unconditional surrender of the Third Reich. “The US and the 
Soviet Union were two dynamic systems and authentic ideology-states,” 
as  Ernst Nolte formulated this viewpoint in his second major work, 
Germany and the Cold War, “indeed different in their age and militancy 
but exactly because of that they have an essential if not absolute enmity 
toward one another, and therefore with their meeting on German soil, the 
Cold War and the division of Germany became as unavoidable as any 
historical event was unavoidable.”15
This position was an intermediate one in that the question of “guilt” 
for the division of Germany, which had been clearly but controversially 
answered by the protagonists in the revisionism debate, was substantially 
relativized. Also, it was left somewhat vague as to whether and how 
intensively the two main victors of the Second World War thought of 
trying to work beyond the demarcation lines of 1945. This viewpoint was 
above all popular because it fi t with the experiences of contemporaries 
after the solidifi cation of the status quo in Europe and simultaneously 
served the demands of the détente era in multiple political respects: It 
allowed both East and West essentially to justify the decisions of the past 
and hence justify the societal systems themselves, yet by pushing aside 
the question of guilt, it also allowed for a continual dialog at least on a 
minimal level.
14 M. Djilas, Gespräche mit Stalin. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer 1962, 146.
15 E. Nolte, Deutschland und der Kalte Krieg. München and Zürich: Piper 1974, 
599.  For discussion of Nolte‘s work, cf. W. Loth, ‘Der “Kalte Krieg“ in deutscher 
Sicht’ in Deutschland-Archiv 9 (1976), 204–213.
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The fl aw in the thesis of necessary system opposition consisted in 
the fact that it could not bear closer historical scrutiny either.16 First 
of all, the actors guiding the destiny of the victorious powers in 1945 
initially wanted to administer the defeated Germany jointly. This can 
be demonstrated for President  Harry Truman and US Secretary of State 
 James Byrnes, British Foreign Secretary  Ernest Bevin in the fi rst months, 
and for  Stalin as well. Both sides in the later East-West confl ict had a 
lasting interest in avoiding disputes among themselves; both viewed the 
democratization of Germany as an existential problem; and both were 
indeed convinced that this was a problem shared by the victorious powers 
(although that can be demonstrated with certainty only for the Western 
side). Secondly, the victorious powers could in principle have continued 
their alliance beyond 8 May 1945. In pursuit of their oppositional security 
interests, they did not existentially threaten one another – the US could 
certainly have lived with a communist controlled Soviet hegemonial 
sphere in Eastern Europe; with its immense need for reconstruction, the 
Soviet Union had far more urgent issues to attend to than challenging 
the liberal order in the major European countries. In economic terms, the 
American interest in new markets and the Soviet interest in assistance 
with reconstruction were even complementary.
Of course, the leadership groups of both powers held long-term 
conceptions of the future which excluded the other.  A lack of experience 
with one another and the starkest imaginable contrasts in political 
culture – the idealistic insouciance of the new world on one side and a 
pathological distrust of the capitalist world on the other – served to make 
an understanding even more diffi cult. That much of the thesis of system 
opposition remains – a joint administration of the defeated Germany 
would have demanded much greater effort than a division, and so such a 
joint administration was less likely from the beginning. Yet, that did not 
make it an impossibility, and it remains the task of historians to ascertain 
why the original intent of the victorious powers was frustrated – on the 
basis of which agenda-setting, which developments, and which specifi c 
decisions.
16 On the following in more detail: W. Loth, ‘Alternativen zum Kalten Krieg? 
Rückblick auf den Beginn des Ost-West-Konfl iktes nach dessen Ende’ in 




Additionally, the concentration on the East-West confl ict as the 
determinant of policy on Germany allowed the more comprehensive 
historical dimension of the German question to slip into the background 
for a long time. The debate about responsibility for the division and the 
signifi cance of the confl ict between the systems went so far that it seemed 
possessed by the subliminal idea that the Reich would have continued to 
exist were it not for the break in the alliance of the victorious powers. 
The extent of the defeat in 1945 remained as underemphasized as the 
Germans’ responsibility for this defeat and the relevance that the German 
Problem would have had for the victorious powers and Germany’s 
European neighbors independent of any East-West confl ict. This did 
fi t with the course of the public debate in the postwar period and the 
widespread unwillingness or inability to deal with the burdens of the 
past; it also implied a signifi cant narrowing of vision. With their view to 
larger contexts, historians could have served a corrective function here. 
That they failed to do so or at least failed to do enough has decisively 
contributed to a situation in which the Germans to the present day have 
diffi culties understanding themselves and their role in world politics.
It is the case that  Andreas Hillgruber repeatedly called attention to 
the problematic of the German state in the center of Europe: The latent 
hegemonic potential of a German nation-state, whose founding was 
made possible only in the exceptional situation of the constellation of 
the Crimean War; the precariously half-hegemonic position of the Reich 
founded in 1871; the large measure of foreign policy continuity from the 
Wilhelmine period to  Hitler, climaxing in the two fl ights forward into 
full hegemony over the European continent. Hillgruber consequently 
interpreted the events of 1945 as the self-infl icted “demise of the German 
Reich.”17 Additionally,  Michael Stürmer and  Hagen Schulze emphasized 
the European dimension of the German question in numerous essays 
during the 1980s.18
17 A. Hillgruber, Kontinuität und Diskontinuität in der deutschen Außenpolitik 
von Bismarck bis Hitler. Düsseldorf: Droste 1969; idem., Die gescheiterte 
Großmacht. Eine Skizze des Deutschen Reiches 1871–1945. Düsseldorf: Droste 
1980.
18 M. Stürmer, ’Kein Eigentum der Deutschen: die deutsche Frage’ in W. Weidenfeld 
(ed.), Die Identität der Deutschen. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 
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Yet,  Stürmer and Schulze combined their discussion of the geopolitical 
problematic with a diffi cult-to-understand new version of the thesis of 
the primacy of foreign policy, (arguing that Germany’s position in the 
middle of Europe was the primary reason for the strength of authoritarian 
structures in German history). Furthermore, this discussion usually 
omitted developments after 1945 as well as the meaning of the “German 
catastrophe” for those developments. In his oft-cited 1969 inaugural 
lecture in Freiburg,  Hillgruber did once characterize  Adenauer’s policy 
of driving the Soviet Union out of Central Europe as an illusionary 
“sequel to German great-power politics,”19 but this reference to lines of 
continuity beyond the caesura of 1945 did not draw much attention. Nor 
did Hillgruber incorporate the experience of German great-power politics 
into his explanation for the policies of the victorious powers.
With few exceptions,20 there remained a curious division of labor 
among German historians: One group analyzed the way to the “German 
Catastrophe” without concerning itself in detail with developments in 
the postwar period, while the other group did yeoman work in analyzing 
the most recent sources for the contemporary period without considering 
the long prehistory. Even  Ernst Nolte, who indeed took on the task of 
determining the historical location of the German Problem in the era of 
the Cold War and to do so developed far-reaching constructions stretching 
back into the Middle Ages, did nothing to overcome this specifi c boundary 
between epochs; the problem of the hegemonial potential of a German 
nation-state does not appear in his work.
There was a successive analysis of the government records of the 
Western Allies during the 1980s. Without any claim to completeness or 
assessment of individual contributions, the list of scholars engaged in 
1983, 83–101; W. Weidenfeld, Dissonanzen des Fortschritts. Stuttgart: Deutsche 
Verlags-Anstalt 1986; H. Schulze, ’Die ”Deutsche Katastrophe’”erklären’, in D. 
Diner (ed.),  Ist der Nationalsozialismus Geschichte? Frankfurt am Main: Fischer 
Taschenbuch-Verlag 1987, 89–101.
19 Quoted in A. Hillgruber, Großmachtpolitik und Militarismus im 20. 
Jahrhundert. Düsseldorf: Droste 1974, 36.
20 For example, W. Loth, ’Die deutsche Frage als europäisches Problem’, 
Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B 51–52/82, 25 December 1982, 3–13; idem., 
’Träume vom Deutschen Reich’ in idem., Ost-West-Konfl ikt und deutsche Frage. 




this task included  Rolf Steininger,  Josef Foschepoth,  Albrecht Tyrell, 
 Hermann-Josef Rupieper, as well as the group at the Freiburg Military 
History Research Offi ce and a series of foreign colleagues.21 This work 
has at least allowed the weight of the German Problem for the Allies 
to become clear in its full scope. We now know that the wartime plans 
made for the division of Germany were not transitory expressions of anti-
German emotions but rather continued to be pursued by the leaders of all 
the victorious powers, despite criticism from experts, in the well founded 
awareness that this time there needed to be more effective measures taken 
against a renewed German threat than had been taken in 1919. We have 
learned that the fi rst initiative for developing division plans came not 
from  Stalin but from  Churchill22 and that his cabinet was still prepared to 
accept such a solution in March of 1945 (although much reluctance had 
in the meantime developed about it).23 A power-political basis for such a 
division was fi rst undermined with Stalin’s public declaration of 9 May 
1945; even after that, however, such fi gures as  Ernest Bevin sympathized 
until early 1946 with French plans for a separation of the Rhineland and 
Ruhr area from the rest of Germany.24
21  R. Steininger, Deutsche Geschichte 1945–1961. Darstellung und Dokumente 
in zwei Bänden. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch-Verlag 1983, enlarged 
edition 2002; J. Foschepoth (ed.), Kalter Krieg und Deutsche Frage. Deutschland 
im Widersreit der Mächte 1945–1952. Göttingen and Zürich: Vandenhoeck 
& Ruprecht 1985; J. Foschepoth (ed), Adenauer und die Deutsche Frage. 
Göttingen: Vandenhoeck  & Ruprecht 1988, second edition 1990; A. Tyrell, 
Großbritannien und die Deutschlandplanung der Alliierten 1941-1945. Frankfurt 
am Main: Alfred Metzner 1987; H. J. Rupieper, Der besetzte Verbündete. Die 
amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik 1949–1955. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag 
1991; Anfänge westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik 1945–1956, 4 vols. München: 
Oldenbourg 1982–1990; B. Thoss and H.E. Volkmann (eds.), Zwischen Kaltem 
Krieg und Entspannung. Sicherheits- und Deutschlandpolitik der Bundesrepublik 
im Mächtesystem der Jahre 1953–1956. Boppard: Boldt 1988.
22 Svetsko-anglijskie otnosenija vo vremja Velikoj otocest vennoj vojny 1941–
1945, vol. 1. Moscow 1983, 182.
23 R. Steininger (ed.), Die Ruhrfrage 1945/46 und die Entstehung des Landes 
Nordrhein-Westfalen. Britische, französische und amerikanische Akten. 
Düsseldorf: Droste 1988, 37 ff.
24 Ibid., 60–62, 76 ff., 102–106.
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Lines of continuity from early dismemberment plans to the 
actual division of Germany into two states will need to be more fully 
incorporated into historians’ accounts than has been usual up till now. 
It is well known that the French veto was the fi rst and for the moment 
decisive cause of the failure of the Potsdam Agreement for establishing 
a central administration. As  Elisabeth Krause has shown in a very 
enlightening dissertation on the question of the central administration 
of occupied Germany,  Bevin backed up French policy so that American 
attempts to save the unifi ed administration of the four occupation zones 
failed.25 The victorious powers’ mutual fears of one another then came 
into play and caused the gulf separating them on Germany policy to 
become ever wider; however, this occurred fi rst of all within the context 
of this torpedoing of a unifi ed four-zone Germany.
Likewise, it has become clear that the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) was intended by its founders to function as much 
as a means of containing the German danger as of containing Soviet 
aggression. Only after the US Senate’s “Vandenberg Resolution” of 11 
June 1948 opened the way for American participation in an Atlantic 
alliance was the French government prepared to present London’s 
recommendations for the founding of a western German state to the 
French parliament.26 It was only after the actual signing of the Atlantic 
Pact on 4 April 1949 that the French consented to the establishment of 
the so-called Trizonia and the Occupation Statute. Furthermore, only 
after the British and Americans had made a declaration guaranteeing 
that they would station troops in the Federal Republic of Germany 
(FRG) did France sign the General Treaty and the European Defense 
Community (EDC) Treaty.27 The fi rst European institutions also had the 
25 E. Kraus, Ministerien für ganz Deutschland? Der Alliierte Kontrollrat und 
die Frage gesamtdeutscher Zentralverwaltungen. München: Oldenbourg 1990, 
102–113.
26 W. Loth, ’Die deutsche Frage in französischer Perspektive’ in L. Herbst (ed.), 
Westdeutschland 1945–1955. Unterwerfung, Kontrolle, Integration. München: 
Oldenbourg 1986, 37–49; once again in Loth, Ost-West-Konfl ikt 46–64, here 60 
ff.
27 K. A. Maier, ‘Die internationalen Auseinandersetzungen um die West-
integration der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und um ihre Bewaffnung im 
Rahmen der Europäischen Verteidigungsgemeinschaft’ in Anfänge westdeutscher 
Sicherheitspolitik, vol. 2, 1–234, here 124.
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same containment function vis-à-vis the Federal Republic: This is seen in 
the prehistory of the Council of Europe, in the decision-making process 
leading to the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC), as well as in the negotiations on the Treaties of Rome.28
It has also become surprisingly clear that the project of integrating 
the Federal Republic into the West was repeatedly called into question 
by the Western Allies right up to the end, that is, up to the signing of the 
Treaties of Paris – this was due in part to the uncertainty as to whether 
the FRG could actually be kept in the Western camp for the long term 
and in part because Western leaders shied away from the cost entailed in 
such an integration: A military buildup by the two blocs and the indefi nite 
military presence of the US in Europe. This was a broad phenomenon from 
 George Kennan’s plan for neutralizing Germany in reaction to the Berlin 
Blockade to the détente initiatives of  Churchill after  Stalin’s death. Thus, 
 Reinhard Neebe could demonstrate that the Political Planning Staff of the 
US State Department was contemplating neutralization even after Stalin’s 
démarche of 10 March 1952: This group recommended the acceptance 
of Stalin’s proposal for elections under Four-Power control (that is, not 
under the supervision of the United Nations) and contemplated setting a 
date in December of 1952.29
That the Soviet side was also aiming for the unifi ed-Germany 
alternative until 1955 has been repeatedly contested, admittedly with 
limited success. Linked with the public disputes of the spring of 1958 
in the Federal Republic, this debate concerns above all the Stalin 
Notes of 1952, in which the Soviet government offi cially offered the 
establishment of a German state with the condition that all occupation 
forces be withdrawn. No other issue affected German historians in such 
an existential way as did the question of whether the proper response 
had been made to these notes; at no other point has the debate been 
carried on so vehemently and in such a confused manner, with specious 
argumentation and twisted logic.
The existential nature of this debate can perhaps best be seen in the 
reaction of  Eugen Gerstenmaier at a conference in the Bundeskanzler-
28 Summarizing this, W. Loth, Der Weg nach Europa. Geschichte der europäischen 
Integration 1939–1957. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck  & Ruprecht 1990, 69–133.
29 R. Neebe, ‘Wahlen als Test: Eine gescheiterte Initiative des Politischen 
Planungsstabs im State Department zur Stalin-Note vom 10. März 1952’ 
Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 1/1989, 139–162.
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Adenauer-Haus in March of 1981 when  Hermann Graml termed the 
“missed opportunity” a “legend.”   Gerstenmaier said that for many years, 
he had been “at odds with myself” as to “whether we had acted correctly,” 
and he had repeatedly “tormented” himself with this question; he was 
thus thankful to Mr. Graml for having “liberated” him from “confl icting 
feelings.”30 At  bottom, Graml had not disproven the thesis of the missed 
opportunity at all. He had only demonstrated that in 1952  Stalin had not 
simply offered the release of the GDR into the West; Graml then quoted 
two statements by Soviet diplomats from April and May of 1952 assuring 
their interlocutors that the Soviet Union was not contemplating doing 
away with the GDR.31 The limited explanatory value of these sources did 
not prevent Graml’s message from being eagerly believed and quickly 
incorporated into more general works.32
All the greater was the commotion four years later when  Rolf 
Steininger sought with elaborate documentation to provide proof that 
Stalin’s offer had been in earnest and that  Adenauer had missed a historic 
opportunity.33  This thesis too lacked a suffi cient source base:  Steininger’s 
central piece of evidence, Stalin’s assurance to the Italian socialist leader 
 Pietro Nenni in July of 1952 that at the beginning of the note exchange 
he had been “actually prepared to make sacrifi ces,”34 was not compelling 
proof for the seriousness of the Soviet initiative.  Yet, instead of revisiting 
the issue of Soviet intentions, the criticism of Steininger focused on the 
30 Contributions to the discussion in H.P. Schwarz (ed.), Die Legende von der 
verpassten Gelegenheit. Die Stalin-Note vom 10. März 1952. Stuttgart and 
Zürich: Belser 1982, 52–55.
31 H. Graml, ‘Die sowjetische Notenkampagne von 1952’, in ibid, 16–31.; H. 
Graml, ‚Die Legende von der verpassten Gelegenheit’, Vierteljahrshefte für 
Zeitgeschichte 29 (1981), 307–341.
32 For example in W. Benz, ‘Bundesrepublik Deutschland’, in Das Zwanzigste 
Jahrhundert II. Europa nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg (= Fischer Weltgeschichte 
Bd. 35). Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag 1983, 124–148, here 
144.
33 R. Steininger, Eine Chance zur Wiedervereinigung? Darstellung und 
Dokumentation auf der Grundlage unveröffentlichter britischer und 
amerikanischer Akten. Bonn: Verlag Neue Gesellschaft 1985, second edition 
1986; R. Steininger, Eine vertane Chance. Die Stalin-Note vom 10. März 1952 
und die Wiedervereinigung. Berlin and Bonn: Dietz 1985, second edition 1986.
34 Made known for the fi rst time by Steininger, Deutsche Geschichte, 410 ff.
Wilfried Loth
182
assertion that  Adenauer had had no choice in the matter at all due to 
the attitude of the Western Allies. That was a hopeless proposition from 
the start; the more documents that were brought into this debate, the 
more clear it became – often against the intentions and statements of the 
authors – that the decision about the Soviet offer lay primarily with the 
Germans themselves. It could not have been otherwise given the self-
understanding of the Western democracies.35
The insight into the weight of the German question even after 1945 
led many historians to warn against rash zeal for reunifi cation.  Karl 
Dietrich Erdmann differentiated between the history of a people and its 
nation-state period. He regarded the latter as having come to an end in the 
case of Germany; in contrast, he viewed the Federal Republic, the GDR, 
and Austria as unifi ed as a the cultural nation, and for the two German 
states oriented upon one another, he spoke of a “dialectical unity” of the 
nation.36 In an article in Die Zeit in August of 1989,  Heinrich August 
Winkler pointed out that “the nation-state founded by  Bismarck had 
destroyed itself,” and with reference to the interest of the victorious 
powers in stabilization through division and the predominant position of 
a unifi ed Germany, he urged the democratization of the GDR: “Because 
it is like that, we should no longer speak of the reunifi cation of Germany 
but rather do something for the freedom of the Germans in the GDR.”37 
At the beginning of 1990, I myself argued for allowing the Germans of 
the GDR to make the decision as to the time for the political reunifi cation 
and also for working to increase the integration of the Germans in a 
European order.38
35 Cf. the collection of reactions to Steininger’s publication R. Steininger, 
‘Freie, gesamtdeutsche Wahlen am 16. November 1952?’, in J. Weber (ed.), Die 
Republik der fünfziger Jahre. Adenauers Deutschlandpolitik auf dem Prüfstand. 
München: Olzog 1989, 88–111.
36 K. D. Erdmann, Die Spur Österreichs in der deutschen Geschichte. Drei 
Staaten – zwei Nationen – ein Volk? Zürich: Manesse 1989.
37 H. A. Winkler, ‘Die Mauer wegdenken,’ Die Zeit, 11 August 1989, 5.
38 W. Loth, ’Welche Einheit soll es sein?’ Blätter für deutsche und internationale 
Politik 35 (1990), 301–309.
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DISPUTED EXPANSION
After the decision for a rapid entry of the GDR into the Federal Republic 
had been made, historians were among those who did not want to see in that 
event a return to a presumed “normality” in German history and instead 
supported further development of the new orientation which the Germans 
had embarked upon after the collapse of the Reich.   Jürgen Kocka,  Hans-
Ulrich Wehler,  Eberhard Jäckel, and others forcefully advocated holding 
fast to the Western orientation of the Federal Republic, integrating the 
East German populace into the Western democracy, and transferring “as 
much sovereignty as possible to European and international institutions.”39 
Along with advocating solidarity among all Germans,  Heinrich August 
Winkler argued that there was an obligation to support the states of East 
Central Europe: Their entry into the European Union should not be 
delayed until such time as they are perfectly organized.40
In any event, many historians could not resist the temptation to utilize 
the surprising reunifi cation within the framework of the Western Alliance 
for a one-sided glorifi cation of the policies of  Konrad Adenauer.  Klaus 
Gotto, who had soberly determined in 1974 that Adenauer’s Germany 
policy had “not achieved its goals,”41 presented the Federal Republic’s 
fi rst chancellor in the spring of 1990 as a “visionary,” whose “fundamental 
assumptions” as to the interests of the Soviets and the paths to German 
unity had received a “clear confi rmation.”42 In the epilogue to the second 
volume of his groundbreaking biography of Adenauer published in 1991, 
 Hans-Peter Schwarz declared that “history” has obviated the necessity 
of providing a fi nal assessment of Adenauer’s reunifi cation policy: 
The reunifi cation of Germany as a part of the Western community of 
39 J. Kocka, ’Nur keinen neuen Sonderweg’, Die Zeit, 19 October 1990, 11–12; 
E. Jäckel, ’Furcht vor der eigenen Stärke?’, Die Zeit, 2 November 1990, 10 (the 
quote above is from this last article); H. U. Wehler, ‘Wider die falschen Apostel’, 
Die Zeit, 9 November 1990, 54–56.
40 H. A. Winkler, ’Für den Westen – ohne Vorbehalt’, Die Zeit, 19 November 
1993, 10.
41 K. Gotto, ’Adenauers Deutschland- und Ostpolitik 1945–1963’, in idem. et 
al. (eds.) Konrad Adenauer. Seine Deutschland und Außenpolitik 1945–1963. 
Mainz: Grünewald 1974, 285.




nations had been made possible “in a constellation of Western unity and 
strength but also Soviet weakness and reasonable reevaluation of their 
own interests under the auspices of East-West détente.” In his view, this 
had been exactly  Adenauer’s long-term calculus from 1952 onward.43 
Schwarz did not regard it as worthwhile to give any thought to the 
possibility that a more signifi cant consideration of Soviet security needs 
as well as efforts to incorporate the communist rulers into a dialog might 
possibly have made the second German dictatorship obsolete earlier.
Whereas some German historians had in the meantime assumed that 
in the postwar period “the establishment of the unity of Germany was 
in the realm of the possible for the price of long-term demilitarization 
and long-term low living standards for all Germans” (as  Wolfgang J. 
Mommsen wrote in 199444), others reacted allergically when in an initial 
investigation of internal GDR sources, I was able to work out more 
clearly the whole-German orientation of Soviet policy than had been 
discernable before. As I believed I was able to show,  Stalin aimed for 
the establishment of an anti-fascist democratic Germany in association 
with the Western Allies; the GDR was the unwanted result of Stalinist 
occupation practice, the revolutionary zeal of German communists, and 
Western walling-off.45  Winkler found that completely unbelievable: 
“Stalin would no longer have been himself if he had given up the 
strategic goal of a revolutionary transformation of Germany in the sense 
of ‘Socialism.’”46  Henning Köhler, another biographer of  Adenauer, 
argued that Soviet occupation practice gives Soviet expressions of goals 
the lie.47  The idea that the West Germans with their choice for the West 
43 H. P. Schwarz, Adenauer. Der Staatsmann: 1952-1967. Stuttgart: Deutsche 
Verlags-Anstalt 1991, 991.
44 W. J.  Mommsen, ’Der Ort der DDR in der deutschen Geschichte’, in J. 
Kocka and M. Sabrow (eds.), Die DDR als Geschichte. Fragen – Hypothesen 
– Perspektiven. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag 1994, 28.
45 W. Loth, Stalins ungeliebtes Kind. Warum Moskau die DDR nicht wollte. 
Berlin: Rowohlt Berlin 1994; also in English translation: Stalin’s Unwanted 
Child. The Soviet Union, the German Question and the Founding of the GDR. 
London and New York: Macmillan and St. Martin’s Press 1998.
46 H. A. Winkler, ‘Im Zickzackkurs zum Sozialismus’, Die Zeit, 17 June 1994, 
40.
47 H. Köhler, ’Stalin ein deutscher Demokrat,’ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
2 August 1994, 8.
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bore any share of responsibility for the division of Germany fell by the 
wayside in the argumentation of the one as well as the other.48  
Conversely,  Gerhard Wettig was well received when he made use 
of the fi rst source materials from the Foreign Ministry of the Russian 
Federation in order to assert that for  Stalin, the note initiative of the 
spring of 1952 was about neither a success in negotiations nor a mere 
propaganda action, but rather it was a matter of “war by other than military 
means.”49 In 2002, I published evidence of thorough preparations for new 
negotiations with the Western Allies.50  Hermann Graml reacted to this by 
attempting to issue a new edition of his propaganda thesis.51  Even if the 
justifi cation provided by source materials for the one case as for the other 
was very thin,52 the impression was able to take hold in the public that we 
know little of Stalin’s actual intentions even now.  In the spring of 2007, 
an editor at the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung was still formulating it 
this way: “There can still be splendid disputes as to whether there was 
a chance of reunifi cation in 1952–53.”53 The most recent contribution 
on the Stalin note debate by  Peter Ruggenthaler, arguing without the 
48 For further criticisms of my book, see W. Loth, ‘Stalin, die deutsche Frage 
und die DDR. Eine Antwort an meine Kritiker’, Deutschland-Archiv 28 (1995), 
290–298.
49 G. Wettig, ’Die Deutschland-Note vom 10. März 1952 auf der Basis der 
diplomatischen Akten des russischen Außenministeriums’, Deutschland-Archiv 
26 (1993), 786–805, here 803; taken up again in G. Wettig, Bereitschaft zu 
Einheit in Freiheit? Die sowjetische Deutschlandpolitik 1945–1955. München: 
Olzog 1999, 200–206.
50 W. Loth, ‘Die Entstehung der „Stalin-Note“. Dokumente aus Moskauer 
Archiven’, in J. Zarusky (ed.), Die Stalin-Note vom 10. März 1952. Neue Quellen 
und Analysen. München: Oldenbourg 2002, 19–115.
51 H. Graml, ‘Eine wichtige Quelle – aber missverstanden’, in Zarusky, Stalin-
Note, 117–137.
52 For criticism of Wettig, cf. W. Loth, ‘Spaltung wider Willen. Die sowjetische 
Deutschlandpolitik nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg’, Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für 
deutsche Geschichte 24 (1995), 290–298; for criticism of Graml, W. Loth, ’Das 
Ende der Legende. Hermann Graml und die Stalin-Note. Eine Entgegnung’, 
Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 50 (2002), 653–664.




slightest evidence that the initiative aimed at the stabilization of the 
GDR, certainly will even strengthen this impression.54
SPECIFICATIONS AND BLOCKADES
We must wait to see the extent to which the work of historians will in the 
future be hindered by contemporary biases. In general, it seems to me 
that the experience of the collapse of communism is a good occasional 
for defi nitively leaving behind the biases of the Cold War. That can 
make historians more sensitive to avoiding an overestimation of the 
possibilities open to the Soviet Union in the past as well, encourage them 
to make the necessary differentiations within the communist world, and 
observe more precisely the transformations within that world, which 
certainly did not begin in 1985. After the experiences of the upheaval 
of 1989–1991, justifi cations of the communist understanding of politics 
are no longer possible; at the same time, the ahistorical extreme form 
of the totalitarianism theory, which always posited the monolithically 
closed nature and immutability of the Soviet system, has also been 
disproven. Likewise, the continuance of the debate about the role of the 
Germans beyond the end of the East-West confl ict can sharpen our view 
that this debate did not start after 1945 and that during the Cold War, it 
was possessed of a highly independent dynamic beyond that of the East-
West confl ict. In general, the far-reaching experience of upheaval can 
promote historical thinking, free up the view of the relative openness of 
decision-making situations, without denying the weight of the burden of 
the specifi c past in question. In other words: Schematizing simplifi ers 
– of whatever provenance – will not have it so easy in the future.
On the other side, the current situation offers an invitation to Western 
triumphalism and to total revisions of those who up till now have clung 
to the Eastern system in one form or another. The public debate about 
the most recent history is not completely free of either tendency; that 
could indeed lead to the introduction of new distortions and emergence 
of new legends in historical work.  In the same way, the temptation is 
too great to “paint” German history once again as “Reich German,” 
54 P. Ruggenthaler (ed.), Stalins großer Bluff. Die Geschichte der Stalin-Note in 
Dokumenten der sowjetischen Führung. München: Oldenbourg 2007.
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altering a phrase from  Jakob Burckhardt,55 that is, to allow the period 
between 1945 and 1990 to appear as only a parenthesis in the history of 
the German nation-state and thereby also once again underestimate the 
signifi cance of the defeat in 1945 as well as the subsequent relevance of 
the German question. More than ever, it will depend on historians, fi rstly, 
to argue precisely and in so doing, free themselves as much as possible 
from political partialities and, secondly, to bring their insights into the 
public discussion.
We should not expect all too much from the opening of Eastern 
archives – in any event, no completely new insights. Information from the 
Soviet sphere has been available to us for some time, albeit certainly not 
in the volume on hand for the Western side; the oft-heard argument that 
one cannot say anything as to Soviet intentions as long as the archives are 
closed has quite a self-serving air to it. Due to the state of the materials, 
the investigation of new sources from the Soviet sphere will prove to be 
an arduous business, which unfortunately will not bring results any too 
quickly. Above all, however, one must not assume that all the decisive 
processes and considerations were documented because Stalinist rule 
was not given to such record keeping.
This means that the professional qualities of the historian will in the 
future be all the more important:  Diligence in dealing with material and 
the most comprehensive possible orientation in working through it.  To 
those ends, it would certainly not hurt to take a critical look back at the 
historiography of the Germany question.
55 Burckhardt had foreseen in 1872 that all accounts of recent history would in 
the future be ‘oriented around 1870–71’ such that ‘all of world history from Adam 
onward would be painted with German victory’, J. Burckhardt, in M. Burckhardt 
(ed) Briefe, vol. 5, Basel: Schwabe & Co 1963, 182 ff.
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On the Constitution of
the Science of History in the
GDR During the Cold War years:
Developments in Greifswald
 MANFRED MENGER
In 1994  Seppo Hentilä published his monograph ‘Jaettu Saksa, jaettu 
historia’, a treatise on the ‘Cold History War’ waged between the two 
German states between 1945 and 1990.1 In some respects the book was 
a surprise: the author, a historian from a country which, at that time, was 
still often categorized as being ‘on the periphery of Europe’, demonstrated 
an astonishingly detailed knowledge of the historiography, the history 
debates and history propaganda in both German states. His book provided 
the most concise survey of the ‘German-German history battle’ to be 
published at that time. Hentilä was also one of the fi rst researchers to base 
his study on the unpublished records of the SED leadership concerning the 
planning, steering and control of historiography in the GDR, and which 
became accessible at the Bundesarchiv (German federal archives) at the 
beginning of 1993. It should also be acknowledged, that Seppo Hentilä 
did not join the ranks of those western historians who cultivated contacts 
with universities in East Germany prior to the fall of Communism, after 
which they either no longer wished to accept the facts or wanted things 
to be seen differently, and distanced themselves from their East German 
colleagues.
1 S. Hentilä, Jaettu Saksa, jaettu historia: Kylmä historiasota 1945–1990. 
Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen Seura 1994.
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 Hentilä devoted a major part of his book to refl ections on the 
defi cits, omissions and politically motivated misrepresentations in 
GDR historiography. But he always endeavoured to be fair and avoided 
generalized verdicts. Instead he exercised a high level of objective 
criticism devoid of pseudo-moralistic value judgements. Meanwhile, his 
very succinct concept of the ‘Cold History War’ between East and West 
Germany has been noted in the publications of German researchers.2 
However, it can hardly be said, that any German historians have 
suitably acknowledged his achievement or engaged in a knowledgeable 
discussion of the main arguments in his book. In view of the language 
barrier this is not at all surprising. But it is surprising that the editors of 
‘Historiallinen Aikakauskirja’ gave Hentilä’s work to a reviewer who, 
although qualifi ed on the subject matter, was not really in a position 
to actually read the book (with the exception of the German-language 
summary and the annotations).3 Whatever the case, this review remained 
at a very superfi cial level.
The debates about the GDR science of history, which intensifi ed 
at the beginning of the nineties, are still alive today, and they continue 
to affect the public discussion about how to assess the East German 
past. Although they are of scientifi c concern, they are also coloured by 
political considerations, standpoints and designs. To a certain degree 
the observation appears justifi ed, that the victors of the ‘Cold History 
War’ are carrying on with the old battle, even though their opponent 
has disappeared. The GDR science of history, which has long since 
been dissolved at both the institutional and the personal level, was often 
assessed solely under the aspect of its political objectives and utilization, 
as an ideologically instrumentalized and deformed ‘legitimizing science’. 
Thanks to the good condition of the records, the precise directives, 
demands and wishes ‘from above’, the direct intervention of the SED 
leadership in academic life and work, and the more or less obedient 
responses of the historians to these wishes can be reconstructed in detail, 
and they have meanwhile been documented and presented in numerous 
publications.
2 see. B. Faulenbach, ‘Die deutsche Geschichtsschreibung nach der Diktatur 
Hitlers’, in G. Corni, M. Sabrow (ed.), Die Mauern der Geschichte. Leipzig: 
AVA 1996, 38.
3 Historiallinen Aikakauskirja 2 (1995), 182–183.
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Of course it is necessary and legitimate to expose the commissioning 
and intrumentalization of science, and to reveal the relationships 
between history, ideology and politics, between historians and the 
exclusive ruling party. However, it is devious to maintain that there was 
hardly anything in the fi eld of historical research and teaching in the 
east that earned the name of science in the true sense of the word, and 
that instead scholars in the east pursued a pseudo-science which served 
solely political ends and whose institutions acted merely as offshoots of 
the party and state leadership. In contrast to the dominant tendency to 
track down all indications and evidence of the political functionalization 
of historiography, the concrete analysis of the most important results of 
work by GDR historians and the critical discussion of their works has so 
far received relatively little attention. Objective criticism of the concrete 
work, a skilled analysis of developments in the science, a truly detailed 
assessment of the achievements and shortcomings of research into specifi c 
fi elds and the works of individual historians are still notable exceptions. 
It is obvious that the main interest lies in unearthing the fallacies of GDR 
historiography, rather than acknowledging its achievements. In addition 
to this, it would appear that the history of this historiography is of greater 
interest than the actual results it produced.
In the meantime, there are at least a few more refi ned professional 
opinions being expressed. Signifi cantly, it was foreign historians rather 
than those immediately involved in the ‘querelles allemandes’ who, like 
Georg Iggers, pleaded at a very early stage for a deeper understanding 
of the inconsistencies in East Germany’s science of history, as opposed 
to the usual sweeping condemnations. They called for the application 
of ‘discipline-related criteria’ rather than morally biased judgements, 
‘critical scientifi c approaches’ rather than ‘simplistic polarization’4. 
Signs are in fact increasing that the phase of unilateral judgment and 
condemnation of the science of history in the GDR is coming to an end. 
Following the wave of disassociation and disapprobation, a general 
objectivization of the debates and their impartial assessment within 
German and international contemporary history research would be of 
great benefi t to the discipline. Time will also show whether and to what 
4 see. K. H. Jarausch, M. Middel, M. Sabrow, ‘Störfall DDR-Geschichts-
wissenschaft. Problemfelder einer kritischen Historisierung’, Historische Zeit-
schrift, Beihefte. Neue Folge, vol. 27 (1997), 1–50.
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extent the ‘old cadre’ of GDR historiographers, who were excluded from 
academic life, can still make a constructive contribution in this process. 
So far, attempts to pursue a self-critical discussion on the history of their 
subject and their own positions have generally proved fairly ineffective. 
Such attempts made by these historians were usually suspected of, or 
denounced as, self-justifi cation. Despite this, the following contribution 
will endeavour to give a preliminary synopsis of certain aspects of 
developments in the GDR science of history up to 1961/62, seen from 
the perspective of a ‘party historian’ – a label currently in popular use. 
Essential decisions were made during this period. From the standpoint of 
GDR historiography it was the period devoted to constituting a ‘socialist 
German science of history’, the period of overcoming an initially still 
dominant ‘bourgeois historiography’ and the period of establishing 
Marxism-Leninism as the  prevailing theoretical foundation of historical 
research and teaching.5 To avoid simply repeating what is already known, 
I shall focus on a ‘case study’ of several developments at the Institute of 
History (until 1951 the History Seminar) at the University of Greifswald. 
It was, in fact, a fairly small study area, and attracted less attention from 
the central party apparatus than the institutes in Berlin or Leipzig. But 
basically, the same processes and developments occurred everywhere.
THE STARTING POSITION
Every science of history is bound up within the living context, within its 
state’s need for tradition and orientation and within its national public. 
After the catastrophic experiences of both world wars and the generally 
accepted necessity of a new orientation, it went without saying that after 
1945 there was an emphatic call for a revision of the traditional view 
of history throughout the whole of Germany. It was, however, clearly 
foreseeable that this revision within the Soviet occupying power’s 
sphere of infl uence would lead to particularly far-reaching changes in 
historiography and the fraternity of historians. Nevertheless, there were 
no initial efforts to politicize historical research. Convinced National 
Socialists, such as  Johannes Paul in Greifswald, were suspended from 
5 W. Schmidt, Zur Konstituierung der DDR-Geschichtswissenschaft in den fünf-
ziger Jahren. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag 1984, 6–7.
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offi ce, a few Marxists returning from exile (such as  Jürgen Kuczynski or 
 Alfred Meusel) received university chairs, but during the forties academic 
teaching and research were clearly dominated by representatives of 
traditional German historiography who continued their existing research 
and behaved mainly, or at least relatively, loyal to the new authority.
This group of scholars included  Adolf Hofmeister (1883–1956), 
professor of medieval and modern history at Greifswald University, 
a highly respected scholar of medieval times who had studied under 
Dietrich Schäfer. He became director of the history institute in 1921 and 
remained in this position after 1945. Even after reaching pensionable age 
(1949), his period of offi ce was extended several times. And even after 
his offi cial retirement in 1954 he was appointed provisional head of the 
institute until, a few months later, the vice-chancellor had to announce: 
‘Due to the advanced effects of age, he is no longer capable of carrying 
out the position.’6
Basically, Hofmeister represented precisely the type of ‘apolitical 
middle-class historian’ who, in the long-run, was defi nitely not desired 
in the GDR, but who was still required for a transitional phase. An 
assessment of 1950, signed by the vice-chancellor, stated: ‘As a historian 
Prof. Hofmeister considers himself an apolitical scholar, whose aim 
in life is to analyse the genealogies of the counts and princes of the 
Middle Ages. His attitude towards progressive ideas is very cautious and 
conservative, and he often expresses misgivings; but he is by no means 
a born fi ghter and submits to the majority in decisive questions. As a 
teacher, students consider him to be politically reactionary.’7 If history 
was to be taught at all to new scholars at universities, the only option 
at fi rst was to leave the task to historians such as Hofmeister. Offi cially 
sought-after and honoured, but internally criticized as a remnant of a 
past epoch, Hofmeister again taught students from 1946 onwards and 
supervised numerous Ph.D. students, including representatives of the 
‘new science of history’, at the University of Greifswald. Until 1950 
teaching was carried out primarily by Hofmeister himself and one part-
time lecturer. Apart from a thorough foundation course in the auxiliary 
6 Universitätsarchiv Greifswald (UAG), PA 221 (Hofmeister), Rektor G. Katsch 
an den Staatsekretär für Hochschulwesen, 15 Feb. 1955.
7 ibid., Politische Charakteristik Prof. Hofmeisters, unterzeichnet von Rektor 
Hans Beyer, 1 August 1950.
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sciences they restricted the content almost exclusively to the history of 
the Middle Ages, and initially research was also confi ned to the traditional 
framework.
NEW DIRECTIONS
At the beginning of the fi fties a radical change took place in the science 
of history in the newly founded GDR. As already often recounted, the 
change was initiated in 1950/51, above all by the SED leadership, and 
enforced during the following decade through massive interventions in 
academic life, the creation of new structures, ideological campaigns and 
disciplinary measures.
The general aim was to programme historical research and teaching 
to meet the political and ideological objectives of the SED and to 
harness them in the interest of securing and stabilizing the new state. 
This required a newly oriented representation of history in terms of both 
concepts and methods. Traditional historiography was to be replaced by 
the establishment of a centrally planned and steered Marxist-Leninist 
science of history dedicated to socialism. These ideas were combined 
with concrete targets surrounding the ‘new view’ of history. These 
included such requirements as focussing research and the depiction 
of history on the role of the masses and progressive and revolutionary 
traditions, especially the history of the working-class movement, and 
exposing the ‘subversive policies of the ruling classes’. Historians were 
to direct their polemic primarily against the ‘imperialist class enemies’ 
and their ideologies. A clear ‘friend-foe image’ was desired and fostered. 
This also implied an orientation towards the experiences, dogmas and 
taboos of the Soviet science of history on the one hand, and disassociation 
from real or supposedly problematical developments in West German 
historiography on the other. The value of historical accounts was also 
to be decisively judged according to the degree their results could be 
used for the necessary combating of bourgeois ideologies in general, and 
particularly for the political-ideological disputes between the GDR and 
the Federal Republic.8
8 Hentilä, Jaettu Saksa, 113–153; H. Haun, Der Geschichtsbeschluß der 
SED 1955. Programmdokument für die ‘volle Durchsetzung des Marxismus-
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These prescribed historical-political directives and their gradual, 
though never unqualifi ed, acceptance by almost all East German 
historians, should be seen within the context of the prevailing domestic 
and foreign-political constellations: the proclaimed goal and the internal 
willingness to create a new society, the confrontation with a superior 
western neighbour who questioned the existence of the GDR, the close 
ties with the Soviet Union and the pressures of the Cold War. The East-
West contrast gained prime signifi cance in GDR historiography. From the 
beginning and throughout the decades the dualism of the political blocks 
and systems strictly determined the radius of the historical experience of 
Marxist-Leninist historical ideology and historiography.9 Their political 
behaviour and basic ideological mind-sets were extensively shaped 
by the ‘necessary requirements’ of the Cold War and subjection to the 
power-political and ideological dominance of the USSR. But of course, 
taking sides in the confl ict between systems and in the Cold War became 
a dominant trend in historical thought not only in the East. It was not long 
before the East-West differences began infl uencing the approaches to the 
years of Nazi dictatorship. On both sides there was a tendency to utilize 
the interpretation of National Socialist dictatorship and direct it against 
the particular system of the other side. Since the opening of the Wall 
this procedure has often been taken to its extreme by indiscriminately 
equating the GDR with Hitler’s Germany.
Some of the fi rst measures taken in order to bring into effect the 
above mentioned political directives included not only the formation of 
an authors’ collective for the fi rst major project in the GDR’s science of 
history programme, a multi-volume textbook on German history and the 
establishment of a Museum of German History (1951), but also changes 
to structures in the academic world based on the Soviet model. The most 
important innovation, which was fi nally founded in 1955 after long 
discussions, was the establishment of a highly competent, Marxist-based 
Institute of History at the Academy of Sciences. The institute with its 
Leninismus’ in der DDR-Geschichtswissenschaft. Dresden: Hannah-Arendt-
Institut für Totalitarismusforschung 1996.
9 W. Küttler, Die marxistisch-leninistische Geschichtswissenschaft und das 
Systemdenken im Ost-West-Konfl ikt, in Wolfgang Küttler, Jörn Rüsen, Ernst 
Schulin (eds.), Geschichtsdiskurs, vol. 5, Globale Konfl ikte, Erinnerungsarbeit 




large number of personnel was designed to contribute decisively towards 
the successful breakthrough of the ‘new science of history’. Meanwhile, 
the gradual ‘conquest’ of the history institutes at the six eastern German 
universities had been on the agenda following the second university 
reform of 1951.10
THE RADICAL CHANGE: FROM  HOFMEISTER TO  SCHILDHAUER
Things move slowly in Pomerania, nevertheless they move steadily 
and without much ado. According to the current information status it 
seems that the process of achieving the position desired by the SED ran 
without any spectacular confrontations between the few ‘bourgeois’ 
and the rapidly increasing majority of Marxist forces in Greifswald. It 
may seem paradoxical, but it is nevertheless true, that the fi ercest battles 
were fought among the various Marxist groups rather than between the 
‘opposing camps’. We will return to this later.
In both general and specifi c terms, substantial preconditions and 
elements of the new direction in the teaching and research of history 
were also created at the University of Greifswald.
First: numerous new posts were created, and the whole of the staff 
was renewed within a few years. 
Following the fi rst appointment of new personnel in 1951, the staff 
at the end of the year included Professor Hofmeister, his long-standing 
colleague Dr  Ursula Scheil and three additional post-doctoral assistants, 
so the institute had fi ve members on its academic staff. Ten years later, 
in the autumn semester 1961/62, the institute staff had increased to 17 
members. There were no ‘old’ members of the university’s science of 
history faculty at the institute any more. While the services of Adolf 
Hofmeister, who died in 1956, were essential during the fi rst post-war 
decade for the continuity of teaching and research at the university’s 
institute of history, his students fared less well. They were in fact 
faced with the alternative of opting for the Marxist-Leninist approach 
to history or leaving the university. Although in individual cases very 
personal motives may have been involved, this was doubtless the crucial 
consideration behind a massive change: without exception, all of the 
10 Schmidt, 9.
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assistants working at the institute in 1951 moved to the West during the 
fi fties. They were not suspended, but left of their own accord under the 
mounting pressure.
Despite this exodus, there were still seven former  Hofmeister 
students among the 17 ‘new’ staff working at the institute in 1961, and 
they included the new director,  Johannes Schildhauer, who had held 
this position since 1957. He completed his doctorate in 1949 under 
Hofmeister’s supervision and was appointed as lecturer at the institute 
in 1952 with the very clear assignment of asserting Marxist positions. 
Four other members of staff had also studied at Greifswald, after the 
Hofmeister era, and the six remaining staff members came from other 
universities and colleges. The qualifi cation of the ‘newcomers’, their 
relationship to scientifi c work and their specialist competence varied 
greatly. However, their one uniting factor was their willingness to fulfi l 
the demands of a Marxist science of history, and to make allowances 
for political realities. With the exception of two people, all the members 
of the institute were now members of the SED. Nevertheless, there 
was by no means total conformity in the understanding of the essence 
and the responsibilities of the science of history. In fact, as always and 
everywhere, the people at the institute still had different characters and 
ideas. It was a bonus for Greifswald that for decades the institute was 
headed by personalities such as Johannes Schildhauer and  Konrad Fritze, 
who were competent scholars in their fi elds and decent human beings. 
Both of them were among Hofmeisters ‘best students’, and both became 
convinced Marxists and paid their tribute to the pressures of political 
expectations. But at the same time they succeeded in their efforts at the 
institute to combat the crude politicizing style which strongly prevailed 
up to the beginning of the sixties and was so damaging to the fraternity 
of historians.
Second: since the beginning of the fi fties fundamental changes were 
made in the contents and the organization of history studies at the history 
institutes in the GDR.
In September 1951 obligatory, uniform syllabuses were introduced 
for all institutes. Teaching had to cover all periods of history, including 
contemporary history. The restrictive syllabus regulations, which strictly 
prescribed the course contents of the fi xed eight-semester study period, 
were designed specifi cally to produce graduates schooled in Marxism-
Leninism. The introduction of an obligatory foundation course in social 
Manfred Menger
198
sciences for all students, and equally obligatory Russian lessons, pointed 
in the same direction.
The institute, which had not only several diploma students (1946: 
14; 1950:16) but also a rapidly increasing number of prospective history 
teachers (1955: 155; 1963: 250) encountered considerable diffi culties, 
which were duly registered by the party apparatus. In 1952 and 1954 
the central committee of the SED contemplated a complete close-down 
in education of history students in Greifswald and Jena for several 
years, because the faculty was understaffed and there was a complete 
lack of ‘comrade professors’.11 However, these plans were never put 
into practice. On the contrary, a number of outside staff, including 
a Soviet guest professor, were successfully appointed to provide 
temporary support. But the numerous new staff appointments were more 
signfi cant. The outstanding status of the science of history in the SED’s 
ideological concept had not only problematical consequences; it also 
had a promoting effect in this academic fi eld. At any rate, more fi nances 
were made available for the development and expansion of history 
teaching and research in the GDR context than ever before. As a result 
Greifswald benefi tted from this development as the generous granting 
of new staff positions indicates. However, the opposite side of the coin 
meant that since the beginning of the fi fties new appointments, special 
advancement (e.g. the granting of research leave) and the allocation of 
teaching assignments depended not only on the applicant’s academic 
qualifi cations but also on their political correctness. ‘Objectivistic “pure 
scientists” with insuffi cient social consciousnesses’12 had virtually no 
chance whatsoever as a historian.
In time, and after a great deal of effort, the majority of specifi cations 
prescribed by the often modifi ed, centrally issued syllabuses were put 
into effect, although in many areas without the appropriate textbooks, 
and sometimes without suffi cient staff knowledge of how to implement 
a Marxist interpretation of history. Most of the students greeted the more 
career-oriented courses with their embracing spectrum of all historical 
periods. It was only in later years that criticism grew in the wake of the 
11 see I.-S. Kowalczuk, Legitimation eines neuen Staates. Parteiarbeiter an 
der historischen Front. Geschichtswissenschaft in der SBZ/DDR 1945 bis 1961. 
Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag 1997, 172, 230.
12 see UAG, PA 785, details on W. Brüske and P. Wackwitz.
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tendency to neglect older periods in history in favour of contemporary 
times.
Third: new research institutions were formed by the beginning of the 
sixties which complied with central directives. These were not imposed, 
but chosen and implemented on the institutions’ own responsibility.
A research group was fi rst formed in keeping with the tradition of 
Greifswald’s history institute. Its self-set task was to examine the history 
of the Hansa, the most important league of cities in German and European 
history, on the basis of historical materialism. This entailed overcoming a 
substantial amount of opposition. Established bourgeois research into the 
Hansa remained very sceptical about the new key in Greifswald. Despite 
this, the initial opposition was much coarser within like-minded ranks 
and at the institute itself. Some people viewed any attempt to address 
subjects in the history of earlier centuries as escapism and a refusal to 
take a stand on contemporary issues. Despite this, the new approach to 
the history of the Hansa developed successfully in the long run. Even 
today the achievements in this area are almost unanimously recognized.
The Hansa historians at Greifswald were able to improve the political 
conditions surrounding their own work within the GDR as well as at 
their own institute after the formation of the parallel working group and 
research agency ‘Baltic relations to the present day’ in 1960, which acted 
more or less as an extension of their own research on the Baltic area 
in the Middle Ages and early modern times.13 This did justice, at least 
pro forma, to the central demand for more topical historical research, 
the examination of the politics of German imperialism and NATO, the 
representation of GDR peace politics in the Baltic area, the struggle of the 
working class in the Nordic countries etc. But, de facto, the new group’s 
research concentrated above all on inquiries into German North European 
policies up to 1945. In this tactically judicious way it was possible to 
avoid dealing with issues surrounding post-war times, the aims of which 
tended to be propagandistic rather than scientifi c. It is true however, 
that research and publications on the topic of Germany and the Nordic 
countries during the war and the pre-war years entailed concessions to 
political demands. These were particularly critical in all issues which 
13 For more details see: F. Petrick, ‘Forschungen zur Zeitgeschichte Nordeuropas 
in Greifswald 1970-1990’, in R. Bohn, J. Elvert, K. Ch. Lammers (eds.), Deutsch-




touched on the politics of the Soviet Union in German-Nordic relations, 
and especially German-Finnish relations and the history of Finland. 
Evaluations which did not correspond with Soviet interpretations were 
deemed unfi t to publish, and in some cases they represented a real threat 
to the author’s existence (e.g. Talvisota – the Winter War).
In addition to ‘Baltic history’ and several topics which were handled 
by individual scholars, a further focus of research was established: 
‘anti-fascist youth resistance’. This topic, and especially its methods 
of treatment, fi tted into the concept of a politically instrumentalized 
representation of history, and it was duly welcomed with strong support 
and recognition by the authorities in Berlin. This occasionally had 
adverse effects on the institute’s working atmosphere. The other research 
areas soon found themselves accused of simply fi nding fault with the 
anti-fascist resistance section’s work, instead of striving to emulate its 
‘progressive impulses’.14
Fourth: political disciplining defi nitely featured in the process of 
constituting the ‘new science of history’.
During the fi fties fi erce political-ideological clashes occurred regularly 
and with varying consequences at all of the history institutes. The 
victims were mainly renowned Marxist historians who were disinclined 
to subject themselves unquestioningly to the intentions of the political 
authorities. But there were certainly numerous others, including several 
‘loyal comrades’, who had virtually no idea why they were attacked 
by the critics.15 The centrally directed campaigns against actual, or 
supposed, ‘deviationists’ reached their climax in 1958/59. In this respect 
the institute at Greifswald was no exception, as outlined below.
The confl icts in Greifswald took place in two phases: 1956–1958 and 
following the construction of the Berlin Wall, 1961–1962. During the fi rst 
phase the confl icts and debates occurred in a relatively moderate form. 
This evidently prompted the ‘chief ideologist’  Kurt Hager to remark at 
the Third University Conference of the SED (1958), that the historians 
14 Private archive M. Menger (PAM), Akten der SED-Parteiorganisation His-
toriker 1960–1963, numerous records.
15 Meanwhile the events have often been described, but until now only a few 
indications can be found on the situation in Greifswald. See J. Peters, ‘Unterwegs 
zwischen Wirtschafts- und Mentalitätsgeschichte’, in, Historische Zeitschrift, 
Beihefte. Neue Folge, vol. 27 (1997), 330–332; Kowalczuk, 329–330.
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in Greifswald had so far remained silent on the subject of revisionism.16 
In the second phase things became much tougher, and there was a fi erce 
inner-party debate. Basically, the initiators wanted to completely align 
historical research and teaching with the political directives and discipline 
the all of the institute staff accordingly. The main opponents were, on 
the one hand, a ‘core of comrades’ who were supported by the party 
apparatus and who dominated the institute via the party leadership, but 
who so far had achieved little in academic terms, and on the other hand 
the ‘state leadership’, that is the director and his deputy ( J. Schildhauer, 
 K. Fritze), and a few other party members who almost without exception 
were among the most productive scholars at the institute (including, for 
instance  Jan Peters,  Wolfgang Wilhelmus).
The confl icts took place within the party organization, as ‘party 
disciplinary measures’, in the style and sometimes with the jargon of 
the Cold War. It was directed against fellow comrades, against superiors 
and work colleagues who were by no means uncommitted, but sincerely 
saw the GDR as a real, defendable alternative to the malformations of 
the German past as well as those of the Federal Republic. However, 
they opposed the more or less superfi cial politicization of science and 
sometimes expressed doubts about the correctness of current political 
decisions. Their critics, who were supported by a ‘brigade’ of the 
university’s party leadership and a Central Committee instructor, had no 
scruples whatsoever about trimming historical research entirely to suit 
political needs and demands. At best they acted on their convictions, but 
there were defi nitely people who were motivated by career prospects or 
even personal animosities and rivalries, which they concealed beneath 
the guise of ideology.
The catalogue of transgressions allegedly committed by the 
‘deviationists’ was long, and can only be briefl y noted here. They were 
accused in varying degrees of serious political deviations, questioning 
party policies, a lack of belief in the triumph of socialism in Germany, 
shrinking away from the massive pressure of the class enemy, neglecting 
the students’ political education, underestimating the signifi cance of 
contemporary history, bias towards older periods in history, revisionist 
tendencies and the separation of science from politics.17 In the summary 
16 Kowalczuk, 304.




of a party activists’ meeting it stated: ‘The comrades were not primarily 
Communists and then historians. Instead, they isolated their research 
from the lively political discussion.’18
This was a very blunt way of raising the demand for a presentation of 
history aligned to party aims and accepted party decisions as incontestable 
scientifi c truths. A warning example was made in order to underline 
this demand:  W. Wilhelmus had presented a thesis about the ‘People’s 
Congress Movement for Unity and a just Peace’ from 1947 to 1949 which 
had been assessed as very good by the experts, including the institute 
director J. Schildhauer. It contained ideas which no longer corresponded 
with the SED’s new party line of 1958 on policies concerning Germany. 
Instead of presenting the defeat and liquidation of ‘German imperialism 
and militarism’ as the main aspect of the national question, in keeping 
with  Ulbricht’s express demand of December 1958 during a consultation 
with ‘leading historians’, Wilhelmus quite correctly, but no longer 
desirably, depicted the prevention of the division of Germany as the main 
objective of the people’s movement. In so doing he had, according to the 
interpretation of his critics, ‘placed himself in the position of the right-
wing SPD leaders and the reactionary West German science of history’,19 
and had ignored the directive of ‘Germany’s most important historian’, 
in other words Ulbricht. The council of the philosophical faculty had 
already accepted the thesis, but then the supposedly ‘revisionist, and 
consequently unscientifi c work, which was detrimental to the party’,20 
had to be withdrawn and fundamentally revised.
Although this was certainly an extreme case, it was nevertheless 
indicative of the agitated atmosphere after the construction of the 
Berlin Wall. The ‘clarifi cation process’, or the settling of accounts with 
the comrades who were ‘affl icted with strong remnants of bourgeois 
ideology’, proceeded according to the usual ritual of criticism and self-
criticism, which was also described by  S. Hentilä.21 In the nerve-racking 
discussions everyone was forced to take a position, whether they wanted 
to or not. The method of playing people off against each other was 
18 ibid, Referat Parteiaktivtagung, 10 Jan. 1962.
19 ibid., Begründung des Parteiverfahrens gegen W. Wilhelmus, 12 Jan. 1962.
20 ibid., Referat Parteiaktivtagung, 10 Jan. 1962.
21 Hentilä, Jaettu Saksa, jaettu historia, 121–127.
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particularly despicable. After months of questioning, accusations and 
exorcisms, all of those affected were self-critically prepared to admit to 
their ‘mistakes’. This ritual of self-criticism, which was invariably more 
or less a self-indictment, included the obligatory assurance that one had 
learned from the discussions and would make every effort in the future to 
satisfy the demands of the party. The ‘party disciplinary measures’ resulted 
in a warning to  J. Schildhauer,  J. Peters and  K. Spading, a reprimand 
for  W. Wilhelmus and a strict reprimand for  K. Fritze. Because of his 
‘overemphasis of medieval history’(!), the medieval scholar Fritze was 
additionally forced to hold a series of lectures on the Second World War. 
Despite the fi erce accusations the punishment was relatively bearable 
for those concerned. Nobody’s professional development was seriously 
impaired.
It is doubtful whether the confl icts led to greater political homogeneity 
among the historians at Greifswald. But they had defi ned the bounds of 
scientifi c independence, namely that it was problematical to try to be 
‘cleverer than the party’.22 Nevertheless, the proceedings did infl ict 
wounds that never quite healed. The institute members affected by the 
disciplinary campaign remained basically the same in terms of character 
and their understanding of history. No real consensus was reached with 
the political fanatics, in fact in the long run they either left the institute or 
adapted to the attitude of the majority of the teaching staff.
***
By the beginning of the sixties the constituting phase of the ‘new science 
of history’ had been completed at Greifswald, around the same time as at 
the other history institutes. The basic directions in education and research 
were established. Scientifi c understanding and behavioural norms 
remained fairly constant in the following years. The situation stabilized 
following the period of incessant changes in content and personnel, 
and ideological battles. The result of the innovations was an effi cient 
staff whose representatives endeavoured to fulfi l the maxims of science 
whilst doing justice to political demands. But, apart from conviction and 
the conscious departure from the ideal of a seemingly apolitical view 
22 PAM, Begründung des Parteiverfahrens gegen J. Peters, 12 Jan. 1962.
Manfred Menger
204
of history, personal adaptation and compliance was undoubtedly at play 
as well. The prescribed limitations of freedom in research and teaching 
were well-known and more or less internalized. Despite this, the scientifi c 
understanding of the university historians cannot simply be deduced 
from the intentions of the representatives of the governing apparatus. 
In the attempt to reconcile the dual demands of scientifi c inquiry and 
political directives it often proved better to avoid very delicate political 
topics completely. That was, and remained, a distinct form of behaviour 
among most of the historians at Greifswald. Even the professor for the 
history of the GDR, who was appointed in the eighties, concentrated 
his research mainly on German-Swedish relations in World War II. In 
general, research and teaching on topics immediately related to politics 
were, unfairly but commonly, delegated to assistants.
Over the years the gradual transition to more subtle methods power 
implementation in the GDR, the more relaxed in the international situation 
and fi nally the end of the Cold War, opened up an increasingly broad 
spectrum for science. The scope of external infl uence was already limited 
as far as the thematic orientation of research was concerned. At any rate it 
can be noted in the case of the institute at Greifswald, that despite centrally 
planned research, we worked on the themes which we considered right 
and important. It was simply a matter of duly emphasizing the political 
relevance of these themes. But we were experts at this, just as we knew 
how to report on the institute as a politically trouble-free area.
In the attempt to counteract an understanding of science in which 
political views played a dominant role, the historians at Greifswald 
cultivated contacts with North European universities. These important 
contacts, although never lost completely, increased considerably from 
the end of the sixties. Following the experiences of the Cold War new 
opportunities and aspects of mutual exchange opened up, particularly 
with Finland and Sweden, and connections were probably stronger than 
those between the historians of the GDR and the Federal Republic. 
Finland in particular displayed a relaxed attitude towards the second 
German science of history far earlier than several other countries. This 
was one of the main reasons why it was possible to stage the seminars 
with Finnish historians held regularly since 1973.23 These meetings 
23 see: J. Kalela, ‘Die Finnenseminare’: Die Zusammenarbeit zwischen den 
Historikern Finnlands und der DDR. – Rückblick eines Beteiligten’, in: E. Hösch, 
J. Kalela, H. Beyer-Thoma (eds.) Deutschland und Finnland im 20. Jahrhundert. 
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helped us immensely, and not simply in the academic sense. They were 
also crucially instrumental in easing ideological infl exibility and fostering 
a sensible relationship in human terms.  Seppo Hentilä contributed a great 
deal towards the development and success of this cooperation. For this 
we sincerely thank and celebrate the latest ‘birthday boy’ among the 
Finnish historians.
Translation from German, Ann Robertson, Berlin
Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag 1999, 31–43.
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Commemorating Two Political
Anniversaries in Cold War Finland:
Independence and the Beginning of
the Winter War
 HEINO NYYSSÖNEN
The purpose of this article is to compare two political anniversaries, one 
an offi cial public holiday and the other a historical anniversary. There 
are a few statements and starting points, which have inspired this study 
in Finland. The fi rst refers to the point that having a public holiday is a 
selective political process. In the 1990s  Seppo Hentilä wrote in the text-
book Suomen poliittinen historia that although 6 December is Finland’s 
Independence Day, 15 November or 4 December could have been chosen 
as well.1 The second deals with the Winter and Continuation Wars.  Max 
Jakobson has noted that the idea of a defeat infl uenced Finns’ visions of 
the future after the war. Jakobson, a veteran himself, had already in the 
1950s made an effort to elucidate on the past in his classic Diplomaattien 
talvisota. In the new preface of the 1989 edition he argued that expediency 
in foreign policy had turned into a historical truth in the minds of many 
young people; current self-evident facts of the older generations did not 
1 S. Hentilä, ‘Itsenäisyydestä jatkosotaan’, in O. Jussila, S. Hentilä, J. Nevakivi, 
Suomen poliittinen historia 1809–1995. Helsinki: Gaudeamus 1996, 96.
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transmit from one generation to another.2 For  Jakobson the whole case 
was a victory in defeat – concepts of ‘the second republic’ and ‘loosing 
the war’ were after 1944 aimed to prove that Finland had rejected its past 
and chosen another political path.3
All these statements raise questions regarding the discursive power of 
historical events and how they are remembered in the present, However, 
our task is to focus on these large topics only with regards to political 
anniversaries. How were the beginning of the Winter War, 30 November, 
and Independence Day, 6 December, celebrated and commemorated in the 
‘second republic’, thus during the Cold War? For practical reasons I have 
chosen only these two anniversaries and their surrounding publicity, as 
only a couple of days separate them. What was discussed, how, and how 
did views of the older and younger generations emerge in the present? 
There is a hypothesis that these two anniversaries offered a frame for 
national minded speech and questions of nationhood during the Cold 
War. However, from a point of conceptual history concepts like nation, 
independence, people or fatherland are not eternal or pure entities; they 
change and absorb new meanings when used in various political and 
historical contexts. At the same time new meanings and contents are 
contested and they are attempted to be controlled in times of political 
struggle as well. How did political actors construct the vocabulary and 
locate themselves and their opponents in the historical political debate?
Although nationalism and patriotism are frequently studied topics, 
national days and anniversaries are not. My method is based on a number of 
earlier studies implicitly concerning national holidays and their publicity 
– and not in the fi rst place on academic contributions later inspired 
by these debates.4 The main source is Suomen Kuvalehti (the Finnish 
2 M. Jakobson, Diplomaattien talvisota, 6 ed. Helsinki: WSOY 1989, iv.
3 M. Jakobson, Väkivallan vuodet, 20. vuosisadan tilinpäätös I. 2 ed. Helsinki: 
Otava 1999, 222; M. Jakobson, Vallanvaihto. Havaintoja ja muistiiinpanoja 
vuosilta 1974–92. 2 ed. Helsinki: Otava 1992, 36.
4 H. Nyyssönen, The Presence of the Past in Politics. ‘1956’ After 1956 in 
Hungary. Jyväskylä: SoPhi 1999, 11–20; H. Nyyssönen, ‘Contested traditions? 
The usage of three national holidays in contemporary Hungary’, in A. Wöll and 
H. Wydra (eds.), Democracy and Myth in Russia and Eastern Europe. New 
York and London: Routledge 2007, 221–243; C. Amalvi, ‘Bastille Day: From 
Dies Irae to Holiday’, in P. Nora (ed.) Realms of Memory: The Construction of 
the French Past, Vol. 3, New York: Columbia University Press; M. Ozouf, La 
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Pictorial Magazine), frequently and thoroughly studied for numerous 
purposes. My reading focuses on a few issues of the magazine published 
each year in November-December, from 1944 to the early 1990s. In spite 
of the richness of this material I am fully aware of the limitations of the 
magazine as a source. However, this traditionally conservative magazine 
systematically published a report from the president’s reception in the 
palace, Linna, as many other stories around 6 December. In the early 
1990s reporting from the reception came to an end, due to boulevard 
papers but plausibly also because its own opinion poll showed that 40 per 
cent of the population was ready to cancel the whole reception.5 Since 
then the reporting has become occasional, thus shifting the focus from 
the state centred independence to a more general commemoration of the 
wars.
THE ROLE OF AN ANNIVERSARY AND A NATIONAL HOLIDAY 
Political anniversaries are TimeSpaces as they connect chronological 
time and space in the same unit.6 TimeSpaces repeat annually, highlight 
a memory of certain historical events, and leave others in their shadow. 
In history politics the days offer a repetitive room for speech-acts to 
remember and forget as other interpretations and symbolic usages of the 
past. Although the ‘original’ moment is already closed, the experience 
continues and is open for new contexts and interpretations. On the 
one hand, we separate politics of commemoration, which in the form 
of cult and rituals could take place in the frame of the anniversary. On 
the other hand there is a larger concept, politics of memory, concerning 
the meanings of the anniversary itself. Attempts to deal with the past 
take always place in the present context, either to maintain or to get 
rid of the past, either to identify or to differentiate from it. Even if the 
Fête révolutionaire. Paris: Gallimard 1976; G.Gyarmati, Március Hatalma – A 
Hatalom Márciusa. Fejezetek Március 15. ünneplésének történétéből. Budapest: 
Paginarium 1998; J. Black, Using History. Oxford: Hodder Arnold 2005.
5 Suomen Kuvalehti (SK) 46–52/1944–2005; SK 49/1991.
6 J. Boyarin, ‘Space, Time and the Politics of Memory’, in J. Boyarin (ed.) 
Remapping Memory. The Politics of TimeSpace. Minneapolis & London: 
University of Minnesota Press 1994, 5–26. 
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political emphasis is not always conscious, also forensic rhetoric could 
aspire to changes in the future – ‘right’ choices in the past create political 
credibility in the present.
An independence day is the main national holiday in ca. every 
second country of the world. Some states celebrate the gaining of the 
(national) independence, whilst others commemorate declarations or 
even the beginning of an independence movement. The days are usually 
connected to national sentiment and rhetoric of freedom, but rarely to the 
form of government. Although there was an attempt to establish a Day of 
Democracy in Finland, its celebration soon vanished in the 1990s. Instead, 
Finns have several other anniversaries, which are not particular public 
holidays but commemorate certain events and great persons, such as the 
Kalevala day and the Day of Swedishness; still as late as 1950 historical 
fi gures such as  J. L. Runeberg,  J. V. Snellman and  Aleksis Kivi gained 
their offi cial dates in the calendar. Political emphasis of certain dates 
becomes even clearer as in the ‘fi rst republic’ the military had a fl ag day 
on 16 May, which since 1920 commemorated a parade of the victorious 
white army in Helsinki after the civil war in 1918. Particularly for the 
whites the day represented de facto consolidation of the independence 
after the civil war. After the Winter War a broader consensus emerged 
to establish a more appropriate denominator. At fi rst they dedicated a 
particular new day to fallen soldiers, and another day, Marshal  C. G. E. 
Mannerheim’s birthday, became the new fl ag day of the army on his 75th 
anniversary in 1942.7
In November 1919 the council of state gave a decree which established 
6 December as an anniversary of independence. In a law from 1929 it 
received a status of a free holiday, a vacation with pay. One purpose of 
this proposal, launched by  Väinö Tanner’s social democratic government 
two years earlier, was to cement the December day against current claims 
to stress the parade day of May 1918. According to the fi rst paragraph 
of the law, updated in 1937, the day would be ‘annually celebrated as a 
public feast and a holiday to commemorate the independence declaration 
of the republic of Finland’.8 The ceremony culture, as the structure of the 
7 Nyyssönen ‘Contested traditions?, 221–230; S. Feiring, ’Runeberg kyllä, 
Sibelius ei - merkkihenkilöt kalenterissamme, Ajastaika  2 (2003).
8 138/1919, Suomen asetuskokoelma vuodelta 1919. Helsinki: Valtioneuvoston 
kirjapaino 1920: H. Nyyssönen, ’Itsenäisyysvapaasta oli aikanaan kova vääntö, 
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day itself, is serious, traditional and state-centred: A service takes place 
in the Helsinki cathedral in presence of the president of the republic, 
who also promotes soldiers in the rank but usually does not address to 
the nation. A national military parade takes place, students march with 
torches, people lay wreaths on war memorials etc. A custom of putting 
two candles in the window still exists although its purpose has become 
obscure: some say that the custom already commemorated  Runeberg’s 
birthday whilst others refer to the illegal jaeger movement during the 
First World War to signify a safe house on their way out of the country. 
The evening reception in the president’s palace is the most well-known 
ceremony.9 Nowadays this spectacle and politics of appearance belong to 
one of those rare collective experiences on the national level: more than 
two million people have watched the event on TV at its peak during the 
last few years. Preparing for the reception is a thing in itself, and one of 
the most interesting descriptions originates from the ethnographer and 
writer  Sakari Pälsi. In the late 1950s Pälsi had to admit that a shadow of 
the past had at fi rst disturbed him at the entrance. Soon he, however, noted 
that the frightening and hateful Russki splendour did not exist but the 
palace represented  Engel’s composed new classic ‘mostly human style’. 
No doubt the golden helmets and silver armour of  Bismark’s cuirassiers 
as well as the French uniforms and the guards at St Stephen’s crown in 
Buda were more spectacular than the uniforms of the Finnish cadets. 
Nevertheless, Pälsi turned this ‘necessity’ to a virtue: lack of artifi cial 
decorations gave an impression of morale and troops committed to fi ght. 
Pälsi also advised his wife how to behave at the welcoming ceremony: 
dropping a curtsy could be understood by somebody as an anachronistic 
relic of the monarchist adventure in 1918. ‘Down with curtsies! You 
have to bend fl uently in a democratic way, smile charmingly and to be 
moderately shy.’10
Turun Sanomat (TS), 3 Dec 2007;  388/1937, Suomen asetuskokoelma vuodelta 
1937. Helsinki: 1938.
9 T. Halonen. ‘Linnan juhlat’ in T. Halonen, L. Aho (eds.), Suomalaisten symbolit. 
Jyväskylä: Atena 2005, 200; H. Hirvikorpi, Linnan juhlat kautta aikojen. 




POLICY LINE, INDEPENDENCE AND WARS
The anniversaries of the independence and the Winter War offered not 
only a context to deal with historical topics but history as identity, too. 
On the 30th anniversary it is striking how the editor of Suomen Kuvalehti 
referred to Finland’s history, and in a conservative way. According to the 
editorial ‘6. XII. 1947’ a safe haven was found in history and tradition as 
no other shelter was available: 
…The people draw the winning power from their own past and 
history, which could pass through even the greatest diffi culties. 
The legacy of our fathers is the resource of our independence, 
when no other support is there to be seen.... Good times are bad 
times in a sense that they lulled us into a nice life, which obscures 
the face of the fatherland. The most important reality, the entity 
of people, and its fate will become alien… The best safeguard is 
found in Finnish history.’
Particularly the use of history takes place in times of crisis, as above, when 
they understood the legacy of fathers as a power resource. Nevertheless, 
the editorial did not mention the political point of view, i.e. what kind 
of history was in case. By the war the old Runebergian romantic vision 
had collapsed and new challenges emerged for the policy towards the 
Soviet Union after 1944. One of the fi rst and most well-known attempts 
to explore the ‘foundations’ of the new policy originated from post-
war premier and president  J. K. Paasikivi himself, who legitimized his 
actions on the basis of earlier moderate attitudes of Fennomanians i.e. 
Finnish nationalists in the nineteenth century. Another constructer of the 
‘line’,  Raoul Palmgren, in the left of the political spectrum, published his 
Suuri linja (The Great Line) in 1948. There he promoted the progressive 
legacy of the ‘great [nineteenth] century’ against ‘the deceit of the fi rst 
republic’. Revolutionary socialists were adopted in the patriotic narrative, 
a contested past, which had tinged Palmgren’s own activity. On the cover 
of the 1976 edition President  Urho Kekkonen, the greatest of current 
domestic arbiters of taste, praised that Palmgren had found the ‘ Snellman 
line, the great line’ a long time before others.11
11 H. Immonen, ‘Paasikivi ja historia’, in T.Polvinen – H. Immonen J.K. 
Paasikivi Valtiomiehen elämäntyö 5 1948-1956. Helsinki: WSOY 2003, 269–
Commemorating Two Political Anniversaries in the Cold War Finland
213
Contrary to  Palmgen’s sympathies for the nineteenth century it is 
striking how much the recent history, i.e. the twentieth century, was 
stressed in Cold War Finland. For example, the years 1904–1975 were at 
stake in  Paavo Haavikko’s Kansakunnan linja (The Line of the Nation), 
released in the frame of the 60th anniversary. According to Suomen 
Kuvalehti, ‘the war did not break the line of the nation’. For Haavikko 
the line of the nation had meant political realism in current circumstances 
and an effort to elaborate on these circumstances in a positive direction. 
In 1990 Haavikko published an extended edition and specifi ed the ‘line’ 
as an attempt for permanent neutrality. In the new edition he added one 
more chapter characterising the years 1975–1990 as an era of national 
opportunism. Already in the fi rst edition he had gone beyond Paasikivi 
and  Kekkonen to fi nd a broader ‘Finland’s line’ based on foreign policy 
and economic interests. According to Haavikko,  Väinö Tanner’s republic 
was transferred to an old men’s realm between 1939 and 1956, then to a 
one man’s country, and fi nally to the era of national opportunism.12 
In 1948 Kekkonen, then chairman of the parliament, had revealed 
something about his political philosophy in his greeting on the occasion of 
the independence anniversary. He argued that the most diffi cult question 
in society was how to adjust the interest of the whole (entire nation) 
with particular interests. ‘The state system which allows the struggle of 
different interests, and is even based on that struggle, is fi rm only with 
a condition that all sides are content with the true priority of the whole 
and convinced that promoting his own good does not divide but instead 
constructs a common good.’ 
No doubt numerous partisan interests existed but one of the deepest 
division lines dealt with the civil war of 1918 and how to deal with its 
legacy in various political contexts – at that time in 1948 Tanner had 
actualised the topic by publishing his memoirs. As a current pseudonym 
Veljenpoika reminded in a story ‘Tolerant independence’, it was typical 
in the fi rst republic to publish a picture of the ‘independence senate’, 
which caused grumbling from the left as they too had fought for the 
independence (in fact Suomen Kuvalehti released this icon again on the 
273; R. Palmgren, Suuri linja Arwidssonista valankumouksellisiin sosialisteihin, 
2 ed.. Helsinki: Kansankulttuuri 1976, 213.
12 SK 47/1976; SK 46/1977; P. Haavikko, Kansakunnan linja. Helsinki: Art 
House 1990, 335;  P. Haavikko, Kansakunnan linja. Helsinki: Otava 1977.
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40th anniversary). According to Veljenpoika the left had full reason to be 
acknowledged as independence had been a result of the First World War 
the Russian revolution, and domestic development. Veljenpoika reminded 
of current moderate forces in 1918 and then referred to the present: even 
the opponents of the current social democratic government considered it 
to be the best guarantee of legality.13
The independence declaration in the parliament in 1917 had been 
quite a puritan act. On the 40th anniversary Suomen Kuvalehti quoted the 
conservative politician  K. G. Idman’s memoirs to remind its readers how 
the chairman had only briefl y replied to the declaration. ‘Not even that 
moment allowed the ponderous Finnish character to forget the current 
discordance in the country. Maybe a glimpse of forthcoming diffi cult 
times created a shadow and hindered all visible outbursts of joy’. From 
the context of 1957 Suomen Kuvalehti argued that a deep domestic 
division was still the most diffi cult and the toughest enemy in Finland 
– in 1918 it still had required a bloody war of independence to secure the 
independence.14
In the memory of 1918 there were elements for both those, who 
wanted to remember and for those, who preferred to forget, in as much as 
for consensus and confrontation oriented interpretations. In the aftermath 
of  Väinö Linna’s epic trilogy Täällä Pohjantähden alla (Under the North 
Star, 1959–1962) two interesting articles were published in Suomen 
Kuvalehti: In the fi rst of them  Matti Kurjensaari introduced the battle 
of Syrjäntaka, thus how ‘a crofter  Jussi Koskela and Emperor  Vilhelm 
II met in Tuulos in 1918’. Kurjensaari mixed facts and fi ction in a sense 
that  Akseli Koskela represented those anonymous soldiers, who on their 
retreat to Russia clashed with the advancing German troops. In another 
story Kurjensaari witnessed a reburial of German soldiers in Hämeenlinna 
in 1962. As a fi ve-year-old child he had seen their burial – some of 
them fallen at Syrjäntaka – and now participated in their exhumation. 
According to Suomen Kuvalehti Kurjensaari focused on the events from 
an open-minded national point of view.
Nevertheless, the magazine had released one attempt to deal with 
these delicate years even before Linna’s trilogy. In 1958 the novelist 
 Mika Waltari published a fi ctive national minded story ‘On 6 December, 
13 SK 49/1948.
14 SK 49/1957. 
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1918–1958’, a story about an execution. There a man named  Toivo 
Raatikainen (his fi rst name means ‘hope’) asked his executor, a German-
trained jaeger to shoot him as a commander, Finn and a red but not as 
a Russian. Before the execution Raatikainen prayed that his small son 
could be educated better than his father had been. This event had a link 
to the Winter War, as  Voitto Kirkas Raatikainen (name means ‘Victory 
Bright’) grew-up to be a sober and moderate young man, who fell for 
his country near Northern Ladoga in 1940.  Waltari asked to pray for the 
fallen sons, both white and red, as for those, who were responsible for the 
present policy in the 1950s.15
In Finland’s relations with the Soviet Union, history politics helped to 
promote peaceful co-existence. President  Kekkonen used  Lenin a couple 
of times since he unveiled a plaque to commemorate Lenin’s recognition 
of Finnish independence in 1959. With regards to our focus the debate re-
emerged in 1976 as a consequence of two books and the gigantic Finnish-
Soviet co-operation fi lm Luottamus (The Trust). Thus, at fi rst  Arvo Poika 
Tuominen, a former fi rst secretary of the illegal Finnish Communist 
Party, published a book, which then was criticized by the historian 
 Tuomo Polvinen: it insulted President  Paasikivi and his earlier political 
career. Tuominen replied that Paasikivi had made the Finnish defence 
more diffi cult by classifying Lenin,  Stalin, and  Ivan the Terrible into the 
same category, as tyrants. Alternatively, it would have been wiser to argue 
that Lenin had given the independence, and that Stalin had tried to steal 
it away. According to Tuominen Lenin had given the independence to 
Finland whereas Paasikivi would have turned the country into a German 
vassal, still believing in German victory in March 1942. Tuominen was 
convinced that Lenin would not have attacked Finland in 1939. In a sense 
this is absurd – Lenin had died in 1924 – and pure speculation, but also 
an interesting predecessor for the speculative what if-histories to appear 
later. In 1976, however, Tuominen’s view caused a sharp reply from a 
conservative columnist, chancellor  Tauno Nurmela, who cited a letter, 
in which Kekkonen had only wondered if Lenin had lived, what could 
have been his role in world politics and would he have attacked Finland. 
Kekkonen had addressed the letter to Tuominen in April 1970 and 
published it six years later in a new sample of letters Kirjeitä Myllystäni. 
15 SK 48/1962; SK 49/1958.
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 Nurmela considered  Tuominen’s views as a myth and forecasted ‘a war 
of belief’ to be the result. 
In the same article Nurmela commented on another brand new 
production, the fi lm Luottamus. For him the purpose was to fi nd a 
common base for a joint  Lenin myth for the great public in the Soviet 
Union and Finland. However, the third participant in the debate,  Tuomo 
Polvinen, considered the fi lm fairly good concerning the acts of Lenin’s 
nationality policy: the question of nationalities was subdued for a 
more sublime aim, i.e. carrying out socialism. Polvinen noted how the 
manuscript stressed several times Lenin’s purpose to strengthen the 
Finns’ own revolution, a paradox, which was later used by  Stalin.16 In 
the fi rst place Lenin, the ‘founding father’ of the Soviet Union, was not 
a ‘Finn-eater’ but a voluntarist. For the public opinion, however, Lenin 
appeared as an ‘Uncle’ and a friend, who knew Finland and appreciated 
Finns. Nevertheless, even this view of national states’ secondary role in 
history caused a political headache concerning the ‘course of history’ – in 
theory co-existence was only a preliminary solution. 
The offi cial slogan on the 60th anniversary stressed unity: ‘Independent 
Finland, our common goal’. According to Suomen Kuvalehti the country 
was reaching its anniversary economically crippled, mentally tired and 
quarrelsome. Current editorials linked party struggles even to the decline 
of independence and 1918: ‘at some point political struggles have to 
end or we will lose our independency’ (1976). ‘If we cannot heal the 
trauma of the civil war we cannot get rid of emotional explanations for 
the reasons and consequences of the Winter and Continuation Wars, not 
even during the next two generations’. (1977)17
Although the Winter War had forced former enemies into a united 
front, the memory of 1918 had left a long shadow over politics. My 
argument is that the historical dichotomy ended only in 1982, when the 
fi rst social democrat was elected the leader of the country. This view 
will become more evident, when we compare the 1977 anniversary to 
1987. For example a journalist Arvo Ahlroos argued in his program 
Kansalaiset (Citizens), dedicated to the 70th anniversary, that emotions 
were sealed already in the sense that the twentieth century history could 
16 SK 47/1976, SK 49/1976; U. Kekkonen, Kirjeitä myllystäni, Maarit Tyrkkö & 
Keijo Korhonen (eds.). Helsinki: Otava 1976, 161–163.
17 SK 49/1976; SK 48/1977.
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be represented in a more racy and generous way. Another landmark 
was reached also in 1987, when invalids of the white freedom fi ghters 
celebrated closing festivities of their association. Nevertheless, a lively 
debate has continued despite the end of the Cold War. For example, an 
academic project was launched in 1998 to clarify all casualities between 
1914 and 1922, and to ‘fi nally get rid of the national trauma of the civil 
war’18. 
ANNIVERSARIES OF THE WINTER WAR
Although 30 November is not an offi cial anniversary, it has been 
commemorated in several ways and particularly in a magazine like Suomen 
Kuvalehti. Every 10th and 25th anniversary the magazine commemorated 
the event systematically. The 10th anniversary was the fi rst time that the 
war was recalled: at that time the main focus was on the level of repeating 
the most important events. On the level of mourning and the memory 
itself on both occasions the magazine called for permanent memorials in 
the cemeteries for fallen war heroes.
Ten years later in 1959 the focus was still on the military and not the 
political level – the home front and human suffering appeared later on the 
agenda. In the aftermath of the Hungarian uprising, the editorial referred 
to glimpses of forgetting and had ‘an eternal question of small nations’ in 
mind. ‘Not everybody likes to recall it… Like there would be something 
shameful, secret or something to be apologised for… The principle of a 
super power is based on the politics of a wolf.’ The editorial wondered 
divine dispensation and the meaning of history as small nations were 
left to the mercy of the great powers. However, these pessimistic tones 
disappeared considerably in the editorials before the 25th anniversary: 
after coping with two wars Finland had reached a status which was not 
bad at all. Finland was like ‘a man in his best age - 47’ and belonged to 
those few countries which had maintained their independence for such 
a long time. Domestic politics had stabilised, relations with the Soviet 
Union were on a fi rm basis, and even the mental wounds of the war had 
started to heal. 
18 http://www.tyovaenperinne.fi /tyovaentutkimus/tt2005/nettiversio/tk3/htm., 
visited 10 Dec 2007.
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However, something new was in the air as, according to the magazine, a 
proper controversy was found between generations.19 No direct reference 
was made in the editorial, but on the basis of the context it is clear that 
the remark also had to do with the wars. The idea appeared again in 1979, 
when the magazine was ready to conclude that in despite of emotional 
views, the unity of the Winter War was highly valued. A growing interest 
towards the recent past revealed a change in attitudes as conservative 
views, and honour of tradition was rising. On the basis of an opinion 
poll, the magazine concluded that the adaptation of new values had 
slowed down.20 At that time  Max Jakobson, then Managing Director of 
the Finnish Business and Policy Forum (Elinkeinoelämän valtuuskunta, 
EVA) published the fi fth edition of his Diplomaattien talvisota. In the 
preface Jakobson surmised that ‘the era of self-fl agellation seemed to 
be over’. For him the new generation missed elements, which supported 
continuity in the life of the nation. According to Jakobson, post-war 
foreign policy had decisively infl uenced notions and interpretations of the 
Winter War. Jakobson considered that history writing had spontaneously 
started from its own premises to interpret the Winter War from the 
Paasikivian perspective.21 On that anniversary Jakobson participated in 
 Pekka Holopainen’s and  Antero Kekkonen’s TV-program Talvisodasta 
kuultuna (Interviewed on the Winter War) with other prominent quests 
 Wolf Halsti,  K. A. Fagerholm,  Ville Pessi,  Arvo Poika Tuominen,  Raoul 
Palmgren,  A. F. Airo, and  L. A. Puntila. When Jakobson wrote a new 
preface for his book in 1989, he was annoyed about the former program. 
He needed to remind that a reporter had asked him who could be blamed 
for starting the Winter War… on the Finnish side.22 
Despite a present cliché of the atmosphere of the 1970s, there indeed 
were TV-programs dealing with the wars, such as a long TV-serial called 
Sodan ja Rauhan miehet (The Men of War and Peace). Nevertheless, 
compared to post-1989 production there were far fewer programs and 
other representations of this kind. One peak was reached in 1989, when 
Suomen Kuvalehti released a 64 page appendix of the Winter War. The 
magazine concentrated ‘on the struggle of survival. The question was 
19 SK 49/1959; SK 48/1964.
20 SK 48/1979.
21 M. Jakobson. Diplomaattien talvisota, 5 ed. Helsinki: WSOY 1979 ii–iv.
22 Jakobson, Diplomaattien talvisota, 6 ed, i.
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about maintaining Finland as an independent and free nation. Researchers 
have favoured speculations about shots in Mainila, government in Terijoki 
or reasons why the war broke out, but they remain in the background’23. 
In the light of the liberation of the East European nations, there was room 
for ‘more authentic interpretations’ as a new form of history politics 
– to remember in a more respectfully way – in Finland as well. Since 
then Suomen Kuvalehti has published many re-remembering stories as 
particular Pictorial Magazines of Wars, although they do not belong to 
our frame in the fi rst place.
 Films belong also to these representations, and they have linked 
wars to independence and to the anniversaries.  Pekka Parikka’s massive 
Talvisota (Winter War) was timed for the 50th anniversary with its 
premier on 6 December 1989, and a TV-series, based on the fi lm, was in 
the forthcoming years shown in November-December. Whereas  Linna’s 
Under the North Star was never shown on television on that day,  Edwin 
Laine’s version of Linna’s Tuntematon Sotilas (Unknown Soldier) has 
become a spectacle in shifting the focus from 1917 to 1939–1944 during 
recent years – at the same time relating independence with war in the 
twenty-fi rst century. In fact both versions of the fi lm had their premier on 
6 December, Laine’s in 1955 and  Rauni Mollberg’s in 1985. In Suomen 
Kuvalehti new recruits analysed the latter fi lm, usually more as an artistic 
representation than a faithful dramatisation of the book. A representative 
of an older generation, editor in chief  Allan Liuhala, took another, sharp 
stand, when he simply commented ‘Mollberg’s fi lm is not Väinö Linna’s 
Unknown [Soldier]’ in his column in the newspaper Hämeen Sanomat. 
At that time Linna itself had become a national icon, if compared to the 
late 1960s. In a story timed for the 30th anniversary of the Winter War 
Linna was repentant as he had destroyed all outrageous messages he had 
received after publishing the book. In the 1950s radicals of the 1930s, 
mostly right-wingers, criticised him, but in the 1960s current criticism 
came from the left.24
During the Cold War the Continuation War 1941–1944 was not often 
put under focus with a special article, at least not in the time of year 
23 SK 46/1989.
24  M. Pöyhönen, Huomautuksia Mollbergin Tuntemattomasta, in A. Arnkil, O. 
Sinivaara (eds), Kirjoituksia Väinö Linnasta. Helsinki: Teos 2006, 492–493; 
Hämeen Sanomat 6 Dec 1985; SK 48/1969.
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that has been studied for this article. Still a number of times the end of 
the war was present. For example in 1954 the editorial ‘6.XII’ referred 
to  Paasikivi’s pessimistic tones in his Messuhalli-speech in 1944. Ten 
years later, 1954, there were moments of wonder and happiness, as 
‘Finns had survived, they had avoided the dangers of communism on the 
loose, relocated Karelians, compensated their property, and had paid the 
heaviest reconstructions in the world’. Despite these signs, the magazine 
warned again that inner contradictions could endanger ‘our destiny for a 
more prosperous future’.25
In 1974 two political incidents took place around the anniversary. 
At fi rst  Eino Uusitalo, the parliamentary chief whip of the Centre Party, 
caused a scandal by suggesting that 19 September, the day of the interim 
peace agreement of 1944, could be chosen ‘beside 6 December as a 
second national red-letter day, as the independence day of the second 
republic’26. Uusitalo presented his proposal in front of his own party 
in the presence of a visiting Soviet delegation, at a time, which later is 
known as an opening of political relations on the party level. Secondly, 
 Kustaa Vilkuna, the wartime head of state censorship and now president 
 Kekkonen’s close associate, started to sink the driftwood hypothesis theory 
of Finland’s entry into the war alongside Germany in 1941. Vilkuna had 
promised to reveal ‘how Finland was taken into the Continuation War’ 
but retreated, when he was not allowed to use general  Paavo Talvela’s 
notes, as the publishing house Kirjayhtymä had the copyright for them. 
Therefore, details referring to Talvela’s papers were removed from the 
article, and there was a public scandal at hand. The case was linked to the 
Stella Polaris affair, when reconnaissance material had been smuggled 
to Sweden after the war, and henceforth burned. Now Vilkuna asked in 
public who ordered it and to protect whom. 
One the one hand, the article and the whole history political debate 
revealed something about populist rhetorical styles in debates of history. 
Neither the topic, nor Vilkuna himself, were what mattered, as it seemed 
that it was the publicity in itself that made the case. The ‘beef’ was less 
clear, as Vilkuna had to admit that scholars already agreed with his 
argument that the driftwood-theory no longer held water. Nevertheless, 
the issue of Suomen Kuvalehti was sold out because of this gripping 
25 SK 49/1954.
26 Helsingin Sanomat (HS) 12 Nov 1974.
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story full of secrets, myths, and censorship.27 On the other hand, even 
the political parties had different interpretations of the recent past. The 
fascist nazi-Germany was ‘the worst of all enemies’, and now  Vilkuna 
was claiming that small Finland had consciously sided with it to start 
a new war. Moreover, the whole scandal took place in the aftermath of 
the 25th anniversary of the FCMA-treaty (1973) and precisely on the 
30th anniversary of the provisional peace treaty. The current marching 
order revealed these views’ delicate nature in relation to the present 
policy ‘line’, as according to Vilkuna, general  Talvela had said that it 
was President  Kekkonen, who decided what could be used. Whether the 
Soviet Union had in the end had real intensions to attack was a question 
to be studied in the future, Vilkuna argued.
Finally there is one more public debate, in which the history of the 
‘fi rst republic’ culminated. In 1986 Helsinki city board rejected with a 
majority of one vote a proposal, which would have granted a location 
for a statue for the civil guard Suojeluskuntalainen. A national student 
union also followed suit and opposed the idea in a declaration. Suomen 
Kuvalehti took a fi rm stand in its editorial titled ‘Independence’, surmising 
that Finland’s recent history had become obscure. Independence meant 
power over history, too: ‘Independence means also that nobody should 
order, which parts of national history should be forgotten’. According to 
the writer only the extreme left had not learned anything from history 
although three generations has passed from 1918. A slight ultimatum was 
added in the end: if Helsinki did not accept the statue there would be other 
cities to receive it, when the republic would turn 71 years in 1988.28 
At the time of the Vilkuna scandal the editor in chief and a veteran 
himself,  Mikko Pohtola had welcomed a publication of a sample from 
Minun isänmaani (My Fatherland) contributed by current politicians and 
other public persons. According to him there had not been any discussion 
about the fatherland in three decades, and if there had been, nobody had 
listened. Therefore a concept could be put on the shelf for a generation, 
then redecorated and reused. Pohtola was not satisfi ed with the present 
interpretation of the concept; walls so far apart that they could not be seen, 





zero-growth. Independence was an unbroken chain, which could not be 
cut into pieces by a ‘second independence day’.29
In the end the statue of Suojeluskuntalainen was unveiled in 
Seinäjoki in 1988. Less known is that during the same summer two 
other constructions, Suojeluskuntalainen and another for the women’s 
organisation Lotta, were erected in Suonenjoki. Both of them were 
donated by an old farmer, who then continued his activities to establish 
voluntary defense organisations in the 1990s. Figures for the boys’ 
organisation Sotilaspoika and girls’ Lottatyttö were fi nally unveiled in 
1998. Memorials and commemoration, thus, fi nally received the green 
light but not the reawakening of the organisations itself. On the 50th 
anniversary of the suppression of the guard in 1994, former and present 
activists gathered at the Finlandia house in Helsinki to demand the guard 
to be re-established. According to the sources of Suomen Kuvalehti the 
state leadership and the top of the army had already rejected the idea. 
The new Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces  Gustav Hägglund 
elaborated his view that there were ‘mental obstacles’ against the idea.30
REPRESENTATIONS OF GROWING UP
On the 30th anniversary of the independence, in 1947, Suomen Kuvalehti 
presented the achievements of the young nation with such an enthusiasm 
and rhetoric, which was not far from that used by the DDR in the late 
1960s. In the report Finland’s harvest already in 1937 had been doubled 
compared to 1917, 400 000 hectares of new fi elds were cleared, education 
and social welfare had improved. Moreover, Finland was frequently 
compared to a living organism, like the Maiden of Finland or to a body 
growing older. In the midst of domestic political fragmentation in 1957 
the magazine presented the country as ‘independent and stubborn’ 
(itsenäinen ja itsepäinen). As a nation Finland had reached ‘the middle-
point of a human being of the present time’. In despite of all the domestic 
contradictions, a certain optimism, based on the idea of forgetting, 
prevailed: ‘Finnish democracy has shown its vitality… Let’s interpret 
29 SK 46–47/1974; SK 49/1974.
30 Sisä-Savon Sanomat (SSS) 26 May 1998; SSS 23 Mar 1999; HS 8 Nov 1994; 
SK 12/1995.
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this national holiday as a day of reconciliation, not to remember the past 
anymore, but grasp fi rmly our common task for a better future.’31
According to the editorial, being young was fi nally a myth in 1967. 
Finns had lived here for over 2000 years, the coat of arms originated 
from the sixteenth century and even in the United Nations they belong 
to the group of middle-aged states. The time had come for a matured 
independent life, to speak less about things already past, but instead 
about those in the future.32 In 1977 Finland was once again embodied 
as a human being, this time as a child with a white knitted cap on the 
cover of Suomen Kuvalehti. Finland also personifi ed every-day heroes, 
like a 60 year old man and a woman, or  Leo Matveinen, who would be 
47 in 2017, one of those for whom present politicians ‘have to revive and 
stabilise the country’.33
All living organisms are mortal and this mode of speech declined 
towards the dawn of the ‘third republic’. Instead, new ideas and slogans 
of opening and going global emerged – maintaining independence 
meant also international competitiveness. In 1987  Mauno Koivisto’s 
loyal opponent Prime Minister  Harri Holkeri campaigned for offi ce in 
the presidental election, in which he presented arguments like ‘being 
international is an advantage for the fatherland’, ‘nationality does not 
hinder being international’ and ‘our peculiarity is an intellectual way of 
thinking independently, in a Finnish way’. There was a clear difference 
compared to Holkeri’s previous 1981 campaign, in which he used also the 
context of 6 December in Suomen Kuvalehti. At that time he frequently 
stressed continuity; deeply rooted in the Paasikivian thought, Holkeri 
promised ‘to secure the line of the nation’.34
In 1988  Raimo Lehtonen, the chairman of AKAVA, a trade union 
of academically educated professionals and other experts, made a more 
challenging point: independence is fi nally more about the future than 
about the past, although history provides a view of its legitimate basis. 
Lehtonen pointed that independence had to be maintained in a constantly 
turbulent environment, in which the main factor was international 
competitiveness. In the article ‘We have to be able to do more than 
31 SK 49/1949; SK 50/1957.
32 SK 50/1967.
33 SK 48/1977.
34 SK 51–52/1987; SK 49/1981.
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the others’ Lehtonen in fact equated independence with international 
competitiveness. This view could be contrasted with the 1970s, when 
 Pekka Kuusi, one of the architects of the forthcoming consensus, tried 
to answer the question ‘what is it to be a Finn’. Kuusi forecasted the 
end of the era of rapid economic growth, which had continued since the 
Second World War. The case was how to adjust with the cycles of a global 
economy, in which ca. 2 per cent of annual growth left enough room for 
political development. Kuusi challenged the slogan of the Finnish way of 
life, which fi nally did not depend on consuming but free-time, sauna, ski 
tracks, and summer cottages.35 
Thus, questions of ‘national identity’ – a stereotype as such when 
defi ned – were repeated in Suomen Kuvalehti during our study. In fact 
the magazine seemed to belong to forces actively propagating ideas of 
national identity during the Cold War. For example, in 1965 over 40 
persons pondered their relation to the question ‘What is good in Finland’. 
Many of them were public persons, whose positions and political views 
varied on the political palette, like, not only, the businesspeople  Juuso 
Walden and  Raakel Wihuri, bishop  Martti Simojoki, but also the Centre 
Party leader  Johannes Virolainen and novelist  Pentti Saarikoski. One 
of the most interesting comments originated from feulletonist  Jouni 
Lompolo. According to him, lack of national traditions, a commitment 
to ‘only a few pillars (nationalism, Winter War)’ helped to adopt 
international perspectives. A short period of civilisation and traditions 
in fact increased freedom. In the fi eld of non-manual work there was 
room for reforms and rebellion; architects and composers could fi nally 
get a non-fi gurative statue. Lompolo also noted the difference between 
generations, and because of the wars, the gap remained clear. As an 
example he mentioned his teacher, who had been disappointed because 
none of the pupils had particularly mentioned the fatherland in an exam. 
Lompolo criticised the rhetorics of their fathers, which still existed in 
the 1960s. ‘We should have had loved to live here because this is our 
fatherland redeemed with blood’. For Lompolo the geographical status 
of the country taught us to learn fl exibility and relativism. The next 
crisis will ‘follow when (or if) the standard of living in the Soviet Union 
becomes higher than in Finland’.36
35 SK 50/1988; SK 50/1976.
36 SK48–52/1965.
Commemorating Two Political Anniversaries in the Cold War Finland
225
Moreover, towards the 1960s, also tentative romantic views of the 
‘people’ emerged to contrast the ‘sublime’ and party of ‘the elite’. Until 
then pictures of the celebrating elite had been repeatedly displayed in the 
magazine. In 1963  Juha Tanttu wrote that ‘A Finn knows full well that 6 
December is an occasion for the great society, and that they [the people, 
the others] travel from Tornio to Haaparanta to buy Swedish goods’. 
Furthermore, in 1966 the novelist  Arto Paasilinna visited Paltamo, where 
‘nothing happened on  Kalle Heikura’s independence day’. Finally, in 
1967 a group of young radicals known as Marraskuun liike, organised 
an alternative party for the homeless – to contrast the elite summoned to 
the president’s castle – known as Kurjat (The Miserables) as reported by 
Suomen Kuvalehti. 
In the 1960s ‘Finnishness’ was not due to fate anymore, as the editor 
in chief of the leading daily Helsingin Sanomat  Yrjö Niiniluoto had 
written in the late 1950s. In 1967 the idea was criticised by a pseudonym 
 Liimatainen in one of his fi rst columns in Suomen Kuvalehti. Finnishness 
as a fate had no value with a premise that Finns would be a certain chosen 
people and therefore had to suffer more. According to Liimatainen ‘you 
can never escape Finnish-ness, not even as a world citizen’. For him 
being a Finn in 1967 meant ‘more understanding of the past, learning 








STUNDE NULL IN THE STUDY OF FINNISH-GERMAN RELATIONS
Until very recently, the German issue was an under researched and under 
discussed area of politics in Finland. This may sound paradoxical as the 
German question was, as a result of the outcome of the Second World 
War, a pivotal political problem for Finland. However, when one peruses 
various semi-political tracts on Finnish foreign policy in the 1960s and 
the 1970s – published by the Paasikivi Society, the Finnish Political 
Science Association, and other organizations – the German factor is 
hardly mentioned.  
The reason for this silence is obvious; the role of Germany (East and 
West) in the Finnish foreign policy was a highly sensitive issue as it 
had direct implications for Finland’s bilateral relations with the Soviet 
Union. In a centralized foreign policy culture, prevailing in Finland until 
the 1990s, such sensitive questions had to be left to the president and 
his closest advisers. It was risky – not only for an individual scholar but 
potentially for the entire nation – to discuss with any degree of freedom 
and precision the German question and its implications for the Finnish-
Soviet relations.1
1 The existence of different views on the German issue and related things among 
the politicians and diplomats is testifi ed in, for instance, Y. Väänänen, Finlan-




There are always some exceptions to the rule. In this case the name 
of the fi rst exception is  Osmo Apunen who published in the 1970s one of 
the fi rst analytical studies on the Finnish foreign policy. Apunen does not 
offer radically new interpretations on the German question, but he traces 
the evolving position of the two German states in the European context 
and offers the fi rst systematic analysis of the ‘German package’ in which 
Finland proposed in 1971 the parallel recognition of the divided state.2 In 
a later book, Apunen explores en passant also the German package and 
sees it primarily as a tactical move by which President  Kekkonen and the 
top bureaucrats in the Foreign Ministry, sometimes in disagreement with 
each other, aimed to strengthen their conception of the Finnish neutrality 
and position the country in the emerging new political order in Europe.3
Obviously, the limited access to diplomatic archives has hindered 
detailed historical studies on how Finland’s relations with the Federal 
Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic 
(GDR) have been directed from the end of the Second World War to 
the present era and what has been the role of the Soviet Union in these 
relations. Now we fi nally have the second exception,  Seppo Hentilä and 
his thorough academic studies and memoirs on the twists and turns in 
Finland’s relations with the two German states, especially the GDR, 
and policies pursued by each of the three governments, as well as the 
great powers. The story of Finnish-German relations is not always very 
consistent and no one really emerges as the unqualifi ed winner, but it is 
informative and sheds light on the realities of Cold War policies.4
HOW TO STUDY FOREIGN POLICY
The account of the foreign policy of a small country depends, among 
other things, on the level of activity and infl uence accorded to its political 
apparatus in relation to the domestic society on the one hand and the 
2 O. Apunen, Paasikiven-Kekkosen linja. Helsinki: Tammi 1977.
3 O. Apunen, Tilinteko Kekkosen aikaan. Helsinki: Kirjayhtymä 1984.
4 S. Hentilä, Kaksi Saksaa ja Suomi.  Saksan-kysymys Suomen puolueettomuus-
politiikan haasteena. Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura 2003; S. 
Hentilä. Harppi-Saksan haarukassa. DDR:n poliittinen vaikutus Suomessa. 
Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura 2004. In addition, Hentilä has 
published numerous articles and chapters on these issues.
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external environment on the other. One may start from the premise that 
the external relations of any country are always politically constructed. 
Some material aspects of the international environment are naturally 
given; they are ‘brute’ facts such as the geopolitical confi guration and 
the level of armaments. On the other hand, many external conditions 
are ‘social’ facts and their infl uence depends on what we believe about 
them and how we act on them. Facts are made ‘social’ by the political 
agencies in a nation whose interpretations and actions help to constitute 
the structures. Thus structures and agencies are mutually constitutive.  
In social constructivism, norms and ideas play an important role; 
in other words, the calculation of ‘brute’ facts, such as material power 
relations, is only one element of foreign policy and their infl uence 
depends on the ideational framing through which the policy makers view 
the external conditions.5 In earlier constructivist literature, it was stressed 
that the responses of actors are shaped by the ways they are socialized 
into the existing structures and their continuities. In more recent research, 
the emphasis has returned more to the behaviour of the agents and the 
way they frame the choices made. Social construction of politics can 
deal also with wars and crises as constitutive events that frame politics. It 
has been noted that the framing of major historical events may be based 
on the necessity of change that results in ‘politics of persuasion’ among 
the advocates of various courses of action.6 This way of thinking should 
not be too diffi cult to apply to the post-Second World War conditions in 
Finnish foreign policy.
In every country, there is a social cognitive structure that establishes 
the boundaries of meanings and actions, and frames political decisions. 
To be effective politically, the agent must be either able persuade 
other signifi cant players about the rightness of its call for change or 
communicate in conformity with the prevailing social cognitive structure 
and its structural constraints. In the latter case, the agent should follow 
the logic of intelligibility and avoid too sharp deviations from the 
mainstream (which may have been constructed by an agent of change). 
5 See, e.g., D. P. Houghton, ‘Reinvigorating the Study of Foreign Policy Decision 
Making: Toward a Constructivist Approach’, Foreign Policy Analysis 3 (2007), 
24–45.
6 W. W. Widmaier, M. Blyth and L. Seabrooke, ‘Exogenous Shocks or Endo-
genous Constructions? The Meanings of Wars and Crises’, International Studies 
Quarterly  51(2007), 747–760.
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Due to this innate pressure at conformity, decision makers tend to choose 
political practices refl ecting the conventions of national identities that, in 
turn, shape their understandings of other states.7    
In the study of Finnish foreign policy, the emphasis on political 
agency has prevailed and the cognitive structures have correspondingly 
received little attention or its infl uence has been kept implicit. In most 
accounts, the key players have been either sovereign governments (e.g. 
Washington and Stockholm), governmental institutions (e.g. foreign 
ministries and intelligence agencies), political parties, or individuals 
(e.g.  Nikita Khrushchev and  Urho Kekkonen). Such a perspective 
is not wrong, of course, as the tapestry of foreign policy is woven by 
various kinds of political actors and their mutual positive and negative 
interactions. A problem with this approach is its inability to provide a 
comprehensive account of the potential redirections in foreign policy or 
they appear to result from changes in the motives and objectives of the 
actors alone. The risk is that foreign policy is seen as a game in which 
the actors pursue primarily short- and medium-term gains, sometimes 
even in a conspiratorial manner.8 In foreign policy, the role of collective 
or individual veto players tends to be important as the decision power is 
often vested with the individual political leader and the group of close 
advisers.9
The concept of structure has in the study of foreign policy two 
connotations; it refers either to the social cognitive structure within a 
nation or the structure of the international environment. The cognitive 
structure is akin to the concept of political culture and provides a 
discursive framework for political action. The external structural view on 
foreign policies qualifi es the operative nature of the cognitive structure; 
for instance when the international structure is bipolar and the relations 
between the great powers are tense, small states have only limited 
7 This line of analysis is developed and applied by T. Hopf, Social Construction 
of International Politics.  Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 
1999. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2002, 14–15, 37–38.
8 External imperatives of one kind in Finnish foreign policy have been stressed , 
for example, by H. Rautkallio, Neuvostovallan asialla. NKP:n vaikutus Suomessa 
1960-luvulla. Helsinki: Tammi 1993.
9 G. Tsebelis, Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press 2002.
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possibilities to construct themselves the internal and external ‘social’ 
facts. 
Their only meaningful strategy is to adapt themselves to the 
existing international situation as best as they can. The need to adjust is 
particularly pronounced if the situation is shaped by a major event such 
as a victory or a loss in a war. The adaptation to the existing political 
situation does not only hint to involuntary compliance with the harsh 
international reality, but it may also be used as an opportunity to collect 
political capital for domestic purposes. ‘Finlandization’ and the way it 
was pursued, especially in the 1960s and the 1970s, by key political 
actors, shows how adaptation to external conditions can also be made to 
serve the advancement of political careers. In the extreme case, the social 
construction of foreign policy can serve private aims but potentially harm 
the collective interests of the nation.
The focus on the dictates of the international structure has dominated 
both the traditional realism, informed by history and geography, and a more 
recent structuralist perspective. The latter mode of analysis may divide the 
external conditions in, for instance, the integration, strategic, and confl ict 
environments and explore their impact on a small-country policies. The 
integration environment refers, in addition to the institutional build-up, 
to the expansion and deepening of international market relations, while 
the strategic environment is created by the development of weapons 
technologies and the way the major states make them to serve national 
policies. The confl ict environment refers to the mix of confrontation and 
cooperation between the states and their security agencies. Deterrence 
in the strategic environment may contain confl icts but often these two 
environments fuel each other, while the integration process tends to 
promote, despite the economic rivalries, political peace.
Structure does not, of course, alone determine policy, but the 
social cognitive structure and domestic responses to the pressures and 
opportunities emanating from the international environment do also 
matter. Thus, in the interaction between systemic structure and political 
agency operating within a national cognitive structure, the need to 
adjust to external dictates remains crucial.10 To repeat my earlier point in 
10 R. Väyrynen, ‘Adaptation of a Small Power to International Tensions: The 
Case of Finland’, in B. Sundelius, The Neutral Democracies and the New Cold 
War. Boulder, CO: Westview 1987, 33–56.  A weakness in strong structuralism 
(as well as in neorealism) is that it tends to privilege internal and external stability 
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different words, the need to adjust to the external strategic and confl ict 
environments may be deliberately used by the political leaders to shape 
the national cognitive structure in which the persuasive making of foreign 
policy operates. In such a situation, the boundaries between the external 
and internal systems become blurred and the autonomy of policy making 
at home is sacrifi ced.
THE ADJUSTMENT OF FINNISH FOREIGN POLICY
In the case of Finland, the postwar settlement in the late 1940s was the 
second main turning point in the country’s history of foreign policy, the 
fi rst one being the gaining of independence in 1917. Germany’s utter 
defeat and the Soviet victory in the Second World War forced to redefi ne 
not only the external relations of Finland, but also the political cognitive 
structure in the country. Until 1942, or even 1943, the ‘offi cial’ Finland 
largely believed in the German victory; not so much because decision 
makers identifi ed closely with Germany, but because the Soviet Union 
was construed, for credible reasons, as the ‘evil empire’ which was out 
to destroy an independent Finland. There was a widespread belief, in 
effect wishful thinking, that German arms would emerge victorious, 
expand Finnish geopolitical infl uence in the East or, at a minimum, to 
save Finland from Soviet occupation. However, should Germany win, 
there was also a common concern on how a small country like Finland 
could retain its sovereignty and security in the postwar system dominated 
by one continental power.11
The Finnish-Russian war ended in 1944 in the uncontested Soviet 
victory that turned things upside down. Finnish politics had to be 
reconstructed both internally and externally to adjust the country to new 
and hence underestimate the possibility of abrupt  changes in structure and the 
redirection in foreign policy by the government; see R. Väyrynen, ‘Institutional 
and Political Stability in Finnish Foreign Policy’, in M. Wiberg (ed.), The Political 
Life of Institutions. Scripta in honorem Jaakko Nousiainen. Helsinki: The Finnish 
Political Science Association 1991, 226–44. 
11 For one perspective on the Finnish political construction of German victory in 
1941–42, see T. Polvinen, J. K. Paasikivi, Valtiomiehen elämäntyö 3, 1939–1944. 
Porvoo: WSOY, 294–314.
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international power relations in which the Soviet Union loomed large. 
The challenge was to redirect the foreign policy to the Soviet satisfaction 
without sacrifi cing the legacy of national identity that had been constructed 
in the crucible of war. The main challenge to the Finnish identity was that 
the wartime unity was now, in the conditions of peace, divided between 
the supporters of liberal-conservative nationalism and those promoting 
a closer association with the Soviet model. The main protagonists were 
the alliance of social democrats and liberal bourgeoisie forces on the 
one hand and the forces gathered around the communists and people’s 
democrats with whom some leading politicians from the Agrarian Union, 
including  Urho Kekkonen, cooperated actively. 
A problem with cognitive structuralism is that it has diffi culties to 
accord independent explanatory capacity to various ‘objective’ factors. 
Yet, it is diffi cult to reduce the postwar geopolitical division of Europe 
– what  Stöver calls die Sicherung von Räumen – the overwhelming 
American presence, and the Russian military prowess to mere social facts 
and perceptions.12 By necessity, these ‘objective’ factors entered into the 
calculations of the Finnish policy makers and had particular impact on 
relations with the Soviet Union. The dominant view was  Paasikivi’s 
historical and geopolitical realism in which the Soviet Union had only 
defensive interests in Finland. It should by all reasonable means avoid 
the impression that its territory could be used as a springboard of attack 
against St. Petersburg. In situations like this, constructivism may stress 
too much the contingent nature of foreign policy decisions as there may 
be little freedom of choice.
Yet, in Finland the ‘objective’ factors were in the late 1940s 
operationalized differently by the key political parties.  The conservatives 
(Kokoomus) were largely isolated and devoid of any signifi cant 
international connections. The Agrarian Union (Maalaisliitto) was also a 
very national party, but had some relations with other peasant parties in 
Nordic countries. The main aim of the party’s majority was to establish 
a close working relationship with the Soviet leadership and gain in that 
way ability to handle that relationship without any critical help from 
the communists. This special relationship was intended to provide the 
Agrarian Union with uncontested and pivotal position in the postwar 
12 B. Stöver, Der kalte Krieg. Geschichte eines radikalen Zeitalters 1947–1991. 
München: C.H. Beck 2007, 48–57.
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Finnish domestic policy. Most of the communists were blindly obedient 
to Moscow which supported them fi nancially but provided only limited 
political support in critical situations. The social democrats realized early 
on the need to adjust to the new political situation, but also started to 
revitalize old relations with the fellow Nordic parties, the British Labour 
Party, and even some unsavory forces across the Atlantic.13
It can be argued that in Finland there was a strong pressure from 1944 
to 1991 to create new identities on Soviet Union as a ‘friend’ and Finland 
as a ‘peaceloving nation’, that was gradually crystallized into political 
conventions, habits, and practices. The glue holding these new identities 
together was ‘trust’ which embodied Finland’s commitment to stay on 
course in ‘friendship policy’ vis-à-vis Moscow and not let any third 
parties to interfere in Finnish-Soviet relations. Finnish foreign policy 
was radically reframed in the new conditions of international politics. 
Underlying this conceptual game was, of course, the Soviet desire keep 
Finland fi rmly in its geopolitical orbit and eliminate any risk of Finland 
aligning with the West.
GERMANY IN FINLAND’S FOREIGN POLICY
The aim of this paper is to explore the validity of various explanations 
on the Finnish positions vis-à-vis the German question, focusing in 
particular on the Soviet factor in the matter. The emphasis on the 
international structural explanation leads to think that in the late 1940s 
the Soviet victory in the Second World War and disagreements among 
the Allies on the future position of Germany locks Finland in a political 
space in which it has only a very limited freedom of movement. The 
division of Germany in 1949 into two coherent, but only semi-sovereign 
states and the absence of an institutional postwar settlement in Europe, 
mean that Finland can hardly take independent political initiatives as 
long as tensions continue and it wants to retain even an appearance of 
13 For more detailed analyses of the foreign policies of main Finnish political 
parties, see K. Hokkanen, Kekkosen maalaisliitto 1950–1962. Maalaisliitto-
Keskustan historia 4. Helsinki: Otava 2002, 9–20; M. Majander, Pohjoismaa vai 
kansandemokratia. Sosiaalidemokraatit, kommunistit ja Suomen kansainvälinen 
asema 1944–1951. Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura 2004.
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neutrality in its foreign policy. The international Spielraum of Finnish 
foreign policy was very restricted indeed and contingency had little role 
in making decisions.
The structural position of Finland was also infl uenced by the evolving 
Western policy on postwar Germany on whose future position especially 
Britain and France had different views. The bone of contention concerned 
the conditions under which German economy and society should be 
rebuilt and integrated in the Atlantic system. This integration was needed 
as Central Europe could not be reconstructed without the economic 
revival of Germany, where  Stalin has expected a worsening economic 
situation and political revolt. Defeated and destroyed Germany became 
the pivot of Europe’s future.14
As is well known, the ultimate result of the political game in Central 
Europe was the incorporation of the three Western zones of occupation 
into the Federal Republic and the extension through NATO formal security 
guarantees to its European members, including since 1955 also the FRG. 
Thus, the choice made by the Western powers was to consolidate their 
zones of occupation into a single political entity, establish a military 
alliance involving security assurances, and accept the division of Europe 
with the resulting risk of Soviet counter-reactions. However, neither side 
wanted a new war and the division of Germany; in fact, Stalin probably 
never wanted, in the fi rst place, a sovereign GDR. Therefore the mutual 
‘acknowledgement of a stalemate was preferable to a continued escalation 
of demands that could lead to war’.15 The underlying interests in Soviet 
policy vis-à-vis Germany were revealed the proposals by Stalin in 1952 
and Beria in 1953 seeking potential solutions to the German problem 
with the Western powers.16
In the West, the grand bargain on the future role of Germany was made 
primarily by the United States, Great Britain, and France. In the West, 
there was a need to satisfy the French concerns that Germany will never 
again turn against it. Such an assurance could only be given by the United 
States which was, however, reluctant to become re-engaged in Europe in 
14 J. L. Gaddis, We Now Know. Rethinking Cold War History. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press 1997, 118–21.
15 R. B. Woods & H. Jones, Dawning of the Cold War. The United States’ Quest 
for Order. Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press 1991, 225–26.
16 Gaddis, We Now Know, 125–31.
Raimo Väyrynen
236
military terms. Indeed, after the demobilization in the immediate postwar 
years the military role of NATO in Europe remained on the ground weak. 
Before the outbreak of the Korean War, the promised US assistance to 
its allies was mainly political and aimed not only at the Soviet Union but 
also to allay the European fears concerning Germany.17
From the Finnish point of view, the developments in Europe had 
a dual meaning. On the one hand the Soviet Union received from the 
West an assurance that the German threat cannot rise on its own, outside 
the US control. On the other hand the exacerbation of political and 
military tensions of the Cold War meant that the FRG was increasingly 
perceived in Moscow as a part of the Western military planning and 
war economy. However, throughout the  Eisenhower administration, the 
United States did not exclude entirely the German reunifi cation from 
the political calculus. As we can see from the initiatives by  Stalin and 
 Beria, even the Soviets were toying with the idea of reunifi cation should 
the new Germany become a neutral and disarmed state on which they 
could exercise infl uence. In the FRG, especially among the Christian 
Democrats, the neutralization of Germany, even if it would become 
unifi ed, was considered a genuinely bad idea and the preference was 
clearly to become fi rmly rooted in European economic and security 
institutions.18
The Soviet Union consolidated its sphere of infl uence in Europe by 
bilateral security arrangements that Finland concluded in its own way in 
April 1948 in the form of Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual 
Assistance (FCMA). Finland was granted in the treaty the right to remain 
outside the confl icts of great powers; i.e., it could claim the right to 
neutrality, at least in the peacetime, but in reality the concept of neutrality 
remained politically contested. Until its abrogation by Finland in 1991, 
the treaty remained the ultimate guarantee for Moscow of Finland’s 
17 See T. P. Ireland, Creating an Entangling Alliance. The Origins of North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press 1981, 80–118, 
G. J. Ikenberry, After Victory. Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding 
of Order After Major Wars.  Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press 2001, 
191–99, and especially M. Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace. The Making of 
the European Settlement 1945–1963. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 
1999, 66–91.
18 M. Trachtenberg, History and Strategy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press 1991, 173–80. See also Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, 101–14.
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acquiescence in the postwar geopolitical imperatives and an operational 
tool for its political infl uence on Finnish foreign and occasionally also 
domestic policy.
The FCMA Treaty defi ned as the joint enemies of Finland and the 
Soviet Union ‘Germany and the states allied with it’, primarily of course 
the United States. As a result of this, the Soviet views on the German 
threat, whether real or perceived, mattered a lot for Finland in particular 
after 1955 when German rearmament as a NATO member was permitted. 
Likewise, the Soviet interpretation of the character of the relationship 
between Germany and the United States, and their military policies in 
Northern Europe, had pivotal infl uences on Finland’s position as well. 
While the Soviet Union, as a military great power, was able to construe 
its own view on the strategic environment and act subsequently on it, 
Finland had only very limited opportunities to do so. As a result, a kind 
of political-military duality developed in Finland: behind the curtains of 
offi cial policy, military planning tried to prepare also for contingencies 
that the foreign policy could not express publicly.
In reality, Helsinki was bound for a long time to manage the political 
sphere of the Finnish-Soviet relations on a bilateral basis. Any effort to 
multilateralize these relations was perceived by Moscow with suspicion. 
If there were any moves to embed Finland more fi rmly in international 
multilateral cooperation, Helsinki had to assure Moscow that they did not 
undermine the priority of bilateral Finnish-Soviet relations. There was 
the need to persuade the Soviet Union to accept Finland’s desire to join 
the Nordic Council and even the United Nations in 1955, not to speak of 
integration agreements with the EFTA and the EEC in the 1960s and the 
1970s. 
 Max Jakobson has suggested that  Paasikivi was in that regard different; 
that because of his historical memory and experience he considered more 
carefully than other policy-makers the impact of the changing external 
environment on the bilateral relations between Finland and the Soviet 
Union.19 May be so, but this observation should not be taken too far, 
however. Especially during his premiership and fi rst presidency in 1944–
1950,  Paasikivi was continuously worried about any adverse effects of 
closer relations with the Western powers, and even Nordic countries, 




that would give Moscow reasons to interfere in Finland’s internal affairs 
which he wanted to avoid by any means. In Paasikivi’s construction of 
politics, it was important to separate external limits on action imposed 
by the Soviet Union from its pressures on the domestic system in which 
democracy and the rule of law should prevail. For Paasikivi, these were 
the tenets of the Finnish political system that could be sacrifi ced to the 
altar of Finnish-Soviet relations.  
It is striking that there are in Paasikivi’s diaries in 1944–1956 
practically no references to Germany. This can be interpreted in at least 
two different ways; either the German issue was so sensitive that it could 
not be even mentioned or the defeated Germany in the early postwar years 
was largely a non-issue for Finland. The latter interpretation gains some 
credence from the remark on 1 March 1948 by General  Oscar Enckell, 
whom Paasikivi quotes approvingly, that the reference to Germany in 
the FCMA treaty was at that time no particular problem because as there 
was neither Germany as a sovereign state nor states allied with Germany. 
In the same vein, it has been said that the treaty was a mere formality as 
long as Germany remained weak and divided, but the situation might 
change, of course, in the future if the country became stronger.20
Stalin was obviously looking carefully to the future power relations in 
Europe. In that regard, the FCMA treaty was for Moscow a precautionary 
measure to deal with any future eventualities that subsequently started to 
materialize in the middle of the 1950s.  Aappo Kähönen puts this well by 
saying that ‘unlike during the prewar period, Finland could no longer be 
thought of as an active buffer but rather as a passive early warning zone’ 
(although for the West some of the buffer role remained).21 Ultimately, 
during the Cold War, Finland remained a zone of geopolitical abstention 
as after the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 no external power deployed any 
troops or arms on the Finnish territory (with the exception of Porkkala 
until 1956).
It is also symptomatic that in his diaries  Paasikivi pays practically no 
attention to the admission of Germany into NATO and the beginning of 
its rearmament. It was well known, of course, that the Soviet Union was 
20 J. Hanhimäki, Rinnaiseloa patoamassa. Yhdysvallat ja Paasikiven linja 1948–
1956. Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen Seura 1996, 39–40
21 A. Kähönen, The Soviet Union, Finland and the Cold War. The Finnish Card 
in the Soviet Foreign Policy, 1956–1959. Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden 
Seura, Bibliotheca Historica 103 2006, 46, 62.
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adamantly opposed to these decisions – as Paasikivi notes on 10 June 
1955 – but they were not regarded as a direct threat to Finland’s security 
probably because of the low perceived risk of a German attack at that 
time.22  
The reality was somewhat different as Moscow coupled in 1954 
political demands with the conclusion of the annual bilateral trade 
agreement. Finland was pressured to sign a communique that criticized 
heavily the efforts at German rearmament. For Finland, it was important 
to avoid being placed in the same position with the Soviet allies in openly 
criticizing Germany’s new position in Europe. In the end, Helsinki 
succeeded in redrafting the joint communiqué from the conclusion of 
trade talks in the manner that no reference was made to Germany. The 
Finns were also able to delete a negative reference to Germany in the 
communiqué issued on the occasion of the visit by Soviet Minister of 
Trade,  Anastas Mikoyan, to Finland in early December 1954.
As a general countermeasure to the German integration and 
rearmament in NATO, Moscow wanted to organize an all-European 
security conference. Finland was naturally one of the recipients of the 
Soviet note in November 1954 as it was sent to all states in Europe and 
North America. However, on both of these issues Finland was able, after 
complicated political maneuvers, to fi nd a compromise that watered down 
the Soviet demands. The Finnish government did not send a delegate, not 
even an observer, to the Moscow conference that ultimately resulted in 
the establishment of the Warsaw Pact.  
All this mitigated some of the US fears about the increase of Soviet 
infl uence in Finland. More signifi cant for the understanding is that the 
German membership in NATO does not seem to have been the main 
motivation for Moscow´s moves vis-à-vis Finland.23 
The Soviet preference for multilateral operations in 1954–55 may 
be traced to the ‘Geneva spirit’ that prevailed at that time in the great-
power relations. Yet, this did not prevent Moscow from waging a heavy 
22 See J. K. Paasikiven päiväkirjat 1944–1956 . Ensimmäinen osa 28.6.1944 
-24.4.1949. Edited by Yrjö Blomsted and Matti Klinge. Helsinki: WSOY 1985 
and J. K. Paasikiven päiväkirjat 1944–1956. Toinen osa 25.4.1949-10.4.1956. 
Helsinki: WSOY 1986. 
23 T. Polvinen, J. K. Paasikivi. Valtiomiehen elämäntyö 5, 1948–1956. Helsinki: 
WSOY 2003, 193–204.  See also Hokkanen, Kekkosen maalaisliitto, 306–307 
and J. Hanhimäki, Rinnakkaiseloa patoamassa, 137–39.
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propaganda war against the NATO membership and rearmament of the 
FRG. The campaign was obviously motivated by the rise of more vocal 
national political demands in the FRG on righting the ‘wrongs’ of the 
Second World War. Moscow became also worried in a more concrete 
manner about the changing strategic calculus in the Baltic Sea. In 
about 1957 it started to follow closely the evolving patterns of military 
cooperation between FRG and other NATO members. It became clear 
that the appeal to make the Baltic a ‘sea of peace’ – that in reality meant 
Soviet mare nostrum – did not produce any tangible results. Political 
and military tensions in the Baltic Sea started to rise.24 In the late 1950s 
and the early 1960s the Soviet Union had genuine reasons for concern, 
because of the Multilateral Force (MLF) nuclear-weapon plans that 
would have integrated the FRG in NATO’s nuclear command system. 
It can be concluded that in 1954–55 Finland was able act in a limited 
way as a political agency and the Soviet Union accepted the political 
reluctance of Finns to support its political initiatives. Of course, the 
ability of Finland to shape even its immediate international environment 
during the Cold War was constrained not only by the Soviet Union but 
also by the West. The Western infl uence was more indirect; Finnish key 
decision-makers dared to oppose some Soviet initiatives because they 
feared Western economic and political counter reactions. The negative 
Western response would have also undermined the emerging effort to 
defi ne Finland as a genuinely neutral country. 25
The political agency of Finland was increasingly connected with the 
person of  Urho Kekkonen who served, in addition to being several times 
prime minister, briefl y as the foreign minister during the 1954 episode. 
It has been amply documented that for  Kekkonen the German threat to 
peace and stability in Europe loomed large. He expressed repeatedly 
concerns about the negative impact of Germany’s economic and political 
revival on Nordic and Finnish security. Kekkonen had an animus, 
obtained originally perhaps during his year of study in Germany in the 
1930s, against the FRG which had in his mind still in the 1960s and the 
1970s embryonic neonazist tendencies. Even  Willy Brandt was regarded 
24 Hentilä, Kaksi Saksaa ja Suomi, 46–48 and Kähönen, The Soviet Union, 
Finland and the Cold War, 84–86.
25 J. Suomi, Kuningastie. Urho Kekkonen 1950–56. Helsinki: Otava 1990, 318–30 
and T. Polvinen, J. K. Paasikivi 5, 210–14. See also Hanhimäki, Rinnakkaiseloa 
patoamassa, 137–39, 145–47.
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by Kekkonen as a person who ‘speaks like a SS man’ which shows 
how strong his prejudices were in this area. True, Kekkonen twisted his 
arms with the GDR as well but his real worry was the FRG because it 
infl uenced in a more critical manner the Soviet policies in Europe.26   
This particular feature of Kekkonen’s mind can be explained, in 
addition to his personality traits, by international structural factors. West 
Germany was gaining in economic power and political infl uence which 
tilted the balance of power in favour of NATO. This development gave, 
in turn, to the Soviet Union grounds to be concerned and rectify the 
emerging imbalance in Europe. As we know from the history of the MLF, 
the Soviet Union was especially worried about the German fi nger on 
the button of a nuclear weapon to be launched from a submarine roving 
the Baltic Sea. In Finland, we may have underestimated the seriousness 
of threat perceptions that were fuelled in Moscow by the combination 
Wirtschaftswunder and the US plans to give to the FRG access to nuclear 
weapons (however indirect and collective this access might have been).  
Right after the Second World War, there was obviously a difference 
between Finland and the Soviet Union in the perception of the German 
threat. The Soviets were actively engaged in working on a political 
settlement in Central Europe to their own advantage, while the Finns 
were less concerned about the revival of the German military power and 
preferred to stay in the sidelines. This is evidenced by  Mannerheim’s 
proposal in January 1945 on the conclusion of a defensive military treaty 
between Finland and the Soviet Union and the subsequent political 
process. The draft prepared by Mannerheim about the limited joint 
defense arrangement between Finland and the Soviet Union spoke about 
the military aggression only in general terms and did not specifi cally 
mention Germany, or any other state, as the source of an attack.27  
By 1948, the situation had changed as the German issue had now 
assumed a central place on the European political agenda. The Soviet 
Union had already concluded mutual defense pacts with Hungary 
and Romania in which Germany had been identifi ed as the source of 
aggression. As we remember, these two treaties were portrayed in  Stalin’s 
26 Hentilä Kaksi Saksaa ja Suomi, 64–71.
27 Mannerheim’s draft has been published in J. K. Paasikiven päiväkirjat, 90–
93. See also T. Polvinen, J. K. Paasikivi. Valtiomiehen elämäntyö 4, 1944–1948. 
Helsinki: WSOY 1999, 35–40, 116–20.
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letter to  Paasikivi as the model for the agreement with Finland as well. 
In Finland, there was a strong resistance towards this type of agreement, 
but the criticism was based on the two-way defense commitment and 
not to the reference to Germany as the potential source of aggression. 
This reference was considered politically obvious and unavoidable. After 
all, Germany had started the Second World War and the task was now 
to prepare an arrangement to prevent such the repetition of such a risk, 
whether likely or not. The Finnish-Soviet negotiations were about the 
conditions of military cooperation if the German attack or the threat of it 
should materialize.28   
As we now know, the substance of the treaty bargaining concerned 
the defi nition of procedures in Finnish-Soviet relations to be followed in 
the case a new war would break out and the implications of this defi nition 
for Finland’s search of neutrality in peacetime.  For the Soviet Union, the 
FCMA Treaty had to bind Finland legally to its sphere of infl uence. It 
also served a preventive function as it could be used as an instrument to 
curtail Finland’s freedom of movement in the West, including ties with 
Germany.29
Apart from the international conditions and domestic security issues, 
the construction of Finland’s external relations vis-à-vis Germany was 
dictated primarily by two factors. First, the return of Finland’s sovereignty 
after the Paris Peace Treaty permitted Helsinki to start concluding 
relations with the defeated powers, though in some cases this happened 
short of full diplomatic relations. Second, the rapid growth of the German 
economy from the late 1940s on, created material incentives to expand 
trade, especially the import of investment goods to support Finland’s 
own economic reconstruction. The implementation of the economic and 
monetary union in the FRG and the investment in industrial production 
opened up for it opportunities to become a pacesetter in the economy 
recovery of Europe.30 Though there were continuing efforts to depoliticize 
28 This conclusion is supported by the detailed analyses of the FMCA Treaty 
negotiations seen from the perspective of the key players, see J. Suomi, 
Vonkamies.  Urho Kekkonen 1944–1950. Helsinki: Otava and  T. Polvinen, J. K. 
Paasikivi. Valtiomiehen elämäntyö 4. 
29 B. Petterson, Sovjetunionen och neutraliteten i Europa. Stockholm: 
Utrikespolitiska institutet 1989, 132–33.
30 B. Eichengreen, The European Economy since 1945. Coordinated Capitalism 
and Beyond. Princeton NJ.: Princeton University Press 2007, 70–73, 93–97.
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the Finnish-German trade relations, the old business contacts from the 
interwar years obviously helped to pave way for the rapid expansion of 
trade.
After the conclusion of fi rst trade agreements in 1947–48, Finland’s 
representation in Germany was established through the equal deployment 
of trade representatives in East and West (Berlin and Cologne, and after 
1952 in Bonn). The onset of the Cold War made it impossible to realize 
Finland’s original intention to establish one unifi ed trade representation 
for the entire Germany. From the very start, it became clear that the 
trade with the FRG was much more important in economic terms; by 
the 1950s, it accounted for over 10 per cent of all Finnish imports, while 
imports from the GDR varied between 1–2 per cent. Because of the 
asymmetry in the economic size of the countries and the composition 
of trade, Finland suffered from a defi cit in its trade with the FRG.31 This 
defi cit benefi ted Finland in several ways, as it supported its own drive of 
industrialization.
The formal division of Germany in 1949 meant that the management 
of trade relations necessarily obtained political undertones. This became 
visible in the efforts of the GDR to put pressure on Finland to recognize 
its full sovereignty. There were even efforts to make its diplomatic 
recognition a precondition for the ratifi cation of trade agreements and 
there were also threats to impose economic sanctions on Finland should 
it not consent. The issue of GDR’s diplomatic recognition seems to 
have come up for the fi rst time in May 1950 in the discussion between 
 Paasikivi and Foreign Minister  Åke Gartz. They agreed that, fearing 
critical reaction from the West, Finland should sign the trade agreement 
with GDR, but not go politically any further than that.32 This remained, 
of course, Finland’s offi cial policy until the early 1970s.
The reason for the GDR’s demands for diplomatic recognition was 
clearly that Finland, being under Soviet infl uence, was expected to 
behave differently from other Western countries. These countries had, 
in support of the  Hallstein doctrine by the FRG, taken a strong stance 
against the recognition of the GDR. However, an interesting thing is 
31 For statistics on Finnish-(West)German trade in 1856–1990, see Pekka 
Visuri & Tuomas Forsberg, Saksa ja Suomi. Pohjoismainen näkökulma Saksan 
kysymykseen. Helsinki: WSOY 1992, 327–330.
32 Paasikiven päiväkirjat 2, 113–114.
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that Moscow lent to East Berlin very little support in its political efforts 
to gain recognition, perhaps because of the concern that Berlin would 
gain too much international legitimacy and infl uence of its own. In the 
end, the GDR had to agree in 1953 with the establishment of a trade 
representation in Helsinki on an equal basis with the FRG. Even this can 
be considered for East Berlin a political victory, albeit a bitter one, as it did 
not have an equal political status with the FRG in any other non-socialist 
country.33 Moreover, it should be kept in mind that the twin policies of 
Nichtanerkennung and Gleichbehandlung, that were institutionalized in 
1953–54, also involved the end of the state of war between Finland and 
the German states.34
CONCLUSION
Usually, the evolution of the Finnish foreign policy in the aftermath 
of the Second World War has been explained solely by the outcome of 
the war that changed signifi cantly the interstate power relations and the 
geopolitical constellation in Europe. The Realpolitik perspective on the 
Finnish policy interprets its course as the inevitable adjustment to the 
‘new realities’ that shrank the policy space and restricted policy options 
available. Indeed, Realpolitik has much in its favor and the Finnish 
foreign policy in the immediate postwar years is diffi cult to understand 
without its insights 
Yet, this interpretation neglects much of the political construction 
of the Finnish-Soviet relations. It has been shown, for instance, beyond 
any doubt that the external constraints were utilized in Finnish domestic 
policy to denounce the political opponents in Moscow and collect thus 
points in one’s own political account. The fi rst two postwar decades in 
Finland provide ample evidence on how in the domestic political fi ghts 
between the mainstream social democrats on the one hand and the 
33 D. Putensen, Im Konfl iktfeld zwischen Ost und West. Finnland, der kalte Krieg 
und die deutsche Frage 1947–1973. Berlin; Arno Spitz GmbH 2000, 47–60; 
Hentilä, Kaksi Saksaa ja Suomi, 24–35; Hentilä, Harppi-Saksan haarukassa, 
29–34. See also Väänänen, Finlandia Bonn, 15–22 and  P. Visuri and T. Forsberg, 
Saksa ja Suomi, 231–235.
34 Putensen, Im Konfl iktfeld zwischen Ost und West, 60–66.
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communists and the  Kekkonen line in the Agrarian Union foreign policy 
was actively used to gain a relative advantage.35 However, even the 
domestic perspective has certain fl aws; in particular it leads easily to the 
excessive instrumentalization of politics. In addition to instruments, there 
are also cognitive structures and political claims whose consideration 
helps in the reconstruction of Finnish-Soviet relations.  
Finnish research on the role of Germany in the foreign policy of 
the country has made in recent years signifi cant progress. It is based 
on serious archival work and has probably been able to disclose most 
of the central political issues. One might say, of course, that the issue 
of Finland’s diplomatic recognition of the GDR, and its demands for 
Anerkennung, have perhaps become in some works a bit of an obsession 
that masks other relevant issues. No doubt, other aspects of Finnish-
German relations have been also covered by various scholars; including 
the impact of Berlin crises on Finnish security position and the politics 
of so-called German package by which Finland initiated the recognition 
of the two German states.  
The German package provides a paramount example of the 
instrumental uses of diplomatic moves as it was closely associated 
with both the Finnish initiative to organize a Cooperation and Security 
Conference in Europe (CSCE) and promote Finland’s own interpretation 
of neutrality.36 We have available memoirs by several diplomats who 
provide interesting insights in the bureaucratic politics of the Finnish 
foreign policy and the bargaining behavior of both German states.37 
Leaving aside the Finnish-Soviet crises of 1958 and 1961, it seems that 
the events associated in the German membership in NATO and Soviet 
initiatives to convene a European conference on collective security in 
Europe show that even during the Cold War Finland could operate as a 
partially free agent, and even with considerable success.
35 For more detailed accounts, see Hokkanen, Kekkosen Maalaisliitto and 
Majander, Pohjoismaa vai kansandemokratia?. 
36 Apunen, Paasikiven-Kekkosen linja;Hentilä, Kaksi Saksaa ja Suomi, 107–
197; T. Soikkanen. Presidentin ministeriö. Ulkoasiainhallinto ja ulkopolitiikan 
hoito Kekkosen kaudella. Hämeenlinna: Karisto 2003, 253–57 and R. Hyvärinen, 
Virkamiehiä, viekkautta ja vakoilua. Helsinki: Otava 2000, 103–122.
37 Väänänen, Finlandia Bonn; Gustafsson, Ritarikadun renki and R. Hyvärinen, 
Virkamiehiä, viekkautta ja vakoilua. Helsinki: Otava 2000.
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Yet, it seems that there is something lacking in the study of Germany’s 
direct and indirect role in Finland’s external relations. For instance, there 
may be more to be learned on the role of Finland during the Cold War in 
the military plans of NATO, including the United States and especially 
its key member states in Europe. The cognitive political structures in 
relation to the Soviet Union have been studied somewhat under the 
rubric of Finlandization but even on that issue there are practically no 
systematic and theoretically informed studies. There are even fewer 
studies on the political cognitive structures, and hence identities in 
Finnish-German relations.  Seppo Hentilä’s work maps very effectively 
the political culture of the relations by various Finnish constituencies 
towards the two German states and especially the GDR. This genre of 
research would probably benefi t from the application of social science 
perspectives to this subject matter.
In focusing on political cognitive structures both collective and 
individual perspectives matter. It would be interesting to know more 
on the political cognitions of the key Finnish political leaders about 
Germany in its own right and in the European context. It is striking 
how little  Paasikivi, who was a German-oriented monarchist during the 
Finnish independence process, says about Germany in his diaries and 
other published material in the post-Second World War years. It seems 
as if he is deliberately suppressing his thoughts, even private ones, in the 
new geopolitical situation.  
We know from diverse sources that  Kekkonen was obsessed with 
Germany, especially the FRG, which he considered the most serious 
threat to European security. Obviously Kekkonen was worried about the 
way in which German foreign and alliance policy would be perceived 
in Moscow and impacted on Finland. He seems to have been concerned 
about the GDR only if its policies received signifi cant backing from 
Moscow. This made sense as East Berlin made ever since the early 1950s 
and more actively again after the late 1960s repeated efforts to effect a 
change in Finland’s policy on the recognition issue.  Kekkonen’s critical 
views on the FRG and its individual politicians – including  Franz-Josef 
Strauss and even  Willy Brandt – can be somehow accounted by rational 
arguments. Yet, one cannot avoid the impression that Kekkonen’s own 
personal experiences in Germany and in Finnish politics in the 1930s 
had created a cognitive map that infl uenced his political views long 
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after.38 These cognitive perspectives motivated, in the context of Soviet-
dominated postwar years, claims and arguments that were used to adjust 
to new international power relations and obtain domestic political gains.
  
38 Hentilä, Kaksi Saksaa ja Suomi, 64–71 and I. Hägglöf, Kauppatorin päiväkirja. 
Helsinki: Otava 1990, 39, 185–86, 260.
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Finnish History Textbooks
in the Cold War 
 SIRKKA AHONEN
SCHOOLBOOKS AS PUBLIC HISTORY
History in school is not just a spin-off of academic history. History 
textbooks are not popularized residuals of research work, but a part 
of the public culture of history. People identify with the past of their 
community through encounters with cultural products like memorials, 
commemorative events and different artistic reenactments of history. 
School history and cultural representations compete in people’s minds. 
School history tends to be more uniform and assertive than cultural 
representations and academic history.
A society is concerned about how the past is mediated to young 
people. In textbooks, the society mediates the commonly acceptable 
representation of history.  The more conformist the society is, the more 
manipulative the history textbooks are. In totalitarian societies history 
education has a hegemonic status in the school curriculum, as a common 
story can justify a totalitarian regime. Democratic societies are less 
concerned about the mediation of a uniform story, but still expect history 
education to assure the people of its unity.
Countries with a diffi cult past differ from each other in their way to 
deal with their historical guilt or credit.  Ian Buruma in his Wages of Guilt 
(2002) offers the contrasting history cultures of Germany and Japan as an 
example. While the Germans, after a decade of denial and silence, made 
a massive attempt to face up to their Nazi past, the Japanese have kept 
defensively silent of the atrocities they are accused of having committed 
during the Second World War. A lack of openness and dialogue is very 
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likely to result in bitter history wars. Such a war was fought between 
Japan and China at the turn of the millennium. The school textbooks 
were the focus of the controversy. The Japanese authors were accused of 
hiding war crimes from young people because of the right of a nation to 
portray the past to the youth in her own way.1 
A loyal, biased treatment of national politics is often regarded as 
more acceptable for a small nation than for a big power, as a small nation 
is more often a victim than a perpetrator. The public, both at home and 
internationally, tends to allow a small nation to be defensive even about 
her dubious past. Thus, in Finland the political choices during the wartime 
in the early 1940s and in the Cold War were long presented as purely 
national self-defense, despite critical interpretations by researchers.
In the Cold War the loyalties of a small state constituted a moral 
problem. The Cold War was not always cold. The big powers, fi ghting 
for hegemony, committed oppressive and aggressive acts against some 
small states. Should other small states have spoken up and condemned 
such acts? In the case of Finland, did the offi cial policy of neutrality 
really not allow expressions of loyalty to countries in distress? Moreover, 
how far could a small country compromise its independence in regard to 
the wishes of a big neighbour? 
Such moral issues were faced by Finnish textbook authors during 
the Cold War. They had to decide what to write about the big powers, 
the US and the USSR, especially about the diffi cult parts of their past. 
In the case of the USSR, the authors had to consider the ways Soviet 
historians interpreted the Russo-Finnish confl icts. The choices of the 
textbook authors led to accusations of an opportune fi nlandisation of 
history education. The question of fi nlandisation is the key issue in the 
discussion of the Cold War on history textbooks.
The textbook authors were not left on their own. Throughout the Cold 
War, up to 1989, schoolbooks were submitted for an offi cial revision 
by the National Board of Education. The practice of revision had been 
started during Russian rule at the end of the 19th century, mainly to secure 
the quality and economic viability of school book production. After the 
political turmoil of the early 20th century political control was also 
practiced in the context of the revision. In the post-war situation in 1945, 
1 I. Buruma, The Wages of  Guilt: Memoirs of War in Germany and Japan. 
London: Phoenix 2002, passim.
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a requirement of political correctness was imposed on schoolbooks. The 
tradition of political control can be suggested as a partial explanation for 
the fi nlandisation of history textbooks in the 1970s. 
In the context of this article the Cold War period in Finland is 
regarded to have lasted from the signing of the Agreement of Friendship, 
Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union in 1948 up 
to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. The agreement of 1948, 
together with the Peace Treaty of the previous year, fi nally ended the 
precarious position of the provisional peace settlement of 1944. During 
1944–47 Finns’ actions were motivated by the fear of Soviet occupation. 
Since 1948 the choices of Finnish politicians may be seen to stem from 
actual Cold War speculations. 
This article focuses on two sensitive topics which serve as indicators 
of the infl uence of the Cold War on Finnish textbooks. First, on the 
contemporary politics of the rivaling big powers, the US and the USSR, 
and second, on the politics of Finland in the Second World War. 
PREVAILING NATIONAL ETHOS IN THE SCHOOL BOOKS OF THE 1950S
Writing a history textbook is a political act, as it means practicing 
public history and eventually contributing to the collective political 
consciousness. Finland from the mid-50s had declared herself offi cially 
neutral. However, in the practice of politics she had to decide from time to 
time where her loyalties lay. In the bi-polar Cold War, a textbook author 
had the options of being either western or eastern oriented or of resorting 
to an opportune neutrality through refraining from political standpoints. 
The tradition from the pre-war period was pro-West. Apart from 
being nationalistic and portraying the history of Finland as a long line of 
development towards an independent nation-state, the textbooks rejected 
any loyalty to the Soviet Union. The authors emphasized the position of 
Finland as a defense of the West. Russia, especially the Soviet Union, 
was portrayed as a barbaric society.2 
2 See quotations in: S. Ahonen and J. Rantala, ’History Education in ”The 
Second Republic” c. 1944-1950’, in Koulu ja menneisyys XXVIII, Suomen 
kouluhistoriallisen Seuran vuosikirja 1990, Helsinki 1990, 13. For a broader 
refl ection, see P. Rouhiainen, Taistelu historian kouluopetuksen sisällöstä Suo-
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After Finland’s defeat in the Continuation War a political cleansing 
of school books took place in 1945, as commanded by the Soviet-
dominated Allied Control Commission. The rhetoric of the textbooks was 
revised through removing anti-Russian and anti-Soviet expressions. The 
Russian October Revolution was no longer portrayed as a calamity. The 
Soviet policy towards Finland in 1940–41 was no longer called ruthless 
repression and paralleled to the acts of  Genghis Khan.3
Despite the prohibition of nine history textbooks and the change of 
rhetoric, the 1945 revision of textbooks was more cosmetic than substantive. 
The nationalistic view of Finland as a historically predetermined nation-
state was maintained. A true revision of the contents of the textbooks was 
left dependent on developments in the actual Cold War situation. 
Around 1950, a paradigm shift took place in the fi eld of academic 
history. The mainstream of historiography before the war had been 
nationalistic. Historians had bolstered the tenets of the young nation 
state through creating a story of a primordial national entity. The 
confl icts between the Finns and Russian had been dealt with partially, 
in favour of the Finns. In the new political situation of the lost war such 
an approach was not possible. Neither was it consistent with the current 
theories of history. The new approach was ‘objectivist’. Objectivity 
was strongly advocated by the historian  Pentti Renvall in his study of 
historical methodology in 1947.4 The book was eventually expanded into 
a standard textbook, used by students and scholars throughout the 1960s 
and 1970s.
The theory of historical objectivity was realized in the historiography 
of the 1950s and early 1960s, greatly prompted by international research. 
While the monumental wartime Handbook of Finnish history from 
1949, written by leading Finnish historians, still presented Finland as a 
justifi ed creditor of the past5, in 1957 an American historian,  C. Leonard 
men sortovuosista vuoden 1945 oppikirjauudistukseen. Unpublished licenciate 
thesis in political history, University of Helsinki 1979.
3 J. Rantala, Sopimaton lasten kasvattajaksi. Opettajiin kohdistuneet poliittiset 
puhdistuspyrkimykset Suomessa 1944–1948. Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen 
Seura, Bibliotheca Historica 26 1997, 65.
4 P. Renvall, Historiantutkimuksen työmenetelmät, Teoriaa käytäntöä, tavoitteita 
suomalaiseen ainekseen sovellettuina. Porvoo: WSOY 1947.
5 A. Korhonen (ed.), Suomen historian käsikirja, Jälkimmäinen osa. Helsinki: 
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Lundin, suggested that Finland was an aggressor in the Second World 
War in 1941.6 In the subsequent debate the patriotic Finnish historian 
 Arvi Korhonen constructed the theory of Finland as driftwood that was 
driven into the war by the force of big power politics.7 In any case, the 
old monoperspectival view of the historical truth was blurred. 
Prior to the historians, the novelist  Väinö Linna conveyed the new 
critical sense of history to the larger public through his novel Unknown 
Soldier (1954). Linna’s Finns fought the Continuation War with divided 
minds. Not everybody felt they were fulfi lling a national mission. The 
saga of a brave, united national war effort was substituted by a realistic 
view of history as alternative choices. 
In history education, a historian and school headmaster,  Martti 
Ruutu, appealed in the 1940s to history teachers for an objective and 
critical way of teaching. He rejected history as an advocate of enemy 
images and straightforward nationalistic education.8 His own textbook 
from 1951, The History of Finland, pursued impartiality in regard to the 
civil war of 1918 but was more patriotic than revisionist concerning the 
wars 1939–1945.
 The majority of history textbooks kept to the basically nationalistic 
interpretation of history throughout the 1950s. The rhetoric had changed 
towards politically neutral expressions, but the disposition of the books 
was built on the idea of a primordial Finnish nationhood. The persistence 
of the tradition was partly due to stagnation in the textbook market. The 
old textbooks from ‘the fi rst republic’ of the 1920s and 1930s, above all, 
the book by  Oskari Mantere and  Gunnar Sarva, came out year after year 
as new editions. Even though Mantere and Sarva were politically liberal 
civil servants, and their books had gone through the political revision 
of 1945, the basic ethos and disposition of the books refl ected the 
traditional view of Finland as a historically justifi ed nation. For example, 
WSOY 1949, passim.
6 C. L. Lundin, Finland in the Second World War. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1957.
7 A. Korhonen, Barbarossa-suunnitelma ja Suomen jatkosodan synty. Helsinki: 
WSOY 1961.




the Continuation War, one of the sensitive topics of political history, was 
portrayed as pure Russian aggression.9
Thus the conclusion can be drawn that the political caution, imposed 
on Finland in 1948 by the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation and 
Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union, did not as such lead to the 
self-censorship of fi nlandisation. The fi rst full decade of the Cold War 
still paid credit to the nationalistic tradition of history. Even if actual 
enemy images were no longer fostered, no truly new perspectives were 
opened to the crucial episodes and sensitive topics. Despite the rewriting 
of history by  Lundin and  Linna, the use of school history in the education 
of young people was considered justifi ed for maintaining the spirit of 
national dignity.
TEXTBOOK INVOLVEMENT IN THE COLD WAR 
The Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance 
imposed an obligation to build mutual trust between the Russians 
and the Finns. President  J. K. Paasikivi repeatedly urged all Finns to 
adopt  the  right attitude of building trust. He and his successor  Urho 
Kekkonen made ‘trust’ into an obligation. Trust was a prerequisite of 
confi dence building. Moreover, Kekkonen became famous for his public 
reinterpretations of history, especially of the Second World War. In his 
offi cial speeches to the Finnish people in the 1960s and 1970s he asked 
the Finns to acknowledge the Russian point of view on the recent past, 
especially regarding the events leading to the independence of Finland in 
1917. The content of school books became the focus of politicians and 
administrators by the end of the 1960s and throughout the 1970s.
Changes in textbook interpretations did not go unnoticed. In 1981 the 
journal Kanava published an article by an American educationist,  Larry 
Shaw, who asserted that Finnish history textbooks were ‘fi nlandised’. 
The term meant that the content of textbooks had been written to avoid 
offending the Soviet authorities and therefore adhered to the Soviet 
interpretation of history. Shaw presented the textbook authors as examples 
of Finnish self-censorship. The authors exercised caution because of the 
9 O. Mantere and G. Sarva, Keskikoulun Suomen historia. Helsinki: WSOY, 
411–418, 420–422.
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fear of critical response from Moscow. Shaw was especially interested in 
how the textbooks presented the two rivaling powers of the Cold War, the 
US and the USSR.10 The debate about the pro-Soviet bias of the textbooks 
mounted into a parliamentary inquiry.11
The accusation of fi nlandisation will be looked at here in the light of 
the textbooks of the 1970s. In the 1960s, despite the prevailing Cold War, 
only a few actually new textbooks were written, so any new approach to 
history education is not easy to discern. The texts of the 1960s pursued 
impartiality and neutral expressions but did not challenge the traditional 
view of national history.12
The introduction of a new school form, the comprehensive school, 
in the early 1970s was accompanied by a boom in textbook publishing. 
A totally new generation of textbooks emerged, mostly written by new 
authors. This article concentrates on the comprehensive school books of 
this decade. As schoolbooks are not spin-offs of academic research but 
rather representations of what a society, represented ultimately by the 
National Board of Education, wants to convey to the younger generation, 
the schoolbooks of the 1970s may be expected to refl ect the new political 
aspirations of the decade.
In the 1970s, after the American failure in Vietnam, the Soviet Union 
gained comparative credibility among many people, also in Finland. On 
the initiative of Soviet ideologues, a project of Finnish-Soviet school book 
revision was launched in 1973. The project commission convened on a 
regular basis and exchanged views on the sensitive topics of history. In 
10 L. J. Shaw, ’USA ja Neuvostoliitto suomalaisissa oppikirjoissa’, Kanava 3/1981. 
The article was based on Shaw´s empirical study ‘A Finnish view of American 
and Soviet History: A Textbook Analysis’, in Deutschland und der Norden in 
Schulbuch und Unterricht, Studien zur Internationalen Schulbuchforschung. 
Schriften reihe des Georg-Eckert-Instituts, Braunschweig 1980, Bd. 29, 71–106.
11 An offi cial inquiry by a member of Parliament, Juhani J. Kortesalmi, on the 
contents of history textbooks, presented to the Parliament 19 May 1981. The Diet 
of 1981, Documents, Written Inquiry No. 307.
12  See e.g.: T. Vierros, J. Paasivirta, and R. Riikonen, Maailma ennen ja nyt. 
Helsinki: Kirjayhtymä 1968. The book is critical about the position of the 
satellites states like Poland and Czechoslovakia under the command of Moscow, 
but equally critical of the US presence in Vietnam and the domestic race problem. 
S. Vehvilä and M. J. Castrén, Suomen historia. Helsinki: WSOY 1967. The books 
deny any political alliance between Finland and Germany in 1941.
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1975, the Soviet party suggested a revision of the origins of the Finnish-
Soviet Winter War of 1939–1940 by removing the Secret Protocol of 
the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939 from the textbooks. According 
to the Soviet argument the document was not acknowledged in Soviet 
historiography. The Finnish party, supported by the National Board of 
Education, refused such a concession. By means of archival testimony 
the Finns proved the existence of the document.13 The incident shows 
that the Finns were not too servile in their quest for harmonious relations 
with the big brother.
Apart from direct Soviet interference, a domestic Finnish initiative 
towards sovietisation developed in the 1970s. A Soviet-friendly student 
movement had spread to the upper secondary schools by 1970, and 
culminated in interference with the school curriculum by the national 
School Student Union. The Union monitored history classes in schools 
and reported the fi ndings in its journal. School-based radical study 
groups were established to advocate a positive interpretation of the 
Soviet Union and a respectively critical interpretation of recent American 
history in history teaching. On the other side, the anti-communist, pro-
West organization Suomalaisen Yhteiskunnan Tuki (The Buttress of the 
Finnish Society) organized study courses for young people in order to 
counteract the leftist manipulation of minds.14
The response by the textbook authors differed from one author group 
to another. The reviews received by the National Board of Education 
indicate that textbook authors quite often had adopted a politely pro-
Soviet approach, even if in some cases the opposite was also observed. 
The National Board adhered to the obligations of the Agreement of 
Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance.15
The most infamous example of Soviet infl uence on Finnish history 
schoolbooks is by the Pirkkala project. In the municipality of Pirkkala, 
under the auspices of the University of Tampere and The National 
13 J. Holmén, Den politiska läroboken: bilden av USA och Sovjetunionen i 
norska, svenska och fi nländska läroböcker under Kalla kriget. Uppsala: Acta 
Universitatis Upsaliensis 2006, 80. 
14 J. Vesikansa, ”Kommunismi uhkaa maatamme”. Kommunisminvastainen 
poervarillinen aktivismi ja järjestötoiminta Suomessa 1950–1968. Helsinki: 
Yliopistopaino 2004, 288–90, 297–99.
15 Idem, 77–79
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Board of Education, a draft for a history textbook for lower secondary 
school was produced with the purpose of providing a Marxist–Leninist 
interpretation of history from prehistory to the 20th century. The text was 
basically a translation of a Soviet textbook. In regard to the sensitive 
topics of the 20th century, such as the Finnish Civil War and the wars of 
1939–1944 the book offered a communist and pro-Soviet view.16
After a lively media discussion and a parliamentary inquiry17 the 
Pirkkala project was discontinued. However, it managed to raise critical 
popular interest in history education. The textbooks were no longer left 
to become fi nlandised in peace. Instead, both Left and Right were alert 
observers of what was written about the big powers and the sensitive 
topics of Finnish history. The National Board of Education rushed to 
give guidelines for political activity in schools. According to the Board, 
a student had the right to express her or his political opinion in the 
classroom, but a teacher did not have the right to political activity in 
school. The guideline was applicable to teaching materials.18
 Janne Holmén, in his study of the textbooks of the Cold War period, 
uses the following sensitive topics as indicators of a bias: people and 
society in the USSR, Soviet economy, prominent persons, democracy and 
dictatorship, Soviet aggression and the Cold War. On the basis of a textual 
analysis he draws the conclusion that the accusation of fi nlandisation was 
valid.19
Holmén also rejects some of the arguments used by Finnish textbook 
authors to defend themselves against  Larry Shaw´s critique of anti-
Americanism and pro-Sovietism in 1981. When the authors  Matti 
Castrén and  Sirkka Ahonen referred to the information the Soviet and 
American publications respectively provided of the recent developments 
in their countries,  Holmén rightly asks whether the authors should 
16 Idem, 81–83.
17 An offi cial inquiry by Kullervo Rainio and 36 other members of Parliament 
to the Secretary of Education 4 April 1975 about political agitation in history 
education in the comprehensive school. The Diet of 1975, Documents, Letter No. 
110; The Diet of 1975, The Protocol of the Plenary Session 13 May.1975, 1363.  
18 KH kirje n: 955/20.2.73; Ylitarkastaja Reino Laine KH:n tiedotuslehdessä 
3/74. Quoted in K. R. Lehtonen and V. Huttunen, Opettajan kirja, Peruskoulun 
historia 3. Helsinki: WSOY 1979, 4.
19 Holmén, Den politiska läroboken, 194.
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have used historical criticism instead of polite acceptance of biased 
information. Why agree with the self-criticism of American authors 
and the self-eulogies of the Soviet publications, when a source critique 
would have been necessary? On the other hand, Holmén himself based 
his overall judgment mainly on the reviews ordered by the National 
Board of Education, without asking from which political standpoints 
they were written. Nor did he ask whether the textbook authors were 
more interested in combating the traditional Russophobic attitudes of a 
major part of the Finnish population than in being servile guardians of 
political correctness.20
At the time, The National Board of Education was obliged to support 
the offi cial foreign politics of Finland and be polite towards the Soviet 
Union. President  Kekkonen kept a close watch on what was written 
about the Soviet Union in the media.21 Therefore both the National Board 
of Education and publishers expected a consistent political correctness 
in the textbooks. Moreover, in the process of textbook publishing the 
authors were restricted by the necessities of the market. An unquestioning 
acceptance of the recommendations by the Board speeded up publishing 
and bolstered competitive advantages in the schoolbook market. In order 
to balance the political constellation of an author team, the publishing 
company Werner Söderström invited a well-known radically leftist 
journalist to be a member of one author team.
The two main topics through which the writer of this article has 
chosen to study the infl uence of the Cold War on Finnish textbooks are: 
attitudes toward the two big powers, and interpretations of Finnish-
Soviet relations. Two textbooks have been chosen on the basis of the 
local knowledge of this writer, with the purpose of discovering various 
approaches to the topics mentioned. The author group of  Ahonen et. al. 
included an active social democrat, and the author group of  Lehtonen et. 
al. had an active member of the conservative National coalition. The rest 
of the group members were politically non-aligned.
20 S. Ahonen and M. J. Castrén, ’Pedagogista tykkivenepolitiikkaa’, Kanava 
4/1981. Also: S. Ahonen and M. J. Castrén, ‘A Study in Bias. Internationale 
Schulbuchforschung’, Zeitschrift des Georg-Eckert-Instituts für internationale 
Schulbuchforschung 1981/1, Heft 3, 239–243.
21 E. Salminen, Vaikeneva valtiomahti. Neuvostoliitto/Venäjä Suomen lehdistössä 
1968–1991. Helsinki: Edita 1996, 37–38.
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In regard to the fi rst aspect, namely attitudes toward the USSR and the 
US,  Ahonen et al. recognise the impressive technological achievements 
of the Soviet Union. The problems of the kolkhozes are not dealt with; 
the book is neutrally descriptive about the issue of the use of political 
power and silent about civil rights in the country.22  Lehtonen et. al. are 
even more positive about the technological and economic advances in 
the USSR, but point out in a critical tone  Stalin’s ruthless oppression of 
the political opposition.23
As to the United States, both books bring up successes in the conquest 
of space but point out the numerous social problems, above all the 
confl icts between races. Lehtonen et al. are more critical in their choice 
of items, presenting, for instance, the McCarthyism of the 1950s.24 In 
regard to the role of the two superpowers in the Cold War, Ahonen et 
al. stress the failure of the US in the Vietnam War and show pictures of 
anti-war demonstrations, but fail to account for USSR’s problems in the 
satellite states. For their part, Lehtonen et. al. are critical about the US 
containment policy against the USSR in Europe. 25
The relative similarity of the books in their approaches is likely to 
have resulted from self-censorship and the revision by the National 
Board of Education. Offi cial foreign policy was thus conveyed to the 
school classes through the offi cial revision system.
In regard to the sensitive topics of the origins of the Winter War 
and the Continuation War, both Ahonen et al. and Lehtonen et. al. 
approach the topics in multiperspectival terms. The security needs of the 
Soviet Union in 1939 are recognised, and the driftwood theory of the 
Continuation war is rejected. Finland is portrayed as an active seeker 
of Germany´s support.26 The schoolbooks fall into line with President 
 Kekkonen´s history lessons. In his speeches in 1973 and 1974 he had 
22 S. Ahonen, O. Kaakinen, Olavi, O. Lappalainen and S. Tiainen, Historian 
maailma 8. Helsinki: Otava 1979 91–99.
23 K. R. Lehtonen, V. Huttunen and O. Laine, Peruskoulun historia 4. Helsinki, 
WSOY 1974, 53–56.
24 Ahonen et al. Historian maailma, 103–109; Lehtonen et al., 59–70.
25 ibid.
26 Ahonen et al., 57–59, 64–-69. Lehtonen et al., 34, 39.
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pondered whether Finnish politicians contributed to the outbreak of the 
Winter War and, moreover, rejected the driftwood theory.27
As to the upper secondary school, the textbooks were as a rule 
inherited from the 1960s. Even if they were re-edited, they were not 
as infl uenced by the Cold War as the comprehensive schoolbooks. In 
addition to traditional meanings attributed to the sensitive topics, the 
upper secondary textbooks on the history of Finland maintained the 
traditional disposition of a grand national narrative. Their turn to change 
was to come in the 1980s.
POST- KEKKONEN ERA IN THE TEXTBOOKS
Throughout the 25 years of his presidency, Urho Kekkonen had been 
a guardian of Finnish-Russian mutual trust and confi dence. He had 
interpreted sensitive topics of Finnish history in his public speeches in 
a manner that was antagonistic to traditional patriotic views but often 
supported by contemporary research. Kekkonen´s successor,  Mauno 
Koivisto, took some steps back in the revision of history. After the 
glasnost in the Soviet Union, he chose to affi rm the Finnish self-image 
of a young righteous  David battling against a ruthless  Goliath in the 20th 
century Finnish-Russian confl icts.
A liberation of minds after Kekkonen’s departure in 1982 was 
noticeable in the reviews of new textbooks of the 1980s. The revision 
of textbooks by the National Board of Education was still obligatory. 
The expert teachers and historians invited by the Board to revise were 
more often than before critical towards the fi nlandised interpretations of 
both the civil war and the 1939–1945 wars. However, there were still 
some among the reviewers who emphasized the requirements of the old 
political correctness.28
Public discussion about the fi nlandisation of schoolbooks gained new 
momentum. The neutrality of history teaching had already been debated 
in 1974 in the context of the Pirkkala episode, and again in 1975, when 
the Finnish-Soviet textbook commission had dealt with the confl icting 
accounts of the outbreak of the Winter War, and once again when  Larry 
27 E. Salminen, Vaikeneva valtiomahti, 120. 
28 Holmén, Den politiska läroboken, 83–91.
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Shaw published his claim of fi nlandisation. The reviews of textbooks 
written by historians and expert teachers for the National Board of 
Education indicate that the criticism of fi nlandisation grew in the course 
of the 1980s. 
The Finnish upper secondary school curriculum was structurally 
changed through a curricular reform in the early 1980s. In the new 
curriculum, the history syllabus was broken into modules that would be 
studied as courses. The change prompted a wave of new textbooks for the 
upper secondary school. The new books refl ected the end of  Kekkonen´s 
era in history education. The requirement of political correctness in regard 
to the Soviet Union was relaxed. Patriotic tones reappeared. The Soviet 
Union was again attributed an aggressive role in both the outbreak of 
the Winter War and developments towards the Continuation War. More 
explicitly than before, the books recognized the ´Terijoki government´, 
an abortive attempt by the Soviet Union to defy the existence of the 
Finnish state in 1939, as well as the offences of the Soviet Union against 
the integrity of Finland after the Winter War in 1940–41.29
 However, the inclusion of Soviet views was not altogether rejected. 
The security needs of the Soviet Union in 1939, as well as the alignment 
of Finland with Germany in 1941, were presented in the books as 
historical facts.30 On the other hand, the authors did not shun a description 
of the dictatorial traits of Soviet rule.  Hannula et al. discussed without 
any hesitation  Stalin’s purges and personality cult.31 On the whole, the 
authors´minds were divided between the old political correctness and a 
post-Kekkonen relaxation. 
Despite an obvious tendency, prompted by  Larry Shaw in the early 
1980s, to rid Finnish history textbooks of fi nlandisation, no open 
discussion about the theme appeared in the history teachers´ journal Kleio 
or at teachers´ conferences in the course of the 1980s. The reason for the 
absence of a truly cathartic discussion might have been a residual self-
29 S. Ahonen, A. Heikkinen, T. Lindlöf, S. Rytkönen, and S. Tiainen, Lukion 
historia, kurssi 6. Helsinki: Kunnallispaino 1984, 114;  S. Hannula, A. Mäkelä, 
and R. Peltovuori, Muuttuva maailma. Nykyajan maailma. Lukion kurssi 5. 
Kuopio: Kustannuskiila Oy 1988.
30 ibid.; cf M. J. Castrén and V. Huttunen, Uuden lukion historia 3a, Kurssi 6. 
Nyky-Suomen perusta. Helsinki: WSOY 1983, 101–2, 215
31 Hannula et al. 121–2.
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censorship carried over from the 1970s, or a pragmatic desire to avoid 
embarrassment by not making professional problems public. 
TEXTBOOKS AFTER THE FALL OF THE SOVIET UNION
The Cold War was ended through a mutual agreement between the Soviet 
Union and the United States in 1990. When the Soviet Union collapsed 
in 1991, the tenets of the Cold War constellation ceased to exist. For 
Finland the change meant a cancellation of the Agreement of Friendship, 
Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with the related obligations of 
maintaining the rhetoric of mutual trust. Political correctness in regard 
to the history of Finnish-Russian relations was no longer a strict 
requirement.
In Finland, national self-confi dence had already been bolstered by 
the rehabilitation of the Winter War in the context of the 50th anniversary 
of the war in 1989. Two powerful war fi lms attracted masses of young 
people, and President  Koivisto through a key speech authorised the 
view of the War as a heroic national act. Finns were no more expected 
to align with the Soviet view of the history of the Winter War and the 
Continuation War.
Historians eventually tackled the phenomenon of the fi nlandisation. 
 Timo Vihavainen  sorted out the different levels and forms of self-cen-
sor ship,   Hannu Rautkallio and  Jukka Tarkka discredited the political 
lead ership of the 1970s and  Esko Salminen questioned the integrity of 
the media. Salminen included history education in his critique.32
The Finnish school system was in a dynamic state of change. The key 
idea was deregulation. The offi cial revision of textbooks was abolished in 
1989, whereafter the market forces alone controlled textbook publishing. 
The new constraints to the authors were constituted by the tastes of 
teachers, parents and the public. In 1994 the National Board of Education 
launched new framework curricula for the comprehensive and the upper 
secondary schools. The frame was broad and open. The schools were 
free to develop their individual syllabi and the pupils were free to make 
choices about their study programme.
32 Salminen, Vaikeneva valtiomahti, 164–5.
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In the new situation textbook authors could re-interpret history and 
present alternative views according to their knowledge and understanding. 
The boundaries were dictated by the tolerance of their clients. Would 
the teachers, parents and the general public accept deviations from the 
standard grand stories of the past, or from the rhetoric that had been 
established as politically correct in the previous decades?
The new wave of textbooks that resulted from the curriculum reform 
of 1994 was free of the ‘mutual trust and friendship’ rhetoric of the 
1970s. On the other hand, there was no drastic change of direction as was 
seen in e.g. Estonian history education after the country’s independence 
in 1991. While the Estonians changed ‘liberation’ to ‘occupation’ and 
rejected any Soviet perspective on the years 1944–199133, Finnish authors 
wrote of the Finnish-Soviet wars of 1939–1944 in terms of relative 
multiperspectivality. The rhetoric was no longer derived from the ‘mutual 
trust and friendship´ tautology, but the accounts of the actual events were 
far from being nationally biased. The origins of the Continuation War 
were treated even more critically than before in regard to Finnish politics, 
thanks to fresh new research results. The military alliance with Germany 
was now attributed to an active Finnish initiative.34 
However, in two issues the tone and interpretation changed. The 
interception victories by the Finns in the Winter War were presented 
proudly in detail. The other issue was the impeachment of Finland’s 
political leaders of 1941–44, urged by the Soviets in 1945. In post-1991 
history books the Finnish authors could forthrightly declare them not 
guilty and instead portray them as national heroes.35 
 In regard to the history of the US and the USSR in the 20th century, 
the new textbooks were equally critically of the Vietnam War and the 
ordeal of the satellite states in Eastern Europe. Despite their attempt to 
pursue a balanced presentation the authors of the 1970s ended up in being 
33 S. Ahonen, Clio Sans Uniform, The Post-Marxist Transformation of History 
Curricula in East Germany and Estonia, 1986–1991. Suomalaisen tiedeakatemian 
toimituksia B:264. Helsinki: Suomalainen tiedeakatemia 1992.
34 P. Arola, L. Hongisto and P. West, Kronos 4, Suomen historian murroskausia. 
Helsinki: Kirjayhtymä 1995, 85–9; E. Heikkonen, M. Ojakoski, and J. Väisänen, 





cautious about the satellite states. Now they discussed both Hungary in 
1956 and Czechoslovakia with a pro-small- state ethos.36  
Another expected change was a shift towards more pro-West attitudes. 
However, the anti-Americanism observed by  Larry Shaw did not vanish. 
From the perspective of the 1990sm the Vietnam War seemed as big a 
failure as it had before. Instead of pro-Americanism, Finnish authors 
invested in substantial information about the European Union. Finland 
joined the European Union in 1995, and the new curriculum for the 
upper secondary school from the same year incorporated a special course 
entitled ‘The Europeans’. The background and nature of the Union was 
also extensively explained in the books written for the ‘International 
Relations’ course.  The tone of the texts was positive, stressing the future 
opportunities of integration. In comparison, texts about post-1991 Russia 
were not silent about the economic, social and political problems of the 
country.37
CONCLUSION
History is a politically sensitive school subject. Finnish authors were not 
alone in tackling the problem of the choices of loyalty prompted by the 
Cold War.  Frances FitzGerald, in her classical study ‘America Revised’ 
(1980), shows that American authors were far from free to interpret 
history on purely scholarly premises.  Janne Holmén, in his comparative 
study of Nordic textbooks (2006), found that Norwegian and Swedish 
authors did not resort to an opportune impartiality in their dealings with 
the sensitive topics of the 20th century.
 In Finland, the end of the Cold War in 1990, together with the end 
of state control, led to changes in the history textbooks. The old rhetoric 
of Finnish-Soviet friendship gave way to the rhetoric of European 
integration. History was reinterpreted from a Finnish national point of 
view, highlighting the conclusion that the books published before 1990 
had been constrained by the pressures of the Cold War.  
36 Arola et. al., Kronos 3, 99, 109; A. Kohi, H. Palo, K. Päivärinta and V. Vihervä, 
Forum, Kansainväliset suhteet. Helsinki. Otava 2006, 109–110, 111.  
37 Kohi et al. Forum, 179; K.  Laitinen, J. Rinne and P. Suominen, Suomen tie 
Eurooppaan. Helsinki: WSOY, passim.
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The Cold War imposed a culture of self-censorship on the Finns. 
In history textbooks signs of opportune neutrality could be observed. 
When the options were Eastern orientation, Western orientation and 
an opportune neutrality, Finnish authors chose neutrality. The authors 
were cautious of being anti-Soviet. In order to nevertheless be impartial, 
they were relatively polite about the other big power, the United States, 
too. The sterile tone of the books tended to hinder a critical problem-
orientation in history education.
The main constraints of textbook writing were imposed by the offi cial 
control of the National Board of Education and the political sensitivity 
of history as a school subject. Politicians and even the public tended 
to react to a political bias in the textbooks. The alertness of people to 
biased lessons protected history education from becoming excessively 
manipulative even when the authorities might have wished partial 
political correctness. In the big debates about school history in the 
1970s, at the peak of the Cold War, the public rejected a Marxist-Leninist 
interpretation of history in the Pirkkala project and the attempt by the 
Finnish-Soviet Commission to harmonise Finnish and Soviet history 
books in regard to the origins of the Winter War.
The public debates about history education taught the textbook 
authors and publishers to resist the temptation to swing with the political 
trends. Unlike their Baltic colleagues, Finnish authors after the end of 
the Cold War refrained from a complete reversal in position. Instead they 
pursued multiperspectivality in their approach to history. The post-1991 
textbooks generally did not resort to a one-sided, Finnish national point 
of view regarding the sensitive topics of 20th century history. Neither did 
they forget to look critically at the new trend of Westernisation, and the 
inclusion of Finland in the European Union. The world of politics might 
turn upside down, but a textbook writer is obliged to hold a steady course 





of Finland and the KGB
 KIMMO RENTOLA
A major post-Cold War history debate in Finland has been over the role 
of President  Urho Kekkonen and his relations with the Soviet Union, in 
particular with the Soviet foreign intelligence. No surprise to anybody, 
variance of interpretations has been wide, fuelled by scarcity of sources 
on the most sensitive aspects, by the unavoidable ambiguity of an issue 
like the intelligence, and even by political leanings.1 As things stand now, 
even a preliminary assessment of available evidence – viewed from a 
distance – might prove useful.
The Soviet Union regularly tried to build back-channel contacts and 
confi dential informal links with the Western powers. On the Soviet side, 
these contacts were usually conducted by intelligence offi cers, as were 
those to  Robert Kennedy on the eve of the Cuban missile crisis,2 and to 
Chancellor  Willy Brandt during his new German Ostpolitik.3 By far the 
1 A good introduction to Finnish studies on Kekkonen in J. Lavery. ‘All of the 
President’s Historians: The Debate over Urho Kekkonen’, Scandinavian Studies 
75 (2003: 3). See also his The History of Finland. Westport: Greenwood Press 
2006, and the analysis of D. Kirby, A Concise History of Finland. Cambridge 
University Press 2006.
2 An account by G. Bolshakov, ‘The Hot Line’, in New Times (Moscow), 1989, 
nos. 4-6; C. Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and 
American Presidency from Washington to Bush. London: HarperCollins 1995, 
278–80. The best known exception is the back channel to Kissinger, which was 
not conducted by an intelligence offi cer, but by Ambassador Dobrynin.
3 W. Keworkow, Der geheime Kanal. Berlin: Rowohlt 1995.
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longest relationship of this kind was established with Kekkonen, whose 
contacts were keenly cultivated by both sides from 1944 right up to his 
resignation in 1981.
On Kekkonen’s relationship with the KGB there is only a thin 
sample of Soviet documents, complemented by memoirs, the most 
informative of which are by the long-time Helsinki rezident  Viktor 
Vladimirov, published only in Finnish.4 The Finnish documentation is 
more extensive now after President Kekkonen’s diaries were published 
in four volumes.5 Kekkonen recorded his hundreds of conversations with 
KGB representatives; at fi rst shyly, calling his interlocutors a “Mr. X” or 
a “Mr. Zh.”, but then unblushingly by their real names. The diaries were 
not written for later publication, but for working purposes, to remember 
who said what and when. Thus the main defect of the entries is brevity, 
abridgment to barest essentials. During his numerous visits to the Soviet 
Union, Kekkonen did not produce any entries; he was not so stupid as to 
take a diary along.6
FINLAND AS A TARGET
According to a Soviet intelligence offi cer, Finland was a kind of great 
power as far as intelligence was concerned.7 Finland became a major 
intelligence target for the Soviets right after the Winter War (1939–
40), because  Stalin’s decision to attack Finland as well as the one to 
4 V. Vladimirov, Näin se oli… Helsinki: Otava 1993. Memoirs by other high KGB 
offi cers (A. Akulov, F. Karasev, E. Sinitsyn) are much more tight-lipped and their 
quality is lower. Only the posthumous (and confused) memoirs of Sinitsyn have 
also been published in Russian.
5 Urho Kekkosen päiväkirjat, ed. by J. Suomi, vols. 1-4. Helsinki: Otava 2001–
04. The diaries cover the period from 1958 to 1981. The Finnish security police 
archives are a fi rst-rate source for other politicians’ contacts with the KGB. 
However, the security police considered it prudent not to produce written reports 
on the President’s contacts, despite the fact that they were noticed.
6 On some short trips, there are entries, probably written after returning home.
7 This was said to the author by Albert Akulov, who was a prominent KGB 
political line offi cer in Helsinki. Of course, it is an exaggeration, but not totally 
baseless.
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make peace had been based on fatally faulty intelligence,8 and he was 
determined never again to repeat the catastrophe. By mid-1940, the 
number of Soviet intelligence offi cers in Finland was second only to that 
in the United States; even Germany hosted fewer.9 By May 1941, NKGB 
resident  Elisei Sinitsyn was able to procure fi rst-rate information from 
government sources, including the fact of the imminent German attack 
and the Finnish participation in it.10
As soon as peace was again in sight, the Soviets focused on high-level 
political contacts. In February 1944 in Stockholm, Soviet intelligence 
established contact with  Eero A. Wuori, the head of the Finnish trade 
unions, who described the basic anti-Nazi stance of Marshal Mannerheim 
to a charming female journalist, who happened to be working for Soviet 
intelligence.11 After the armistice in September 1944, this effort was 
revived in Helsinki by Sinitsyn, who again showed up, now as a political 
counsellor in the Soviet Control Commission. Among the fi rst to call was 
Urho Kekkonen, 44, a fast rising Agrarian politician.12 
8 K. Rentola, “Sovjetisk etteretning og Stalins beslutning om krig og fred 
med Finland, 1939-1940”, in Motstrøms: Olav Riste og norsk internasjonal 
historieskrivning, ed. by S. Holtsmark, H. Pharo & R. Tamnes. Oslo: Cappelen 
2003, 188–17. The article is based on NKVD foreign intelligence documents. 
For Stalin admitting the failure in the April 1940 post mortem session, see A. O. 
Chubaryan & H. Shukman (eds.), Stalin and the Soviet-Finnish War 1939–1940. 
London: Cass 2002, 196.
9 Introduction by O. I. Nazhestkin in Ocherki istorii rossiiskoi vneshnei razvedki, 
vol. 3 (1933–1941), ed. by E. M. Primakov et al. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye 
otnosheniya 1997, 17–8, quoting a report by the head of foreign intelligence P. 
M. Fitin. In the US, there were 18 offi cers, in Finland 17, in Germany 13.
10 NKGB reports from Helsinki, 4 Jun 1941; 10 Jun 1941; 13 Jun 1941, in Sekrety 
Gitlera na stole u Stalina: Razvedka i kontrrazvedka o podgotovke germanskoi 
aggressii protiv SSSR. Mart-ijun’ 1941 g. Dokumenty iz Tsentralnogo arkhiva 
FSB Rossii, ed. by V. K. Vinogradov et al. Moscow 1995, 140, 151–3, 157.
11 Venona decrypts, Razin to Fitin, Feb 1944. Wuori was mentioned as ‘Tsilindr’ 
in these telegrams. On the female agent ‘Klara’ (Gusti Stridsberg), see W. Agrell, 
Venona: Spåren från ett underrättelsekrig. Stockholm: Historiska Media 2003, 
302–28.
12 In 1943–44, Kekkonen developed a contact with the American intelligence in 
Stockholm (Vilho Tikander of OSS), but he does not seem to have had contacts 
with the Soviets (or the British) before the armistice.
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Since Finland avoided occupation, instead of directly imposing 
their will, the Soviets had to fi nd ways of infl uencing those in power 
in Helsinki. As for the Finns, they remained in the Soviet sphere of 
interests, a fact acknowledged by the Western allies, and the leaders of 
the country had to adapt to this. As usual in rapidly changing situations, 
fi rst something is done, and the theory justifying the action would be 
formulated only afterwards. As for the Agrarian contacts with the Soviet 
intelligence,  Kaarlo Hillilä (Minister of the Interior, 1944 to 1945) wrote 
later that it was vital to prevent the strong Finnish Communist Party from 
having exclusive access to the Soviets. It was necessary to deal directly 
with the Soviets on as high a level as possible, so the Communists could 
not ‘fake out Russian support even when that did not exist at the moment, 
and so obtain positions otherwise out of reach for them.’13
 Stalin never believed what was said to him above the table; he wanted 
to know what the other side was really up to. The Finns adapted to this. 
Even old President  Paasikivi understood the necessity of confi dential 
contacts, but would not deal personally with intelligence offi cers, 
not wanting to touch ‘an ugly fi sh’, as he said.14 Instead, he relied 
on middlemen and messengers, various left wing social democratic 
politicians,15 and Kekkonen.
Kekkonen was qualifi ed for this. In the 1920s, he had served as an 
offi cer in the Finnish security police, and then prepared his doctor of law 
dissertation on agent provocateur, a police agent inside revolutionary 
ranks. On his study trips to Vienna and to Berlin he discovered that the 
learned doctors in the security police of these countries ‘did not even 
know as much as I know’, as he complained to his wife.16 He saw 
Moscow for the fi rst time as a counter intelligence offi cer, checking out 
13 National Archives of Finland (KA), Paasikivi papers V: 35, Memorandum by 
Kaarlo Hillilä, 31 Oct. 1950, attached in Kekkonen to Paasikivi, 11 Dec 1950.
14 Paasikivi’s diary, 15 Jun. 1946, J.K. Paasikiven päiväkirjat 1945–1956, vols. 
1-2, ed. by Y. Blomstedt & M. Klinge. Helsinki: WSOY 1985–86.
15 The most important ones were Mauno Pekkala (prime minister, 1946–48), 
Reinhold Svento (2nd Foreign Minister) and Eero A. Wuori (chairman of the trade 
unions, then minister, in 1945 ambassador to London). In Sinitsyn’s memoirs, 
they are mentioned under code names, and can be identifi ed on the basis of 
Paasikivi’s diary entries on their discussions with the Soviets.
16 Kekkonen to his wife Sylvi, 25 Jun. 1928. Kekkonen dropped this theme and 
wrote his dissertation on local elections law.
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listening devices and security lapses in the Finnish mission. Although 
his second visit in 1945 was in a friendship delegation, even then the 
attendant Soviet lady watcher suspected that the Finnish Minister of 
Justice, Mr. Kekkonen, was a spy. He was so curious, always asking 
pertinent questions and very sensitive ones at that; at the kolkhoz he 
wanted to know which of the men had fought on the Finnish front and 
how many had fallen, and then he wanted to see the house of the poorest 
kolkhoznik. On top of it all, he was capable of assessing the exact amount 
of spectators in a football match in Moscow.17 
Despite his background, Kekkonen did not immediately grasp every 
peculiarity of his new friends, as can be seen from the letter in which he 
described to his wife how  Sinitsyn in June 1945 transferred him to his 
successor,  V. F. Razin. 
Elisei is leaving for good; last Friday the Finnish-Soviet Friendship 
Society threw a farewell dinner for him. There, he asked me to 
dinner on Sunday. I believed a good many people would attend, 
but there were only him, the newly arrived Razin, and me. When 
the restaurant ran short of brandy, we came to our home, where I 
invited [ Kustaa Vilkuna], and he brought along [a female artist] 
and we had a cozy night. Razin speaks good German. I think that 
through Razin I can take care of my business.18
This was a routine transfer meeting of a Soviet intelligence contact, a 
pattern Kekkonen did not fully understand at that time. But the full nature 
of these new contacts was not easy to grasp for Razin either. A seasoned 
intelligence offi cer, he tried to run agents according to offi cial rules, and 
(if we can believe Sinitsyn’s memoirs) at his fi rst meeting with Kustaa 
Vilkuna, he thrust him a brown envelope stuffed with money. Sinitsyn 
had to go to great pains to explain the ‘misuderstanding’ to an offended 
Vilkuna, who was an academic scholar and a personal intelligence hand 
for Kekkonen. And when Kekkonen put out serious political feelers as if 
joking, as he always did with the Russians (‘l’ll probably take over the 
17 Russian Foreign Policy Archives (AVP RF), fond  012, opis 6, papka 85, 
delo 273, ll. 11-13v, Report by T.Yu. Solovieva, offi cial of the Soviet society for 
cultural contacts (VOKS), 12 Oct. 1945. Kekkonen was a sports union leader, so 
the number of spectators was routine for him.
18 Kekkonen to his wife Sylvi, 19 Jun. 1945.
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Ministry of Interior in the next government’),  Razin was not at all on the 
same wave length, but responded according to the offi cial line only: ‘The 
man there should enjoy the trust of the working class’ etc.19
During Razin’s tenure, 1945 to 1947, Moscow hoped that Finland 
would also follow the path to a people’s democracy. Accordingly, their 
intelligence activities concentrated on the communist control of the 
security police (Valpo). When it turned out that Finland had a path of 
its own, the signifi cance of confi dential contacts with non-communist 
politicians rose again, and a pure national force like Kekkonen’s party, 
the Agrarians, was much less suspected by the Soviets than the social 
democrats, who were connected to an international movement.
THE NATURE OF THE BACK CHANNEL
Some characteristics of this relationship became evident early on. 
First, the backdoor channel was useful in vital issues, as the Mutual 
Assistance Treaty of 1948. Before and during the negotiations, Kekkonen 
was in touch with  Mikhail Kotov and others, explaining the utter limit the 
Finns could accept, and painting in dark colours the threat of anti-Soviet 
forces coming into power in Helsinki if these reasonable needs would 
not be met by the Soviets. This and the information obtained from other 
sources (in particular, the Finnish generals’ opinion that in a possible 
world war Finland would need to take the Soviet side20) made it possible 
for Stalin to accept a lesser treaty than the Hungarian and Rumanian ones 
he fi rst set as models. From the Finnish point of view, the most important 
feature of the channel was where it led to: right to the top in the Kremlin, 
and with reasonable speed. This function was underlined by the fact that 
19 Paasikivi’s diary, 14 Feb. 1947.
20 The information on generals’ opinions was delivered by the Minister of 
Interior Yrjö Leino (a communist) or by Finland’s ambassador to Moscow, Cay 
Sundström. Kekkonen was careful not to divulge military secrets. In 1954, when 
the KGB needed to know what the Finns would do in case of a Soviet attack on 
northern Norway in a major war, Kekkonen did not say anything himself, but his 
close female friend said to the KGB that Finland would not put up any resistance 
in such case. AVP RF, fond 0135, opis 38 (papka 204), d. 6, pp. 177–8, Memo 
of a conversation between Anne-Marie Snellman and Yu. V. Bakey, on 6 and 7 
May 1954.
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discussions between state leaders were usually interpreted by the KGB 
Helsinki resident and not by professional interpreters.
The 1948 pattern was to repeat itself in every major treaty concerning 
the position of Finland. In particular, when Finland negotiated its Western 
economic integration treaties, fi rst with the EFTA and later with the EEC, 
the Soviet ‘yes’ was obtained through patient background discussions 
with the KGB representatives. In issues like these, the KGB tended 
to ignore other Soviet interests not vital from their particular point of 
view, so that an ambassador complained in his memoirs how the foreign 
ministry often prepared complicated negotiation strategies only to fi nd 
out that the Finns had already agreed the main issue secretly through the 
KGB, thereby getting benefi ts they would never have been able to pull 
from diplomatic or foreign trade bureaucracies.21
Second, the back channel tended to reduce communist infl uence in 
Finnish political life. The Communist Party, with a fi fth of the popular 
vote, was a formidable force, and one of Kekkonen’s main preoccupations 
in his dealings with the Soviets was to use the contact to domesticate 
the communists.22 In 1954, for instance, the Soviets compelled Finnish 
communists to drop their resistance to military appropriations in the 
Finnish budget.23
Third, it is not simple to establish, which side dominated. The Soviet 
Union was a superpower, Finland a small neighbour, and the KGB 
offi cers were trained to see their contacts as agents and as objects or 
instruments in their operations. But there was more to it than that. In 
1944, Kekkonen and  Vilkuna were in their mid-40s, 10 to 15 years older 
than  Sinitsyn and  Kotov, and with experience in counter-intelligence, 
government, and academic life. Finland was their home turf and the 
contact language was Finnish. According to Sinitsyn’s memoirs, his 
meetings with Vilkuna always commenced with alternating Kalevala 
verses: the folklore professor tortured a Smolensk country boy. Every 
21 J. Derjabin, Omalla nimellä. Helsinki: Otava 1997.
22 This was noted and complained by the Foreign Ministry in Moscow: 
‘Kekkonen often uses his contacts with Soviet representatives for various 
political manoeuvres.’ AVP RF, f. 0135, op. 38 (papka 204), d. 8, pp. 16-27, ‘K 
obstanovke v Finlyandii’, 24 Jun. 1954, a memo prepared by A. Aleksandrov and 
I. Marchuk, signed by section chief G. F. Pushkin.
23 Details in K. Rentola, Niin kylmää että polttaa: Kommunistit, Kekkonen ja 
Kreml 1947–1958. Helsinki: Otava 1997.
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issue at hand always received full attention from the Finns, who knew all 
details, but the Soviet leaders in Moscow could devote only a fraction of 
their attention to Finland, and they mainly wanted to hear that everything 
was proceeding as it should. In case of confl icts, the KGB in Helsinki 
sometimes had incentives to smooth out chukhna peculiarities24, because 
in case of escalation, they would have to answer to embarrassing questions 
about their earlier reports. Of course, there were limits to this. With time 
passing and experience accumulating, the roles were reversed, not with 
Kekkonen so much as with the next generation, such as when  Kotov in 
the 1970s dealt with ambitious politicians thirty years his junior, like 
 Paavo Väyrynen.
Finally, the perennial question: what is in it for me? In addition to 
high-level issues, the KGB always tried to collect small commissions, 
their pounds of fl esh, loose change, as it was described by Kissinger. 
Even from  Khomeini in 1979, the Moscow headquarters wanted 
something specifi c, a gesture.25 An introduction, a juicy piece of news, 
prevention of something to be published (or leak of another item), and 
most desired of all, a person wanted by Soviet security.26 In April 1950, 
when Kekkonen was appointed prime minister for the fi rst time, his 
government decided to hand over two Estonian anti-Soviet guerrillas, 
who eight months earlier had succeeded in escaping to Finland. One was 
actually delivered.27 Probably with this in mind, the following summer 
Kekkonen told the Agrarian party congress: ‘I am affected neither by 
24 ‘Chukhna’ is a pejorative Russian word for a Finn, in particular in the St. 
Petersburg area. Mikoyan had a fi ne collection of chukhna jokes he said he fi rst 
heard from Sergei Kirov.
25 V. Kuzichkin, Inside the KGB: Myth and Reality. London: André Deutsch 
1990, 271.
26 ‘Whatever is given to the KGB must be done secretly, deeply, and with 
very strong precautions’, explained ‘General Marov’ to writer Norman Mailer;
see his Oswald’s Tale: An American Mystery. New York: Random House 1995, 
405.
27 This man, Artur Löoke, was condemned to death in Tallinn, as can be seen 
in the Estonian KGB archives. The other one, Herman Treial, was too sick to 
transfer; an unsuccessful escape attempt made him an international celebrity 
and drew e.g. Eleanor Roosevelt’s appeal, but soon after he died in a Helsinki 
hospital. The documents in the case fi le (12 L Treial & Löoke) in the Foreign 
Ministry Archives and personal fi le no. 11461 in the Security Police Archives.
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hate nor by love, when what is at stake is political action for the best of 
the country.’28 In February 1956, fi ve days before the electoral council 
was to vote on the next President of the Republic, the Kekkonen camp 
and the KGB busy making deals, an illegal Soviet intelligence offi cer 
who had sat in a Finnish prison almost two years was suddenly pardoned 
and ejected over the eastern border.29 Of course, there is no conclusive 
proof of a connection between this pardon and the presidential deals.
Kekkonen’s special slice was career promotion. The main prize 
was reaped in the 1956 presidential elections. To stop any anti-Soviet 
candidate, the Soviets fi rst wanted President  J. K. Paasikivi to continue, 
despite his advanced age (85 years); this was the offi cial Soviet line as 
late as fi ve days before the crucial electors’ meeting.30 Then, however, 
Kekkonen and  Vilkuna sold their KGB contacts ( Kotov and  Vladimirov) 
the idea that Kekkonen could also obtain a majority if the communists 
were given detailed orders on how to use their votes and if some additional 
measures were taken.  Khrushchev, who liked risky ventures, gave his nod 
on a dramatic day, when he delivered his secret speech to the 20th CPSU 
Congress. So, the Soviets abandoned Paasikivi, the communists were 
given orders (the party leaders needed to be shown the actual Moscow 
cipher telegram to turn their heads), and Kekkonen was elected by the 
closest margin possible.31 Had it failed, the two KGB offi cers would 
28 That remained his credo: ‘I do not feel any feelings in this offi ce.’ Kekkonen’s 
diary 19 Dec 1963.
29 His name was K. A. F. Holmström, by birth a Swede; he had been watching 
northern Norwegian defence facilities. The pardon was signed by the Police 
Superintendent (an Agrarian close to Kekkonen) during a leave of the social 
democratic Minister of Interior. The decision came as a surprise to the security 
police, who were planning to let the man slip into Sweden. Documents in his 
personal fi le no. 11524, Archives of the Security Police of Finland.
30 A memorandum for the Moscow top leadership on the presidential elections 
in Finland, 10 Feb. 1956, by Ivan Tugarinov, deputy chief, KI pri MID, AVP 
RF, f. 0135, op. 40, papka 215, d. 34, ll. 6-13.  The ‘small KI’, a rump from 
the intelligence conglomerate KI, remained in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
as an analytical centre. See V. Zubok, ‘Soviet Intelligence and the Cold War: 
The “Small” Committee of Information, 1952–53’, Diplomatic History, vol. 19 
(1995: 3).
31 A synthesis by T. Polvinen in his J.K. Paasikivi: Valtiomiehen elämäntyö 5, 
1948–1956. Helsinki: WSOY 2003.
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have found themselves far away, but as winners they were fast on their 
way towards the rank of general. In 1957, at 41,  Kotov was promoted to 
deputy chief of foreign intelligence in charge of western Europe.32
PRESIDENT AND REZIDENT
A contradictory situation developed after 1956. On one hand, Kekkonen 
was a pro-Soviet politician with close contacts to the KGB, and these 
were continued. In 1958, he recorded eleven private discussions with 
the KGB rezident, and in addition there were phone calls, meetings with 
others present, and the rezident’s private meetings with Kekkonen’s 
closest allies. On the other hand, he was now the head of a state which 
had agencies that practised counter intelligence operations against the 
very same KGB. Tracking a high KGB offi cer, Finnish security police 
offi cials sometimes saw that the Finn the chekist was going to meet was 
the President of the Republic himself.33
The KGB tried to fi nd ways to use this to their advantage. Immediately 
after the 1956 elections,  Vilkuna travelled to Moscow to meet a senior 
Soviet foreign intelligence offi cial. ‘The guy’ wanted something in return 
for KGB support: the Finnish Ministry of Interior should be taken over 
by the Agrarian party, ‘to secure the security police and its surroundings 
keep appropriately to the right line instead of the present bias. Otherwise 
not possible to sleep in peace. [This is] no interference in Finnish internal 
affairs, but the actions of the other side [the West] must also be under 
decent control.’34 
‘The guy’ asked for a lot. Kekkonen was able to deliver only after 
the further shock of the ‘Night frost’ crisis of 1958.35 After that, the 
32 Reports signed by him in the appendix in Ocherki istorii rossiiskoi vneshnei raz-
vedki, vol. 5, 1945–1965. Moskva: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya 2003, 690–97.
33 To avoid attention, Kekkonen sometimes met the KGB resident in the house 
of his son or elsewhere.
34 Kekkonen Archives, 1/25, Vilkuna to Kekkonen, 25 Feb. 1956. ’The guy’ 
was higher than the KGB men in Finland, possibly A. M. Sakharovski, who was 
responsible for Scandinavia and was promoted foreign intelligence chief in May 
1956. 
35 Preparing for that crisis, the KGB (Vladimirov) made a harsh attack against 
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Ministry of the Interior was headed by Agrarians for eight years36, and 
the security police controlled by the president. But this did not mean 
cessation of Finnish counter-intelligence activities. The change consisted 
of the fact that from that point on, everything was done quietly, in the 
dark. Emphasis was put on preventive action; espionage cases37 were 
usually not brought to court, double agents were no longer used to trap or 
provoke the KGB,38 no KGB diplomat was declared persona non grata. 
Many were quietly asked to leave, sometimes by the president himself, 
when he was seeing his good friend, the local KGB chief. When the 
president met the resident, between smiles and assertions of trust, crude 
raw truths were said, as if joking, and somewhere in the shadows their 
subordinates quietly clashed, and both knew that this was the case. The 
most famous non grata case was that of a high-level political line offi cer, 
 Albert Akulov, who was asked to leave in 1973, when he not only tried 
to recruit Finns, but also spied on the Japanese embassy. Reportedly, 
Kekkonen said that this man would not be seen in Finland as long as he 
was the President of the Republic. The Soviets took this literally.
Kekkonen knew which agency his Soviet friends served; he wanted 
the guys sitting as close to the Devil’s right hand as possible. But he was 
kept in the dark about the full extent of the activities of his friends. He did 
not ask, not liking being lied to.39 His best contact  Mikhail Kotov, who 
the Finnish security police, wanting Kekkonen take action to set a limit to their 
activities. Kekkonen Archives, Karjalainen fi le, Ahti Karjalainen to Kekkonen, 
13 Jun. and 24 Jun. 1958.
36 In 1966, when the Agrarians fi nally had to give the Ministry of Interior to the 
Social Democrats, police issues were transferred to the minister of defence, who 
was an Agrarian.
37 In some trials since 1953, even Russian intelligence offi cers caught on illegal 
reconnaissance missions in Finland had been condemned to prison.
38 In 1958, the Finnish security police was, after four years of action, preparing to 
reap the benefi ts of a complicated double agent operation, which was planned to 
lead into expulsions of fi rst-rate KGB diplomats (e.g. Zhenikhov and Vladimirov). 
The plan was quietly dropped. Supo Archives, personal fi le no. 11572; the fi le on 
Soviet espionage, no. XXIII E 1 – 26.
39 Immediately after the occupation of Czechoslovakia, Kekkonen was most 
upset and offended by the fact that the Soviets had blatantly lied to an old 
customer like himself right to his face. Kekkonen’s diary, 22 and 23 Aug. 1968.
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used to show up in Helsinki to explain some unexcepted turns of events,40 
was not available after the occupation of Czechoslovakia. He was busy in 
Prague as the chief KGB foreign intelligence representative there. Back 
in Helsinki in 1971, he did not mention this komandirovka to Kekkonen. 
Nor did  V. M. Vladimirov say, showing up again in 1970, where had he 
been meanwhile. This British style gentleman had been the head of the 
KGB department responsible for sabotage, assassinations and the like. 
Probably he told Kekkonen as much as he wrote in his memoirs: in the 
meantime, he had been involved in ‘some issues in Soviet-Chinese and 
Soviet-Czechoslovak relations.’
Most of the prominent Helsinki KGB hands worked almost their 
whole career in Finnish affairs. Many were involved with Finland for 
more than thirty years. The language effectively chained an offi cer to 
Helsinki. Foreign intelligence insiders believed that members of their 
‘Finnish mafi a’ looked like Finns, dressed like Finns, behaved like Finns. 
They were reticent, phlegmatic, and slow, liked the sauna, skiing, hard 
drinking and even weather ‘almost as their own.’41 On some occasions it 
is plausible that KGB offi cers could see where the situation would lead to 
sooner and better than their superiors in the Kremlin. When Finland’s free 
trade agreement with the EEC was negotiated,  Kotov said to Kekkonen 
that he ‘disagrees with the Soviet leadership’ and thinks that the offi cial 
(strictly negative) Soviet line was faulty. He said he believed that in the 
end Moscow would allow the Finns to sign up with Brussels.42 
WESTERN ATTITUDES
Western intelligence knew about the close relations between Kekkonen 
and the KGB. The most critical moment came after 15 December 1961, 
when KGB major  Anatoli Golitsyn (in Finland Klimov) defected from 
Helsinki to the CIA. The Soviets told Kekkonen that Golitsyn was ‘a very 
40 E.g. the defection of Golitsyn, the assassination of Kennedy, the dismissal of 
Khrushchev, the foreign political turn of the SDP right wing leader Leskinen.
41 As described by Gordievsky in O. Gordievsky and I. Rogatchi, Sokea peili: 
Ihmisiä vallan ja vakoilun puristuksessa. Helsinki: WSOY 1997, 166.
42 Kekkonen’s diary, 3 Jan. 1973.
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low-level offi cial and knew almost nothing’,43 having served in Helsinki 
only for a short period and against the main enemy, not in Finnish affairs. 
But it turned out that he had picked up more than gossip about KGB 
political operations. He told the Americans about the prevalence of the 
political fi eld in the Helsinki KGB operations, and gave several names 
and code names for Soviet ‘agents of infl uence’ in Finnish political life, 
and even a list of restaurants used for meetings.44
Americans discussed the revelations with Kekkonen himself. The 
president ‘received the information calmly, and with keen interest, and 
did not contest it’. He ‘also mentioned that some people, because of the 
positions held by them, were required to be in regular contacts with the 
Soviets and might give an impression they were being used.’ Thanking 
the Americans for the information, the president said that he would now 
be able to warn the next prime minister to be careful when appointing 
new Cabinet ministers.45
Despite this last rather comical remark and his outward calm, 
Kekkonen was nervous. As a cautionary measure, for two years he did 
not meet directly with the new KGB resident,  Yuri Voronin.46 It seems, 
43 Kekkonen’s diary, 13 Jul. 1963. The information had been given at some point 
earlier, but Kekkonen recalled it here in connection with the West German Felfe 
case.
44 According to the list received by Finnish military intelligence, Eero A. Wuori 
was ‘Moses’, the splinter social democratic leader Aarre Simonen was ‘Sika’ 
(Swine), but Kustaa Vilkuna was under a neutral name ‘Ville’. P. Salminen, 
Puolueettomuuden nimeen. Helsinki: Suomen mies 1995, 146, 189. In the Supo 
Archives, fi le amp XV U 1 b, there is a list of 28 KGB and GRU offi cers, written 
down by and by the Finnish security police chief Armas Alhava, no title, no 
signature, no date, but late 1962.
45 A memo from the US Government to the Swedish Prime Minister Tage 
Erlander, given on 20 Jan 1962, published as an appendix in J. Widén, Notkrisen 
och dess efterspel: USA:s relationer med Sverige under en av kalla krigets 
höjdpunkter, oktober 1961-mars 1962. Stockholm: Forskningsprogrammet 
Sverige under kalla kriget 2004.
46 In Kekkonen’s diaries, no private meetings with Voronin are recorded, except 
one, on 5 Apr. 1964. Of course, there could have been meetings not recorded 
by him, but this seems improbable, because he eagerly recorded (and directed) 
meetings with Voronin by others close to him, as Ahti Karjalainen or Arvo Korsi-
mo (19 Jan. 1963, 19 Mar. 1963, 8 Nov. 1963 and several others). During this 
period, Kotov frequently visited Helsinki to consult Kekkonen in case of important 
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however, that the main Western conclusion drawn from  Golitsyn’s 
revelations was that the West must take a more positive and constructive 
attitude to Kekkonen to avoid pushing him completely to the Soviet side. 
The Swedish Prime Minister  Tage Erlander was urged by the US to pay 
more attention (in a positive sense) to Kekkonen. This he did.
In August 1963,  Rex Bosley of the British intelligence showed up 
in Helsinki to talk with Kekkonen about the revelations. He said that on 
Golitsyn’s list of top Finns ‘in Soviet service’ were the two leaders of 
the splinter social democratic party ( Emil Skog and  Aarre Simonen), the 
commander of the Helsinki City Police ( Erik Gabrielsson), and last but 
not least, Urho Kekkonen himself. ‘Was there really “in Soviet service”? 
Kekkonen asked. ‘That’s what he said’, Bosley responded, but then 
explained that the West considered the president as a mysterious political 
fi gure, close to  Khrushchev, but not ‘in service’. Kekkonen was relieved. 
In his diary he pondered the proper way to get it known in Moscow 
that he was considered mysterious, ‘even suspected’ by the West. This 
information ‘would strengthen my position in the Soviet Union.’47 
Here, Kekkonen reaped the fruit of sharing of his assessments of 
Soviet leaders with Western intelligence circles. His most important 
Western contact was Reginald ‘Rex’ Bosley, whom he for an unknown 
reason called ‘Art Dealer’ (Taulukauppias).48 Bosley, who had served in 
Finland in the 1940s, showed up in 1957 to say that there was a group 
in the British government willing to keep up unoffi cial contacts with 
the Finnish president.49 By the mid-60s, Bosley had visited Kekkonen 
developments. Voronin’s predecessor V. V. Zhenikhov, whom Kekkonen met 
frequently, lost his job because of the defection of his subordinate.
47 Kekkonen’s diary, 29 Aug. 1963. Bosley also told about the case of Penkovsky, 
‘the biggest spy that can be imagined’. Due to him, the West saw that the Soviet 
Union is not as strong as it was trying to make others believe. The damage he did 
to the Soviets was irreparable. Years later, Bosley said that Golitsyn had claimed 
that Kekkonen was ‘a spy hired by them’, but the SIS had rejected the accusation 
‘by saying that UKK [Kekkonen] is their spy.’ Kekkonen’s diary, 5 Nov. 1975.
48 Information about the nickname given to the author by Gen. Urpo Levo, 
who was the president’s aide-de-camp and organized many of his clandestine 
meetings.
49 J. Suomi, Kriisien aika: Urho Kekkonen 1956–1962. Helsinki: Otava 1992, 
108.
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more than 20 times.50 In the US archives there is a memo on a frank and 
detailed discussion between Kekkonen and ‘a British friend’ at the height 
of the Note Crisis in 1961.51
If we can infer from topics discussed, the Swedish industrialist  Marcus 
Wallenberg might have served as Kekkonen’s intelligence channel to 
some circles in the West.52
THE  BREZHNEV PERIOD
Three weeks after  Khrushchev’s fall, the new Soviet leadership restored 
the direct KGB contact with Kekkonen. The new resident in Helsinki, 
 V. S. Stepanov, was of Karelian (or Finnish) origin and had a perfect 
command of language. Immediately on arrival he wanted to meet in the 
presidential sauna, to declare that he, unlike the ambassador, had direct 
contact with Brezhnev. ‘Has he?’ Kekkonen pondered, and had his close 
ally ask  Albert Akulov of the KGB political line if this was really the 
case. Envious of his new boss, Akulov declared that it was he who had the 
direct link to Brezhnev and not Stepanov, ‘at least not yet’.53 This incident 
shows a new feature: the Soviets, including KGB offi cers, slandered 
each other and even criticized their top leaders. Early on, after the Cuban 
missile crisis,  Kotov had said that ‘some people in the USSR, he among 
them, had considered Khrushchev’s policy towards the US too soft. But 
the decision had to be made quickly and the other line would probably 
have led to the occupation of Cuba [by the US].’54 When Brezhnev came 
50 Kekkonen’s diary, 9 Jul. 1965. On this visit, Bosley said that Shelepin would 
take over the Soviet leadership.
51 National Archives (US), Record Group 84, Box 7, folder 320, Finland-USSR 
1959–1961, Memo on a discussion between Kekkonen and a friend on 6 Nov. 
1961, 8 Nov. 1961, published by J. Aunesluoma in Finnish in Historiallinen 
Aikakauskirja, vol. 100 (2002: 2). Nothing has so far turned up in the British 
archives.
52 When the KGB Helsinki rezident gave Kekkonen a rather extensive account 
of Soviet leaders’ thinking on the war in Vietnam, the next day Kekko nen told 
Wallenberg about it. Kekkonen’s diary, 27 and 28 Mar. 1965.
53 Kekkonen’s diary, 7 and 10 Nov. 1964.
54 Kekkonen’s diary, 9 Jan. 1963.
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to power, the KGB channel produced a frank assessment about the new 
leader: ‘That’s a stupid guy.’55 Kekkonen probably agreed.56
Through the new rezident, Kekkonen fi rst tried to promote ideas 
developed during the  Khrushchev era, such as the exchange of Finnish 
recognition of the German Democratic Republic for the return of the 
city of Vyborg (in Finnish, Viipuri) with surroundings, lost in the Second 
World War.57 Initially, the KGB man was eager, but the new ideological 
climate in Moscow did not turn out to be favourable. After the occupation 
of Czechoslovakia, Kekkonen dropped the idea.
KGB efforts to infl uence Finnish political life were facilitated by the 
fact that, hoping for entrance into the government, traditional anti-Soviet 
parties were changing their line and beginning to strive for Soviet contacts, 
the Social Democrats from the mid-60s and then also the Conservatives. 
Kekkonen thus lost the argument that if the Russians did not deal with 
him, worse forces would take over in Finland. On the other hand, Soviet 
positions were weakened by electoral losses suffered by the traditional 
customer parties, the Agrarians and the Communists, and by currents 
inside these two parties which favoured distancing themselves from the 
Soviets. On the surface, all relevant forces took their oaths of loyalty 
to friendship and the ‘ Paasikivi-Kekkonen line’, but deeper and hidden 
forces were fi ercely competing with each other, and on both sides. 
Around 1970, the Soviets were even afraid of ‘losing’ Finland. A silent 
crisis developed, when the CPSU International Department – backed by 
 Suslov and, to an extent,  Brezhnev – were trying to introduce a more 
distinct left-wing domination in Finnish political life after Kekkonen, who 
was believed to be retiring. Deputy head of the international department, 
55 Kekkonen’s diary, 17 Oct. 1964. Which one of the Soviets said this is not 
written down. The entry was written on the basis of the discussions Kekkonen’s 
close ally Korsimo had in Moscow with the former Helsinki resident Zhenikhov 
about the reasons for Khrushchev’s dismissal.
56 When British Prime Minister Harold Wilson suggested that Brezhnev would
do as a secretary general for the Transport Workers’ Union, whereas Kosygin 
could be an excellent chairman for the Imperial Chemical Industries, Kekkonen 
agreed, but did not offer further criticism of Brezhnev. Instead, he gave his 
thoughts on how this kind of a man had been able to come to power. The National 
Archives (UK), Foreign and Commonwealth Offi ce (FCO) 33/724, Record of 
conversation between Wilson and Kekkonen, 17 Jul. 1969.
57 Kekkonen’s diary 19 Oct. and 16 Nov. 1965.
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 Aleksei Belyakov, was appointed ambassador to promote these ideas. The 
KGB, however, wanted to continue business as usual with Kekkonen and 
after him with his more docile pupil,  Ahti Karjalainen.58 Kekkonen and 
the KGB prevailed, the ambassador was pulled out after seven months 
in offi ce.
During this crisis Kekkonen showed an additional feature in his 
dealings. Aware of the fact that the KGB would not trust his word only, 
Kekkonen wrote memorandums about what the president was believed 
to be thinking, and these were then given to the KGB by his personal 
intelligence chief, Professor  Kustaa Vilkuna, who was a long-time regular 
agent in the KGB books.59 So, the KGB obtained both the president’s direct 
views and secret agent information about these, both of which had been 
carefully prepared by Kekkonen himself. In the agent reports, the Soviets 
were sometimes criticized rather sharply for their insuffi cient support 
for the president in his diffi cult task. The president was described to be 
very depressed because of the Soviets having let him down, ‘completely 
alone (…) without the slightest help from any of yours.’60 The brightest 
KGB chiefs in Helsinki possibly guessed that also this agent information 
originated from Kekkonen, but they could not afford to destroy a pattern 
certainly appreciated by the Centre. Of course, the KGB probably had 
also real (but weaker) agent sources around Kekkonen.
KGB purists accused the Helsinki political line of becoming a branch 
of diplomacy. Where were actual agents, meeting in secret, taking orders, 
doing as they were told to and getting paid for it?61 The Helsinki hands 
responded by infl ating numbers and by recording contacts as agents,62 and 
58 A detailed description and assessment of this crisis in K. Rentola, Vallan-
kumouksen aave: Vasemmisto, Kekkonen ja Beljakov 1970. Helsinki: Otava 
2005, part of which published as ’Der Vorschlag einer europäischen Konfe renz 
für Sicherheit und die stille Krise zwischen Finnland und der Sowjetunion’, in 
Neutralität – Chance oder Chimäre? Konzepte des dritten Weges für Deutsch-
land und die Welt 1945–1990, Hrsg. D. Geppert u. U. Wengst. München: Institut 
für Zeitgeschichte 2005, 177–202
59 This kind of ploy is mentioned in Kekkonen’s diary on 7 Dec. 1970.
60 Kekkonen Archives, Yearbook for 1971, P.M. on 1 Apr. 1971, no signature, 
Kekkonen’s note: ‘Vilkuna to Vladimirov’.
61 O. Kalugin, Proshchai, Lubyanka! Moskva: Olimp 1995, 225.
62 According to Gordievsky (1997, 124–6) the KGB political line in Helsinki 
in the 1970s had 33 actual agents, 33 confi dential contacts, and 25 targets under 
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by trying to prove that operative conditions in Finland were extremely 
complicated and very diffi cult.63 Operatives with experience of big 
powers ridiculed this: how come a tiny security police with a hundred 
offi cers could create diffi cult conditions? But the Helsinki hands did not 
bow down. On the contrary,  V. M. Vladimirov proved ‘scientifi cally’ 
in his dissertation in the KGB Academy that in specifi c (and diffi cult) 
operative conditions it was necessary to shift emphasis from traditional 
agent operations to modern contact network, through which all necessary 
information could be obtained.64
By the 1970s, the  Brezhnev stagnation began to take its toll on KGB 
operations in Finland. Discipline was slackening, there were instances 
of corruption and various side efforts. In 1973, the former KGB resident 
to Helsinki,  V. S. Stepanov, asked Kekkonen to propose to Brezhnev 
and  Podgornyi that he, Stepanov, be appointed as Soviet ambassador 
to Helsinki.65 After some hesitation, Kekkonen agreed, fearing that the 
arrogant Karelian might get his appointment even without his support. 
Kekkonen might have been tempted to play various Soviet interests and 
bureaucracies against each other in order to gain more latitude; he was 
aware of intense rivalry between Soviet actors, but that was a dangerous 
game and uncertainties were huge. In any case, Stepanov was appointed, 
but forced to resign from the KGB.66 In Helsinki, his arrival made a 
mess of the KGB high level network and in particular of relations with 
Kekkonen. As ambassador and ‘Vice President of Finland’, as he liked to 
present himself, Stepanov was in charge of offi cial relations, but he also 
development. The total fi gure corresponds with the records of the Finnish security 
police, where the KGB political line offi cers in Helsinki in 1970 had 101 recorded 
contacts persons who were met more or less regularly. However, it seems absurd 
that 33 of these could have been agents in any meaningful sense.
63 Estonian State Archives (ERAF) library, KGB collection, Memo by Capt. 
A.P. Akulov, ‘Agenturno-operativnoe obstanovki v Finlyandii: Obshchii obzor’ 
(KGB copy, secret, no. 55), 1968.
64 Kalugin (1995, 225) says that Vladimirov’s conclusion was strongly sup ported 
by Kryuchkov, new head of foreign intelligence from 1971.
65 V. Stepanov to Kekkonen, dated 20.9. but should be 20.11.1973, published in 
Kirjeitä myllärille 1956–1981, ed. by P. Lähteenkorva & J. Pekkarinen. Helsin ki: 
Otava 2000, 369. 
66 Kalugin, Proshchai, Lubyanka!, 224. The English translation does not include 
passages on Kekkonen.
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wanted to control his old area of confi dential contacts, despite the fact 
that the KGB was represented by a very senior offi cer,  Mikhail Kotov. 
‘Kotov mildly criticized  Stepanov’, Kekkonen noted.67 The two Soviets 
‘seem to be on bad terms. K. of course is jealous of S.’68
After Kotov, the Helsinki residency was taken over for two years by a 
son-in-law to somebody high up, a completely incapable know-nothing, 
not even able to speak Finnish, Swedish or German, the three languages 
Kekkonen knew. The president did not even get his name right. ‘Kotov’s 
successor’, he noted in his diaries.
CONCLUSIONS
Some preliminary conclusions can be drawn.
First, the information currents. By 1970, there could not be any 
signifi cant political secrets in Finland for the Soviets. Discussing the 
fate of the presidency and the successor problem with Kotov, Kekkonen 
noted that the KGB resident ‘knew everything, even things I did not 
know.’69 In political terms, Finland was transparent to the Soviets and 
their network enabled them to infl uence matters heavily. Kekkonen for 
his part received every kind of Moscow rumour and unique information 
on Soviet leaders, their way of thinking, even hidden motives,70 and their 
pecking order, although even he was often surprised and disappointed by 
their actions.
Second, it is possible that Soviet intelligence operations in other areas, 
such as traditional military intelligence, were a bit neglected in Finland. 
67 Kekkonen’s diary, 15 Jul. 1975.
68 Kekkonen’s diary, 25 Nov. 1975.
69 Kekkonen’s diary, 23 Oct. 1972. Earlier, Kotov had a more traditional boast 
that ’we know better than you, what the people of Finland are thinking and talking 
about in railway carriages, restaurants, offi cers’ clubs….’ Kekkonen’s diary, 25 
Nov. 1963.
70 On the Soviet leaders’ concerns inside the Socialist camp, Stepanov said 
that the situation in Poland was becoming better and Gomulka’s position was 
strengthening, whereas in Czechoslovakia the new leadership was losing control. 
‘In both countries, the Zionists are guilty.’ Kekkonen’s diary, 6 Apr. 1968.
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Not that there was much to hide, but this was quite a diffi cult terrain to 
penetrate into, as were some other ‘hard’ branches of the Finnish state.
Third, for political reasons and to boost their network, the KGB 
regularly helped Kekkonen and Finnish industries to get huge profi table 
deals, which they in purely economic terms would probably not have got. 
What was even more important, through his contacts Kekkonen was able 
to obtain Soviet approval for Finnish participation in Western economic 
integration. Thus, KGB contacts strengthened capitalism in Finland.
CODA
Kekkonen was as skillful an operator as anybody connected with the KGB, 
but his last days in offi ce were unavoidably melancholic. In June 1981, 
 Brezhnev informed the CPSU politburo that because of his worsening 
health, Kekkonen is thinking of withdrawing from offi ce rather soon. (In 
fact, he had two months to go.) As for the successor, he no longer repeated 
his earlier negative views of his former protégé  Ahti Karjalainen, but 
the latter had meanwhile acquired a notorious reputation, drinking too 
much and getting involved in scandalous situations. Kekkonen had said 
to the KGB resident – now again a competent offi cer,  V. M. Vladimirov 
– that his most suitable successor would be  Jaakko Pajula, director of the 
National Pension Fund.
This was an ‘utterly unexpected turn’ for the KGB. Pajula was not 
generally known, and lacked a strong political base. The KGB was 
astray, in this decisive moment they could not offer any advice at all 
to the Kremlin, nor were they able to assess how the situation would 
develop in the nearest future.71
Kekkonen did not record anything of this in his diary; possibly he 
did not remember the details afterwards. It is diffi cult to believe that 
such a renowned tactician could produce such a silly and unrealistic idea. 
As loyal supporters of Kekkonen, Pajula and his friend  Olavi J. Mattila 
(whose name was mentioned in an earlier KGB-inspired successor 
plan) had been promoted to high positions in state-controlled parts of 
economic life, but they did not carry any political weight of their own. 
71 Russian State Archives for Contemporary History (RGANI), f. 89, per. 42, d. 
44, str. 5, Zasedaniya politburo TsK KPSS, Rabochaya zapis’, 18 Jun 1981.
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In the last instance, both Kekkonen himself and the KGB lost control of 
the most important lever of Finnish-Soviet relations, that of the Finnish 
presidency. The limits of the KGB infl uence were shown by the fact that 
Kekkonen’s successor, social democrat  Mauno Koivisto, was elected 
without clear Soviet support, even against their wishes.72
72 Koivisto preserved the KGB contact inherited from Kekkonen and took care 
of many vital issues through that channel. Only at the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, he informed the last KGB resident Feliks Karasev that this system was 
now over and henceforth issues between the states would proceed through regular 
diplomatic channels.
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The FCMA Treaty: Who Fathered It? 
 TIMO SOIKKANEN
The 1948 FCMA treaty is undoubtedly one of the most important and 
controversial treaties in Finnish history. It became – surprisingly early 
– a focal point of research. The fi rst serious study was that of  Veikko 
Veilahti, who, in 1953, wrote a licentiate thesis for the School of Social 
Sciences in Helsinki, entitled Yhteistoiminta- ja avunantosopimus 
Suomen ja Neuvostoliiton poliittisten suhteiden perustana (The Treaty 
of Cooperation and Mutual Assistance as the Cornerstone of  Finnish – 
Soviet Relations). A lot could be said about the fate of this work. Two of 
the three examiners rejected it. In doing so, they accused the researcher 
of tendentiousness and maintained that the problem of the treaty was 
too close in time to permit of scholarly study. A vehement press polemic 
sprang up around Veilahti’s text.
Threatening letters were written.1 To this day, the licentiate thesis 
has remained unaccepted. These events of the early days of the treaty 
strikingly reveal the political element that has, from the very beginning, 
clung to research about the FCMA treaty. Due to the lack of sources, 
research around the treaty has for decades been compelled to adopt a 
comparative approach: the natural parallels have been the treaties of a 
similar kind made between the Soviet Union and other states.2
1 The reader will fi nd references to these letters in D. Anckar, Sven Lindman 
och Yrjö Ruutu. Anteckningar kring en episod. Meddelanden från ekonomisk-
statsvetenskapliga fakulteten vid Åbo Akademi. Statsvetenskapliga institutionen. 
Ser. A.201. Åbo 1984.
2 A good example of this type of approach is contained in Keijo Korhonen’s 
article ‘Suomen valtiosopimukset’, in I. Hakalehto (ed.), Suomi kansainvälisen 
jännityksen maailmassa. Porvoo: WSOY 1969.
Timo Soikkanen
292
However, the history of the mutual relations between Finland and 
the Soviet Union later opened up another interpretative perspective 
when President  Urho Kekkonen, in the early 1970s, gave a semi-offi cial 
analysis of  Yartsev’s pre-Second World War approaches, seeing them 
from both a comparative standpoint and as initiatory for the history of 
such an agreement between Finland and Soviet Union. The negotiations 
undertaken in Moscow prior to the outbreak of the Winter War formed a 
part of Kekkonen’s interpretation.
A third and distinct point of comparison – one that has been politically 
highly sensitive – is the drawing of a parallel with the agreement made 
between the Soviet Union and the  Kuusinen government in the beginning 
of the Winter War. An analogy here might be made with the agreement 
drawn up in March 1918 by the Kansanvaltuuskunta (the Finnish People´s 
Deputation) for a Sopimus ystävyyden ja veljeyden lujittamisesta (an 
Agreement for the Strengthening of Friendship and Fraternity).
In the beginning of the 1980s, researchers found a new line of 
development when sources relating to the origin of the treaty began 
to open up. In the middle of the decade, for example,  J. K. Paasikivi’s 
diaries were published. On the other hand, Soviet material was still to 
remain for several years outside the reach of researchers.
As noted, the question of who took the initiative for the FCMA treaty 
was raising political passions as soon as the treaty was in being. Was 
it Mannerheim, Paasikivi,  Zhdanov,  Molotov, or  Stalin? The initiative-
taker obviously played a considerable role and even became a weapon in 
the struggle for the acceptance of the treaty itself. In consequence, he had 
meaning for the historian, too. In what follows, various interpretations 
about the initiator of the FCMA treaty will be looked at, showing how 
the conclusions drawn, including analyses of the prime motivation, have 
changed over time. The question is therefore one both of the tumult of 
political battle as well as one of the assessments of the argumentation 
used in the writing of history. The arguments involved will not be laid 
out in chronological presentation but only when they have come into 
publicity. That is to say, progress occurs in the manner demanded by 
historiography. An onion is being peeled.
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A PART OF POLITICS
When the key discussions that led to the treaty began in November 
1947,  Stalin and  Molotov pointed out on different occasions the previous 
initiative taken by the Finns. The Commissar for Foreign Affairs, 
Molotov, in receiving in that month the Finnish government delegation 
led by Prime Minister  Mauno Pekkala, started, a discussion about a treaty 
of friendship and mutual assistance. He did so by reminding the Finns 
to their surprise that Marshal  Mannerheim had put forward the idea of a 
treaty of this kind when talking to Zhdanov after the armistice following 
the Continuation War. In this connection, Molotov also recalled that 
Prime Minister Paasikivi had suggested such a treaty in May 1945.
Prime Minister Pekkala was delighted to hear that the roles of 
Mannerheim and Paasikivi had now come out as instigators of a mutual 
assistance treaty, for Pekkala hardly wished to have such an unpopular 
measure attributed to him.3             
In March 1948, the Communist press, headed by Vapaa Pohjola, told 
its readers that Finland had taken steps to enter into a defence treaty 
with the Soviet Union. According to Vapaa Pohjola, immediately after 
the ending of the Continuation War, there prevailed – and even among 
the Right – a general opinion that Finland should never again become 
entangled in war with the Soviet Union and that all necessary measures 
should be undertaken to avoid that eventuality:
To this end our general staff, which of old can hardly be accused 
of excessive Soviet partiality, drew up a memorandum in which a 
military agreement with the Soviet Union was proposed.4
A few days later Suomen Tietotoimisto (STT – the Finnish news agency) 
rushed to deny these assertions – most probably at the behest of Paasikivi.5 
3 T. Heikkilä, Paasikivi peräsimessä. Pääministerin sihteerin muistelmat 1944–
48. Keuruu: Otava 1965, 300–301. 
4 ’Oikeistomme suhtautuminen avunantosopimukseen. Onko se muodostunut 
kielteisemmäksi?’. Vapaa Pohjola 11 Mar. 1948.  
5 T. Suontausta, ’Paasikiven sopimus – Eduskunnan sopimus’, in K. Kare 
(ed.), J. K.Paasikivi. Itsenäisyys – rauha – valtiollinen sivistys. Hämeenlinna: 
Ka risto 1960, 103; T. Karvonen, Neljännesvuosisata YYA-sopimusta. Pori: 
Kansankulttuuri 1973, 22–23. Karvonen has attributed the wrong year to the 
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What was occurring was a form of shadow boxing, something that was 
far from clear to the general public.
The motives of the Soviet leadership in referring to what might be 
termed the paternity of the treaty were naturally enough connected in the 
fi rst place with starting up negotiations for the treaty. The basic question 
in Finnish domestic comment was of how to present the treaty.
REJECTED PATERNITY
 
By keeping quiet about the whole issue in publishing his memoirs in 
the beginning of the 1950s, Mannerheim expressed everything. He did 
not want to acknowledge paternity though it was on offer. Again, his 
confi dant, General  Erik Heinrichs, was silent about this matter in the 
biography of Mannerheim which he published in the beginning of the 
1960s. Heinrichs can be considered as knowing exceptionally well the 
events of the year 1945, for as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces 
he was a key fi gure in drawing up with Mannerheim in the beginning of 
the year the draft of an agreement intended for Zhdanov.
The legal expert  Tauno Suontausta, who in 1948 was a member of 
the consultative committee which handled the FCMA treaty, wrote in 
the beginning of the 1960s that Zhdanov took up the issue fi rst with 
Mannerheim, but discussed it later with Paasikivi, too. In 1961, in 
Suomalainen Suomi, the historian  Lauri Hyvämäki reviewed Suontausta’s 
explanation of the origin of the FCMA treaty. Hyvämäki emphasized 
that Paasikivi himself, when speaking to the consultative committee, had 
explained ‘in some detail’ the early stages. It seems evident that Hyvämäki 
had personally discussed these matters with Suontausta. According to 
Hyvämäki, Suontausta’s account confi rmed that the initiative had not 
come from Finland but from the Control Commission.6
On the twenty-fi fth anniversary of the FCMA treaty, the long-serving 
Secretary of the Finnish-Soviet Friendship Society,  Toivo Karvonen, 
drew attention to the ‘considerable confusion’ surrounding the origins of 
the treaty.  He felt that the information about the defence treaty having 
information got from Suontausta.
6 Suontausta, ’Paasikiven sopimus’, 102–103; L. Hyvämäki, ’Ulkopolitiikkamme 
kertosäe’, Suomalainen Suomi 3/1961.
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originated from the Finnish side, while Moscow and Zhdanov in Helsinki 
had rejected the proposal, was ‘unimaginable’.7      
 A REVIVED PATERNITY
That the treaty was a child of Mannerheim was an explanation that did not 
become rooted in opinion until the beginning of the 1980s. Two books, 
in particular, were responsible for this development. The fi rst was the 
fi nal volume of  Stig Jägerskiöld’s Mannerheim biographical series and 
the second was, likewise, the fi nal volume in  Tuomo Polvinen’s wide-
ranging series on   the international relations of Finland, the one entitled 
Jaltasta Pariisin rauhaan (From Yalta to the Peace of Paris).
The new interpretation rested on the fact that Mannerheim had become 
uneasy on account of the demands of the Soviet Union for the dismantling 
of Finnish coastal artillery. On 20 December 1944, Mannerheim wrote 
to Zhdanov, the chairman of the Control Commission, and asked, in the 
light of the continuing danger from the Germans, that Finland should be 
allowed to keep this artillery in place. On 6 January 1945, Zhdanov replied 
in the negative. Nonetheless, Mannerheim kept up his correspondence 
and appealed, inter alia, to the joint defence concerns of Finland and the 
Soviet Union.
According to what Jägerskiöld wrote, this correspondence of 
Mannerheim was no longer a great step to discussions about a defence 
agreement.8 Polvinen, for his part, drew the following conclusion:
Mannerheim’s letters show that his thoughts were moving from 
the technical details of marine defence into much wider spheres. 
The question was no more a question simply of gun-barrels and 
submarines but of a comprehensive system for the relations 
between Finland and the Soviet Union.
Polvinen continues by describing how in a conversation with Zhdanov 
on 22 December 1944:
7 Karvonen, Neljännesvuosisata YYA-sopimusta, 22–23.




Mannerheim himself grasped the pen and clearly drafted, even if 
in a slightly wavering old man’s handwriting, a fi rst sketch for an 
agreement between Finland and the Soviet Union. The Marshal 
wrote an outline in Russian of three articles in all.9
 Jägerskiöld’s and  Polvinen’s interpretations are well written. Both 
their works appeared in 1981, at the time when Kekkonen’s quarter-
of-a century long term of offi ce was ending. With the popularization of 
the ideas in Jägerskiöld`s and Polvinen’s texts, they created for post-
Kekkonen Finland a swiftly-established basis for the alleged initiative 
and paternity of Marshal Mannerheim.
I remember myself an occasion in the 1980s when, in connection 
with an   evaluation task, I was listening to school history lessons. I 
made a conscious effort to go to classes in which the post-Continuation 
War ‘dangerous years’ were being dealt with. Two-thirds of the teachers 
gave their class to understand that Mannerheim had both invented 
and planned the FCMA treaty. And, when Finland celebrated its 60th 
anniversary as an independent state,  Jukka Tarkka wrote in a Festschrift 
about ‘Mannerheim’s bold initiative’ which had ‘radically improved the 
situation of Finland’.10
Thus, as late as the 1980s, Marski (as Mannerheim was familiarly 
known to the Finns), received gratis, another feather in his cap. The new 
interpretation fi t in well with Mannerheim’s stress on the importance of the 
 Yartsev negotiations as well as on the role he played before the outbreak 
of the Winter War in recommending a certain concessionary policy. The 
historical writing of the 1980s had found a bridge into the period before 
the Winter War. It looked as if the problem of the security of Finland had 
now found its solution by means of a synthesis: Marski’s way of thinking 
and Yartsev’s proposals combined would solve the eternal problem of 
Finnish security. Standpoints, it seemed that one of the Paasikivi line’s 
pillars had crumbled and fallen: this was his conviction that the FCMA 
treaty had been a Soviet idea. On the other hand, it did appear as if the 
FCMA treaty was now a safe, domestic product. 
The Paasikivi diaries do not bear out the above-mentioned 
interpretation
9 T. Polvinen, Jaltasta Pariisin rauhaan. Juva: WSOY 1981, 58–59.
10 J. Tarkka, ’Mannerheimin aloite’, in J. Tarkka and A. Tiitta Seitsemän vuo-
sikymmentä kansakunnan elämästä. Keuruu: Otava 1987.
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The diaries of President Paasikivi appeared in 1985 for the years 
1944–1956. They do not provide credence to the semi-offi cial status of 
the interpretations mentioned above. In no part of his texts does Paasikivi 
mention either Mannerheim or himself as initiators of the treaty – on the 
contrary, in fact. From his entries of 19 January and 22 January 1945, the 
picture emerges that Zhdanov, having received from Mannerheim a letter 
expressing the wish that Finland retain the disputed coastal artillery, 
decided to seize his chance and thus indicated the possibility of a treaty. 
After this, Mannerheim had drawn up a treaty ‘about which Zhdanov had 
spoken’.
In fact, the description of events in the Paasikivi diaries for 1945 
faithfully matches that given by Mannerheim from his sickbed in 1948 
to Ambassador  G. A. Gripenberg. Gripenberg wrote down in his diary 
Mannerheim`s account as follows:
Schdanoff (sic) on account of this letter had later gone to 
Mannerheim and said, among other things, that a Finnish-Russian 
defence pact might be envisaged. Mannerheim had thereupon 
answered that he had not for the moment thought of anything 
else than a coastal defence arrangement, but that it was of course 
possible to discuss the idea put forward by Schdanoff.
This later account of Mannerheim can, naturally enough, be easily 
challenged on grounds of source-criticism by averring that Mannerheim 
was at that time – in the early part of 1948 – trying to pass the buck solely 
on to Zhdanov as the new initiative for a treaty had been felt by the Finns 
to be embarrassing.11
In his diary, Paasikivi later returned in different connections to the 
matter.  When, in November 1947, Molotov had received in his study 
the Finnish delegation and had told the delegation that the original idea 
had come from Mannerheim and Paasikivi, the vexed Paasikivi had told 
his diary:
11 G. A. Gripenberg’s diary 19 Jan. 1948. Jägerskiöld, Viimeiset vuodet, 126–127. 
See also Polvinen’s later research: T. Polvinen, ’Zdanov, Mannerheim ja YYA-
sopimuksen esivaihe 1944–1945’, in Jorma Selovuori (ed.), …vaikka voissa 
paistaisi? Venäjän rooli Suomessa (Festsschrift  for Osmo Jussila). Porvoo: 
WSOY 1998, 362. 
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It is maintained that the proposal was made by Mannnerheim and 
myself. This is a mistake, we have not made the proposition. It 
was Zhdanov.12
The indignant Paasikivi demonstrated with the aid of his notes the true 
state of affairs to those who came visiting, such as  K. A. Fagerholm and 
 Cay Sundström, the Finnish minister in Moscow. Paasikivi also drew 
up a memorandum for the on-going negotiations. In this, he explicitly 
avowed that it was Zhdanov in 1945 who was the fi rst to take the matter 
up.13
It is worth noting that Paasikivi did not, for example, deny the 
outlines of an agreement drawn up by Mannerheim nor did he contest 
Mannerheim’s and his own activities in the year 1945. What he continued 
to deny, however, was that the initiative for a defence pact came from the 
pair of them. It was Zhdanov who had brought up a defence pact and 
Mannerheim’s and Paasikivi’s activities constituted only a continuation 
and consequence.
Paasikivi’s diary entries have not infl uenced Finnish interpretations. 
The vision of Mannerheim’s initiative continues its triumphal march and 
more and more historians seem to be joining it.
THE SOVIET MYTHOLOGY
In the Soviet writing of history and in the FCMA mythology, Manner-
heim was not generally given the same kind of initiator’s role which he 
received from the Finnish side; this, notwithstanding the fact that in 1947 
Soviet negotiators mentioned the role of a previous Finnish initiative to 
the Finnish delegation. This was exceptional. For example, in the 1980s 
 V. V. Pohlebkin kept quiet about Mannerheim’s role as an initiator of the 
treaty. 
It is, however, true that in 1988 an interesting discussion began 
about the FCMA treaty and in it  Vladimir Smirnov, referring to Finnish 
interpretations, posed the question of Mannerheim’s motives. According 
12 J. K. Paasikivi’s diary 15 Nov. 1947. See also Sundström’s account, ibid., 31 
Dec. 1948; T. Soikkanen 1991, 374–375.
13 J. K. Paasikivi’s diary 17 Nov. 1947, 31 Dec. 1947 and 17 Jan. 1948.
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to  Smirnov, Mannerheim had not been considered a supporter of 
friendship with the Soviet Union. That was why other motives had to 
be sought for his presumed initiative. But Smirnov was unable to say 
what these other motives were. It was clear that Smirnov did not really 
want to give Mannerheim the honour of fathering the FCMA treaty. 
In short, instead of Mannerheim, Smirnov offered the long line of the 
Finnish working-class movement, singling out the agreement made in 
1918 between Soviet Russia and the People’s Deputation.14
It is interesting to note that Mannerheim himself and Smirnov took 
basically the same stance on Marski’s potential paternity; Mannerheim 
did not want the honour and Smirnov did not want to give it.
THE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE 1990S
In the beginning of the 1990s, I drew attention, in certain newspaper 
articles and in my biography of Yrjö Ruutu, to the possibility that Zhda-
nov had been a solo player in this question and that he had not had the 
approval of the Kremlin. In any case, it does seem as if the Kremlin had 
reacted negatively to Zhdanov’s activities and initiative. Should this be 
so, it may be possible to reconcile the earlier information and the extracts 
from Paasikivi’s diary.
In the light of the latter’s diaries, Mannerheim and Paasikivi seemed 
to have assumed throughout that Moscow was fully behind Zhdanov. In 
his diary Paasikivi added, in brackets after Zhdanov’s name, the word 
‘Kremlin’. This miscalculation is a refl ection of the fact that Paasikivi did 
not understand the course of development but was repeatedly surprised 
by it. When Paasikivi, on the evening of 22 January 1945, rushed to 
Mannerheim to hear Zhdanov’s and Stalin’s answer to Mannerheim’s 
and Paasikivi’s way of thinking, Zhdanov did not react in the expected 
way. Paasikivi’s diary entries reveal that Zhdanov had now found that 
an agreement would simply serve as a beacon towards which one could 
be drawn. Zhdanov had just wanted – surprise, surprise – to speak about 
14 Vl. Smirnov, ’Tie kohti majakkaa. Todellako Mannerheim?’, Maailman ja Me 
1/1988; H. Viitala, ’Majakka ennakkoluulojen yössä. Mannerheim sopimuksen 
ensimmäinen luonnostelija’, ibid  1/1998. 
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‘that limited question’ which Mannerheim had originally raised in his 
letter. In astonishment, Paasikivi told his diary on 22 January 1945:
The great issue thus remains unattended. Whatever the reason 
was behind Zhdanov’s change in stand, we cannot fathom it. 
Something seems to have come in between.
On this was based my conclusion15 that the initiative was originally 
Zhdanov’s and that the Kremlin had, without further ado, turned it down. 
At the same time, Mannerheim and Paasikivi had begun, at Zhdanov’s 
request, to develop his proposal.
RUSSIAN SOURCE-MATERIAL
In the year 1994,  Maxim Korobochkin threw light on the course of events 
by utilizing the hitherto closed Soviet archives. In investigating the origins 
of the treaty, he linked up the Soviet proposals of 1939 for both the Baltic 
States and Finland. The Baltic lands entered into agreements in the spirit 
of submitting to coercion, while the Finns rejected such an agreement 
from the very start of the negotiations. According to Korobochkin, ‘the 
next Soviet initiative of this kind emerged in 1945’. He believed that 
Zhdanov, in discussing with President Mannerheim on 18 January 1945 
the letter Marski had written to him, had affi rmed that he had ‘nothing 
against’ military cooperation with Finland on land and sea. Korobochkin 
continues:
It is not clear whether this proposal was a personal initiative of 
the ACC Chairman, or whether he had received some general 
briefi ng this subject in Moscow.16 
In so far as Zhdanov had received instructions, Korobochkin believes 
that this ambitious member of the Politbureau had got his timing wrong. 
15 T. Soikkanen 1991, 373–377; T. Soikkanen, ’YYA-sopimus. Turha sulka mars-
kin hatussa’, Turun Sanomat 6 Jan. 1992; cf. Turun Sanomat 6 Mar 1995. 
16 M. Korobochkin, ‘The USSR and the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and 
Mutual Assistance with Finland’, in J. Nevakivi (ed.), Finnish-Soviet Relations 
1944–1948. Helsinki: University of Helsinki 1994, 171.
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For two days later, Zhdanov received from the Commissar for Foreign 
Affairs,  Molotov, stiffl y-worded complaints in which he was accused of 
‘hot-headedness’, of a desire ‘to go forward before it was time’ and of 
endeavouring ‘to resolve all issues in the course of one discussion’.
The Commissar for Foreign Affairs explained to his over-active 
subordinate that the initiative ‘for closer cooperation’ should come from 
the Finns and not from the Soviet side. In any case, Molotov went on, this 
kind of agreement was ‘music of the future’, which would be possible 
only after full diplomatic relations had been restored, in other words, 
after the peace treaty.17
The phrase ’wider cooperation’ used by Molotov in his litany of 
complaints, was a request which had to come from the Finns. It indicated 
a vista of opportunity, but in this light Molotov regarded Mannerheim’s 
initiative a narrow one, and evidently only concerning coastal artillery.
Molotov recalled once more Zhdanov’s mistake. The Soviet Union 
was in no direct need of an agreement of this kind. The armistice had 
fulfi lled the Soviet Union’s territorial demands. A one-sided approach 
might on the contrary make alliance relations diffi cult. Nevertheless, in 
principle, the envisioning of a treaty was desirable.
In May 1945, the dogged Zhdanov took the matter up again with 
Molotov. Zhdanov’s initiative was, according to  Korobochkin, this time 
‘probably’ attributable to Paasikivi.18 But according to the Paasikivi 
diaries, the move was made by Zhdanov and Paasikivi himself only 
returned to the matter. According to the diary entry of 26 May 1945, 
Paasikivi had affi rmed to Zhdanov that ‘last time’ (12 May) he (Zhdanov) 
had taken up the question of an agreement and now Paasikivi was 
continuing this discussion. However, though Paasikivi in 1945 thought 
that an agreement of this sort would be a good means of strengthening 
position of Finland, enabling even extra advantages to be obtained, he 
held fast to the idea that the initiative was to come from Russia.
Among themselves, the protagonists accorded the honour of fi rst 
mover to the other.




 POLVINEN’S NEW INTERPRETATION
In the year 1998, in the Festschrift to  Osmo Jussila, Tuomo Polvinen 
returned to the theme of the origin of the FCMA treaty. His starting-point 
this time was the use made of the new Russian source-material. Hence, 
where  Korobochkin had viewed matters somewhat narrowly from the 
perspective of Soviet material, Polvinen was now able to bind together 
the earlier accounts and the information derived from the new Russian 
sources.
Polvinen saw Mannerheim in 1944–45 as attempting to realize the 
ideas for a treaty sketched out by  Yrjö Ruutu and  Erik Castren. The 
Control Commission noticed at once the signifi cance of Mannerheim’s 
initiative and despatched it at once to Moscow, where Zhdanov was then 
residing.
In discussing the matter with  Stalin, Zhdanov was instructed to 
tell Mannerheim that the Soviet Union was willing to cooperate in the 
maritime areas and wanted to know how Mannerheim had envisaged the 
extent of this cooperation. 
On his return to Helsinki, Zhdanov, on 18 January 1945, immediately 
sought out Mannerheim at Tamminiemi. Zhdanov began the discussion 
by saying that he wanted to make an ‘important announcement’ about 
Finnish maritime defence and navy. He was interrupted by Mannerheim, 
who emphasized that his starting-point was that after the two-hundred 
and fi fty – year long hostility between Finland and Russia there had 
come a time for fundamental change. Mannerheim then spoke about the 
common interests Finland and the Soviet Union had in protecting the 
bridgehead formed by Finland.
After Zhdanov had again got a chance to speak, he informed 
Mannerheim that the Soviet Union agreed that the Mannerheim’s 
perceptions of the common Finnish and Soviet interests in defence of 
Finnish territory were correct. What next followed in their talk together 
must be looked at word for word, as Zhdanov said it:
On this basis, we cannot oppose military cooperation between 
us not merely on the sea but also on the land. Hence, it would 
be desirable to know how Finland understands the range of this 
cooperation.19
19 Polvinen, ’Zdanov, Mannerheim ja YYA-sopimuksen esivaihe’, 355–357. See 
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 Polvinen maintains that Zhdanov had advanced his position ‘so swiftly’ 
that according to his report Mannerheim looked scared.
But there is, however, another and more natural explanation. It was 
not the speed of the conversation that upset him, but the fact that the 
conversation seemed to be going towards a wider interpretation than he 
had envisaged!
That is why Mannerheim did indeed observe that this military 
cooperation on land might mean the entry of Soviet forces into the territory 
of the Republic of Finland, a matter that would be objectionable to a nation 
that did not want foreign forces on its soil. According to Mannerheim, 
this form of military cooperation would also raise the question of the 
infringement of the sovereignty and neutrality of Finland.
As the conversation proceeded, Mannerheim wanted to have the 
issue restricted to coastal defence. Zhdanov, for his part, saw that 
the experiences of war had shown that the Finnish forces alone were 
insuffi cient to repel an invader and ensure the continuity of the security 
of Finland. As Polvinen quotes it, Zhdanov then went on to say:
Unless the parties accept a (military) cooperation between 
Finland and the USSR in a wider and more concrete form than 
that indicated in Mannerheim’s cautious statement, then he, 
Zhdanov, was, for his own part, ready to abandon his proposal, 
which was of the kind that could only be put   forward once.20
Thus the clearly-offended Zhdanov spoke of his own proposal nor did he 
try to appeal to any suggestion that Mannerheim might have originally 
fathered the scheme.
AN ATTEMPTED INTERPRETATION
It may be of interest to note the variations in argumentation and the motives 
behind it all. The leadership of the Finnish state – President Mannerheim 
and Prime Minister Paasikivi – seem from the very beginning to have 
kept, whether with others or in their private observations, strictly to the 




line that the impulse to make a wider agreement out of the question of 
preserving the coastal artillery came from the Soviet Union. Although 
Mannerheim and Paasikivi were prepared in the spring of 1945 to work 
on a defence agreement, they wanted right from the beginning as well as 
in all stages of discussion to hold fast to the view that the impulse had to 
come expressly from the Soviet Union.
Correspondingly,  Molotov, with  Stalin in the background, impressed 
repeatedly on Zhdanov in 1945 that the proposal for wider cooperation 
had specifi cally to come from the Finns. An acceptance in principle and 
the initiative had to be got from the Finns, but the agreement itself could 
wait.
At the turn of 1947–48, the Soviet leadership stuck doggedly to the 
view that the suggestion of a wider defence agreement had to come 
from the Finns. In an atmosphere of this kind, of confl icting pressures of 
interest and of the attempt to foist the initiative on the other party, was 
the FCMA treaty born.
Of what kind then was the disputed initiative?
A key factor was the new letter Mannerheim sent to Zhdanov about 
the keeping in place of Finnish coastal artillery once the latter had given 
his initial refusal. Zhdanov’s negative reaction to Mannerheim’s fi rst 
letter got Mannerheim to accept – fortunately for the writing of history 
– a new letter on 8 January 1945 from the government’s foreign affairs 
committee.  Heinrichs read the text of the letter aloud. Paasikivi accepted 
it, because he regarded it as modest in tone.  Reinhold Svento, Pekkala, and 
 Johan Helo agreed with Paasikivi.  Enckell said nothing, but according to 
Paasikivi’s diary was of the same opinion as he was. Paasikivi described 
Mannerheim’s letter as ‘sensible’ – ‘not bad at all’.21
No Finn would ever have imagined that such a text contained a 
proposal for a defence pact. It was unthinkable. Nevertheless, it was 
just this letter that the Control Commission had, according to  Polvinen, 
straightaway regarded as signifi cant (from the standpoint of the idea of 
a treaty) and had sent it to Moscow for Zhdanov`s perusal. Polvinen’s 
interpretation has indeed received a new shade of meaning if compared 
with his original interpretation of 1981. In a way, Polvinen is now 
referring to a disagreement between, on the one hand, Paasikivi and his 
21 J. K.Paasikivi`s diary 8 Jan. 1945. 
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government, and on the other, Mannerheim.22 In other words, in this 
letter Mannerheim had consciously aimed at the creation of a wider 
agreement.
And the Control Commission had understood this.  Polvinen does not 
say this explicitly, but only such a line of thought would permit of an 
interpretation of Mannerheim’s initiative. Yet why should Mannerheim 
have acted like this? Why should he have spoken, in seeking to keep 
the artillery, of a wider defence pact? Did he deliberately wish to avoid 
the imputation of parenthood in the face of a subsequent judgement of 
history? Without further evidence, it would be futile to speculate on his 
motives.
In any case, where Paasikivi and his colleagues in government felt that 
the reference in Mannerheim’s letter ‘to the common defence interests 
of Finland and the Soviet Union’ constituted an effective argument 
for keeping the coastal artillery in place, the cock-a-hoop Control 
Commission, for whom the artillery question was an insignifi cant detail, 
interpreted it, however, as a starting-point for a joint defence pact.
Thus was born the initiative for an FCMA agreement, but no one 
knew who the real father was. Thereafter both parties were to emphasize 
the pro-geniture of the other.
THE TIME FACTOR
It is surely of vital interest to note the later oscillations in interpretation. 
When the FCMA treaty fi nally emerged in 1948, both the Kremlin and 
the Finnish communists emphasized that Finland and Mannerheim had 
taken the initiative, while Paasikivi and Mannerheim repeatedly rejected 
this imputation.
In course of time and as the value of the FCMA treaty grew, the roles 
switched. Then, Soviet commentators and Finnish Communists denied 
Mannerheim’s role and motives, or at any rate disparaged them, while 
among the writers of Finnish history the attempt began to be made to 
emphasize Mannerheim’s sense of initiative. 
Polvinen, in the fourth volume of his biography of Paasikivi, which 
appeared at the turn of the century, held fast to Mannerheim’s initiative. 
22 Polvinen, ’Zdanov, Mannerheim ja YYA-sopimuksen esivaihe’, 356.
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He did maintain that both Mannerheim’s and Paasikivi’s comments in 
1948 were affected by the wish to place the uncomfortably-felt treaty’s 
initiative on the shoulders of Zhdanov. But these 1948 comments were 
a consequence, according to  Polvinen, ‘of the change in the general 
situation’.23
What Polvinen ignored was that Paasikivi expressed his sentiments in 
his diary as early as January 1945, that is to say, contemporary comments 
years before ‘the change in the general situation’.
Even the textbooks of Finnish history have preserved this old picture. 
In them, Mannerheim rides unfl inchingly on, and, surprisingly, with a 
feather in his cap. And myths live on – eternally.              
23 T. Polvinen, J.K. Paasikivi. Valtiomiehen elämäntyö 4. 1944–1948. Porvoo: 
WSOY 1999, 33–40; cf. T. Soikkanen, ’Tarjottu ja torjuttu isyys’, in Unto Vesa 
(ed.), YYA: aika ja sopimus. Tampere. Tampereen yliopisto 1998.
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The Marshall Plan and Finland
 DÖRTE PUTENSEN 
Having emerged from the Second World War as the only major power 
with an intact economy and an infrastructure hardly affected by the war, 
the United States of America sensed the necessity to provide both military 
and fi nancial aid to economically devastated Europe. The original hope, 
that reconstruction would be achieved without a great deal of external 
assistance, and that Great Britain and France would rapidly rebuild their 
economies via their colonies, proved unfounded. Little progress had been 
made by 1947, and the unusually severe winter of 1946–47 had only 
made the situation worse. At that time the economies of the European 
countries were still struggling below the effi ciency levels of the pre-war 
years. Agriculture and coal production were stagnating at low levels. This 
was aggravated by high unemployment and a scarcity of food which led 
to strikes and unrest in several countries and a generally tense political 
situation.
From America’s point of view any political instability resulting from 
economic deprivation represented a destabilising factor that could benefi t 
the expansion of Soviet infl uence in western European countries and 
thus be a potential threat to the US. American aid was thus designed to 
prevent this. Recovery in Germany played a key role in the scheme, since 
the US envisaged it with a type of outpost function to counter Soviet 
intrusions. From America’s political viewpoint Germany’s economy was 
so closely interwoven with the European economy, that reconstruction 
in Germany was the sole key to Europe’s way out of its economic crisis. 




A third reason for American aid to Europe was the creation of a market 
for American surplus production. During the Second World War the US 
had experienced a completely unprecedented pace of economic growth, 
since the country was producing military supplies not only for itself, but 
also for its allies and at fi rst for its future enemies as well. At the end of 
the war US industries quickly adapted to the production of consumer and 
investment goods, and the shortages of the war years were replaced by a 
boom in consumer goods supplies. But in the long run the economy could 
only be kept in full swing by permanently securing correspondingly high 
export levels. In this respect the American economy urgently required a 
favourable market in Europe for its products.
This was the constellation of background factors when the US 
Secretary of State  George C. Marshall announced the European recon-
struction program in early 1947. In June Marshall stated that the US 
would provide the necessary support, if Europe were prepared to launch 
a mutual long-term reconstruction program. During a speech at Harvard 
University on 5 June 1947 he said: ‘Our policy is directed not against any 
country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. 
Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so 
as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which 
free institutions can exist. Any government that is willing to assist in the 
task of recovery will fi nd full co-operation, I am sure, on the part of the 
United States government.’1
Thus Marshall’s offer was offi cially directed to all of the European 
states. It put Finland in an extremely complicated position and its 
government was faced with diffi cult questions. The route that Finland 
eventually chose has been frequently discussed in contemporary history 
research, and interpreted in a variety of ways. Did Finland’s fi nal decision 
to refuse aid mean the country’s sovereignty was restricted, and that 
it had shied away as a result of the Soviet warnings and demands? Or 
did Finland’s decision actually manage to secure a maximum room of 
manoeuvre for its future decisions and its action radius? Seen from the 
immediate perspective of the years 1947–48, Finland’s behaviour must 
certainly have given the impression that the country was shying away 
from the program because of its big eastern neighbour. But now, with 
the benefi t of hindsight, Finland’s decision not to participate secured the 
1 W. Cornides (ed.), Europa-Archiv. Frankfurt/Main 1947, 821 f.
The Marshall Plan and Finland
309
country’s chance to pursue a policy of neutrality which may not have 
existed had the President  Juho Kusti Paasikivi decided otherwise in 1947. 
This will now be illuminated on the basis of the historical facts.2
Marshall’s speech found no immediate resonance within Finland. It 
was only after the British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin expressed a 
positive attitude towards the Marshall plan a week later that the nature 
and the possible consequences of the offer for Finland and the whole 
of Europe were discussed in Finnish newspapers.3 In view of Finland’s 
diffi cult economic situation and the heavy reparation payments which had 
to be met, the positive reactions were in a clear majority, although there 
was apprehension about a growing rift between West and East as a result 
of the plan. Obviously, such a development could hardly be in Finland’s 
foreign political interests. Clear opposition was expressed solely by the 
Finnish People’s Democratic League SKDL whose strongest member 
organisation was the Communist Party of Finland.
The fi nal decision on the matter lay in the hands of the country’s 
president Juho Kusti Paasikivi who subsequently held intense discussions 
with leading members of government and his country’s foreign policy 
experts. In a confi dential letter to Foreign Minister  Carl Enckell dated 
19 June 1947, President Paasikivi expressed a defi nitely positive attitude 
towards Marshall’s offer. He certainly deemed it necessary for the 
foreign ministry to critically examine all the details and the international 
complexities of the project, but pleaded for Finland’s participation in it, 
should the country satisfy the necessary conditions and be included in the 
recovery program.
During the following days Paasikivi received the assessments of 
several Finnish diplomats who saw the Paris conference of the ‘big three’ 
foreign ministers as the last chance for a united Europe and predicted a 
2 For the debate surrounding the Finnish Marshall plan decision see, for 
instance, J. Nevakivi, Zdanov Suomessa: miksi meiltä ei neuvostoliittolaistettu? 
Helsinki: Otava 1995; J. Aunesluoma, ‘Länsiblokin Suomi. Suomi mukaan 
Marshallin suunnitelmaan 1947’, in M. K. Niemi & V. Pernaa (eds.), Entäs 
jos... Vaihtoehtoinen Suomen historia. Jyväskylä: Ajatus Kustannus 2005, 161 
ff; M. Majander, Pohjoismaa vai kansandemokratia? Sosiaalidemokraatit, 
kommunistit ja Suomen kansainvälinen asema 1945–1951. Helsinki: Suomalai-
sen Kirjallisuuden Seura 2004.
3 M. Thomas, Finnland zwischen Frieden und Kaltem Krieg. Die Außenpo litik 
des Präsidenten Paasikivi 1947–1955. Hamburg: Verlag Kovač 2005, 33 ff.
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division of Europe should the meeting fail.4 Their apprehensions seemed 
to be confi rmed when Molotov rejected the Franco-British proposals on 
2 July 1947 and abruptly left the conference.
On 4 July the French and British foreign ministers  Georges Bidault 
and  Bevin sent an invitation to 22 states to participate in discussions on 
the overall European implementation of the Marshall plan on 12 July 
1947. This put the Finnish government in a diffi cult position. Whilst 
deliberating whether or not Finland should take part in such a conference 
 Paasikivi had to keep in mind that, although Finland had signed the Paris 
Peace Treaty on 10 February 1947 and subsequently ratifi ed it on 18 
April 1947, the actual enactment by the major powers still had to take 
place. The French and British ambassadors immediately presented the 
invitation to Finland’s foreign minister  Enckell on 4 July. Several Finnish 
diplomats then urgently advised non-participation in the conference for 
political reasons. They were convinced that the western states would 
appreciate this decision, and that such a step would have no negative 
effects on future loans or the continuity of trade relations with these 
states, particularly with the US. 
On 4 July, when Enckell informed Paasikivi about the state of current 
developments, Paasikivi presented his foreign minister the initial draft of 
a letter in which he tended towards accepting the invitation. Paasikivi’s 
strategy aimed to enable Finland to benefi t from the economic aid whilst 
avoiding the country becoming institutionally involved in the program. 
Finland wanted to reap the economic benefi ts without binding itself 
politically, in order to avoid provoking any possible confl icts with its 
eastern neighbour and major power, the Soviet Union. With this in mind, 
Paasikivi developed a number of possible variations which included 
such proposals as the conference participation of a Finnish exploratory 
delegation with politicians from all of the governing parties, or a Soviet 
guarantee of long-term economic aid should Finland opt out from the 
program.5
The following days were full of hectic behind-the-scenes activities; 
there were talks, meetings, discussions and information exchanges on 
4 Thomas, Finnland zwischen Frieden und Kaltem Krieg, 35.
5 J. K. Paasikivi’s diary, 4 July 1947, in Y. Blomstedt & M. Klinge (eds), J. 
K. Paasikiven päiväkirjat 1. Helsinki-Porvoo-Juva: WSOY 1985, 466, col. 
893/894.
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various levels and with a great diversity of participants. The government 
had referred the problem to the parliamentary committee for foreign affairs 
which voted 10 to 6 in favour of Finnish participation at the conference.6 
The foreign ministry made contacts with the Soviet embassy and the 
Finnish embassies abroad, the government committee for foreign affairs 
met several times, the president held consultations with leading fi gures 
from the political and economic spheres, the parliamentary committee 
for foreign affairs was convened, etc. 
On 5 July confi dential talks were held between the Finnish Foreign 
Minister  Enckell and the Soviet ambassador in Helsinki,  Alexandr 
Abramov, during which Enckell explained Finland’s intention to send 
observers to the Marshall plan conference. In turn Ambassador Abramov 
handed Enckell an aide-memoire, in which the Soviet Union frankly 
stated that the Marshall plan represented an attack on the sovereignty 
of the European countries, and that for this reason participation in the 
conference should be rejected.7
  The reactions of the other European states were carefully monitored, 
particularly those of the neutral states and the neighbouring Scandinavian 
countries who expressed certain reservations about realizing the Marshall 
aid plan outside the framework of the United Nations. They wanted as 
far as possible to depoliticise the controversy surrounding American 
economic aid for Europe, but irrespective of this and in the fi nal instance 
they tended towards participation in the Marshall plan.
In contrast to this, the views of Finland’s foreign policy leadership 
still remained torn between different options. At a meeting of the 
government’s foreign policy committee on 7 July the differences of 
opinion became openly apparent. Prime Minister  Mauno Pekkala was 
the one who argued most decisively against participation for political 
reasons, to avoid giving any impression for the Soviet Union that Finland 
was joining a western alliance directed against it. Enckell still considered 
it right to send a delegation of observers to the Paris conference, while 
his colleague  Reinhold Svento (deputy foreign minister) was in favour 
of Finnish participation for economic reasons. The positions were so 
6 H. Seppälä, Itsenäisen Suomen puolustuspolitiikka ja strategia. Helsinki: 
WSOY 1974, 308.
7 Thomas, Finnland zwischen Frieden und Kaltem Krieg, 38.
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divergent that a viable consensus proved impossible, and President 
 Paasikivi had to postpone the decision. When discussions continued on 
the following day, Paasikivi proposed sending Finnish representatives 
to the conference, since in the fi nal instance Finland maintained the sole 
right to decide whether or not it would participate in the Marshall plan.
Following the meeting a piece of information from Prime Minister 
 Pekkala obviously revived  Paasikivi’s misgivings. Pekkala reported on 
a conversation with the deputy chairman of the Control Commission 
 Grigory Savonenkov, who had made it clear to Pekkala that Finland 
should not despatch a delegation, because the Finns had undertaken 
in the ceasefi re agreement not to participate in any groupings directed 
against the Soviet Union.8 In contrast to the aide-memoire from  Abramov, 
Savonenkov had created a link between Finnish participation in the 
conference and the peace treaty which still had to be ratifi ed. Paasikivi 
reacted with great anger and indignation. Finnish non-participation at the 
bidding of the Soviet Union could result in a loss of prestige for Finland. 
Despite this, he became very aware of Finland’s uncertain position, so 
that he decided to reconsider his position once more. Under the infl uence 
of the Soviet threat other politicians started to rethink their positions too. 
In contrast to his earlier argumentation,  Svento now saw the danger of 
a drastic deterioration in Fenno-Soviet relations and henceforth rejected 
any Finnish participation in the conference.9
Although Paasikivi was still convinced that Finland would suffer an 
international loss of face by rejecting Marshall aid as a result of Soviet 
pressure, he nevertheless presented the members of government with 
his formulation for a rejection of participation in the Paris conference. 
He justifi ed Finland’s non-participation with reference to the ceasefi re 
agreement and emphasised Finland’s endeavour to stay outside of 
international political disputes. Although Foreign Minister  Enckell shared 
the misgivings about Finland’s possible loss of prestige, he supported 
Paasikivi’s position by pointing out that the main aim of Finnish foreign 
policy had to be the avoidance of confl ict with the Soviet Union. In 
addition to this he did not think that economic reasons made it absolutely 
essential to participate. Participation could result in restrictions from the 
8 J. Tarkka, ’Paasikiven aika’, in Y. Blomstedt (ed), Suomen historia, Vol. 8. 
Espoo: Weilin+Göös 1988, 77.
9 Thomas, Finnland zwischen Frieden und Kaltem Krieg, 42.
The Marshall Plan and Finland
313
Soviet side, ranging from grain import embargos to the non-ratifi cation 
of the peace treaty.
Finland was in a hard predicament and had to consider its approach 
extremely carefully in order to keep any negative effects to a minimum. 
In an effort to gain greater clarity about the Soviet Union’s position 
further talks were held between Finland’s foreign policy leadership 
and Soviet diplomats. Since the Soviet side feared that the acceptance 
of economic aid would result in an adverse political infl uence on itself, 
and eventually in the division of Europe, they felt obliged to strongly 
recommend Finland to abstain both from participating in the conference 
and in the aid program itself.10
As a result of all the exploratory talks, discussions and recommen-
dations the government issued a majority statement on 10 July 1947 
in favour of not accepting the invitation to Paris, but it refrained from 
passing a corresponding resolution. Consequently, in the afternoon, the 
government’s foreign affairs committee had to convene again in the 
presence of President  Paasikivi. After this the committee fi nally managed 
to reach agreement on the rejection of the invitation, and the whole of the 
government then immediately confi rmed the rejection of participation 
in the conference. All that remained to be done was for the president to 
endorse the decision.
Despite this, the parliamentary committee for foreign affairs was 
convened that same evening. It met in the presence of the prime minister 
and the two foreign ministers with the task of ‘giving its blessing’ to the 
decision of the president and the government. However, the government 
representatives were unable to convince the majority of the parliamentary 
committee members with their arguments, and in the end the committee 
voted 10 to 5 in favour of participation in the conference. Although this 
parliamentary opinion did not affect the fi nal government decision, it did 
in fact illustrate the thinness of the ice that Paasikivi and his government 
were treading, and it proved that they could not necessarily rely on a 
parliamentary majority.
On 11 July President Paasikivi endorsed the previous day’s agreed 
reply stating that Finland would not be accepting the invitation to 
participate in the Marshall plan conference in Paris.11 In its reply the 
10 Thomas, Finnland zwischen Frieden und Kaltem Krieg, 44.
11 J. K. Paasikivi’s diary 11–12 July, 472, col. 906.
Dörte Putensen
314
Finnish government regretted not being able to participate in the Paris 
conference, even though Finland was also in need of aid for economic 
recovery.12 The reasoning behind the decision stated that: ‘Since 
Finland’s position as a state has not yet been guaranteed by a permanent 
peace treaty, and since the Marshall plan has become a subject of fi ercely 
differing opinions between the major powers, Finland, which wishes to 
remain outside of international disputes, unfortunately has no possibility 
of participating in the aforementioned conference.’13
In the end Finland’s political leadership had declined the invitation 
for political reasons. Their consideration of the Soviet Union seemed 
more important to them than the possibility of economic aid from the 
west. Nevertheless, this behaviour on the part of Finland should not be 
seen as a deferential bow by  Paasikivi to the demands of the eastern 
neighbour. Rather than indicating compliance, Paasikivi’s main aim was 
to avoid giving the Soviet Union any cause to interfere even more directly 
in Finnish affairs.14 Paasikivi was far more interested in strengthening 
the image of his policies in the eyes of the Soviet leaders, and in this 
he succeeded.15 The Finnish diplomat and journalist  Max Jakobson later 
assessed the Finnish decision as: ‘The most agonizing act of self-denial 
in a decision taken by Finland after the end of the last war.’16
At the beginning of the debates surrounding the Marshall plan and the 
question of Finland’s participation in the aid program, Finland’s political 
leadership, and particularly President Paasikivi, had placed the attitude of 
the Soviet Union at the centre of their deliberations. What emerged in the 
end was a foreign political priority designed to avoid becoming involved 
in any confl icts with the eastern neighbour. Finland’s behaviour prompted 
the following poignant comment from Jakobson: ‘The Marshall Plan 
endeavoured to save Europe from Communism, but Finland probably 
12 J. K. Paasikivi’s diary 11–12 July, 468, col. 898.
13 Quoted from T. Heikkilä, Paasikivi peräsimessä: Pääministerin sihteerin 
muistelmat 1994–1948. Helsinki: Otava 1965, 296.
14 D. Putensen, Im Konfl iktfeld zwischen Ost und West. Finnland, der Kalte Krieg 
und die deutsche Frage, 1947–1973. Berlin: Berlin Verlag Arno Spitz  2000, 38.
15M. Jakobson, Finnland im neuen Europa. Berlin: Berlin Verlag Arno Spitz 
1999, 55.
16 M. Jakobson, Finnlands Neutralitätspolitik zwischen Ost und West. Wien-
Düsseldorf: Econ 1969, 115 f.
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saved itself from Communism by saying no to the Marshall Plan.’17 At the 
same time the debates surrounding the plan and Finland’s fi nal decision 
had also shown that the foreign political understanding with the Soviet 
Union effectively restricted Finland’s room to manoeuvre in subsequent 
western political relations.18
In addition to this, the leading Finnish politicians had obviously 
recognised during the course of the debate that the Marshall plan would 
defi nitely lead to an economic division of Europe, and that Finland’s 
position could become complicated as a result of this. Such a division 
would inevitably lead to further controversy between the major powers. 
In the event of such constellation, it was Finland’s task to develop a 
political course which avoided the country becoming a pawn in the game 
of any of the major powers. It was against this background and with their 
focus on the decision to decline the conference invitation that  Paasiki vi 
and the Finnish government fi rst publicly formulated their aim of wishing 
to remain outside international disputes between the major powers.
Initially, the public reacted with mixed feelings towards the decision 
taken by the president and the government. Disappointment was 
expressed, but eventually the opinion prevailed that Finland’s political 
leadership had nevertheless made the right decision. International 
reactions to the decision were also interesting. The Soviet Union was 
very content with the Finnish decision, and understanding was signalled 
in most cases in the west. Several countries, such as the US, Great Britain 
and Sweden gave assurances that Finland should not suffer economic 
disadvantages because of this political decision, and that trade relations 
would continue unrestricted. Loan facilities were also offered. This was 
of great importance to Finland, since the country faced huge economic 
pressure as a result of the high reparations payments due to the Soviet 
Union. Within six years Finland was obliged to pay reparations to the 
Soviet Union to the value of 300 million dollars based on 1938 world 
market prices. One of the major challenges was not merely the level of 
the reparations payments, but the fact that the Soviet Union wanted a 
large proportion of the reparations to be made in the shape of machinery, 
equipment and metal industrial products. However, Finland was still 
mainly agricultural and had a highly developed and extensive timber and 
17 Jakobson, Finnland im neuen Europa, 55.
18 Thomas, Finnland zwischen Frieden und Kaltem Krieg, 51.
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paper industry, but its metal processing industry, which had grown in 
the 1920s and the 1930s, was in the early stages of development.19 This 
meant that the country was compelled to develop and extend its metal 
industry, and for this it depended on supplies from the west, particularly 
in the initial phase. Consequently, any restrictions in trade and economic 
relations with western countries resulting from non-participation in 
the Marshall plan would have had particularly negative consequences 
for Finland. After all, the country wanted to do its utmost to pay of the 
reparations within the set framework of time and in the required form 
and volume, in an effort to reduce its dependence on the Soviet Union to 
a minimum.20
The development and extension of a metalworking industry proved 
extremely problematic at the beginning, but turned out eventually to be 
of great benefi t. The country was compelled to add a ‘metal leg’ to its 
already existing ‘wooden leg’, in other words to diversify its economic 
structure, a change which proved its worth over the following decades. 
During the fi rst years of the industry’s development the turnover was 
secure, because of the deliveries to the Soviet Union. Later Finland was 
able to sell the products from this industrial sector to the international 
markets as well.
 In September 1947 the Soviet Union fi nally ratifi ed the Paris Peace 
Treaty. Research assesses this step in a variety of ways. On the one hand 
it has been interpreted as ‘a reward’ for Finland’s non-participation in 
the Marshall plan, and on the other hand this connection has been drawn 
into doubt or rejected altogether.21 In this respect  Juhana Aunesluoma’s 
argumentation is interesting: he inquired into what would have happened 
if Finland had accepted the Marshall plan. He assumes that even then the 
peace treaty may have been ratifi ed, since the Soviet Union’s room for 
manoeuvre was restricted in 1947.22
19 R. Hjerppe & P. Vartia,’Talouden kasvu ja rakennemuutos 1860–2000’, in H. 
Loikkanen, J. Pekkarinen and P. Vartia (eds), Kansantaloutemme rakenteet ja 
muutos. Helsinki: Yliopistopaino 2002, 9 ff.
20 R. Büttner, Sowjetisierung oder Selbständigkeit? Die sowjetische 
Finnlandpolitik 1943–1948. Hamburg: Verlag Kovač 2001, 262 ff.
21 See for example Nevakivi, Zdanov Suomessa, 205 ff.
22 Aunesluoma, ‘Länsiblokin Suomi’, 170.
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In retrospect, Finland’s Marshall plan decision proved itself not only 
right, it also signifi ed a turning point in Finland’s post-war foreign policy. 
The division of Europe into two political blocks began with the Marshall 
plan and was intensifi ed by the subsequent steps of the two disputing sides. 
All essential areas of politics and public life were infl uenced by these 
developments. The East-West confl ict, or the Cold War, was destined to 
infl uence the international political climate for over forty years. Against 
this background  Paasikivi’s guiding idea, that Finland should remain 
outside the disputes of the major powers, became a vital elixir of Finnish 
politics. From then on it formed the bedrock of the neutrality policy to 
which Finland committed itself in the mid-1950s.
The Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance was 
concluded on 6 April 1948 between the Soviet Union and Finland, and 
acted as a kind of Magna Carta for Finnish foreign policy throughout 
the Cold War. The treaty was the fi rst offi cial document to contain the 
formulation that Finland wished to remain outside of any confl icting 
interests between the major powers. During the negotiations on the treaty 
Finland’s representatives had insisted that this formulation be included 
in the preamble. Irrespective of the restrictions contained in the details, 
this formulation secured not only a certain level of independence for 
Finland from the major western powers; it also unmistakeably defi ned 
the country’s independence in relation its big eastern neighbour.
In 1955, after the Soviet Union had prematurely returned the Porkkala 
military base to Finland and ended the fi fty-year lease, Finland took steps 
to create a second foreign policy cornerstone to complement the Treaty 
of Friendship: it started declaring itself a neutral country whilst laying 
particular emphasis on the preamble to the Treaty of Friendship. 
In the fi eld of foreign policy the country found itself in a permanent 
tension zone between the Treaty of Friendship and the declared policy 
of neutrality. Whilst the Treaty of Friendship represented the decisive 
mainstay of Finnish policy towards the east, Finland endeavoured 
to underline its neutrality towards the west. However, this position of 
neutrality met with only qualifi ed acceptance from the other states, 
including the neutral ones. This was understandable since, in the event of 
a specifi c and likely confl ict, Finland’s position could possibly have been 
pre-programmed by the Treaty of Friendship depending on the Soviet 
Union’s interpretation. The Soviet government’s extensive interpretation 
of the military clauses had been demonstrated in the so called note crisis 
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of 1961: as a result of the tensions in the Baltic area, and without Finland’s 
agreement, the Soviet premier  Nikita Khrushchev wanted to unilaterally 
implement the mechanism of military consultations according to article 
2 of the Treaty of Friendship against Finland’s will. This was fortunately 
prevented at the last minute through mutual talks between Khrushchev 
and President  Kekkonen. From that point onwards one of Finland’s 
utmost priorities in its foreign relations was to champion constellations 
between east and west which would exclude the implementation of the 
military clauses of the Treaty of Friendship.
It was only in the early 1990s that Finland was able to free itself 
from this predicament when, in the wake of the political changes in 
eastern and central Europe, the Treaty of Friendship unceremoniously 
disappeared into oblivion. Until then the treaty had been regarded as the 
shrine of Fenno-Soviet relations, but now Finland suddenly gained a new 
level of foreign political freedom, far greater than anything the country 
had experienced since the end of the Second World War. This presented 
Finland with the possibility of creating closer ties with the west without 
having to constantly keep its eye on reactions in the east. Finland’s 
accession to the European Union in 1995 opened up completely new 
perspectives for the country, and although this also included new political 
constraints, they bore no resemblance to those endured during the Cold 
War era.
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The Ambiguous Henry Kissinger:
Professor, Policymaker, Historian1 
 JUSSI M. HANHIMÄKI
The announcement in November 1968 was a surprise. A 45-year old 
Harvard professor who had arrived in the United States as a refugee 
from Nazi Germany some thirty years earlier and risen to a highly 
coveted position within the American academia seemed, to many, not 
the most logical choice as  Richard Nixon’s National Security Advisor. 
The president-elect was, after all, best known for his partisanship rather 
than his breadth of vision. If anything, this selection seemed to indicate 
a suspiciously broad mind on Nixon’s part. After all, Kissinger was a 
representative of an Ivy League the new president-elect had grown to 
hate since he exploded on to the American political arena in the aftermath 
of the Second World War. Moreover, few could have expected that the 
appointment would have as far reaching consequences as it did: Kissinger 
and Nixon would soon be running foreign policy as their private reserve, 
they would launch initiatives that, in some ways, revolutionized post-
war US foreign policy, and Kissinger himself would – in fi ve years time 
– hold two key posts as the mantle of the Secretary of State was added 
to his NSC position. Fewer yet could have anticipated that it would be 
Kissinger, rather than Nixon, that would stay in Washington for the next 
eight years.
Because of his unlikely rise to the pinnacles of power, and the 
achievements and disappointments during Kissinger’s long tenure in 
offi ce, his ‘mind’ has been examined with the vigor accorded to few other 
1Much of this chapter is based on J. M. Hanhimäki, The Flawed Architect: Henry 




modern statesmen. Even before he had fi nished his tenure in government, 
numerous books provided exhaustive analyses of Kissinger’s thinking.2 
The efforts have not stopped. Most recently,  Jeremi Suri has provided a 
bold analysis of the way in which the former secretary of state’s personal 
background impacted his policy making. ‘Kissingerology’ has become 
a virtual academic sub-fi eld – to which the present author has made 
his modest contribution – focused on the merits of Kissinger’s various 
efforts from the SALT negotiations to the Opening to China, from his 
role in the Vietnam peace negotiations to his shuttle diplomacy in the 
Middle East.3 What seems evident from the writings of both Kissinger 
himself and those who have commented upon his career is the simple 
fact that history – both personal and general – played a crucial role in 
determining Kissinger’s approach to politics. To determine whether he 
was a brilliant analyst of international relations or a mediocre scholar but 
a good political animal rests in part upon an understanding of his ability 
to ‘think outside the box’; to ignore the baggage that a Jewish-German 
immigrant to the United States inevitably carried with him wherever he 
went, whatever he did, whomever he dealt with. He may not have learned 
the art of realpolitik growing up in Nazi Germany. But Kissinger did 
look to history for lessons and warnings – sometimes misinterpreting 
them, sometimes ignoring them – throughout his remarkable career. As 
Kissinger himself later put it: ‘The conviction that leaders have formed 
before reaching high offi ce are the intellectual capital they will consume 
as long as they continue in offi ce.’4
2 Some of the early works included: S. Graubard, Kissinger: Portrait of a Mind. 
New York: Norton 1974; or such negative renditions as D. Landau, Kissinger: 
The Uses of Power. Boston: Houghton Miffl in 1972; B. Mazlish, Kissinger: The 
European Mind in American Policy.  New York: Basic Books 1976.
3 J. Suri, Henry Kissinger and the American Century. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press 2007.
4 H. Kissinger, White House Years. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1979, 79.
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THE MAKING OF A SCHOLAR
Heinz Alfred Kissinger was born on May 27, 1923 in Fürth, a small town 
in Bavaria, Germany. The time and the place could hardly have been less 
fortunate for a middle-class Jewish family. This was the year of Adolf 
Hitler’s unsuccessful ‘Beer Hall Putsch’ in nearby Munich after which 
he began the writing of Mein Kampf (to be published in 1925). Within a 
few years, the Bavarian Jews, like other German Jews, would gradually 
be ostracized. In August 1938 the Kissingers left Germany to the United 
States, settling in Manhattan. In 1945 Henry – he had anglosized his 
name upon arrival to the adopted country – returned to Germany as 
member of the US occupation force. In the fall of 1947 Kissinger entered 
Harvard University’s Class of 1950 as a second-year undergraduate; ten 
years later, having completed his Ph.D., Kissinger published two books, 
Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy and A World Restored.
It was, already, a remarkable story. The two books made the 34-year 
old scholar into a best seller and secured him an appointment at Harvard’s 
International Affairs department. Kissinger had, by the mid-1950s, 
become an adept student of both diplomatic history and nuclear strategy, 
fi elds that would later make him uniquely qualifi ed for membership in 
the country’s foreign policy elite.
Kissinger’s record at Harvard had been, in fact, nothing but 
remarkable. Working in the Government department, Kissinger made 
‘Harvard history’ by writing the longest senior thesis (353 pages) to be 
found on the shelves of the venerable institution. Nor did he shy away 
from challenging topics, as the title of Kissinger’s thesis was ‘The 
Meaning of History.’ In practice the senior thesis was slightly more 
limited in scope: it compared the thinking of  Immanuel Kant with that of 
 Arnold Toynbee and  Oswald Spengler. His main goal was commendable: 
to argue that free will mattered, that historical determinism went too far, 
and that individuals were the responsible agents of history.
Indeed, ‘The Meaning of History’ was ultimately an optimistic work 
from a young man that had narrowly escaped the horrors of Nazi Germany. 
It was a work that stressed the signifi cance of individual choice within a 
context of circumstances beyond one’s control.  As he wrote:
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No person can choose his age or the condition of his time. The 
past may rob the present of much joy and much mystery. The 
generation of Buchenwald and the Siberian labor-camps cannot 
talk with the same optimism as its fathers… But this merely 
describes a fact of decline and not its necessity… The experience 
of freedom enables us to rise beyond the suffering of the past and 
the frustration of history. In this spirit resides humanity’s essence, 
the unique which each man imparts to the necessity of his life, the 
self-transcendence which gives peace.5  
Kissinger, at 27 years of age, did not shy away from making overarching 
– if at times almost impenetrable, statements that would later become 
a trademark of his writing.  
But there was another – more ‘Kissingerian’ – message in ‘The 
Meaning of History’. Decision-making was inherently morally ambigu-
ous. The future secretary of state emphasized the need to acknowledge 
human limits and perils, but he also recognized that human agency and 
responsibility ultimately did make a difference. While man could not 
choose his age ‘the form taken by the particular period, the meaning 
given to life is the task of each generation.’6 Indeed, Kissinger’s message 
was characteristically ambiguous: he was clearly not devoid of ideals 
but seemed to fi nd some solace in realpolitik. This dichotomy – an 
optimism challenged by a deep pessimism – would remain with him 
for the remainder of his career. It was undoubtedly in part a result of 
his personal history; whereas Kissinger had escaped Nazi death camps, 
thirteen of his relatives had not.  History was not a story rising towards 
some moral crescendo.
The tilt towards realpolitik was further evident in his next major 
project. The choice of Kissinger’s dissertation topic was, in fact, quite 
unusual. Whereas most of his contemporaries were working on ‘current’ 
topics – something to do with post-World War international relations 
– Kissinger wrote about the Concert of Europe in the early nineteenth 
century. ‘A World Restored:  Metternich,  Castlereagh and the Problems 
of Peace, 1812-1822’ was in a class of its own. Some less than impressed 
5 Quoted in Graubard, Kissinger: Portrait of a Mind, 8.
6 Quoted in Suri, Henry Kissinger, 31.
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colleagues even suggested that Kissinger might want to transfer to the 
History Department. Kissinger – who did display notable talent for 
writing diplomatic history – resisted the temptation and instead argued 
that his dissertation held specifi c relevance in the Cold War world. 
Much like in the early nineteenth century, when  Napoleon’s France had 
presented a challenge to the stability of the European state system, so 
did the Soviet Union (and its then ally China) represent the twentieth 
century revolutionary menace to a stable world order. If  Napoleon’s 
challenge had provided the great threat to stability in the Europe of the 
early nineteenth century, the Sino-Soviet challenge represented a similar 
threat to global stability in the mid twentieth century. By implication, 
then, if the conservative statesmen  Metternich and  Castlereagh had 
restored peace and stability through their diplomatic efforts, a similar 
solution could certainly be arrived at by Western statesmen a century and 
a half later.
Kissinger’s dissertation, which gained him a Ph.D. in May 1954, was 
the fi rst obvious occasion where he molded history to fi t his needs. It 
was, in fact, a clear-cut statement of the author’s own worldview. The 
primacy of geopolitics and the balance of power were key ingredients 
to providing international stability, and in the ability of a select number 
of diplomats to shape (or reshape) international relations. In fact, if 
anything, A World Restored, stresses the impor tance of the individual 
statesman. As Kissinger put it: ‘The test of a statesman is his ability to 
recognize the real relationship of forces and to make this knowledge 
serve his ends’.7 It was, to a large extent, a version of the ‘great man 
theory’ of history. As Kissinger added:
The statesman is like one of the heroes in classical drama who has 
had a vision of the future but who cannot transmit it directly to his 
fellow-men… The statesman must therefore be an educator; he 
must bridge the gap between a people’s experience and his vision, 
between a nation’s tradition and its future.8
7 H. Kissinger, A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of 
Peace 1812-1822. Boston: Houghton Miffl in 1957, 325.
8 Cited in Suri, Kissinger, 37.
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The last point was, of course, what Kissinger and  Nixon said they were 
doing by launching détente in the late 1960s: embarking on a new course 
that was not necessarily well understood at home.
Yet, there was also a sense of the limits that even such eminently skilful 
statesmen as Castlereagh and Metternich had been forced to accept. In 
fact, while the title of the dissertation leads one to suggest an overtly 
laudatory account of the statesmanship of two early nineteenth century 
Europeans, Kissinger ended his book by stressing the shortcomings rather 
than the achievements of the two. Neither was Kissinger’s ‘hero’, yet 
both provided examples of the extent to which accident and circumstance 
could undermine the work of even the most eminent and skilful leaders. 
Or, as the historian  John Lewis Gaddis puts it, Kissinger’s guide to the 
statesmen – and presumably to himself – was that they needed to ‘rescue 
choice from circumstance.’9 While Kissinger’s later conduct may not 
have been an example of such apparent humility, it is obvious that at least 
in the early 1950s the Harvard Ph.D. student had a healthy appreciation 
of the limits that each and every national or international leader faced.
A World Restored, was published three years later by the Boston-based 
publishing house Houghton Miffl in. In the same year, he also published 
another book, far more popular and ‘timely.’ In 1955 he had opted for a 
three-year position as the director of a study group analysing the impact 
of nuclear weapons at the high-powered Council of Foreign Relations 
in New York.10 In the next three years Kissinger – whose appointment 
coincided with the publication of his fi rst major article on US national 
security in the Council’s prestigious journal Foreign Affairs11 – moved 
closer to the corridors of power and published, in 1957, Nuclear Weapons 
and Foreign Policy. Almost four months on the best-seller list, the book 
won critical praise from most reviewers and was discussed on the front 
pages of major American newspapers. It set the basis for Kissinger’s 
future reputation as a capable synthesizer – and at times original thinker 
9 J. Gaddis, ’Rescuing Choice from Circumstance: The Statecraft of Henry 
Kissinger’, in G. Craig and F. Loewenheim (eds.), The Diplomats, 1939–1979. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press 1994, 564–592.
10 W. Isaacson, Kissinger. New York: Simon & Schuster 1992, 82–83.
11 H. Kissinger, ’Military Policy and the Defense of the Grey Areas’, Foreign 
Affairs, April 1955.
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– of major foreign policy issues. Indeed, if not yet a household name, 
Kissinger had by the age of thirty-four, earned the respect of most of his 
colleagues and, more signifi cantly for him, many of the decision makers 
in or about to gain power.
The arguments presented in Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy 
were not, however, entirely unique to Kissinger.  In some ways this was 
hardly a surprise; the book was based on the monthly discussions at the 
Council and, given the participants, thus often refl ected dominant views 
about the problems and role of nuclear weapons. Above all, Kissinger 
was interested in the dilemma of the nuclear age, which he defi ned as 
the fact that ‘the enormity of modern weapons makes the thought of war 
repugnant, but the refusal to run any risks would amount to giving the 
Soviet rulers a blank check.’12
This was, indeed, the dilemma that the  Eisenhower administration’s 
massive retaliation doctrine – the idea that Washington could effectively 
deter war by threatening to use US nuclear weapons – faced as the 
Soviet nuclear arsenal grew. It was largely one of credibility: massive 
retaliation implied the willingness to use nuclear weapons while the sheer 
destructive power of them raised serious doubts about the feasibility of 
such a proposition. ‘Maximum development of power is not enough’, 
Kissinger argued, because ‘with modern technology such a course 
must paralyze the will’. What was needed, Kissinger maintained, was 
a ‘strategic doctrine which gives our diplomacy the greatest freedom of 
action and which addresses itself to the question of whether the nuclear 
age presents only risks or whether it does not also offer opportunities.’13
For Kissinger the latter was more the case. Indeed, the most distin-
guishing (and most frequently discussed) characteristic of Kissinger’s 
book was his argument that while an all out nuclear war was an unlikely 
possibility because it would be too destructive, a confl ict between the 
United States and the Soviet Union might well evolve into a limited 
nuclear war. As he wrote: ‘Limited nuclear war represents our most 
effective strategy against nuclear powers or against a major power which 
12 H. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. New York: Doubleday 
1957, 4.
13 Ibid., 14, 15.
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is capable of substituting manpower for technology.’14 What he meant 
was that unless the U.S. had the ability and will to fi ght by using its 
nuclear arsenal, the president would too easily be faced with too equally 
unappealing options if challenged by the USSR (or China): surrender 
or nuclear holocaust. Hence, he maintained, the United States needed 
to have the capability – and the will – to fi ght nuclear wars in limited 
settings. Indeed, the problem for Kissinger was actually not so much one 
of technology but of political will and psychology. Americans had for 
some time – and particularly due to the Second World War – considered 
total victory (or unconditional surrender) the only kind of victory. 
Since the Soviets developed their bomb in 1949, however, this will had 
become hampered by the fear of prompt and utter destruction by nuclear 
weapons. What was therefore needed in large part was a redefi nition of 
the meaning of ‘victory’ – since there could not be an all out war, there 
could not be all  out victory, at least not over a nation that possessed 
thermonuclear weapons.
Again, he was arguing for a break with history and tradition. Kissinger 
maintained that American diplomacy needed to develop a ‘framework 
within which the question of national survival is not involved in every 
issue. But equally, we must leave no doubt about our determination to 
achieve intermediary objectives and to resist by force any Soviet military 
move’. If that were the task for diplomacy, then the challenge for US 
military policy was ‘to develop a doctrine and a capability for the graduated 
employment of force’ that would support these diplomatic efforts. In this 
way, Kissinger further maintained, the dilemma of nuclear weapons and 
foreign policy could be successfully addressed by ‘seeking to avoid the 
horrors of all-out war by outlining an alternative, in developing a concept 
of limitation that combines fi rmness with moderation, diplomacy can 
once more establish a relationship with force, even in the nuclear age’.15
In terms of geopolitics this essentially implied that while the 
possession of nuclear weapons made the United States and the Soviet 
Union virtually immune to direct nuclear attack from each other, this 
should not allow the US to shrink from contemplating the possibility that 
14 Issacson, Kissinger, 166.
15 Ibid., 167-168.  See also R. Weitz, ‘Henry Kissinger’s Philosophy of 
International Relations’, Diplomacy and Statecraft 2 (1991), 111–113.
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local nuclear war might well erupt. In other words, Europe and the third 
world were fair game for a limited nuclear war.
Of course, Kissinger did not advocate this stand purely, or even 
primarily, because he thought that the United States should be engaging 
in limited nuclear wars around the globe. His point was more nuanced: 
only by embracing a strategic doctrine that assumed a limited nuclear 
war as a realistic option, could the United States derive the necessary 
diplomatic leverage from its military arsenal. In other words, Kissinger’s 
arguments were essentially meant to correct the shortcomings of the 
doctrine of massive retaliation with a limited nuclear war corollary.
The two books that Kissinger published in 1957 had therefore an 
important similarity when it came down to the making of foreign policy: 
both were concerned with the limits imposed upon statesmen by their 
domestic constituencies. Of course, the domestic constituencies facing 
 Castlereagh and  Metternich were far different from the one that the 
American foreign policy elite had to contend with in the 1950s. Yet, even 
in A World Restored Kissinger argued that the ‘acid test of a policy is its 
ability to obtain domestic support’.16 In both books, moreover, Kissinger 
maintained that the greatest threat to truly great statesmanship, states -
manship that could yield signifi cant long-term positive consequen ces, 
came from within, from ‘bureaucratic inertia’17 or from the ‘inherent 
tension between the mode of action of a bureaucracy and the pattern of 
statesmanship.’18
This argument, which Kissinger revisited in his next major work 
Necessity for Choice: Prospects of American Foreign Policy (1960), was 
to remain the key to his foreign policy making. In the end, when looking 
at Kissinger’s modus operandi once he was in a position of power, it 
is this disdain for bureaucracies, which strikes a chord. Metternich and 
Castlereagh may not have been his ‘heroes,’ but Kissinger certainly 
displayed a need to dissect what the prerequisites of and obstacles to 
great statesmanship were. Hence, bureaucracies became an obvious target 
of his antipathy, likely to provide the greatest obstacle for statesmen 
wishing to move towards new territory – towards, that is, new policies 
16 Kissinger, A World Restored, 326.
17 Ibid., 328
18 Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons, 247.
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that were radically different from familiar traditions. For, in his eyes, true 
statesmen were visionaries, they were the ones who needed to act when 
the rest of the society still slept; they were the ones who set the course 
of policy without the benefi t of experience as to what results that policy 
might yield. As he wrote in Nuclear Weapons:
The inclination of a bureaucracy is to deny the possibility of great 
conception by classifying it as ‘unsound,’ ‘risky,’ or other terms 
which testify to a preference for equilibrium over exceptional 
performance. It is no accident that most great statesmen were 
opposed by the ‘experts’ in their foreign offi ces, for the very 
greatness of the statesman’s conception tends to make it inaccessible 
to those whose primary concern is with safety and minimum risk.19
These were words that in large part explain the care that Kissinger took, 
once in power, to insulate himself from the infl uence – and at times advice 
– of the bureaucracy most closely involved in making American foreign 
policy: the State Department. Kissinger was, after all, if not modeling 
himself after  Metternich,  Castlereagh or  Bismarck, obsessed with the 
pursuit and prerequisites of greatness. By 1968 he would fi nd a willing 
accomplice in this task in the newly elected president  Richard Nixon.
AT THE FRINGES OF POWER
In the late 1950s and 1960s, Henry Kissinger’s career took on a new 
mixture of theory and practice. On the one hand, he became a tenured 
Harvard professor who wrote about current issues in US foreign policy 
with particular reference to NATO. On the other, he was itching to be 
a policy maker and was constantly at the fringes of power during the 
 Kennedy and  Johnson administrations. In the end, fortunately for him, he 
did not gain a major position within the inner circles of the democratic 
administrations, perhaps because of his close association with one of the 
republican hopefuls,  Nelson Rockefeller. Hence, by 1968, Kissinger was 
in the unique position of being an academic whose reputation had not 
19 Ibid.
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been ‘tarnished’ by being one of the ‘Best and the Brightest’ who had 
been in charge of American foreign policy during the country’s increasing 
involvement in the Vietnam War. If not completely apolitical, Kissinger 
was at least relatively non-partisan in his quest for power, and found 
himself ready to take advantage of the changes that rocked American 
politics during the last year of Lyndon B. Johnson’s presidency.
Throughout the 1960s Kissinger’s intellectual productivity was 
remarkable. He published constantly in such journals as Foreign Affairs, 
Daedalus, and The Reporter, while writing occasional pieces for the 
New York Times.20 Most importantly for Kissinger’s tenure though, 
he published, in 1960, his third book The Necessity for Choice. Based 
largely on his earlier articles, this work was, as  Walter Isaacson puts 
it, ‘packaged as a coherent approach to foreign policy – and as a job 
application in case the new president decided to seek some fresh thinking 
from Cambridge.’21 Dividing the book to chapters on deterrence, limited 
war, the United States and Europe, negotiations, arms control, the role 
of emerging nations, and the relationship between the policymaker and 
the intellectual, Kissinger clearly, as so many of his ‘class’ at Harvard, 
wanted to be picked as one of the ‘best and the brightest’ in 1961.
So why did Kissinger not become, in the early 1960s, an instrumental 
fi gure among a cast of characters that included a number of Kissinger’s 
earlier benefactors and many of his Harvard colleagues, such as 
 McGeorge Bundy? The answer lay in part in Kissinger’s own writings 
and personality that seemed to clash with that of such ‘action intellectuals’ 
as Bundy,  Robert McNamara or  Walt Rostow. His writings had, for 
one, displayed a strong penchant for realpolitik and a keen interest in 
diplomacy as it was traditionally practiced: through negotiations at the 
highest levels. Moreover, Kissinger was interested in subject matters that 
did not necessarily draw the attention of the Kennedy team – Kissinger 
had little interest in economics, he was not an adept ‘number cruncher’, 
and focused excessively on the Soviet Union and Europe. In contrast, 
20 For example: Kissinger, ‘Arms Control, Inspection and Surprise 
Attack’, Foreign Affairs, July 1960; ‘Limited War: Nuclear or 
Conventional? A Reappraisal’, Daedalus, Fall 1960;  ‘The New Cult of 
Neutralism’, The Reporter 24 November 1960.
21 Isaacson, Kissinger, 105.
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the Kennedy foreign policy team’s key members – Rostow, McNamara 
and Bundy himself – stressed the role of economic aid in countering 
communist threats (witness the Alliance for Progress for Latin America) 
and appeared convinced that the Third World (particularly Southeast 
Asia, but also the Middle East and Africa) was the main arena where 
the Soviet-American confrontation was to be fought in the future. In this 
sense, Kissinger was simply not a good fi t for the  Kennedy administration, 
and, although he acted as a consultant to Bundy’s NSC staff in 1961–62, 
he felt frustrated in ‘offering unwanted advice and infl icting on President 
 Kennedy learned disquisitions about which he could have done nothing 
even in the unlikely event that they aroused his interest.’ To put it another 
way: in the early 1960s Kissinger’s reading of history and current affairs 
did not match with the ‘can-do’ mindset of the Kennedy clan.22
Following the disappointment of his year as an outside consultant to 
the Kennedy White House, Kissinger continued to publish. His major 
work focused still, though, on the Atlantic partnership and the need to 
rethink the American-West European relationship. In 1965, The Troubled 
Partnership: A Reappraisal of the Atlantic Alliance and an edited work 
Problems of National Strategy hit the bookstores, just in time before 
French President  Charles de Gaulle withdrew French troops from NATO’s 
unifi ed military command, and expelled NATO’s headquarters from 
Paris. Not surprisingly, Kissinger called for improving the consultative 
networks within NATO in order to allay some of the complaints of US 
unilateralism that led to de Gaulle’s withdrawal and the biggest crisis for 
NATO’s unity to date. And yet, Kissinger was characteristically skeptical 
about sharing ‘real’ power with allies. To him consultation would work 
best if there were a consensus over alliance goals and policy; this not 
being the case, consultation was unlikely to resolve the differences 
on other than peripheral issues. As he put it in typically Kissingerian 
prose: ‘consultation is least effective when it is most needed: when 
there exist basic differences of assessment or of interest.  It works in 
implementing a consensus rather than creating it’.23 To Kissinger, the 
22 H. Kissinger, White House Years. Boston: Houghton Miffl in 1979, 9. 
23 Cited in G. A. Andrianopoulos, Kissinger and Brzezinski: the NSC and the 
Struggle for Control of US National Security Policy. London: Macmillan 1991, 
96.
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lack of consensus that became so evident when France left NATO, was a 
hindrance to effective and unifi ed western policy, but it was not one that 
could necessarily be solved through consultation. Moreover, Kissinger 
stressed the need for the United States not to allow its allies to minimize 
Washington’s freedom of action. During his years in power, Kissinger’s 
penchant for working unilaterally to set the framework for détente with 
the Soviet Union surely was based in part on these beliefs in the ‘poverty’ 
of multilateral consultation and the need to retain maximum freedom of 
action for the United States.
Without discounting his ideas about the Atlantic alliance, the key 
to Kissinger’s future lay not in his intellectual productivity in the 
1960s. Luckily for him, Kissinger was able to remain at the fringes 
of power throughout the 1960s by, in effect, being connected to both 
sides of the political spectrum. He was clearly rather uninterested in 
domestic political issues that made it probably fairly easy for him to 
be ‘available’ for both democrats and republicans. Thus, throughout 
the 1960s, although Kissinger was unable to gain access to the inner 
circles of either the Kennedy or Johnson administrations, he remained 
connected to both. In April 1965, for example, Kissinger wrote letters 
to McGeorge Bundy supporting Johnson’s decision to send troops 
to Vietnam – on this one he was likely to be, as Bundy noted in his 
reply, ‘somewhat lonely among all our friends at Harvard’.24 From 
October 1965 onwards, Kissinger served as a consultant to the Johnson 
government on its Vietnam policy, participating, among other things, 
in the secret ‘Pennsylvania Negotiations’ in Paris in 1967. While 
these talks eventually collapsed due to North Vietnamese insistence 
on a complete US bombing halt, Kissinger had had his fi rst touch of 
secret diplomacy for which his appetite would later prove insatiable.




While the contacts with the  Kennedy and  Johnson administrations 
kept Kissinger at the outer fringes of power throughout the 
1960s, he had also secured his place as the chief foreign 
policy advisor to one of the richest politicians in America. 
 Nelson Rockefeller was, undoubtedly, Kissinger’s favored choice as 
a future president of the United States, a man, who, Kissinger maintains 
in his memoirs, ‘I am certain would have made a great President’.25 
When  Rockefeller died in 1979, Kissinger dedicated the fi rst volume of 
his memoirs, White House Years, to the memory of his former mentor. 
And yet, it must have been clear to Kissinger by 1968, that the governor 
of New York was unlikely ever to claim the highest prize. Having worked 
for him in the campaigns of 1964 and 1968, Kissinger had certainly 
come to respect the man whom he would later be able to work with, 
as ‘Rocky’ became  Gerald Ford’s Vice President. But there was also 
the realization that as a national campaigner Rockefeller was no match 
for his competitors, be they republican or democrat. While he had the 
fi nancial resources to match any Kennedy campaign, Rockefeller was, 
unfortunately for him, too ‘liberal’ to ever gain the respect of the republican 
right and thus have a realistic chance to gain his party’s nomination.
The man who claimed the republican nomination at the Miami Beach 
convention in August 1968 and went on to win the November elections, 
was one whom Kissinger had told held a ‘dangerous misunderstanding’ 
of foreign policy. As Kissinger told  Emmett Hughes,  Richard Nixon was 
‘of course, a disaster. Now the Republican Party is a disaster. Fortunately, 
he can’t be elected – or the whole country would be a disaster’.26
Three months later Kissinger, for better or worse, joined Richard 
Nixon’s team. Kissinger would now be making history and, later, 
shaping how that history was to be written. It is a story detailed more 
effectively elsewhere. 27 Suffi ce it to say here that Kissinger did put his 
particular ‘lessons of history’ into good use at the very start of the Nixon 
25 Kissinger, White House Years, 5,
26 Isaacson, Kissinger, 128.
27 Most recently, in R. Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger. New York: Harper & Collins 
2007.
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administration. By inauguration day it was clear that foreign policy 
was to be reserved for a few in the know – Kissinger and the president 
being the key makers of policy from the very outset. Everything was 
centralized to the hands of the National Security Advisor (Kissinger). 
What followed was a series of dramatic events – the opening to China, 
détente with the Soviet Union, a tortuous end to the Vietnam War 
– that were at least to an extent a result of the visionary impulse of a 
statesman, seeing ahead of his people. In a sense, Kissinger and Nixon 
practiced the kind of statesmanship Kissinger had described already in 
his Harvard years. No wonder, or so the admirers of Henry Kissinger 
would have it, the man was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1973.
Naturally, not all agree. The annals of Kissingerology remains fi lled 
with angry recriminations of Kissinger’s many failures as a policy maker. 
Whether he is Dr. Kissinger or Mr. Henry is a question that will probably 
never be solved.28 And yet, it is worth asking, by way of conclusion, how 
Kissinger himself has shaped and continues to shape his own history.
As most policymakers he has shown no remorse for miscalculations 
and mistaken policies. His justifi cation has been straightforward: a 
policymaker has to act, a historian is content to observe. Or, in Kissinger’s 
own words, ‘As a historian one has to be conscious of the possibility of 
tragedy.  However, as a statesman, one has the duty to act as if one’s country 
is immortal.  I have acted on the assumption that our problems are soluble’.29 
Perhaps this explains some of the shortcomings of Kissinger’s career 
as a foreign policy practitioner.  He was caught by the moment, cut down 
by the need to ‘do’ something, to ‘solve problems’. A historian and a 
policymaker are, after all, by defi nition two very different creatures; 
the former lives by the ‘long view’, the latter can rarely afford it. 
One example may serve to illustrate the point.  A historian – even an 
amateur one and surely someone as accomplished as Henry Kissinger 
– should have known that the Israeli domination in the Middle East, 
supported by American military aid after the 1967 Six Days War, was not 
a sustainable solution to the complex dynamic of hatreds that had plagued 
28 J. Hanhimäki, ‘”Dr. Kissinger” or “Mr. Henry”: Kissingerology, Thirty Years 
and Counting’, Diplomatic History 27 (2003), 637–676.




the region since the dawn of time. The Syrians and the Egyptians, in 
particular, were far from content to see the Sinai peninsula or the Golan 
Heights remain under Israeli control. To secure a stable Middle East a 
formula for negotiations and compromise – such as the ones pushed 
by the UN or the American Secretary of State  William Rogers – were 
necessary. Instead of pushing for a negotiated solution, Kissinger and 
 Nixon chose to wait and rely on the strong Israeli deterrent to keep peace. 
They were proven dramatically wrong in October 1973. At this point one 
might have expected a change of course, a search for a comprehensive 
multi-party solution to a complex problem. But Kissinger’s response was 
different. He chose to use the opportunity to minimize Soviet infl uence 
in the region by placing the United States – through his personal shuttle 
diplomacy – ate the center of the bilateral deals that eventually resulted 
in several bilateral disengagement agreements (between Israel and Egypt 
on the one hand, and Israel and Syria on the other). This was hardly a 
visionary solution based on a deep understanding of the region’s complex 
history because it ignored dealing with the most vexing of all issues, 
the Palestinians. It is a shortcoming that the United States continues to 
grapple with today. Kissinger’s legacy was, at best, a partial peace.30
This ambiguity can, in fact be applied in a broad sense to Kissinger’s 
uneasy and multifaceted relationship with history. He, as most policymakers 
do, often instrumentalized and used history to prove a point – the Soviets 
could be untrustworthy peace partners in the Middle East but reliable 
negotiators when it came down to nuclear weapons. Kissinger – like any 
memoir-writer – found no fault in his doings; the bete noire was always 
the fi ckle Congress or the untrustworthy foreign leader. And, like so many 
others, Kissinger liked to paint himself as always having been at the 
center of the storm, a stable hand guiding America in treacherous waters. 
In both cases he is now, fi nally, being measured against the abundance 
of documentary evidence that is currently being digested by scholars and 
students keen to fi nd out what the ‘real history’ of Henry Kissinger’s era at 
the helm of American policy was like. The professor-turned-policymaker 
has a secure place in history. But its particular shade will continue to shift.
30 See, for example, Suri, Kissinger, 249–274.
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Forced Democratization?
Some Lessons from Postwar Germany
HEINRICH AUGUST WINKLER
Learning from history is rightly considered a political virtue. Yet not 
every attempt to base political decisions on historical experience bears 
scrutiny. To justify going to war against Iraq in 2003,  George W. Bush 
and American neoconservatives repeatedly invoked the example of 
Germany. They told the world that the ‘re-education’ of the Germans 
following the defeat and occupation of Nazi Germany in 1945 shows 
that the transition from dictatorship to democracy is possible by means 
of external military force.
As President Bush put it in his speech at the Annual Dinner of the 
American Enterprise Institute on February 26, 2003: 
‘We will remain in Iraq as long as necessary, and not a day more. 
America has made and kept this kind of commitment before – in 
the peace that followed a world war. After defeating enemies, we 
did not leave behind occupying armies; we left constitutions and 
parliaments … In societies that once bred fascism and militarism, 
liberty found a permanent home. There was a time when many 
said that the cultures of Japan and Germany were incapable of 
sustaining democratic values. Well, they were wrong.’1
For historians, the alleged parallel between Germany and Iraq poses a 
problem. The same is true for the other parallel, that between Japan and 
Iraq, but this is a topic experts in Japanese history are more qualifi ed to 
1 Offi ce of the White House Press Secretary (eds.), President  Discusses the 




deal with than me. The question to which I would now like to turn is the 
following: Is it really correct to draw such a general conclusion from what
happened in Germany after 1945 as President  Bush and the American 
neoconservatives did? Or was it particular historical conditions that made 
the democratization of Germany – or, more accurately, a part of Germany 
– into a postwar success story?
The democratization of the part of Germany occupied in 1945 by 
American, British, and French troops was not the fi rst attempt to 
introduce Western democracy to Germany. Nor was it the second. The 
fi rst attempt was the Revolution of 1848; it failed because its objective of 
unity in freedom – creating a Germany that was both a nation state and 
a constitutional state – exceeded the capacity of liberal and democratic 
forces at that point in history. The second attempt was the Weimar 
Republic of 1918 to 1933. By the end of the First World War, Germany had 
been a nation state for almost half a century. During that time it had also 
been a constitutional state, albeit one not based on liberal principles. The 
empire created by  Bismarck did not become a parliamentary democracy 
until autumn of 1918, when military defeat was certain. The coinciding 
of democratization and defeat was one of the heaviest psychological 
burdens that the Weimar Republic would have to carry; it was also one of 
the more deep-seated reasons why the fi rst German Republic foundered 
in the storms of world economic crisis and was replaced by a dictatorship 
of extreme nationalism – the so-called Third Reich. 
Traditionally, Germany belonged to the Western world. In the High 
Middle Ages Germany helped implement the most fundamental forms 
of power separation – the separation of spiritual and temporal power as 
well as the separation of princely and corporative power. These were 
the two premodern forms of power separation that constituted the Latin 
West and distinguished it from the Byzantine East. Germany also made 
active, formative contributions to the emancipation movements of the 
early modern period – to humanism, reformation and enlightenment. 
Unlike France and England, however, Germany did not develop into 
a nation state in those centuries. State-building took place at the level 
of the prince-controlled territorial states rather than at the level of the 
Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, which until its dissolution 
in 1806 wanted to be something different and something more than a 
nation state. 
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Germany did not draw the same political consequences from the 
Enlightenment as France, England, and the young United States of 
America. The forces that held power in Germany up until 1918 forcefully 
rejected the ideas of representative democracy. During the First World War 
the intellectual elite polemically contrasted the ‘ideas of 1789’ with the 
‘ideas of 1914’, which held that a strong and just authoritarian state must 
protect Germany’s inward-looking culture, its Kultur der Innerlichkeit, 
from the materialistic civilization of the democratic West, that caused 
historians after 1945 to speak of a ‘German divergence from the West’ 
or a ‘German Sonderweg’.2  Thomas Mann’s 1918 ‘Observations of a 
Non-political Man’ is the classic literary document of German protest 
against Western political culture. Mann soon distanced himself from this 
view, but many of his readers still clung to it, even after the end of the 
monarchy and the introduction of a parliamentary system.3
For all that, the Revolution of 1918 to 1919 did not spell a radical break 
with Germany’s pre-democratic past. The reason for this lay mostly in 
the partial democratization that had already taken place in Germany long 
before 1918. Ever since  Bismarck’s creation of the Kaiserreich in 1871, 
Germany had known a signifi cant aspect of democracy in the form of 
universal male suffrage. It guaranteed German men a right to participate 
in legislation, even if they couldn’t vote for their political leaders. After 
the Kaiserreich collapsed, there was only one way to go – toward more 
democracy: women’s suffrage, the democratization of voting rights 
at the state and local levels, and the consistent implementation of a 
parliamentary government based on majority rule. 
So as we can see, German democratization in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries was non-simultaneous (‘ungleichzeitig’). The 
parliamentarization at the end of the First World War was preceded by 
2 L. Krieger, The German Idea of Freedom. History of a Political Tradition. 
Boston: Beacon Press 1957; B. Faulenbach, Ideologie des deutschen Weges. 
Die deutsche Geschichte in der Historiographie zwischen Kaiserreich und 
Nationalsozialismus. München: C. H. Beck 1980; H. A. Winkler, Der lange Weg 
nach Westen, 2 volumes, München: C. H. Beck 2005–2006, particulary vol. 2, p. 
640ff. English translation: Germany, The Long Road West, 2 volumes, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 2006.
3 T. Mann, ’Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen’, in Gesammelte Werke in 
dreizehn Bänden. Frankfurt/Main: S. Fischer Verlag 1990, Vol. 12, 1–589.
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the earlier introduction of universal male suffrage in the formative period 
of the Kaiserreich. The citizens of the fi rst German democracy were 
accustomed to political participation via elections, not the accountability 
of their leaders to parliament. When the last majority-rule government of 
the Weimar Republic collapsed in the spring of 1930, Germany resorted 
to its ‘back-up constitution’, a half-authoritarian system of emergency 
decrees issued by the Reich President. Starting then, the Reichstag as 
a legislative organ had less of a say than it did during the constitutional 
monarchy of the Kaiserreich. 
It soon became apparent that the wheel of history could not be turned 
back without serious consequences. The deparliamentarization galvanized 
antiparliamentary forces on the right and left. In the Reichstag election of 
July 31, 1932, National Socialists and Communists together received the 
majority of votes and parliamentary seats. The winner of the election was 
 Hitler, who now led Germany’s by far strongest political party. Since 1930 
he had been presenting himself as a champion of the political rights of 
Germans, while at the same time appealing to the widespread resentment 
felt toward Western democracy, which was seen as the political system of 
the victors. In this way Hitler was the politician who benefi ted most from 
the ‘Ungleichzeitigkeit’ (the non-simultaneous or asynchronic character) 
of Germany’s democratization.4 
After coming to power in January 1933, Hitler was able to win the 
support of Germany’s educated classes by cultivating the myth of a new 
thousand-year Reich. In previous years rightwing intellectuals from the 
‘conservative revolution’ had resurrected the idea of a supranational – 
one could even say, God-ordained – German mission, whereby the Reich 
was to become the European Ordnungsmacht and lead the Old Continent 
in its fi ght against Western democracy and Eastern bolshevism. In the 
medieval version of the legend, the Reich’s duty was to stop the rule 
of the Antichrist; Hitler exploited this myth just as much as its older 
version, where the Antichrist was a Jew. Still today, many underestimate 
the extent to which the Third Reich availed itself of political theology. 
The situation in 1945 was almost entirely different than that in 1918. 
After the First World War came neither a societal nor an ethical break 
4 The term “Ungleichzeitigkeit des Gleichzeitigen“ has been coined by the 
German art historian Wilhelm Pinder, Das Problem der Generation in der 
Kunstgeschichte Europas. Berlin: Frankfurter Verlagsanstalt 1928, 1ff.
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with the past. The Kaiserreich’s military leaders, high-level bureaucrats, 
judges, academic teachers, industrialists, and large landowners were able 
to carry over their infl uence safely into the Weimar Republic. Although 
the most important documents implicating the political and military 
leaders of the Kaiserreich had been known since 1919, a self-critical 
examination of the Kriegsschuldfrage – the war-guilt question – did not 
take place. On the contrary: In reaction to the Treaty of Versailles and 
its war-guilt clause stipulated by the Allies emerged the fanciful view 
that Germany did not bear any specifi c responsibility for the war. This 
Kriegsunschuldlegende joined forces with another legend, the notorious 
Dolchstoßlegende – the claim that, by failing to adequately support the 
war, unpatriotic forces at home effectively stabbed fi ghting troops in 
their backs, thus precipitating German defeat. These legends were among 
the most powerful weapons used by rightwing Nationalists to attack the 
Weimar Republic.
After Germany’s unconditional surrender on May 8, 1945, such 
views still found an audience, but that audience represented only a small 
portion of the population. For the vast majority it was evident that Nazi 
Germany had initiated the Second World War, and it was evident that their 
defeat was a result of Allied military supremacy. The Second World War, 
unlike the First, ended with Allied occupation. Except for those areas 
under Polish or Soviet administration, the occupation encompassed all 
of pre-1938 Germany. There were no German representatives who could 
speak for the entire population of the four occupation zones, there were 
no national parties and, most important, there was no German military. 
The leaders of the Third Reich who had survived the Zusammenbruch 
were forced to stand trial at an Allied tribunal. All other Germans had 
to undergo a ‘denazifi cation’ process, in which they were categorized as 
‘offenders’, ‘lesser offenders’, ‘fellow travelers’, or ‘exonerated’. 
One cannot call denazifi cation a success. For one, its implementation 
by the Western occupying powers was inconsistent. Though the British 
and the French were more generous than the Americans, even the 
Americans tempered their judgment during the course of the Cold War. 
In the end, the young Federal Republic of Germany reintegrated most 
of the former Nazis to avoid creating a reservoir for radical rightwing 
protest. Another problem was that many of the reforms introduced by the 
occupying powers did not endure. The liberalization of the crafts code 
(Handwerksordnung) and public service law ordered by the Americans 
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and the British, for example, was either revoked or never went into effect 
to begin with. What is more, while important reforms failed others were 
prevented. The American occupying power rejected the socialization of 
key industries provided for by the constitution of the state of Hessen 
because it ran counter to the principle of free enterprise. 
Of the ‘old elites’ only one group was eliminated completely: the 
aristocratic estate owners east of the Elbe, a group who after 1918 had 
stood in almost unanimous opposition to the fi rst German democracy 
and did much to bring about its downfall. The large landholdings east 
of the Oder-Neisse line fell to Poland; those of northern East Prussia 
went to the Soviet Union. Any estates in the Soviet occupation zone were 
appropriated during the 1945 land ‘reform’, the majority of which were 
then transferred to expelled farmers from Polish or Soviet administered 
areas in the East. For its part, the Western occupation zones had nothing 
comparable with the Junker estates east of the Elbe. The land reform and 
the loss of the eastern territories created a deep caesura in Germany’s 
social history. The powerful elite who had, for centuries, made their mark 
on Germany literally had the ground cut from under them.
The expulsion of the Germans from the eastern provinces of the 
German Reich as well as from Czechoslovakia and Hungary cannot be 
simply characterized as an instance of Soviet or Stalinist methods. It is 
true that the systematic removal of Germans was a logical consequence 
of  Stalin’s plan to annex northern East Prussia and shift the territory of 
Poland toward the West; but it must also be remembered that the United 
States and Great Britain had given their general consent to this radical 
solution at the Yalta Conference in February 1945. In internal talks 
Roosevelt and Churchill based their position on a historical precedent: 
the exchange of minorities between Greece and Turkey stipulated by the 
January 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. 
In the Potsdam Agreement of August 1945 the Soviet Union, the USA, 
and Britain jointly agreed that the transfer of Germans to Germany should 
‘be effected in an orderly and humane manner’.5 Yet the presence of this 
‘saving clause’ had no mitigating effect. By August of 1945, millions of 
Germans had already fl ed, or had been forced, into the four occupation 
zones, and those not yet displaced were afforded no effective protection 
5 The Potsdam Agreement. Selected Documents Concerning the German Question 
1943–1949. Berlin: Staatsverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik 1967, 
53–69.
Forced Democratization? Some Lessons from Postwar Germany
341
by the Potsdam Agreement. The expulsion of Germans in 1945 and after 
amounted to an Allied-sanctioned form of ethnic cleansing. Its deeper 
cause lay of course in Germany: it was  Adolf Hitler’s Third Reich – its 
policies of exploitation and oppression, deportation and genocide – that 
destroyed the basis for peaceful coexistence among Germans and non-
Germans in Eastern Central Europe. 
The Potsdam Agreement sounded clear-cut about the political future 
of occupied Germany, but it wasn’t. The occupation was supposed to 
eliminate German militarism and Nazism and ‘to prepare for the eventual 
reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis and for 
eventual peaceful cooperation in international life by Germany’.6 Yet the 
problem was that the Western powers and the Soviet Union held opposing 
views on democracy. As the Hamburg constitutional jurist  Hans-Peter 
Ipsen put it in 1949, ‘Cuius occupatio, eius constitutio’, or ‘he who 
occupies, his constitution’.7 Ipsen’s formulation – a modern take on the 
policy of ‘cuius regio, eius religio’, famously proclaimed in the 1555 
Peace of Augsburg – concisely captures the difference in development 
between Western and Soviet occupation zones. The Potsdam Agreement 
tried to give the impression of an Allied consensus, yet in reality such a 
consensus did not exist. 
Liberation from Nazi dictatorship did not translate immediately into 
freedom. This applied to divided Europe in general and divided Germany 
in particular. The success of the Western Allies and the American policy 
of democratization in Germany had many causes. The military defeat 
and occupation of Germany allowed for a break in continuity more 
fundamental than the one in 1918. The establishment of a democracy in 
West Germany was also facilitated by the absence of a Junker class. The 
West German society had a stronger bourgeois tradition than society east 
of the Elbe. 
At least as important in establishing democracy in West Germany 
was the change of consciousness among the German people. In October 
1945 the temporary council of the German Protestant Church published 
what is now known as the Stuttgart Declaration of Guilt. One of its key 
sentences reads: ‘By us infi nite wrong was brought over many peoples 
6 Ibid., 58.
7 H. P. Ipsen, ’Das Grundgesetz in seiner Vorläufi gkeit’, in Recht, Staat, 
Wissenschaft 2 (1950), 186f.
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and countries’.8 German Protestantism, particularly German Lutheranism, 
had done much in the past to help solidify the authoritarian state. In 1945 
it showed us another Lutheran tradition: the willingness to confess one’s 
own guilt. 
The Stuttgart Declaration encountered widespread resistance, from 
former Hitler sympathizers as well as from within the Church. The 
declaration, many criticized, appeared to endorse the Allied doctrine of 
German collective guilt. In retrospect, however, this document marked 
the beginning of a long and paradoxical process of rethinking. To borrow 
a term from the philosopher  Hermann Lübbe, a ‘communicative silence’ 
dominated Germany in the 1950s.9 People didn’t speak about what they 
did during the Nazi period; and they said as little as possible about what 
their neighbors did. In 1960 a new generation emerged and treatment 
of the past became increasingly self-critical. Though it confessed 
German guilt, the Stuttgart Declaration did not specifi cally mention the 
extermination of the Jews. Not until after the Historikerstreit – the 1986 
controversy about the uniqueness of the Nazi genocide – did the view of 
the Holocaust as the central event in twentieth-century German history 
become widely accepted. 
The Allied attempt to democratize Germany would hardly have been 
successful had there not been a German attempt three decades earlier. 
Bonn did not become Weimar because it had the chance to learn from 
Weimar. The Western Allies found in Germany an important, albeit small, 
‘back-up army’ of politicians who had experienced the Weimar Republic 
and learned from its mistakes. The fi rst Federal President,  Theodor 
Heuss, belonged to that group, as did the fi rst Federal Chancellor,  Konrad 
Adenauer, and the fi rst postwar leader of German social democracy,  Kurt 
Schumacher. Joining the democrats who had remained during the war 
were returning emigrants likewise shaped by the fi rst German Republic. 
8 A. Boyens, ’Das Stuttgarter Schuldbekenntnis vom 19. Oktober 1945 – 
Entstehung und Bedeutung’, in Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 19 (1971), 
347–397.
9 H. Lübbe, ’Der Nationalsozialismus im politischen Bewußtsein der Gegenwart’, 
in M. Broszat (ed.), Deutschlands Weg in die Diktatur. Internationale Konferenz 
zur nationalsozialistischen Machtübernahme im Reichstagsgebäude zu Berlin. 
Referate und Diskussionen. Ein Protokoll. Berlin: Siedler 1983, 329–349.
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When the Bonn Parliamentary Council drafted the Basic Law for 
the Federal Republic of Germany in 1948 and 1949, they made sure to 
avoid the systematic shortcomings of the Weimar Constitution of 1919. 
The result was a functional representative democracy that took on its 
opponents with foresighted and effective constitutional parameters. 
Never again should a democratically-elected head of state become an 
ersatz-legislator who could deactivate the parliament. Never again 
should a parliament topple the head of government without having to 
elect his successor. Never again should enemies of democracy legally 
seize power. It required the experience of the fi rst democracy and its 
downfall to inoculate the second against such crises. Had the Germans 
not learned from their own history, the Western Allied ‘reeducation’ 
would have failed. 
While West Germany cultivated ‘anti-totalitarian’ principles in re-
action to its recent past, the Soviet occupation zone, later to become the 
German Democratic Republic, had to limit itself to ‘anti-fascist’ tenets. 
The ‘anti-fascist’ position served to legitimate a new dictatorship mainly 
modeled on the Soviet Union. The GDR didn’t receive democratic 
legitimation until much later when, as a result of the ‘peaceful revolution’ 
in the fall of 1989, it received its fi rst and last freely-elected parliament on 
March 18, 1990. The People’s Chamber used its newly won freedom to 
pass a resolution approving GDR’s merger with the Federal Republic of 
Germany. Hence even after 1945 the process of German democratization 
remained non-simultaneous. The Germans who lived in the West 
experienced a second attempt at democracy in the municipal and state 
elections of 1946 and 1947. For the Germans in Soviet-controlled 
territory, the local elections of 1946 were the last elections with any 
degree of freedom. The East Germans did not enjoy a secure democracy 
until four and a half decades later. 
It should not be forgotten that the often-invoked West-German ‘suc-
cess story’ also owed much to the longest sustained period of economic 
growth in the twentieth century, a boom that began in the early 1950s 
and lasted until the middle of the 1960s. In ironic allusion to the Weimar 
Republic, the economic historian Knut Borchardt named the German 
‘economic wonder’ the ‘back-up constitution’ of the second German 
democracy.10 The high rates of growth allowed the swift integration of 
10 Oral contribution of Knut Borchardt to the conference “Die deutsche Staats-
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expellees from the former Eastern provinces and refugees from the GDR; 
they eased the balancing of social and confessional antagonisms; they 
were essential in reducing membership to radical parties on both sides of 
the political spectrum; and they contributed to the transformation of the 
two major democratic parties – fi rst the christian democrats and later the 
social democrats – from sectional parties to people’s parties. 
Without the economic boom,  Adenauer would have had much 
greater diffi culty in garnering majority support for his policy of Western 
integration. The same can be said for the intensely debated issue of 
rearmament. As prosperity increased in West Germany, so did the need 
for security. With regard to external security, this need could only be 
met through close alliance with Western powers. The joint opposition 
to communism and the Soviet Union formed a bridge between West 
Germany and the Western victors. The more the West accepted the 
Federal Republic of Germany as a political partner, the weaker traditional 
German reservations about Western democracy became. 
It helped the Federal Republic’s military integration into the West and 
the consolidation of Western Europe that a conservative democrat like 
Adenauer was their champion; and it helped Adenauer that he didn’t have 
to defend his foreign policy to a radical right, but to a moderate left led by 
the social democrats. The largest opposition party at the time placed more 
emphasis on the reunifi cation of Germany than on the Federal Republic’s 
integration into the West. German politics had, from the perspective of the 
Weimar Republic, reversed themselves. In the fi rst German democracy 
the right was nationalist and the left was internationalist; in Bonn the 
moderate right supported supranational politics while the moderate left 
earned themselves a patriotic image. 
The social democrats came to power only after they accepted the 
political reality of the alliance with the West. The Ostpolitik introduced 
by  Willy Brandt, the fi rst social democratic Federal Chancellor, 
supplemented, rather than neutralized, Adenauer’s Westpolitik. The 
policies of the social-liberal coalition government between 1969 and 
1982 aimed to expand the Federal Republic’s options in the East and 
make the reality of a divided Germany more bearable. Reunifi cation 
remained an offi cial goal of the Federal Republic, yet it was seen as 
krise 1930–1933: Handlungsspielräume und Alternativen“, held at Historisches 
Kolleg, Munich, January 1991.
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unobtainable by most of its citizens and politicians so long as the East-
West opposition continued. Consequently, the Federal Republic no longer 
saw itself as something provisional. In contrast to its early years the 
Federal Republic’s self-image was, as the historian and political scientist 
 Karl Dietrich Bracher wrote in 1976, increasingly that of a ‘post-national 
democracy among nation states’.11 
By the 1980s Western integration had ceased to be a bone of contention 
between political parties in the Federal Republic. Indeed, one witnessed 
the emergence of something like a posthumous  Adenauer left, whose 
intellectual spokesman was the philosopher  Jürgen Habermas. During 
the Historikerstreit Habermas delivered the following verdict: 
The unreserved opening of the Federal Republic to the political 
culture of the West is the major intellectual accomplishment of 
the postwar era, of which my generation in particular can be 
proud… The only patriotism that doesn’t alienate us from the 
West is a constitutional patriotism. Those who want to restore a 
conventional form of German national identity destroy the only 
reliable foundation for our integration into the West.12
Four years later the event took place that no one in the 1980s thought 
possible: After negotiations between the Federal Republic and the GDR 
as well as with the four former occupying forces, Germany was reunifi ed. 
The date October 3, 1990 meant nothing less than the solution to the 
postwar German question. In respect to territory, the Two Plus Four 
Treaty – the legal basis of unifi ed Germany – determined the new Federal 
Republic’s borders, with the Oder-Neisse line stipulated in the Potsdam 
Agreement being a necessary requirement for reunifi cation. In respect 
to European security, the Two Plus Four Treaty sanctioned Germany’s 
membership in NATO. Put differently: The Soviets had accepted a 
solution to the German question on Western terms.
11 K. D. Bracher, Die deutsche Diktatur. Entstehung, Struktur, Folgen des 
Nationalsozialismus, Cologne: Verlag Kiepenheuer & Witsch 1979, 544 
(Epilogue to the 5th edition).
12 J. Habermas, ’Eine Art Schadensabwicklung’, in “Historikerstreit“. Die 
Dokumentation der Kontroverse um die Einzigartigkeit der nationalsozialistischen 
Judenvernichtung, München: Piper 1987, 62–76.
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Yet there is a larger historical context in which October 3, 1990 must 
be seen. The German question of the nineteenth century concerned the 
relationship between unity and freedom. The reunifi cation brought with 
it that which the liberals and democrats had been constantly striving 
toward but had reached neither with the Revolution of 1848 nor with 
the Reichsgründung of 1871: unity in freedom. On the day of German 
reunifi cation, at an offi cial ceremony in the Berlin Philharmonic Hall, 
the then-Federal President  Richard von Weizsäcker summed up the 
historical signifi cance of the reunifi cation in one fi tting sentence: ‘For 
the fi rst time in history the whole of Germany has found a lasting place 
in the company of Western democracy’.13
By way of conclusion, I would like to return to the question with 
which I began: Does the successful postwar democratization of Germany 
(or, more accurately, a part of Germany) allow us to draw the general 
conclusion that a country can be brought from dictatorship to democracy 
by means of external military force? Or should Germany’s success be 
attributed to particular historical factors? My answer, which emerges 
from the material presented in this essay, is as follows:
The Germany of 1945 could only have been liberated from without. 
Yet West Germany was able to make the transition from liberation to 
freedom because it could fall back on and re-establish its own liberal, 
constitutional, and democratic traditions. Culturally, Germany was 
a country of the Old Occident, connected with Western democracies 
through common legal traditions based on the rule of law. Germany 
became a nation state later than France and England and a democracy later 
still, but the liberal forces of the nineteenth century did much to help the 
authoritarian state on its way to becoming a constitutional one.  Bismarck’s 
empire was a constitutional monarchy with all the characteristics of a 
constitutional state, including a parliament of democratically-elected 
representatives. The Weimar Republic – Germany’s fi rst political system 
based on majority-rule – failed not least because it was widely considered 
to be a form of government imposed on Germany by the victors. But the 
Parliamentary Council in Bonn learned its lessons from the shortcomings 
of the Weimar Constitution: the Basic Law it passed in 1949 laid the 
constitutional foundation for the Federal Republic’s success. 
13 Archiv der Gegenwart 6 (1990), 34305f.
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The young democracy of Weimar – whose voters ultimately elected 
parties calling for the abolishment of democracy – taught Germans that 
there is more to democracy than majoritarianism. Democracy also relies 
on a political culture of peaceful dialogue. Along with differences of 
opinion, this means, according to the political scientist  Ernst Fraenkel, 
establishing a basic consensus on values and institutions that are held to 
be worth defending.14 It is for this reason that the Parliamentary Council 
declared the essential provisions of the Basic Law inalienable.
If there is something to be learned from German democratization for 
the democratization of Iraq or other states then it is this: the decisive 
impulses must come from within. The only improvements sustainable 
in the long-run are those that fi nd support in a country’s own past 
experiences. Reforms seen as imposed entirely from without will be 
undone sooner or later. There is nothing that stands more in the way of 
an opening to the political culture of the West than nationalist or religious 
resentment. There is nothing more conducive to such an opening than the 
development of a pluralistic civil society.
Successful democratization is based on societal and cultural 
requirements that cannot be brought about through external force. Those 
who want to help other countries with democratization can at most help 
those countries help themselves. Those who appeal to historical analogies 
often exploit history so that it refl ects their own wishful thinking. By 
invoking the German example of 1945 to justify taking out  Saddam, the 
proponents of the war in Iraq did just that. Without further refl ection, 
they argued that what worked for a Western country with a tradition 
of constitutional government and a developed parliamentary culture 
would also work for a non-Western country that does not know, or only 
barely knows, those traditions. The members of the ‘warring party’, the 
Kriegspartei so to speak, could pursue this line of argument only because 
they refused to acknowledge the historical facts that stood in the way of 
their undertaking. 
Quod erat demonstrandum.
14 E. Fraenkel, ’Strukturdefekte der Demokratie und deren Überwindung’, in: 
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